From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
vegard.nossum@oracle.com, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>,
Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2013 10:32:16 +0100 (CET) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.00.1312131028400.7125@twin.jikos.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20131213052712.GH23888@thunk.org>
On Fri, 13 Dec 2013, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> I am at least partially sympathetic to the concerns which Greg has
> raised, though. At the very least the exploit() tags should also have
> a date stamp, so it we can automatically scan for exploit tags whose
> time has come and gone.
At least this is a non-issue, if you supply the CVE string (as
Vegard's patchset proposed), as it implicitly contains a year it has been
issued (which seems like sufficient granularity for this kind of
tracking).
> I'm also worried about false positives getting triggered due to
> userspace bugs, corrupted file systems, or other random hardare
> failures. This could be a support headache for distributions, and
> possibly for other kernel support organizations as well. Given that
> attack authors will probably adapt their explots to only try them on
> known RHEL/SLES kernels that have the bug, it wouldn't surprise me if
> enterprise distro's such as Red Hat and SuSE will very likely simply
> not turn on the config option.
I of course can't really now talk officially about what we would do, as no
internal discussion about this has happened, but my gut feeling is that we
will be turning it off, exactly due to the reasons outlined above.
We want to maintain sanity of our support engineers and not let them be
drowned in figuring out these being false positives and then going through
the pain of explaining this to the customer.
--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-12-13 9:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-12-12 16:52 [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 2/9] exploit: report to audit subsystem when available vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 3/9] hfs: Known exploit detection for CVE-2011-4330 vegard.nossum
2013-12-13 8:00 ` Dan Carpenter
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 4/9] net: Known exploit detection for CVE-2012-2136 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 5/9] hfsplus: Known exploit detection for CVE-2012-2319 vegard.nossum
2013-12-13 1:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 11:14 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 6/9] x86: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-0268 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 7/9] drm/i915: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-0913 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 8/9] userns: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-1959 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 9/9] perf: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-2094 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 19:06 ` [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-12 21:13 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-12 23:50 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-12 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 11:10 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2013-12-13 14:21 ` Jiri Kosina
2013-12-13 9:20 ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 22:49 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 13:06 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 15:55 ` Jason Cooper
2013-12-13 23:07 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 0:25 ` Dave Jones
2013-12-13 0:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-12-13 1:42 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 1:44 ` Dave Jones
2013-12-13 5:09 ` James Morris
2013-12-13 5:46 ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-13 13:19 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 10:21 ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 10:31 ` Alexander Holler
2013-12-13 11:48 ` Dan Carpenter
2013-12-13 11:57 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 13:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 18:00 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 17:58 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 18:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-12-13 18:37 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 5:27 ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-13 9:32 ` Jiri Kosina [this message]
2013-12-13 18:07 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 9:12 ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 13:27 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 8:20 ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-14 23:59 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 12:54 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-16 5:17 ` Sasha Levin
2013-12-19 6:14 ` David Rientjes
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