From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>,
Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2013 14:27:53 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20131213132753.GC10981@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <52AACF63.2020004@oracle.com>
* Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> wrote:
> On 12/12/2013 10:13 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> > I like it. I like how lightweight it is, and I like that it can be
> > trivially compiled out. My concerns would be:
> >
> > - how do we avoid bikeshedding about which exploits are "serious
> > enough" to trigger a report?
>
> Well, I've already suggested that only bugs that potentially lead to
> privilege escalation/intrusion (local and remote) would be
> candidates. This probably includes any kind of buffer overflow or
> "wild write" bug.
It's also up to the maintainer of the subsystem, so bikeshedding is
only as effective as the maintainer allows it to be.
> Clearly, a bug should also be present over a complete release cycle
> before it's worth annotating. [...]
Yes, only bugs present in a released kernel are candiates.
> [...] A bug introduced in -rc1 and fixed in -rc5 is NOT a candidate.
That's generally true, except perhaps in the special case if a bug got
backported and released in a stable kernel, and some good exploit got
released for that bug. In that case checking it is useful.
The point is that we want to check things that have a chance to result
in actual messages: i.e. deterministically triggerable bugs in
released kernel that are either trivially exploitable or are known to
be exploited in exploit kits.
Thanks,
Ingo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-12-13 13:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-12-12 16:52 [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 2/9] exploit: report to audit subsystem when available vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 3/9] hfs: Known exploit detection for CVE-2011-4330 vegard.nossum
2013-12-13 8:00 ` Dan Carpenter
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 4/9] net: Known exploit detection for CVE-2012-2136 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 5/9] hfsplus: Known exploit detection for CVE-2012-2319 vegard.nossum
2013-12-13 1:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 11:14 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 6/9] x86: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-0268 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 7/9] drm/i915: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-0913 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 8/9] userns: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-1959 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 9/9] perf: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-2094 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 19:06 ` [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-12 21:13 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-12 23:50 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-12 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 11:10 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2013-12-13 14:21 ` Jiri Kosina
2013-12-13 9:20 ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 22:49 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 13:06 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 15:55 ` Jason Cooper
2013-12-13 23:07 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 0:25 ` Dave Jones
2013-12-13 0:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-12-13 1:42 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 1:44 ` Dave Jones
2013-12-13 5:09 ` James Morris
2013-12-13 5:46 ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-13 13:19 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 10:21 ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 10:31 ` Alexander Holler
2013-12-13 11:48 ` Dan Carpenter
2013-12-13 11:57 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 13:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 18:00 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 17:58 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 18:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-12-13 18:37 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 5:27 ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-13 9:32 ` Jiri Kosina
2013-12-13 18:07 ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 9:12 ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 13:27 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2013-12-13 8:20 ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-14 23:59 ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 12:54 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-16 5:17 ` Sasha Levin
2013-12-19 6:14 ` David Rientjes
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