From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>,
stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com,
paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org,
jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 07:54:42 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5189c15054885863b1b5cb86a43bec09725d8650.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210108040708.8389-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
On Thu, 2021-01-07 at 20:07 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
> IMA measures files and buffer data such as keys, command-line arguments
> passed to the kernel on kexec system call, etc. While these measurements
> are necessary for monitoring and validating the integrity of the system,
> they are not sufficient. Various data structures, policies, and states
> stored in kernel memory also impact the integrity of the system.
> Several kernel subsystems contain such integrity critical data -
> e.g. LSMs like SELinux, AppArmor etc. or device-mapper targets like
> dm-crypt, dm-verity, dm-integrity etc. These kernel subsystems help
> protect the integrity of a system. Their integrity critical data is not
> expected to change frequently during run-time. Some of these structures
> cannot be defined as __ro_after_init, because they are initialized later.
>
> For a given system, various external services/infrastructure tools
> (including the attestation service) interact with it - both during the
> setup and during rest of the system run-time. They share sensitive data
> and/or execute critical workload on that system. The external services
> may want to verify the current run-time state of the relevant kernel
> subsystems before fully trusting the system with business critical
> data/workload. For instance, verifying that SELinux is in "enforce" mode
> along with the expected policy, disks are encrypted with a certain
> configuration, secure boot is enabled etc.
>
> This series provides the necessary IMA functionality for kernel
> subsystems to ensure their configuration can be measured:
> - by kernel subsystems themselves,
> - in a tamper resistant way,
> - and re-measured - triggered on state/configuration change.
>
> This patch set:
> - defines a new IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() to measure
> integrity critical data,
> - limits the critical data being measured based on a label,
> - defines a builtin critical data measurement policy,
> - and includes an SELinux consumer of the new IMA critical data hook.
Thanks Tushar, Lakshmi. This patch set is queued in the next-
integrity-testing branch.
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-15 12:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-08 4:07 [PATCH v10 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08 4:07 ` [PATCH v10 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08 4:07 ` [PATCH v10 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08 4:07 ` [PATCH v10 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08 4:07 ` [PATCH v10 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure " Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08 4:07 ` [PATCH v10 5/8] IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-14 2:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-14 17:57 ` Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08 4:07 ` [PATCH v10 6/8] IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the " Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08 4:07 ` [PATCH v10 7/8] IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08 4:07 ` [PATCH v10 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-12 16:27 ` Paul Moore
2021-01-12 18:25 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2021-01-13 19:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-13 19:19 ` Paul Moore
2021-01-13 21:11 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-13 22:10 ` Paul Moore
2021-01-13 23:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-14 2:40 ` Paul Moore
2021-01-14 2:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-14 16:22 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2021-01-14 16:44 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-14 16:50 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-14 17:48 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2021-01-14 19:21 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2021-01-14 16:51 ` Paul Moore
2021-01-15 12:54 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2021-01-15 17:26 ` [PATCH v10 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi
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