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From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>,
	Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>,
	"Michael Roth" <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>,
	Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>,
	Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>,
	David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/16] KVM: x86/mmu: WARN if upper 32 bits of legacy #PF error code are non-zero
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2024 11:11:57 +1300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3779953f-4d07-41d7-b450-bbc2afffaa43@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240228024147.41573-7-seanjc@google.com>



On 28/02/2024 3:41 pm, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> WARN if bits 63:32 are non-zero when handling an intercepted legacy #PF,

I found "legacy #PF" is a little bit confusing but I couldn't figure out 
a better name either :-)

> as the error code for #PF is limited to 32 bits (and in practice, 16 bits
> on Intel CPUS).  This behavior is architectural, is part of KVM's ABI
> (see kvm_vcpu_events.error_code), and is explicitly documented as being
> preserved for intecerpted #PF in both the APM:
> 
>    The error code saved in EXITINFO1 is the same as would be pushed onto
>    the stack by a non-intercepted #PF exception in protected mode.
> 
> and even more explicitly in the SDM as VMCS.VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE is a
> 32-bit field.
> 
> Simply drop the upper bits of hardware provides garbage, as spurious

"of" -> "if" ?

> information should do no harm (though in all likelihood hardware is buggy
> and the kernel is doomed).
> 
> Handling all upper 32 bits in the #PF path will allow moving the sanity
> check on synthetic checks from kvm_mmu_page_fault() to npf_interception(),
> which in turn will allow deriving PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS from AMD's
> PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK without running afoul of the sanity check.
> 
> Note, this also why Intel uses bit 15 for SGX (highest bit on Intel CPUs)

"this" -> "this is" ?

> and AMD uses bit 31 for RMP (highest bit on AMD CPUs); using the highest
> bit minimizes the probability of a collision with the "other" vendor,
> without needing to plumb more bits through microcode.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 7 +++++++
>   1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index 7807bdcd87e8..5d892bd59c97 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -4553,6 +4553,13 @@ int kvm_handle_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 error_code,
>   	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(fault_address >> 32))
>   		return -EFAULT;
>   #endif
> +	/*
> +	 * Legacy #PF exception only have a 32-bit error code.  Simply drop the

"have" -> "has" ?

> +	 * upper bits as KVM doesn't use them for #PF (because they are never
> +	 * set), and to ensure there are no collisions with KVM-defined bits.
> +	 */
> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(error_code >> 32))
> +		error_code = lower_32_bits(error_code);
>   
>   	vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
>   	if (!flags) {
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>

  reply	other threads:[~2024-02-29 22:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 83+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-28  2:41 [PATCH 00/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Page fault and MMIO cleanups Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 01/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Exit to userspace with -EFAULT if private fault hits emulation Sean Christopherson
2024-03-01  8:48   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-07 12:52   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-03-12  2:59     ` Binbin Wu
2024-04-04 16:38       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-08  4:22   ` Yan Zhao
2024-04-04 16:45     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 02/16] KVM: x86: Remove separate "bit" defines for page fault error code masks Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 12:44   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-29 18:40     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 20:56       ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-29 13:43   ` Dongli Zhang
2024-02-29 15:25     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 03/16] KVM: x86: Define more SEV+ page fault error bits/flags for #NPF Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  4:43   ` Dongli Zhang
2024-02-28 16:16     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 04/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Pass full 64-bit error code when handling page faults Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  7:30   ` Dongli Zhang
2024-02-28 16:22     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 13:32       ` Dongli Zhang
2024-03-05  3:55   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 05/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Use synthetic page fault error code to indicate private faults Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 11:16   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-29 15:17     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06  9:43   ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-06 14:45     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  9:05       ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-07 14:36         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-12  5:34   ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 06/16] KVM: x86/mmu: WARN if upper 32 bits of legacy #PF error code are non-zero Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 22:11   ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2024-02-29 23:07     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-12  5:44       ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 07/16] KVM: x86: Move synthetic PFERR_* sanity checks to SVM's #NPF handler Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 22:19   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-29 22:52     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 23:14       ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-12  9:44   ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 08/16] KVM: x86/mmu: WARN and skip MMIO cache on private, reserved page faults Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 22:26   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-29 23:06     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 23:21       ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-04 15:51         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-05 21:32           ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06  0:25             ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 09/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Move private vs. shared check above slot validity checks Sean Christopherson
2024-03-05 23:06   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06  0:38     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06  1:22       ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06  2:02         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06 22:06           ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06 23:49             ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:28               ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-08  4:54   ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-08 23:28     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-11  4:43       ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-12  0:08         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 10/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Don't force emulation of L2 accesses to non-APIC internal slots Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:03   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 11/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Explicitly disallow private accesses to emulated MMIO Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06 22:35   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06 22:43     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06 22:49       ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06 23:01         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06 23:20           ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-07 17:10         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-08  0:09           ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 12/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Move slot checks from __kvm_faultin_pfn() to kvm_faultin_pfn() Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:11   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 13/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Handle no-slot faults at the beginning of kvm_faultin_pfn() Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:48   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-07  0:53     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 14/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Set kvm_page_fault.hva to KVM_HVA_ERR_BAD for "no slot" faults Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:50   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-07  1:01     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 15/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Initialize kvm_page_fault's pfn and hva to error values Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:46   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 16/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Sanity check that __kvm_faultin_pfn() doesn't create noslot pfns Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:46   ` Huang, Kai
2024-04-17 12:48 ` [PATCH 00/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Page fault and MMIO cleanups Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-18 15:40   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-19  6:47   ` Xiaoyao Li

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