From: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
To: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
pair@us.ibm.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com,
brijesh.singh@amd.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, rth@twiddle.net, thuth@redhat.com,
berrange@redhat.com, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
david@redhat.com,
Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, pasic@linux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [for-6.0 v5 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2020 12:43:13 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201217124313.0b321ecf.cohuck@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201217062116.GK310465@yekko.fritz.box>
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On Thu, 17 Dec 2020 17:21:16 +1100
David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 08, 2020 at 01:43:08PM +0100, Cornelia Huck wrote:
> > On Tue, 8 Dec 2020 13:57:28 +1100
> > David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> wrote:
> >
> > > On Fri, Dec 04, 2020 at 02:12:29PM +0100, Cornelia Huck wrote:
> > > > On Fri, 4 Dec 2020 13:07:27 +0000
> > > > "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > * Cornelia Huck (cohuck@redhat.com) wrote:
> > > > > > On Fri, 4 Dec 2020 09:06:50 +0100
> > > > > > Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > On 04.12.20 06:44, David Gibson wrote:
> > > > > > > > A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the
> > > > > > > > hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order
> > > > > > > > to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has
> > > > > > > > its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism
> > > > > > > > to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection
> > > > > > > > level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected
> > > > > > > > execution environment.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each
> > > > > > > > platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem
> > > > > > > > ideal for users, or particularly for management layers.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option
> > > > > > > > "machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other
> > > > > > > > than SEV.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration
> > > > > > > > for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's
> > > > > > > > "memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a
> > > > > > > > "securable-guest-memory" property pointing to a platform specific
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Can we do "securable-guest" ?
> > > > > > > s390x also protects registers and integrity. memory is only one piece
> > > > > > > of the puzzle and what we protect might differ from platform to
> > > > > > > platform.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I agree. Even technologies that currently only do memory encryption may
> > > > > > be enhanced with more protections later.
> > > > >
> > > > > There's already SEV-ES patches onlist for this on the SEV side.
> > > > >
> > > > > <sigh on haggling over the name>
> > > > >
> > > > > Perhaps 'confidential guest' is actually what we need, since the
> > > > > marketing folks seem to have started labelling this whole idea
> > > > > 'confidential computing'.
> > >
> > > That's not a bad idea, much as I usually hate marketing terms. But it
> > > does seem to be becoming a general term for this style of thing, and
> > > it doesn't overlap too badly with other terms ("secure" and
> > > "protected" are also used for hypervisor-from-guest and
> > > guest-from-guest protection).
> > >
> > > > It's more like a 'possibly confidential guest', though.
> > >
> > > Hmm. What about "Confidential Guest Facility" or "Confidential Guest
> > > Mechanism"? The implication being that the facility is there, whether
> > > or not the guest actually uses it.
> > >
> >
> > "Confidential Guest Enablement"? The others generally sound fine to me
> > as well, though; not sure if "Facility" might be a bit confusing, as
> > that term is already a bit overloaded.
>
> Well, "facility" is a bit overloaded, but IMO "enablement" is even
> more so. I think I'll go with "confidential guest support" in the
> next spin.
>
Works for me.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-17 11:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 93+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-12-04 5:44 [for-6.0 v5 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 01/13] qom: Allow optional sugar props David Gibson
2020-12-04 12:57 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-14 21:25 ` Eduardo Habkost
2021-01-11 18:04 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 02/13] securable guest memory: Introduce new securable guest memory base class David Gibson
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 03/13] securable guest memory: Handle memory encryption via interface David Gibson
2020-12-04 13:10 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-08 4:03 ` David Gibson
2021-01-12 3:49 ` David Gibson
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 04/13] securable guest memory: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 05/13] securable guest memory: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2021-01-11 18:09 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 06/13] securable guest memory: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson
2021-01-11 18:13 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-01-12 3:03 ` David Gibson
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 07/13] sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() David Gibson
2020-12-14 16:50 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 08/13] securable guest memory: Introduce sgm "ready" flag David Gibson
2020-12-14 17:00 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17 5:38 ` David Gibson
2020-12-17 11:24 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 09/13] securable guest memory: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code David Gibson
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 10/13] spapr: Add PEF based securable guest memory David Gibson
2021-01-05 23:34 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-08 0:34 ` David Gibson
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration David Gibson
2020-12-14 17:22 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17 5:47 ` David Gibson
2020-12-17 11:38 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17 14:15 ` Greg Kurz
2020-12-18 11:41 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-18 12:08 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-04 7:15 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-04 12:46 ` [EXTERNAL] " Halil Pasic
2021-01-04 18:40 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-05 10:56 ` [EXTERNAL] " Halil Pasic
2021-01-05 20:41 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-11 16:59 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-11 19:58 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-12 8:19 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-12 18:55 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-13 8:06 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-15 18:55 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-19 8:19 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-19 9:59 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-14 11:23 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-13 12:42 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-14 10:28 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14 10:36 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-14 10:52 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14 11:05 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-14 11:45 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-14 11:50 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14 12:20 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-14 14:04 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-14 14:09 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14 14:15 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-14 15:25 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14 15:33 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-15 18:24 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-14 11:25 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-14 23:51 ` David Gibson
2021-01-18 17:39 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-19 8:28 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-19 8:34 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 12/13] securable guest memory: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2020-12-04 8:10 ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-12-04 8:17 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04 8:29 ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-12-04 14:43 ` Halil Pasic
2020-12-08 1:54 ` David Gibson
2020-12-08 8:16 ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-12-08 10:28 ` Halil Pasic
2020-12-08 12:50 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17 5:53 ` David Gibson
2020-12-04 17:04 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04 5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 13/13] s390: Recognize securable-guest-memory option David Gibson
2020-12-15 11:45 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17 5:54 ` David Gibson
2020-12-04 8:06 ` [for-6.0 v5 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models Christian Borntraeger
2020-12-04 13:02 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04 13:07 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-12-04 13:12 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-08 2:57 ` David Gibson
2020-12-08 12:43 ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17 6:21 ` David Gibson
2020-12-17 11:43 ` Cornelia Huck [this message]
2020-12-04 13:25 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-12-04 13:51 ` Halil Pasic
2020-12-08 2:54 ` David Gibson
2020-12-04 9:50 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-12 3:02 ` David Gibson
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