From: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
To: "Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@nxp.com>,
"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
"Aymen Sghaier" <aymen.sghaier@nxp.com>,
"Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"James Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "kernel@pengutronix.de" <kernel@pengutronix.de>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Steffen Trumtrar <s.trumtrar@pengutronix.de>,
Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@nxp.com>,
Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@pengutronix.de>,
David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>,
Franck Lenormand <franck.lenormand@nxp.com>,
Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
"linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
"keyrings@vger.kernel.org" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys
Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2021 17:37:17 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a07e5544-1e62-a8da-485e-6fcafd16bab9@pengutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f0f43b30-3dfb-c2a0-7f69-6e5488f871cd@nxp.com>
Hello Horia,
On 21.03.21 21:01, Horia Geantă wrote:
>> - [RFC] drivers: crypto: caam: key: Add caam_tk key type
>> Franck added[3] a new "caam_tk" key type based on Udit's work. The key
>> material stays within the kernel only, but can optionally be user-set
>> instead of coming from RNG. James voiced the opinion that there should
>> be just one user-facing generic wrap/unwrap key type with multiple
>> possible handlers. David suggested trusted keys.
>>
> The whole point was to use caam "black blobs", with the main advantage of
> keys being kept encrypted in memory after "unsealing" the blobs.
> (Keys in blobs are encrypted with a persistent BKEK - blob KEK, derived from
> fuse-based OTPMK. OTOH black keys are keys encrypted with an ephemeral, random
> KEK that is stored in an internal caam register. When a black blob is unsealed,
> the key is practically rekeyed, the random key replacing the BKEK; key is never
> exposed in plaintext, rekeying happens in caam).
>
> Current implementation uses "red blobs", which means keys are left unprotected
> in memory after blobs are unsealed.
Oh. I will reread the series when sending the v2 cover letter. Thanks for spotting.
(Sorry for the noise, missed this question first time)
>> - Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
>> Sumit reworked[4] trusted keys to support multiple possible backends with
>> one chosen at boot time and added a new TEE backend along with TPM.
>> This now sits in Jarkko's master branch to be sent out for v5.13
>>
>> This patch series builds on top of Sumit's rework to have the CAAM as yet another
>> trusted key backend.
>>
> Shouldn't the description under TRUSTED_KEYS (in security/keys/Kconfig)
> be updated to reflect the availability of multiple backends?
>
> Thanks,
> Horia
>
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-03-23 16:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-03-16 17:01 [PATCH v1 0/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-16 17:01 ` [PATCH v1 1/3] crypto: caam - add in-kernel interface for blob generator Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-21 20:46 ` Horia Geantă
2021-03-23 16:41 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-16 17:01 ` [PATCH v1 2/3] KEYS: trusted: implement fallback to kernel RNG Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-16 17:01 ` [PATCH v1 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-16 19:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-03-17 13:58 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-16 23:14 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-17 7:39 ` Sumit Garg
2021-03-17 8:07 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-17 14:02 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-30 21:28 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-21 20:48 ` Horia Geantă
2021-03-23 16:35 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-23 18:07 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-03-24 9:26 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-24 10:47 ` Sumit Garg
2021-03-24 14:07 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-25 5:26 ` Sumit Garg
2021-03-27 12:41 ` David Gstir
2021-03-28 20:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-03-29 10:11 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-31 23:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-03-30 7:26 ` Sumit Garg
2021-03-31 23:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-04-01 7:41 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-30 21:47 ` Eric Biggers
2021-03-31 23:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-03-31 23:34 ` Eric Biggers
2021-04-01 1:11 ` Herbert Xu
2021-04-01 5:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-04-01 6:03 ` Eric Biggers
2021-04-01 5:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-03-24 16:14 ` James Bottomley
2021-03-24 20:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2021-03-24 21:58 ` James Bottomley
2021-04-02 1:49 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2021-03-31 18:35 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 10:15 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 10:23 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-16 23:10 ` [PATCH v1 0/3] " Richard Weinberger
2021-03-17 14:08 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-30 21:50 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 10:04 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 10:20 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 10:28 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 10:53 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 10:57 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 11:05 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 11:13 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 11:16 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-30 22:04 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-30 22:16 ` James Bottomley
2021-03-31 18:36 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-03-31 18:49 ` James Bottomley
2021-03-31 19:36 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 10:06 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 13:20 ` Sumit Garg
2021-04-01 18:26 ` James Bottomley
2021-04-01 12:55 ` Sumit Garg
2021-04-01 13:17 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 13:30 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-04-01 13:52 ` Sumit Garg
2021-04-01 13:59 ` Richard Weinberger
2021-04-01 14:12 ` Sumit Garg
2021-04-01 11:11 ` David Howells
2021-03-21 20:01 ` Horia Geantă
2021-03-23 16:34 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2021-03-24 6:23 ` Sumit Garg
2021-03-23 16:37 ` Ahmad Fatoum [this message]
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