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From: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
To: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>, Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>,
	pair@us.ibm.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, frankja@linux.ibm.com, david@redhat.com,
	mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com,
	David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
	thuth@redhat.com, Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
	Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	dgilbert@redhat.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, rth@twiddle.net,
	berrange@redhat.com, Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
	qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re:  Re: [for-6.0 v5 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2021 09:19:50 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210119091950.4a27a615.cohuck@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210115185514.GB24076@ram-ibm-com.ibm.com>

On Fri, 15 Jan 2021 10:55:14 -0800
Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Jan 13, 2021 at 09:06:29AM +0100, Cornelia Huck wrote:
> > On Tue, 12 Jan 2021 10:55:11 -0800
> > Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> wrote:
> >   
> > > On Tue, Jan 12, 2021 at 09:19:43AM +0100, Cornelia Huck wrote:  
> > > > On Mon, 11 Jan 2021 11:58:30 -0800
> > > > Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> wrote:
> > > >     
> > > > > On Mon, Jan 11, 2021 at 05:59:14PM +0100, Cornelia Huck wrote:    
> > > > > > On Tue, 5 Jan 2021 12:41:25 -0800
> > > > > > Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> wrote:
> > > > > >       
> > > > > > > On Tue, Jan 05, 2021 at 11:56:14AM +0100, Halil Pasic wrote:      
> > > > > > > > On Mon, 4 Jan 2021 10:40:26 -0800
> > > > > > > > Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> wrote:      
> > > > > >       
> > > > > > > > > The main difference between my proposal and the other proposal is...
> > > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > >   In my proposal the guest makes the compatibility decision and acts
> > > > > > > > >   accordingly.  In the other proposal QEMU makes the compatibility
> > > > > > > > >   decision and acts accordingly. I argue that QEMU cannot make a good
> > > > > > > > >   compatibility decision, because it wont know in advance, if the guest
> > > > > > > > >   will or will-not switch-to-secure.
> > > > > > > > >         
> > > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > > You have a point there when you say that QEMU does not know in advance,
> > > > > > > > if the guest will or will-not switch-to-secure. I made that argument
> > > > > > > > regarding VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM (iommu_platform) myself. My idea
> > > > > > > > was to flip that property on demand when the conversion occurs. David
> > > > > > > > explained to me that this is not possible for ppc, and that having the
> > > > > > > > "securable-guest-memory" property (or whatever the name will be)
> > > > > > > > specified is a strong indication, that the VM is intended to be used as
> > > > > > > > a secure VM (thus it is OK to hurt the case where the guest does not
> > > > > > > > try to transition). That argument applies here as well.        
> > > > > > > 
> > > > > > > As suggested by Cornelia Huck, what if QEMU disabled the
> > > > > > > "securable-guest-memory" property if 'must-support-migrate' is enabled?
> > > > > > > Offcourse; this has to be done with a big fat warning stating
> > > > > > > "secure-guest-memory" feature is disabled on the machine.
> > > > > > > Doing so, will continue to support guest that do not try to transition.
> > > > > > > Guest that try to transition will fail and terminate themselves.      
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Just to recap the s390x situation:
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > - We currently offer a cpu feature that indicates secure execution to
> > > > > >   be available to the guest if the host supports it.
> > > > > > - When we introduce the secure object, we still need to support
> > > > > >   previous configurations and continue to offer the cpu feature, even
> > > > > >   if the secure object is not specified.
> > > > > > - As migration is currently not supported for secured guests, we add a
> > > > > >   blocker once the guest actually transitions. That means that
> > > > > >   transition fails if --only-migratable was specified on the command
> > > > > >   line. (Guests not transitioning will obviously not notice anything.)
> > > > > > - With the secure object, we will already fail starting QEMU if
> > > > > >   --only-migratable was specified.
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > My suggestion is now that we don't even offer the cpu feature if
> > > > > > --only-migratable has been specified. For a guest that does not want to
> > > > > > transition to secure mode, nothing changes; a guest that wants to
> > > > > > transition to secure mode will notice that the feature is not available
> > > > > > and fail appropriately (or ultimately, when the ultravisor call fails).      
> > > > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > > On POWER, secure-execution is not **automatically** enabled even when
> > > > > the host supports it.  The feature is enabled only if the secure-object
> > > > > is configured, and the host supports it.    
> > > > 
> > > > Yes, the cpu feature on s390x is simply pre-existing.
> > > >     
> > > > > 
> > > > > However the behavior proposed above will be consistent on POWER and
> > > > > on s390x,  when '--only-migratable' is specified and 'secure-object'
> > > > > is NOT specified.
> > > > > 
> > > > > So I am in agreement till now. 
> > > > > 
> > > > >     
> > > > > > We'd still fail starting QEMU for the secure object + --only-migratable
> > > > > > combination.      
> > > > > 
> > > > > Why fail? 
> > > > > 
> > > > > Instead, print a warning and  disable the secure-object; which will
> > > > > disable your cpu-feature. Guests that do not transition to secure, will
> > > > > continue to operate, and guests that transition to secure, will fail.    
> > > > 
> > > > But that would be consistent with how other non-migratable objects are
> > > > handled, no? It's simply a case of incompatible options on the command
> > > > line.    
> > > 
> > > Actually the two options are inherently NOT incompatible.  Halil also
> > > mentioned this in one of his replies.
> > > 
> > > Its just that the current implementation is lacking, which will be fixed
> > > in the near future. 
> > > 
> > > We can design it upfront, with the assumption that they both are compatible.
> > > In the short term  disable one; preferrably the secure-object, if both 
> > > options are specified. In the long term, remove the restriction, when
> > > the implemetation is complete.  
> > 
> > Can't we simply mark the object as non-migratable now, and then remove
> > that later? I don't see what is so special about it.  
> 
> This is fine too. 
> 
> However I am told that libvirt has some assumptions, where it assumes
> that the VM is guaranteed to be migratable if '--only-migratable' is
> specified. Silently turning off that option can be bad.
> 

I meant "later" as in "when support for live migration has been added".
Mucking around with the options does not sound like a good idea.


  reply	other threads:[~2021-01-19  8:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 93+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-12-04  5:44 [for-6.0 v5 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models David Gibson
2020-12-04  5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 01/13] qom: Allow optional sugar props David Gibson
2020-12-04 12:57   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-14 21:25   ` Eduardo Habkost
2021-01-11 18:04   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-12-04  5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 02/13] securable guest memory: Introduce new securable guest memory base class David Gibson
2020-12-04  5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 03/13] securable guest memory: Handle memory encryption via interface David Gibson
2020-12-04 13:10   ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-08  4:03     ` David Gibson
2021-01-12  3:49     ` David Gibson
2020-12-04  5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 04/13] securable guest memory: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2020-12-04  5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 05/13] securable guest memory: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2021-01-11 18:09   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-12-04  5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 06/13] securable guest memory: Decouple kvm_memcrypt_*() helpers from KVM David Gibson
2021-01-11 18:13   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-01-12  3:03     ` David Gibson
2020-12-04  5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 07/13] sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() David Gibson
2020-12-14 16:50   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04  5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 08/13] securable guest memory: Introduce sgm "ready" flag David Gibson
2020-12-14 17:00   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17  5:38     ` David Gibson
2020-12-17 11:24       ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04  5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 09/13] securable guest memory: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code David Gibson
2020-12-04  5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 10/13] spapr: Add PEF based securable guest memory David Gibson
2021-01-05 23:34   ` Ram Pai
2021-01-08  0:34     ` David Gibson
2020-12-04  5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration David Gibson
2020-12-14 17:22   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17  5:47     ` David Gibson
2020-12-17 11:38       ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17 14:15         ` Greg Kurz
2020-12-18 11:41           ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-18 12:08             ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-04  7:15             ` Ram Pai
2021-01-04 12:46               ` [EXTERNAL] " Halil Pasic
2021-01-04 18:40                 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-05 10:56                   ` [EXTERNAL] " Halil Pasic
2021-01-05 20:41                     ` Ram Pai
2021-01-11 16:59                       ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-11 19:58                         ` Ram Pai
2021-01-12  8:19                           ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-12 18:55                             ` Ram Pai
2021-01-13  8:06                               ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-15 18:55                                 ` Ram Pai
2021-01-19  8:19                                   ` Cornelia Huck [this message]
2021-01-19  9:59                                   ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-14 11:23                           ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-13 12:42                         ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-14 10:28                           ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14 10:36                             ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-14 10:52                               ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14 11:05                                 ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-14 11:45                                   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-14 11:50                                     ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14 12:20                                       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-14 14:04                                         ` Cornelia Huck
2021-01-14 14:09                                           ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14 14:15                                             ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-14 15:25                                               ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-14 15:33                                                 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-15 18:24                               ` Ram Pai
2021-01-14 11:25                           ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-14 23:51                             ` David Gibson
2021-01-18 17:39                               ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-01-19  8:28                                 ` Christian Borntraeger
2021-01-19  8:34                                   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04  5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 12/13] securable guest memory: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2020-12-04  8:10   ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-12-04  8:17     ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04  8:29       ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-12-04 14:43         ` Halil Pasic
2020-12-08  1:54           ` David Gibson
2020-12-08  8:16             ` Christian Borntraeger
2020-12-08 10:28             ` Halil Pasic
2020-12-08 12:50               ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17  5:53                 ` David Gibson
2020-12-04 17:04   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04  5:44 ` [for-6.0 v5 13/13] s390: Recognize securable-guest-memory option David Gibson
2020-12-15 11:45   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17  5:54     ` David Gibson
2020-12-04  8:06 ` [for-6.0 v5 00/13] Generalize memory encryption models Christian Borntraeger
2020-12-04 13:02   ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04 13:07     ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-12-04 13:12       ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-08  2:57         ` David Gibson
2020-12-08 12:43           ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-17  6:21             ` David Gibson
2020-12-17 11:43               ` Cornelia Huck
2020-12-04 13:25       ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-12-04 13:51         ` Halil Pasic
2020-12-08  2:54     ` David Gibson
2020-12-04  9:50 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2021-01-12  3:02   ` David Gibson

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