All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>, "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	vegard.nossum@oracle.com, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>,
	Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>, Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2013 10:14:42 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+55aFxKsaRFR=Tjs9VJfFk3X4USbGWOvNrMg7BQYv7VX28_zQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKOvngwCStCabR7wK0wwcu2H4eTz7=29FbbBWdGpoC78g@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 9:58 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> These locations tend to be very hard to reach accidentally

Not necessarily.

Don't get me wrong - I think that it's a good idea to at least have
the option to complain about certain errors, and leave markers in the
logs about things that look suspicious.

But looking through the recent list of commits that explicitly mention
a CVE, the only one I find where a syslog message would make sense is
the HID validation ones. There, adding a warning about malicious HID
devices sounds like a good idea.

But a *lot* of the rest is just checking ranges or making sure we have
proper string handling etc that just wouldn't be practical to check.
So the error itself may be "hard to reach accidentally", but
*checking* it would be so complex/painful that it would likely just
introduce more room for bugs.

So I think the "WARNING" thing is a good idea, but I think it is a
good idea if it's used very judiciously. IOW, not for "random CVE"
(because quite frankly, most of them seem to be utter shit), but for
serious known issues. And for those issues *only*.

If I start seeing patches adding warnings "just because there's a
CVE", then I'm not in the least interested. But if there is some known
root-kit or similar, then by all means..

                    Linus

  reply	other threads:[~2013-12-13 18:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-12-12 16:52 [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 2/9] exploit: report to audit subsystem when available vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 3/9] hfs: Known exploit detection for CVE-2011-4330 vegard.nossum
2013-12-13  8:00   ` Dan Carpenter
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 4/9] net: Known exploit detection for CVE-2012-2136 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 5/9] hfsplus: Known exploit detection for CVE-2012-2319 vegard.nossum
2013-12-13  1:40   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 11:14   ` One Thousand Gnomes
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 6/9] x86: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-0268 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 7/9] drm/i915: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-0913 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 8/9] userns: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-1959 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 16:52 ` [PATCH 9/9] perf: Known exploit detection for CVE-2013-2094 vegard.nossum
2013-12-12 19:06 ` [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-12 21:13   ` Kees Cook
2013-12-12 23:50     ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-12 23:55       ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 11:10         ` One Thousand Gnomes
2013-12-13 14:21           ` Jiri Kosina
2013-12-13  9:20       ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 22:49         ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 13:06       ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 15:55         ` Jason Cooper
2013-12-13 23:07         ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13  0:25     ` Dave Jones
2013-12-13  0:45       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-12-13  1:42       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13  1:44         ` Dave Jones
2013-12-13  5:09         ` James Morris
2013-12-13  5:46           ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-13 13:19             ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 10:21           ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 10:31         ` Alexander Holler
2013-12-13 11:48           ` Dan Carpenter
2013-12-13 11:57             ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-12-13 13:23             ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13 18:00               ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 17:58         ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13 18:14           ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2013-12-13 18:37             ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13  5:27     ` Theodore Ts'o
2013-12-13  9:32       ` Jiri Kosina
2013-12-13 18:07       ` Kees Cook
2013-12-13  9:12     ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-13 13:27       ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-13  8:20   ` Vegard Nossum
2013-12-14 23:59   ` Ryan Mallon
2013-12-13 12:54 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-12-16  5:17 ` Sasha Levin
2013-12-19  6:14 ` David Rientjes

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to='CA+55aFxKsaRFR=Tjs9VJfFk3X4USbGWOvNrMg7BQYv7VX28_zQ@mail.gmail.com' \
    --to=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=alan@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=dan.carpenter@oracle.com \
    --cc=daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch \
    --cc=davej@redhat.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=james.l.morris@oracle.com \
    --cc=jasowang@redhat.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=mingo@kernel.org \
    --cc=tt.rantala@gmail.com \
    --cc=tytso@mit.edu \
    --cc=vegard.nossum@oracle.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.