From: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: axboe@kernel.dk, linux-block@vger.kernel.org, tytso@mit.edu,
dm-devel@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, snitzer@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
ebiggers@kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-audit@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com,
linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
agk@redhat.com, serge@hallyn.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v9 06/16] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read
Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2023 14:22:27 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230410212227.GC18827@linuxonhyperv3.guj3yctzbm1etfxqx2vob5hsef.xx.internal.cloudapp.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhRX4-=SSAkb0f2722dJ9JGudTyT-B=t8uoRqA8efwcoSg@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 02:05:20PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 30, 2023 at 5:59???PM Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
> >
> > From: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
> >
> > IPE's initial goal is to control both execution and the loading of
> > kernel modules based on the system's definition of trust. It
> > accomplishes this by plugging into the security hooks for
> > bprm_check_security, file_mprotect, mmap_file, kernel_load_data,
> > and kernel_read_data.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
>
> ...
>
> > ---
> > security/ipe/hooks.c | 169 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > security/ipe/hooks.h | 13 ++++
> > security/ipe/ipe.c | 6 ++
> > 3 files changed, 188 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c
> > index 335b773c7ae1..fd5109e29c76 100644
> > --- a/security/ipe/hooks.c
> > +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c
> > @@ -23,3 +23,172 @@ void ipe_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
> > {
> > ipe_invalidate_pinned_sb(mnt_sb);
> > }
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * ipe_bprm_check_security - ipe security hook function for bprm check.
> > + * @bprm: Supplies a pointer to a linux_binprm structure to source the file
> > + * being evaluated.
> > + *
> > + * This LSM hook is called when a binary is loaded through the exec
> > + * family of system calls.
> > + * Return:
> > + * *0 - OK
> > + * *!0 - Error
> > + */
> > +int ipe_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> > +{
> > + struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = { 0 };
> > +
> > + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, bprm->file, ipe_op_exec);
> > + return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * ipe_mmap_file - ipe security hook function for mmap check.
> > + * @f: File being mmap'd. Can be NULL in the case of anonymous memory.
> > + * @reqprot: The requested protection on the mmap, passed from usermode.
> > + * @prot: The effective protection on the mmap, resolved from reqprot and
> > + * system configuration.
> > + * @flags: Unused.
> > + *
> > + * This hook is called when a file is loaded through the mmap
> > + * family of system calls.
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + * * 0 - OK
> > + * * !0 - Error
> > + */
> > +int ipe_mmap_file(struct file *f, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
> > + unsigned long flags)
> > +{
> > + struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = { 0 };
> > +
> > + if (prot & PROT_EXEC || reqprot & PROT_EXEC) {
>
> Is there a reason why you care about @reqprot? It seems like IPE
> would only be interested in the protection flags that the kernel is
> actually using.
>
> I notice that in the `ipe_file_mprotect()` hook you ignore @reqprot,
> which I believe is the right thing to do.
>
Yes I double checked and found that's not necessary, I will remove that.
-Fan
> > + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, f, ipe_op_exec);
> > + return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
> > + }
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * ipe_file_mprotect - ipe security hook function for mprotect check.
> > + * @vma: Existing virtual memory area created by mmap or similar.
> > + * @reqprot: The requested protection on the mmap, passed from usermode.
> > + * @prot: The effective protection on the mmap, resolved from reqprot and
> > + * system configuration.
> > + *
> > + * This LSM hook is called when a mmap'd region of memory is changing
> > + * its protections via mprotect.
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + * * 0 - OK
> > + * * !0 - Error
> > + */
> > +int ipe_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
> > + unsigned long prot)
> > +{
> > + struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = { 0 };
> > +
> > + /* Already Executable */
> > + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
> > + return 0;
> > +
> > + if (prot & PROT_EXEC) {
> > + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, vma->vm_file, ipe_op_exec);
> > + return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
> > + }
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * ipe_kernel_read_file - ipe security hook function for kernel read.
> > + * @file: Supplies a pointer to the file structure being read in from disk.
> > + * @id: Supplies the enumeration identifying the purpose of the read.
> > + * @contents: Unused.
> > + *
> > + * This LSM hook is called when a file is being read in from disk from
> > + * the kernel.
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + * 0 - OK
> > + * !0 - Error
> > + */
> > +int ipe_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
> > + bool contents)
> > +{
> > + enum ipe_op_type op;
> > + struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx;
> > +
> > + switch (id) {
> > + case READING_FIRMWARE:
> > + op = ipe_op_firmware;
> > + break;
> > + case READING_MODULE:
> > + op = ipe_op_kernel_module;
> > + break;
> > + case READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS:
> > + op = ipe_op_kexec_initramfs;
> > + break;
> > + case READING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
> > + op = ipe_op_kexec_image;
> > + break;
> > + case READING_POLICY:
> > + op = ipe_op_ima_policy;
> > + break;
> > + case READING_X509_CERTIFICATE:
> > + op = ipe_op_ima_x509;
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + op = ipe_op_max;
> > + WARN(op == ipe_op_max, "no rule setup for enum %d", id);
> > + }
> > +
> > + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, file, op);
> > + return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * ipe_kernel_load_data - ipe security hook function for kernel load data.
> > + * @id: Supplies the enumeration identifying the purpose of the read.
> > + * @contents: Unused.
> > + *
> > + * This LSM hook is called when a buffer is being read in from disk.
> > + *
> > + * Return:
> > + * * 0 - OK
> > + * * !0 - Error
> > + */
> > +int ipe_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
> > +{
> > + enum ipe_op_type op;
> > + struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = { 0 };
> > +
> > + switch (id) {
> > + case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
> > + op = ipe_op_firmware;
> > + break;
> > + case LOADING_MODULE:
> > + op = ipe_op_kernel_module;
> > + break;
> > + case LOADING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS:
> > + op = ipe_op_kexec_initramfs;
> > + break;
> > + case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
> > + op = ipe_op_kexec_image;
> > + break;
> > + case LOADING_POLICY:
> > + op = ipe_op_ima_policy;
> > + break;
> > + case LOADING_X509_CERTIFICATE:
> > + op = ipe_op_ima_x509;
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + op = ipe_op_max;
> > + WARN(op == ipe_op_max, "no rule setup for enum %d", id);
> > + }
> > +
> > + build_eval_ctx(&ctx, NULL, op);
> > + return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
> > +}
> > diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.h b/security/ipe/hooks.h
> > index 30fe455389bf..857cae69678c 100644
> > --- a/security/ipe/hooks.h
> > +++ b/security/ipe/hooks.h
> > @@ -11,4 +11,17 @@
> >
> > void ipe_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb);
> >
> > +int ipe_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
> > +
> > +int ipe_mmap_file(struct file *f, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
> > + unsigned long flags);
> > +
> > +int ipe_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
> > + unsigned long prot);
> > +
> > +int ipe_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
> > + bool contents);
> > +
> > +int ipe_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
> > +
> > #endif /* IPE_HOOKS_H */
> > diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c
> > index bef923026b50..7af2f942decd 100644
> > --- a/security/ipe/ipe.c
> > +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c
> > @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
> > */
> >
> > #include "ipe.h"
> > +#include "hooks.h"
> >
> > bool ipe_enabled;
> >
> > @@ -12,6 +13,11 @@ static struct lsm_blob_sizes ipe_blobs __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> >
> > static struct security_hook_list ipe_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, ipe_sb_free_security),
> > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, ipe_bprm_check_security),
> > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ipe_mmap_file),
> > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ipe_file_mprotect),
> > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ipe_kernel_read_file),
> > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ipe_kernel_load_data),
> > };
> >
> > /**
> > --
> > 2.39.0
>
> --
> paul-moore.com
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-10 21:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-30 22:57 [RFC PATCH v9 00/16] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 01/16] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:00 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-06 19:20 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 02/16] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2023-01-31 10:53 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 22:38 ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:02 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-06 20:00 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 19:13 ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 03/16] ipe: add evaluation loop and introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-01-31 10:29 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-01-31 15:49 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-10 23:21 ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 2:33 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-02 19:03 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-10 18:53 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 20:32 ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 04/16] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 05/16] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2023-01-31 10:49 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 19:46 ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:04 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-10 19:10 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 21:45 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-12 23:36 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-13 18:45 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-17 18:06 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-17 20:16 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-17 21:18 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-17 21:31 ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 06/16] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2023-01-31 12:51 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-09 22:42 ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:05 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-10 21:22 ` Fan Wu [this message]
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 07/16] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2023-01-31 12:57 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-01-31 17:10 ` Steve Grubb
2023-03-02 19:05 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-16 22:53 ` Fan Wu
2023-04-11 23:07 ` Paul Moore
2023-04-11 23:21 ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 08/16] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:06 ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 09/16] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2023-01-31 8:53 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-01-31 23:01 ` Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:07 ` Paul Moore
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 10/16] dm-verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-01-31 13:22 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 23:26 ` Fan Wu
2023-02-02 8:21 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-07 23:52 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 11/16] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-03-02 19:08 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-16 22:10 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 12/16] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-02-09 3:30 ` Eric Biggers
2023-02-09 22:21 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 13/16] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-01-31 14:00 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 23:50 ` Fan Wu
2023-02-02 9:51 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-08 0:16 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 14/16] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 15/16] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2023-01-30 22:57 ` [RFC PATCH v9 16/16] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2023-01-31 3:59 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2023-02-02 0:19 ` Fan Wu
2023-01-31 14:22 ` [RFC PATCH v9 00/16] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Roberto Sassu
2023-02-01 0:48 ` Fan Wu
2023-02-02 10:48 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-02-08 0:31 ` Fan Wu
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