From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: axboe@kernel.dk, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu,
dm-devel@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, snitzer@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
ebiggers@kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-audit@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com,
linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
agk@redhat.com, serge@hallyn.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 09/16] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2023 14:07:27 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhTiLafboxni2z01mxs=QNZFjgJ7EMJL33RWPpTqJKgfgA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1675119451-23180-10-git-send-email-wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 5:58 PM Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>
> From: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
>
> block_device structures can have valuable security properties,
> based on how they are created, and what subsystem manages them.
>
> By adding LSM storage to this structure, this data can be accessed
> at the LSM layer.
>
> Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
...
> ---
> block/bdev.c | 7 ++++
> include/linux/blk_types.h | 3 ++
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 +++
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 ++++++
> include/linux/security.h | 22 +++++++++++
> security/security.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 6 files changed, 119 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/block/bdev.c b/block/bdev.c
> index edc110d90df4..f8db53b47c00 100644
> --- a/block/bdev.c
> +++ b/block/bdev.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
> #include <linux/pseudo_fs.h>
> #include <linux/uio.h>
> #include <linux/namei.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/part_stat.h>
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> #include <linux/stat.h>
> @@ -396,6 +397,11 @@ static struct inode *bdev_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
> if (!ei)
> return NULL;
> memset(&ei->bdev, 0, sizeof(ei->bdev));
> +
> + if (security_bdev_alloc(&ei->bdev)) {
> + kmem_cache_free(bdev_cachep, ei);
> + return NULL;
> + }
> return &ei->vfs_inode;
> }
>
> @@ -405,6 +411,7 @@ static void bdev_free_inode(struct inode *inode)
>
> free_percpu(bdev->bd_stats);
> kfree(bdev->bd_meta_info);
> + security_bdev_free(bdev);
>
> if (!bdev_is_partition(bdev)) {
> if (bdev->bd_disk && bdev->bd_disk->bdi)
> diff --git a/include/linux/blk_types.h b/include/linux/blk_types.h
> index 99be590f952f..137a04f45c17 100644
> --- a/include/linux/blk_types.h
> +++ b/include/linux/blk_types.h
> @@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ struct block_device {
> #ifdef CONFIG_FAIL_MAKE_REQUEST
> bool bd_make_it_fail;
> #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> + void *security;
> +#endif
> } __randomize_layout;
>
> #define bdev_whole(_bdev) \
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index ed6cb2ac55fa..1f79029c9e28 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -417,3 +417,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
> #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
> +
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bdev_alloc_security, struct block_device *bdev)
> +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bdev_free_security, struct block_device *bdev)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bdev_setsecurity, struct block_device *bdev, const char *name,
> + const void *value, size_t size)
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 0a5ba81f7367..b622ceb57d83 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1618,6 +1618,17 @@
> * @what: kernel feature being accessed.
> * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> *
> + * @bdev_alloc_security:
> + * Initialize the security field inside a block_device structure.
> + *
> + * @bdev_free_security:
> + * Cleanup the security information stored inside a block_device structure.
> + *
> + * @bdev_setsecurity:
> + * Set a security property associated with @name for @bdev with
> + * value @value. @size indicates the size of @value in bytes.
> + * If a @name is not implemented, return -EOPNOTSUPP.
> + *
Just a heads-up that the LSM hook comment blocks are moving to
security/security.c very soon now (if they are not already there by
the time you read this).
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20230217032625.678457-1-paul@paul-moore.com
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index d1571900a8c7..5c81dd3b1350 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2705,6 +2730,51 @@ int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
>
> +int security_bdev_alloc(struct block_device *bdev)
> +{
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + rc = lsm_bdev_alloc(bdev);
> + if (unlikely(rc))
> + return rc;
> +
> + rc = call_int_hook(bdev_alloc_security, 0, bdev);
> + if (unlikely(rc))
> + security_bdev_free(bdev);
> +
> + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(bdev_alloc_security);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_alloc);
> +
> +void security_bdev_free(struct block_device *bdev)
> +{
> + if (!bdev->security)
> + return;
> +
> + call_void_hook(bdev_free_security, bdev);
> +
> + kfree(bdev->security);
> + bdev->security = NULL;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_free);
> +
> +int security_bdev_setsecurity(struct block_device *bdev,
> + const char *name, const void *value,
> + size_t size)
> +{
> + int rc = 0;
> + struct security_hook_list *p;
> +
> + hlist_for_each_entry(p, &security_hook_heads.bdev_setsecurity, list) {
> + rc = p->hook.bdev_setsecurity(bdev, name, value, size);
> + if (rc && rc != -EOPNOTSUPP)
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(bdev_setsecurity);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_setsecurity);
I think we need to see the `security_bdev_setsecurity()` hook actually
used by a caller in this patch.
> #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
> int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
> {
> --
> 2.39.0
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-03-04 20:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-30 22:57 [RFC PATCH v9 00/16] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 01/16] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:00 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-06 19:20 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 02/16] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2023-01-31 10:53 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 22:38 ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:02 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-06 20:00 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 19:13 ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 03/16] ipe: add evaluation loop and introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-01-31 10:29 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-01-31 15:49 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-10 23:21 ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 2:33 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-02 19:03 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-10 18:53 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 20:32 ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 04/16] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 05/16] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2023-01-31 10:49 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 19:46 ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:04 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-10 19:10 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 21:45 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-12 23:36 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-13 18:45 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-17 18:06 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-17 20:16 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-17 21:18 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-17 21:31 ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 06/16] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2023-01-31 12:51 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-09 22:42 ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:05 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-10 21:22 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 07/16] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2023-01-31 12:57 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-01-31 17:10 ` Steve Grubb
2023-03-02 19:05 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-16 22:53 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 23:07 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-11 23:21 ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 08/16] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:06 ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 09/16] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2023-01-31 8:53 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-01-31 23:01 ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:07 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 10/16] dm-verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-01-31 13:22 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 23:26 ` Fan Wu
2023-02-02 8:21 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-07 23:52 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 11/16] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:08 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-16 22:10 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 12/16] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-02-09 3:30 ` Eric Biggers
2023-02-09 22:21 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 13/16] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-01-31 14:00 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 23:50 ` Fan Wu
2023-02-02 9:51 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-08 0:16 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 14/16] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 15/16] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 16/16] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2023-01-31 3:59 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2023-02-02 0:19 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-31 14:22 ` [RFC PATCH v9 00/16] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 0:48 ` Fan Wu
2023-02-02 10:48 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-08 0:31 ` Fan Wu
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