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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	tglx@linutronix.de, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/speculation: Support "Enhanced IBRS" on future CPUs
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 10:58:00 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <27c85759-e662-d281-f8a0-0a80ca8ee18f@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1518509708.12890.33.camel@infradead.org>

On 13/02/2018 09:15, David Woodhouse wrote:
>>>  
>>> -		if (!data)
>>> +		if (!data && !spectre_v2_ibrs_all())
>>>  			break;
>> This should check the value of IBRS_ALL in the VM, not in the host.
> No, it's host we want. If IBRS_ALL is set in the host, we set the
> actual hardware MSR once at boot time and never touch it again. The
> SPEC_CTRL MSR we expose to guests is purely a no-op fiction.
> 
> If spectre_v2_ibrs_all() is true then KVM should *never* actually pass
> through or touch the real MSR.

That would be nice but unfortunately it's not possible. :(

The VM might actually not have IBRS_ALL, as usual the reason is
migration compatibility.  In that case, that no-op fiction would be very
slow because the VM will actually do a lot of SPEC_CTRL writes.

So the right logic is:

- if the VM has IBRS_ALL, pass through the MSR when it is zero and
intercept writes when it is one (no writes should happen)

- if the VM doesn't have IBRS_ALL, do as we are doing now, independent
of what the host spectre_v2_ibrs_all() setting is.

Paolo

  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-13  9:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-12 15:27 [PATCH 1/2] x86/speculation: Correct Speculation Control microcode blacklist again David Woodhouse
2018-02-12 15:27 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/speculation: Support "Enhanced IBRS" on future CPUs David Woodhouse
2018-02-13  7:47   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-13  8:12     ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-13  8:02   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-13  8:15     ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-13  9:58       ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2018-02-13 10:21         ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-13 10:36           ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-13 10:41             ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-13 10:53               ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-13 10:55                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-16  9:58               ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-16 10:08                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-16 10:21                   ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-16 11:04                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-16 12:10                       ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-19 23:37                         ` Jon Masters
2018-02-19 23:42                           ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-02-19 23:53                             ` valdis.kletnieks
2018-02-20  0:00                               ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-02-20  0:13                                 ` Alan Cox
2018-02-20  0:43                                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-20  1:03                                     ` Alan Cox
2018-02-20  1:08                                       ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-02-20  8:52                                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-02-20 11:43                                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-20 14:08                                   ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-02-20 14:46                                     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-20 14:59                                       ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-02-20 15:09                                         ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-23 18:12                                       ` Is: RSB Alternative bit in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES Was:Re: " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-02-23 18:18                                         ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-02-15 15:21     ` Pavel Machek
2018-02-13  8:57 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/speculation: Correct Speculation Control microcode blacklist again tip-bot for David Woodhouse

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