From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com,
gmazyland@gmail.com, tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com,
sashal@kernel.org, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 08:22:44 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fc80b1a1-ff4d-3bf2-59bd-2cb56135bf0f@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3746bc7673df25354411151442a7772b867be396.camel@linux.ibm.com>
On 1/13/21 6:49 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
Hi Mimi,
>>>>>>>> I remain concerned about the possibility of bypassing a measurement by
>>>>>>>> tampering with the time, but I appear to be the only one who is
>>>>>>>> worried about this so I'm not going to block this patch on those
>>>>>>>> grounds.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks, Paul.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Including any unique string would cause the buffer hash to change,
>>>>>>> forcing a new measurement. Perhaps they were concerned with
>>>>>>> overflowing a counter.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> My understanding is that Lakshmi wanted to force a new measurement
>>>>>> each time and felt using a timestamp would be the best way to do that.
>>>>>> A counter, even if it wraps, would have a different value each time
>>>>>> whereas a timestamp is vulnerable to time adjustments. While a
>>>>>> properly controlled and audited system could be configured and
>>>>>> monitored to detect such an event (I *think*), why rely on that if it
>>>>>> isn't necessary?
>>>>>
>>>>> Why are you saying that even if the counter wraps a new measurement is
>>>>> guaranteed. I agree with the rest of what you said.
>>>>
>>>> I was assuming that the IMA code simply compares the passed
>>>> "policy_event_name" value to the previous value, if they are different
>>>> a new measurement is taken, if they are the same the measurement
>>>> request is ignored. If this is the case the counter value is only
>>>> important in as much as that it is different from the previous value,
>>>> even simply toggling a single bit back and forth would suffice in this
>>>> case. IMA doesn't keep a record of every previous "policy_event_name"
>>>> value does it? Am I misunderstanding how
>>>> ima_measure_critical_data(...) works?
>>>
>>> Originally, there was quite a bit of discussion as to how much or how
>>> little should be measured for a number of reasons. One reason is that
>>> the TPM is relatively slow. Another reason is to limit the size of the
>>> measurement list. For this reason, duplicate hashes aren't added to
>>> the measurement list or extended into the TPM.
>>>
>>> When a dentry is removed from cache, its also removed from IMA's iint
>>> cache. A subsequent file read would result in adding the measurement
>>> and extending the TPM again. ima_lookup_digest_entry() is called to
>>> prevent adding the duplicate entry.
>>>
>>> Lakshmi is trying to address the situation where an event changes a
>>> value, but then is restored to the original value. The original and
>>> subsequent events are measured, but restoring to the original value
>>> isn't re-measured. This isn't any different than when a file is
>>> modified and then reverted.
>>>
>>> Instead of changing the name like this, which doesn't work for files,
>>> allowing duplicate measurements should be generic, based on policy.
>>
>> Perhaps it is just the end of the day and I'm a bit tired, but I just
>> read all of the above and I have no idea what your current thoughts
>> are regarding this patch.
>
> Other than appending the timestamp, which is a hack, the patch is fine.
> Support for re-measuring an event can be upstreamed independently.
>
Thanks for clarifying the details related to duplicate measurement
detection and re-measuring.
I will keep the timestamp for the time being, even though its a hack, as
it helps with re-measuring state changes in SELinux. We will add support
for "policy driven" re-measurement as a subsequent patch series.
thanks,
-lakshmi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-14 16:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-08 4:07 [PATCH v10 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08 4:07 ` [PATCH v10 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08 4:07 ` [PATCH v10 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08 4:07 ` [PATCH v10 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08 4:07 ` [PATCH v10 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure " Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08 4:07 ` [PATCH v10 5/8] IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-14 2:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-14 17:57 ` Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08 4:07 ` [PATCH v10 6/8] IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the " Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08 4:07 ` [PATCH v10 7/8] IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-08 4:07 ` [PATCH v10 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook Tushar Sugandhi
2021-01-12 16:27 ` Paul Moore
2021-01-12 18:25 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2021-01-13 19:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-13 19:19 ` Paul Moore
2021-01-13 21:11 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-13 22:10 ` Paul Moore
2021-01-13 23:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-14 2:40 ` Paul Moore
2021-01-14 2:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-14 16:22 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian [this message]
2021-01-14 16:44 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-14 16:50 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-14 17:48 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2021-01-14 19:21 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2021-01-14 16:51 ` Paul Moore
2021-01-15 12:54 ` [PATCH v10 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Mimi Zohar
2021-01-15 17:26 ` Tushar Sugandhi
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