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From: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>,
	Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>,
	Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>,
	"David Matlack" <dmatlack@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Exit to userspace with -EFAULT if private fault hits emulation
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2024 12:22:53 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZeqSncClqOQqCO41@yzhao56-desk.sh.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240228024147.41573-2-seanjc@google.com>

On Tue, Feb 27, 2024 at 06:41:32PM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Exit to userspace with -EFAULT / KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT if a private fault
> triggers emulation of any kind, as KVM doesn't currently support emulating
> access to guest private memory.  Practically speaking, private faults and
> emulation are already mutually exclusive, but there are edge cases upon
> edge cases where KVM can return RET_PF_EMULATE, and adding one last check
> to harden against weird, unexpected combinations is inexpensive.
> 
> Suggested-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c          |  8 --------
>  arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 13 +++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> index e4cc7f764980..e2fd74e06ff8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> @@ -4309,14 +4309,6 @@ static inline u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)
>  	return PG_LEVEL_4K;
>  }
>  
> -static void kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> -					      struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
> -{
> -	kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault->gfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
> -				      PAGE_SIZE, fault->write, fault->exec,
> -				      fault->is_private);
> -}
> -
>  static int kvm_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  				   struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
>  {
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
> index 0669a8a668ca..0eea6c5a824d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
> @@ -279,6 +279,14 @@ enum {
>  	RET_PF_SPURIOUS,
>  };
>  
> +static inline void kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> +						     struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
> +{
> +	kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault->gfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
> +				      PAGE_SIZE, fault->write, fault->exec,
> +				      fault->is_private);
> +}
> +
>  static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
>  					u32 err, bool prefetch, int *emulation_type)
>  {
> @@ -320,6 +328,11 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
>  	else
>  		r = vcpu->arch.mmu->page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
>  
> +	if (r == RET_PF_EMULATE && fault.is_private) {
Should we just check VM type + RET_PF_EMULATE, and abort?
If r is RET_PF_EMULATE, and fault is caused by accesing a shared address,
the emulation code could still meet error if guest page table pages are in
private memory, right?

> +		kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, &fault);
> +		return -EFAULT;
> +	}
> +
>  	if (fault.write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable && emulation_type)
>  		*emulation_type |= EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP;
>  
> -- 
> 2.44.0.278.ge034bb2e1d-goog
> 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-03-08  4:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 83+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-28  2:41 [PATCH 00/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Page fault and MMIO cleanups Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 01/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Exit to userspace with -EFAULT if private fault hits emulation Sean Christopherson
2024-03-01  8:48   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-07 12:52   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-03-12  2:59     ` Binbin Wu
2024-04-04 16:38       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-08  4:22   ` Yan Zhao [this message]
2024-04-04 16:45     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 02/16] KVM: x86: Remove separate "bit" defines for page fault error code masks Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 12:44   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-29 18:40     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 20:56       ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-29 13:43   ` Dongli Zhang
2024-02-29 15:25     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 03/16] KVM: x86: Define more SEV+ page fault error bits/flags for #NPF Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  4:43   ` Dongli Zhang
2024-02-28 16:16     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 04/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Pass full 64-bit error code when handling page faults Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  7:30   ` Dongli Zhang
2024-02-28 16:22     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 13:32       ` Dongli Zhang
2024-03-05  3:55   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 05/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Use synthetic page fault error code to indicate private faults Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 11:16   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-29 15:17     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06  9:43   ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-06 14:45     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  9:05       ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-07 14:36         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-12  5:34   ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 06/16] KVM: x86/mmu: WARN if upper 32 bits of legacy #PF error code are non-zero Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 22:11   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-29 23:07     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-12  5:44       ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 07/16] KVM: x86: Move synthetic PFERR_* sanity checks to SVM's #NPF handler Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 22:19   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-29 22:52     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 23:14       ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-12  9:44   ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 08/16] KVM: x86/mmu: WARN and skip MMIO cache on private, reserved page faults Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 22:26   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-29 23:06     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 23:21       ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-04 15:51         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-05 21:32           ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06  0:25             ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 09/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Move private vs. shared check above slot validity checks Sean Christopherson
2024-03-05 23:06   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06  0:38     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06  1:22       ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06  2:02         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06 22:06           ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06 23:49             ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:28               ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-08  4:54   ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-08 23:28     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-11  4:43       ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-12  0:08         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 10/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Don't force emulation of L2 accesses to non-APIC internal slots Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:03   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 11/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Explicitly disallow private accesses to emulated MMIO Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06 22:35   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06 22:43     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06 22:49       ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06 23:01         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06 23:20           ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-07 17:10         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-08  0:09           ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 12/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Move slot checks from __kvm_faultin_pfn() to kvm_faultin_pfn() Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:11   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 13/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Handle no-slot faults at the beginning of kvm_faultin_pfn() Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:48   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-07  0:53     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 14/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Set kvm_page_fault.hva to KVM_HVA_ERR_BAD for "no slot" faults Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:50   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-07  1:01     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 15/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Initialize kvm_page_fault's pfn and hva to error values Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:46   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 16/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Sanity check that __kvm_faultin_pfn() doesn't create noslot pfns Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:46   ` Huang, Kai
2024-04-17 12:48 ` [PATCH 00/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Page fault and MMIO cleanups Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-18 15:40   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-19  6:47   ` Xiaoyao Li

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