From: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
Cc: axboe@kernel.dk, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu,
dm-devel@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, snitzer@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
ebiggers@kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-audit@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com,
linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
agk@redhat.com, serge@hallyn.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 00/16] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)
Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2023 16:48:52 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230201004852.GB30104@linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <033335b26f6becdc3dc0325ef926efd94fcc4dda.camel@huaweicloud.com>
On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 03:22:05PM +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> On Mon, 2023-01-30 at 14:57 -0800, Fan Wu wrote:
> > IPE has two known gaps:
> >
> > 1. IPE cannot verify the integrity of anonymous executable memory, such as
> > the trampolines created by gcc closures and libffi (<3.4.2), or JIT'd code.
> > Unfortunately, as this is dynamically generated code, there is no way
> > for IPE to ensure the integrity of this code to form a trust basis. In all
> > cases, the return result for these operations will be whatever the admin
> > configures the DEFAULT action for "EXECUTE".
>
> I think it would be useful to handle special cases, for example you
> could allow a process that created a file with memfd to use it, at the
> condition that nobody else writes it.
>
> This would be required during the boot, otherwise services could fail
> to start (depending on the policy).
>
Thanks for the suggestion. I agree with your opinion and I think supporting
memfd is possible but restricting read/write needs more hooks. We would like
to avoid adding more complexity to this initial posting as necessary.
We will consider this as a future work and will post follow-on patches
in the future.
-Fan
> > 2. IPE cannot verify the integrity of interpreted languages' programs when
> > these scripts invoked via ``<interpreter> <file>``. This is because the
> > way interpreters execute these files, the scripts themselves are not
> > evaluated as executable code through one of IPE's hooks. Interpreters
> > can be enlightened to the usage of IPE by trying to mmap a file into
> > executable memory (+X), after opening the file and responding to the
> > error code appropriately. This also applies to included files, or high
> > value files, such as configuration files of critical system components.
>
> Ok, it is a well known issue. Hopefully, it will be fixed soon.
>
> Roberto
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-01 14:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-30 22:57 [RFC PATCH v9 00/16] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 01/16] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:00 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-06 19:20 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 02/16] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2023-01-31 10:53 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 22:38 ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:02 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-06 20:00 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 19:13 ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 03/16] ipe: add evaluation loop and introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-01-31 10:29 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-01-31 15:49 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-10 23:21 ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 2:33 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-02 19:03 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-10 18:53 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 20:32 ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 04/16] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 05/16] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2023-01-31 10:49 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 19:46 ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:04 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-10 19:10 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 21:45 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-12 23:36 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-13 18:45 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-17 18:06 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-17 20:16 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-17 21:18 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-17 21:31 ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 06/16] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2023-01-31 12:51 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-09 22:42 ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:05 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-10 21:22 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 07/16] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2023-01-31 12:57 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-01-31 17:10 ` Steve Grubb
2023-03-02 19:05 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-16 22:53 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 23:07 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-11 23:21 ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 08/16] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:06 ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 09/16] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2023-01-31 8:53 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-01-31 23:01 ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:07 ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 10/16] dm-verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-01-31 13:22 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 23:26 ` Fan Wu
2023-02-02 8:21 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-07 23:52 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 11/16] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:08 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-16 22:10 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 12/16] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-02-09 3:30 ` Eric Biggers
2023-02-09 22:21 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 13/16] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-01-31 14:00 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 23:50 ` Fan Wu
2023-02-02 9:51 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-08 0:16 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 14/16] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 15/16] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 16/16] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2023-01-31 3:59 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2023-02-02 0:19 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-31 14:22 ` [RFC PATCH v9 00/16] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 0:48 ` Fan Wu [this message]
2023-02-02 10:48 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-08 0:31 ` Fan Wu
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