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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: axboe@kernel.dk, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu,
	dm-devel@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
	Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, snitzer@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	ebiggers@kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-audit@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	agk@redhat.com, serge@hallyn.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 05/16] ipe: add userspace interface
Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2023 17:45:41 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhQDvWDshaZvJrHmjcwyHFxv9oYTN9bn0xiTtFZQRp+GPg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230410191035.GB18827@linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net>

On Mon, Apr 10, 2023 at 3:10 PM Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 02:04:42PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 5:58???PM Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
> > >
> > > As is typical with LSMs, IPE uses securityfs as its interface with
> > > userspace. for a complete list of the interfaces and the respective
> > > inputs/outputs, please see the documentation under
> > > admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
> >
> > ...
> >
> > > ---
> > >  security/ipe/Makefile    |   2 +
> > >  security/ipe/fs.c        | 101 +++++++++
> > >  security/ipe/fs.h        |  17 ++
> > >  security/ipe/ipe.c       |   3 +
> > >  security/ipe/ipe.h       |   2 +
> > >  security/ipe/policy.c    | 135 ++++++++++++
> > >  security/ipe/policy.h    |   7 +
> > >  security/ipe/policy_fs.c | 459 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > >  8 files changed, 726 insertions(+)
> > >  create mode 100644 security/ipe/fs.c
> > >  create mode 100644 security/ipe/fs.h
> > >  create mode 100644 security/ipe/policy_fs.c

...

> > > +/**
> > > + * ipe_update_policy - parse a new policy and replace @old with it.
> > > + * @addr: Supplies a pointer to the i_private for saving policy.
> > > + * @text: Supplies a pointer to the plain text policy.
> > > + * @textlen: Supplies the length of @text.
> > > + * @pkcs7: Supplies a pointer to a buffer containing a pkcs7 message.
> > > + * @pkcs7len: Supplies the length of @pkcs7len.
> > > + *
> > > + * @text/@textlen is mutually exclusive with @pkcs7/@pkcs7len - see
> > > + * ipe_new_policy.
> > > + *
> > > + * Return:
> > > + * * !IS_ERR   - OK
> > > + * * -ENOENT   - Policy doesn't exist
> > > + * * -EINVAL   - New policy is invalid
> > > + */
> > > +struct ipe_policy *ipe_update_policy(struct ipe_policy __rcu **addr,
> > > +                                    const char *text, size_t textlen,
> > > +                                    const char *pkcs7, size_t pkcs7len)
> > > +{
> > > +       int rc = 0;
> > > +       struct ipe_policy *old, *new;
> > > +
> > > +       old = ipe_get_policy_rcu(*addr);
> > > +       if (!old) {
> > > +               rc = -ENOENT;
> > > +               goto err;
> > > +       }
> > > +
> > > +       new = ipe_new_policy(text, textlen, pkcs7, pkcs7len);
> > > +       if (IS_ERR(new)) {
> > > +               rc = PTR_ERR(new);
> > > +               goto err;
> > > +       }
> > > +
> > > +       if (strcmp(new->parsed->name, old->parsed->name)) {
> > > +               rc = -EINVAL;
> > > +               goto err;
> > > +       }
> > > +
> > > +       if (ver_to_u64(old) > ver_to_u64(new)) {
> > > +               rc = -EINVAL;
> > > +               goto err;
> > > +       }
> > > +
> > > +       if (ipe_is_policy_active(old)) {
> >
> > I don't understand the is-active check, you want to make @new the new
> > active policy regardless, right?  Could this is-active check ever be
> > false?
>
> Actually this is needed. Policy updates can be applied to any deployed
> policy, which may be saved in two places: the securityfs file node
> and the ipe_active_policy pointer. To update a policy, this function first
> checks if the policy saved in the securityfs file node is currently active.
> If so, it updates the ipe_active_policy pointer to point to the new policy,
> and finally updates the policy pointer in the securityfs to the new policy.

Ah, okay.  I must have forgotten, or not realized, that multiple
policies could be loaded and not active.

I guess this does make me wonder about keeping a non-active policy
loaded in the kernel, what purpose does that serve?

-- 
paul-moore.com

--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit

  reply	other threads:[~2023-04-12 12:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-01-30 22:57 [RFC PATCH v9 00/16] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 01/16] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:00   ` Paul Moore
2023-04-06 19:20     ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 02/16] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2023-01-31 10:53   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 22:38     ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:02   ` Paul Moore
2023-04-06 20:00     ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 19:13       ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 03/16] ipe: add evaluation loop and introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-01-31 10:29   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-01-31 15:49   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-10 23:21     ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02  2:33       ` Paul Moore
2023-03-02 19:03   ` Paul Moore
2023-04-10 18:53     ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 20:32       ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 04/16] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 05/16] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2023-01-31 10:49   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 19:46     ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:04   ` Paul Moore
2023-04-10 19:10     ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 21:45       ` Paul Moore [this message]
2023-04-12 23:36         ` Fan Wu
2023-04-13 18:45           ` Paul Moore
2023-04-17 18:06             ` Fan Wu
2023-04-17 20:16               ` Paul Moore
2023-04-17 21:18                 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-17 21:31                   ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 06/16] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2023-01-31 12:51   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-09 22:42     ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:05   ` Paul Moore
2023-04-10 21:22     ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 07/16] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2023-01-31 12:57   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-01-31 17:10   ` Steve Grubb
2023-03-02 19:05     ` Paul Moore
2023-03-16 22:53       ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 23:07         ` Paul Moore
2023-04-11 23:21       ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 08/16] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:06   ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 09/16] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2023-01-31  8:53   ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-01-31 23:01     ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:07   ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 10/16] dm-verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-01-31 13:22   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 23:26     ` Fan Wu
2023-02-02  8:21       ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-07 23:52         ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 11/16] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:08   ` Paul Moore
2023-03-16 22:10     ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 12/16] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-02-09  3:30   ` Eric Biggers
2023-02-09 22:21     ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 13/16] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-01-31 14:00   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 23:50     ` Fan Wu
2023-02-02  9:51       ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-08  0:16         ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 14/16] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 15/16] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 16/16] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2023-01-31  3:59   ` Bagas Sanjaya
2023-02-02  0:19     ` Fan Wu
2023-01-31 14:22 ` [RFC PATCH v9 00/16] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01  0:48   ` Fan Wu
2023-02-02 10:48     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-08  0:31       ` Fan Wu

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