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From: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	vegard.nossum@oracle.com, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>,
	Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2013 10:55:23 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20131213155523.GC2609@titan.lakedaemon.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20131213130648.GA10870@gmail.com>

On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 02:06:48PM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote:
...
> In future the exploit() code could trigger actual active defensive 
> measures, such as immediately freezing all tasks of that UID and 
> blocking further fork()s/exec()s of that UID.
> 
> Depending on how critical the security of the system is, such active 
> measures might still be a preferable outcome even if there's a chance 
> of false positives. (Such active measures that freeze the UID will 
> also help with forensics, if the attack is indeed real.)

I would recommend adding the CVSS score or some other quantifiable
attribute to the exploit() call, eg:

	exploit("CVE-2011-4330", 72);

Or, optionally, maintaining a lut of CVE -> severity number.  Then the
user can decide how to respond to different levels of exploits.

So, >80 freezes all tasks of the UID, email user
    >30, <80 emails user
    <30 just logs it.

I'm swagging this, my point is the user needs a concrete, configurable
way to be alerted / respond.

thx,

Jason.

  reply	other threads:[~2013-12-13 15:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-12-12 16:52 [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 2/9] exploit: report to audit subsystem when available vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 3/9] hfs: Known exploit detection for CVE-2011-4330 vegard.nossum
2013-12-13  8:00   ` Dan Carpenter
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 4/9] net: Known exploit detection for CVE-2012-2136 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 5/9] hfsplus: Known exploit detection for CVE-2012-2319 vegard.nossum
2013-12-13  1:40   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 11:14   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 6/9] x86: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-0268 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 7/9] drm/i915: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-0913 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 8/9] userns: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-1959 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 9/9] perf: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-2094 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 19:06 ` [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-12 21:13   ` Kees Cook
2013-12-12 23:50     ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-12 23:55       ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 11:10         ` One Thousand Gnomes
2013-12-13 14:21           ` Jiri Kosina
2013-12-13  9:20       ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 22:49         ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 13:06       ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 15:55         ` Jason Cooper [this message]
2013-12-13 23:07         ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13  0:25     ` Dave Jones
2013-12-13  0:45       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-12-13  1:42       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13  1:44         ` Dave Jones
2013-12-13  5:09         ` James Morris
2013-12-13  5:46           ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-13 13:19             ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 10:21           ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 10:31         ` Alexander Holler
2013-12-13 11:48           ` Dan Carpenter
2013-12-13 11:57             ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 13:23             ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 18:00               ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 17:58         ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 18:14           ` Linus Torvalds
2013-12-13 18:37             ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13  5:27     ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-13  9:32       ` Jiri Kosina
2013-12-13 18:07       ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13  9:12     ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 13:27       ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13  8:20   ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-14 23:59   ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 12:54 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-16  5:17 ` Sasha Levin
2013-12-19  6:14 ` David Rientjes

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