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From: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: axboe@kernel.dk, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	tytso@mit.edu, corbet@lwn.net, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
	Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, snitzer@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	ebiggers@kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-audit@redhat.com,
	linux-block@vger.kernel.org, eparis@redhat.com,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	agk@redhat.com, serge@hallyn.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 07/16] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support
Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2023 15:53:40 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230316225340.GB22567@linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhRqMrTuvVtwzJoK2U=6O1QuaQ8ceA6+qm=6ib0TOUEeSw@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 02:05:33PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 31, 2023 at 12:11???PM Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > Hello,
> >
> > On Monday, January 30, 2023 5:57:22 PM EST Fan Wu wrote:
> > > From: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
> > >
> > > Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails,
> > > allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be notified
> > > of potentially malicious actions on their systens with respect to IPE
> > > itself.
> > >
> > > The new 1420 audit, AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS indicates the result of a policy
> > > evaulation of a resource. The other two events, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
> > > and AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE represent a new policy was loaded into the
> > > kernel and the currently active policy changed, respectively.
> >
> > Typically when you reuse an existing record type, it is expected to maintain
> > the same fields in the same order. Also, it is expect that fields that are
> > common across diferent records have the same meaning. To aid in this, we have
> > a field dictionary here:
> >
> > https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-documentation/blob/main/specs/fields/
> > field-dictionary.csv
> >
> > For example, dev is expected to be 2 hex numbers separated by a colon which
> > are the device major and minor numbers. But down a couple lines from here, we
> > find dev="tmpfs". But isn't that a filesystem type?
> 
> What Steve said.
> 
> I'll also add an administrative note, we just moved upstream Linux
> audit development to a new mailing list, audit@vger.kernel.org, please
> use that in future patch submissions.  As a positive, it's a fully
> open list so you won't run into moderation delays/notifications/etc.
> 
Thanks for the info, I will update the address.

> > > This patch also adds support for success auditing, allowing users to
> > > identify how a resource passed policy. It is recommended to use this
> > > option with caution, as it is quite noisy.
> > >
> > > This patch adds the following audit records:
> > >
> > >   audit: AUDIT1420 path="/tmp/tmpwxmam366/deny/bin/hello" dev="tmpfs"
> > >     ino=72 rule="DEFAULT op=EXECUTE action=DENY"
> >
> > Do we really need to log the whole rule?
> 
> Fan, would it be reasonable to list the properties which caused the
> access denial?  That seems like it might be more helpful than the
> specific rule, or am I missing something?
> 
Audit the whole rule can let the user find the reason of a policy decision.
We need the whole rule because an allow/block is not caused by a specific
property, but the combination of all property conditions in a rule.

We could also add a verbose switch such that we only audit
the whole rule when a user turned the verbose switch on. 

-Fan

> paul-moore.com

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  reply	other threads:[~2023-03-17 15:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-01-30 22:57 [RFC PATCH v9 00/16] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 01/16] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:00   ` Paul Moore
2023-04-06 19:20     ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 02/16] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2023-01-31 10:53   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 22:38     ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:02   ` Paul Moore
2023-04-06 20:00     ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 19:13       ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 03/16] ipe: add evaluation loop and introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-01-31 10:29   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-01-31 15:49   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-10 23:21     ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02  2:33       ` Paul Moore
2023-03-02 19:03   ` Paul Moore
2023-04-10 18:53     ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 20:32       ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 04/16] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 05/16] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2023-01-31 10:49   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 19:46     ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:04   ` Paul Moore
2023-04-10 19:10     ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 21:45       ` Paul Moore
2023-04-12 23:36         ` Fan Wu
2023-04-13 18:45           ` Paul Moore
2023-04-17 18:06             ` Fan Wu
2023-04-17 20:16               ` Paul Moore
2023-04-17 21:18                 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-17 21:31                   ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 06/16] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2023-01-31 12:51   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-09 22:42     ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:05   ` Paul Moore
2023-04-10 21:22     ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 07/16] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2023-01-31 12:57   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-01-31 17:10   ` Steve Grubb
2023-03-02 19:05     ` Paul Moore
2023-03-16 22:53       ` Fan Wu [this message]
2023-04-11 23:07         ` Paul Moore
2023-04-11 23:21       ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 08/16] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:06   ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 09/16] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2023-01-31  8:53   ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-01-31 23:01     ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:07   ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 10/16] dm-verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-01-31 13:22   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 23:26     ` Fan Wu
2023-02-02  8:21       ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-07 23:52         ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 11/16] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:08   ` Paul Moore
2023-03-16 22:10     ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 12/16] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-02-09  3:30   ` Eric Biggers
2023-02-09 22:21     ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 13/16] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-01-31 14:00   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 23:50     ` Fan Wu
2023-02-02  9:51       ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-08  0:16         ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 14/16] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 15/16] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 16/16] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2023-01-31  3:59   ` Bagas Sanjaya
2023-02-02  0:19     ` Fan Wu
2023-01-31 14:22 ` [RFC PATCH v9 00/16] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01  0:48   ` Fan Wu
2023-02-02 10:48     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-08  0:31       ` Fan Wu

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