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From: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 kvm list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,  platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,  linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	 Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	 Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	 Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	 Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	 Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	 Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
	 Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	 Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	 Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
	Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	 Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	tony.luck@intel.com,  npmccallum@redhat.com,
	brijesh.ksingh@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 20/40] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe
Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 06:35:25 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAA03e5FMD8xvvBdf9gqdoR05xF9+scLZBNLpx9iP6WVWK84xdw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210707183616.5620-21-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

On Wed, Jul 7, 2021 at 11:38 AM Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> wrote:
>
> When SEV-SNP is globally enabled on a system, the VMRUN instruction
> performs additional security checks on AVIC backing, VMSA, and VMCB page.
> On a successful VMRUN, these pages are marked "in-use" by the
> hardware in the RMP entry, and any attempt to modify the RMP entry for
> these pages will result in page-fault (RMP violation check).
>
> While performing the RMP check, hardware will try to create a 2MB TLB
> entry for the large page accesses. When it does this, it first reads
> the RMP for the base of 2MB region and verifies that all this memory is
> safe. If AVIC backing, VMSA, and VMCB memory happen to be the base of
> 2MB region, then RMP check will fail because of the "in-use" marking for
> the base entry of this 2MB region.
>
> e.g.
>
> 1. A VMCB was allocated on 2MB-aligned address.
> 2. The VMRUN instruction marks this RMP entry as "in-use".
> 3. Another process allocated some other page of memory that happened to be
>    within the same 2MB region.
> 4. That process tried to write its page using physmap.
>
> If the physmap entry in step #4 uses a large (1G/2M) page, then the
> hardware will attempt to create a 2M TLB entry. The hardware will find
> that the "in-use" bit is set in the RMP entry (because it was a
> VMCB page) and will cause an RMP violation check.
>
> See APM2 section 15.36.12 for more information on VMRUN checks when
> SEV-SNP is globally active.
>
> A generic allocator can return a page which are 2M aligned and will not
> be safe to be used when SEV-SNP is globally enabled. Add a
> snp_safe_alloc_page() helper that can be used for allocating the
> SNP safe memory. The helper allocated 2 pages and splits them into order-1
> allocation. It frees one page and keeps one of the page which is not
> 2M aligned.
>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>

Co-developed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>

The original version of this patch had this tag. I think it got
dropped on accident.

> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  1 +
>  arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c            |  5 ++++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c          | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c          | 16 ++++++++++++++--
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h          |  1 +
>  5 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index 55efbacfc244..188110ab2c02 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -1383,6 +1383,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
>         int (*complete_emulated_msr)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err);
>
>         void (*vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
> +       void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>  };
>
>  struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
> index c0ebef560bd1..d4c77f66d7d5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
> @@ -2441,7 +2441,10 @@ int kvm_create_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int timer_advance_ns)
>
>         vcpu->arch.apic = apic;
>
> -       apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> +       if (kvm_x86_ops.alloc_apic_backing_page)
> +               apic->regs = kvm_x86_ops.alloc_apic_backing_page(vcpu);
> +       else
> +               apic->regs = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
>         if (!apic->regs) {
>                 printk(KERN_ERR "malloc apic regs error for vcpu %x\n",
>                        vcpu->vcpu_id);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index b8505710c36b..411ed72f63af 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -2692,3 +2692,30 @@ void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
>                 break;
>         }
>  }
> +
> +struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +       unsigned long pfn;
> +       struct page *p;
> +
> +       if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
> +               return alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> +
> +       p = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO, 1);
> +       if (!p)
> +               return NULL;
> +
> +       /* split the page order */
> +       split_page(p, 1);
> +
> +       /* Find a non-2M aligned page */
> +       pfn = page_to_pfn(p);
> +       if (IS_ALIGNED(__pfn_to_phys(pfn), PMD_SIZE)) {
> +               pfn++;
> +               __free_page(p);
> +       } else {
> +               __free_page(pfn_to_page(pfn + 1));
> +       }
> +
> +       return pfn_to_page(pfn);
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 2acf187a3100..a7adf6ca1713 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -1336,7 +1336,7 @@ static int svm_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>         svm = to_svm(vcpu);
>
>         err = -ENOMEM;
> -       vmcb01_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> +       vmcb01_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
>         if (!vmcb01_page)
>                 goto out;
>
> @@ -1345,7 +1345,7 @@ static int svm_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>                  * SEV-ES guests require a separate VMSA page used to contain
>                  * the encrypted register state of the guest.
>                  */
> -               vmsa_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> +               vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
>                 if (!vmsa_page)
>                         goto error_free_vmcb_page;
>
> @@ -4439,6 +4439,16 @@ static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
>         return 0;
>  }
>
> +static void *svm_alloc_apic_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +       struct page *page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
> +
> +       if (!page)
> +               return NULL;
> +
> +       return page_address(page);
> +}
> +
>  static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
>         .hardware_unsetup = svm_hardware_teardown,
>         .hardware_enable = svm_hardware_enable,
> @@ -4564,6 +4574,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
>         .complete_emulated_msr = svm_complete_emulated_msr,
>
>         .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
> +
> +       .alloc_apic_backing_page = svm_alloc_apic_backing_page,
>  };
>
>  static struct kvm_x86_init_ops svm_init_ops __initdata = {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 5f874168551b..1175edb02d33 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -554,6 +554,7 @@ void sev_es_create_vcpu(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
>  void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
>  void sev_es_prepare_guest_switch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned int cpu);
>  void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
> +struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>
>  /* vmenter.S */
>
> --
> 2.17.1
>
>

  reply	other threads:[~2021-07-14 13:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 176+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-07-07 18:35 [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 00/40] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 01/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 20:17   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15  7:39     ` Joerg Roedel
2021-07-15 13:42     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-07-15 15:45       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15 17:05         ` Tom Lendacky
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 02/40] KVM: SVM: Provide the Hypervisor Feature support VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 20:37   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-14 21:00     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 03/40] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 04/40] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 21:07   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-14 22:02     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 22:06       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-14 22:11         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 05/40] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Brijesh Singh
2021-07-15 18:37   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15 19:28     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 17:22       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-20 22:06         ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-20 23:10           ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 06/40] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Brijesh Singh
2021-07-12 18:44   ` Peter Gonda
2021-07-12 19:00     ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-15 18:56       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15 19:08         ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-15 19:18           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 07/40] x86/sev: Split the physmap when adding the page in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 22:25   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15 17:05     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-15 17:51       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15 18:14         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-15 18:39           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15 19:38             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-15 22:01               ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15 22:11                 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-30 11:31               ` Vlastimil Babka
2021-07-30 16:10                 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 08/40] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Brijesh Singh
2021-07-15 19:02   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-15 19:16     ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 09/40] x86/fault: Add support to dump RMP entry on fault Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 19:21   ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-08 15:02     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-08 15:30       ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-08 16:48         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-08 16:58           ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-08 17:11             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-08 17:15               ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 10/40] x86/fault: Add support to handle the RMP fault for user address Brijesh Singh
2021-07-08 16:16   ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-12 15:43     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-12 16:00       ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-12 16:11         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-12 16:15           ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-12 16:24             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-12 16:29               ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-12 16:49                 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-15 21:53                   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-30 16:00   ` Vlastimil Babka
2021-07-30 16:31     ` Dave Hansen
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 11/40] crypto:ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 12/40] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 13/40] crypto: ccp: Shutdown SNP firmware on kexec Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 14/40] crypto:ccp: Provide APIs to issue SEV-SNP commands Brijesh Singh
2021-07-08 18:56   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 15/40] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 13:22   ` Marc Orr
2021-07-14 16:45     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 18:14       ` Marc Orr
2021-07-15 23:48   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 12:55     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 15:35       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 15:47         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 16/40] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command " Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 17/40] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 18/40] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 19/40] crypto: ccp: provide APIs to query extended attestation report Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 20/40] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Brijesh Singh
2021-07-14 13:35   ` Marc Orr [this message]
2021-07-14 16:47     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-20 18:02   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-08-03 14:38     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 21/40] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 18:00   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 18:46     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 19:31       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 21:03         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 22/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 19:33   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 21:25     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 20:24       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-07 18:35 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 23/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
2021-07-12 18:45   ` Peter Gonda
2021-07-16 19:43   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 21:42     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 24/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 20:01   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 22:00     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 20:51       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 21:34         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 21:36           ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 25/40] KVM: SVM: Reclaim the guest pages when SEV-SNP VM terminates Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 20:09   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 22:16     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-17  0:46       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 12:55         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 17:18           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 18:34             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 19:03               ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 19:14                 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 19:37                 ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-20 16:40                   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-20 18:23                     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 26/40] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 20:18   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 22:48     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 16:54       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 18:29         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 19:14           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 19:49             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 20:13               ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-21 17:53         ` Marc Orr
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 27/40] KVM: X86: Add kvm_x86_ops to get the max page level for the TDP Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 19:19   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-16 20:41     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-20 19:38       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-20 20:06         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 28/40] KVM: X86: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by SEV Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 18:15   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 29/40] KVM: X86: Introduce kvm_mmu_get_tdp_walk() for SEV-SNP use Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 30/40] KVM: X86: Define new RMP check related #NPF error bits Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 20:22   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-17  0:34     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 31/40] KVM: X86: update page-fault trace to log the 64-bit error code Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 20:25   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-17  0:35     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 32/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 20:45   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-17  0:44     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 20:04       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 33/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 21:00   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 14:19     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 18:55       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 19:15         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-13 16:32         ` Borislav Petkov
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 34/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle " Brijesh Singh
2021-07-16 21:14   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-19 14:24     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 35/40] KVM: Add arch hooks to track the host write to guest memory Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 23:30   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-20 15:15     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 36/40] KVM: X86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Brijesh Singh
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 37/40] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle the RMP nested page fault Brijesh Singh
2021-07-20  0:10   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-20 17:55     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-20 22:31       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-20 23:53         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-21 20:15           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 38/40] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Brijesh Singh
2021-07-19 22:50   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-20 14:37     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-20 16:28       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-20 18:21         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-07-20 22:09           ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 39/40] KVM: SVM: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Brijesh Singh
2021-07-21  0:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-21 16:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-07-07 18:36 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 40/40] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Brijesh Singh
2021-07-21  0:01   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-07-21 17:47     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-07-21 19:52       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-08-20 14:44         ` Tom Lendacky
2021-07-08 15:40 ` [PATCH Part2 RFC v4 00/40] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Dave Hansen

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