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From: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com,
	gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH v10 7/8] IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy
Date: Thu,  7 Jan 2021 20:07:07 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210108040708.8389-8-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210108040708.8389-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>

From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>

Define a new critical data builtin policy to allow measuring
early kernel integrity critical data before a custom IMA policy
is loaded.

Update the documentation on kernel parameters to document
the new critical data builtin policy.

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  5 ++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c             | 12 ++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 526d65d8573a..6034d75c3ca0 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@
 	ima_policy=	[IMA]
 			The builtin policies to load during IMA setup.
 			Format: "tcb | appraise_tcb | secure_boot |
-				 fail_securely"
+				 fail_securely | critical_data"
 
 			The "tcb" policy measures all programs exec'd, files
 			mmap'd for exec, and all files opened with the read
@@ -1765,6 +1765,9 @@
 			filesystems with the SB_I_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE
 			flag.
 
+			The "critical_data" policy measures kernel integrity
+			critical data.
+
 	ima_tcb		[IMA] Deprecated.  Use ima_policy= instead.
 			Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted
 			Computing Base.  This means IMA will measure all
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 2c9db2d0b434..9b45d064a87d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -206,6 +206,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
 };
 
+static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = CRITICAL_DATA, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+};
+
 /* An array of architecture specific rules */
 static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init;
 
@@ -228,6 +232,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
 
 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
 static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata;
+static bool ima_use_critical_data __initdata;
 static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init;
 static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
 {
@@ -242,6 +247,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
 			ima_use_appraise_tcb = true;
 		else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0)
 			ima_use_secure_boot = true;
+		else if (strcmp(p, "critical_data") == 0)
+			ima_use_critical_data = true;
 		else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0)
 			ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true;
 		else
@@ -871,6 +878,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 			  ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules),
 			  IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
 
+	if (ima_use_critical_data)
+		add_rules(critical_data_rules,
+			  ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules),
+			  IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+
 	ima_update_policy_flag();
 }
 
-- 
2.17.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-01-08  4:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-08  4:07 [PATCH v10 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08  4:07 ` [PATCH v10 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08  4:07 ` [PATCH v10 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08  4:07 ` [PATCH v10 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08  4:07 ` [PATCH v10 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure " Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08  4:07 ` [PATCH v10 5/8] IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-14  2:09   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-14 17:57     ` Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08  4:07 ` [PATCH v10 6/8] IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the " Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08  4:07 ` Tushar Sugandhi [this message]
2021-01-08  4:07 ` [PATCH v10 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-12 16:27   ` Paul Moore
2021-01-12 18:25     ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2021-01-13 19:13     ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-13 19:19       ` Paul Moore
2021-01-13 21:11         ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-13 22:10           ` Paul Moore
2021-01-13 23:10             ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-14  2:40               ` Paul Moore
2021-01-14  2:49                 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-14 16:22                   ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2021-01-14 16:44                     ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-14 16:50                       ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-14 17:48                         ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2021-01-14 19:21                           ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2021-01-14 16:51                       ` Paul Moore
2021-01-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v10 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Mimi Zohar
2021-01-15 17:26   ` Tushar Sugandhi

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