From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Cc: "pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com" <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>,
"chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com" <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"tabba@google.com" <tabba@google.com>,
Yan Y Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"michael.roth@amd.com" <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>,
"dmatlack@google.com" <dmatlack@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Use synthetic page fault error code to indicate private faults
Date: Thu, 29 Feb 2024 07:17:14 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZeCf-sJIyR7vuMtD@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <063aa825af395439cc1b3669fb326c395bd6fe42.camel@intel.com>
On Thu, Feb 29, 2024, Kai Huang wrote:
>
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > index 408969ac1291..7807bdcd87e8 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > @@ -5839,19 +5839,31 @@ int noinline kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 err
> > bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct;
> >
> > /*
> > - * IMPLICIT_ACCESS is a KVM-defined flag used to correctly perform SMAP
> > - * checks when emulating instructions that triggers implicit access.
> > * WARN if hardware generates a fault with an error code that collides
> > - * with the KVM-defined value. Clear the flag and continue on, i.e.
> > - * don't terminate the VM, as KVM can't possibly be relying on a flag
> > - * that KVM doesn't know about.
> > + * with KVM-defined sythentic flags. Clear the flags and continue on,
> > + * i.e. don't terminate the VM, as KVM can't possibly be relying on a
> > + * flag that KVM doesn't know about.
> > */
> > - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(error_code & PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS))
> > - error_code &= ~PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS;
> > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(error_code & PFERR_SYNTHETIC_MASK))
> > + error_code &= ~PFERR_SYNTHETIC_MASK;
> >
>
> Hmm.. I thought for TDX the caller -- handle_ept_violation() -- should
> explicitly set the PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS so that here the fault handler can
> figure out the fault is private.
>
> Now it seems the caller should never pass PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS, then ...
>
> > if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa)))
> > return RET_PF_RETRY;
> >
> > + /*
> > + * Except for reserved faults (emulated MMIO is shared-only), set the
> > + * private flag for software-protected VMs based on the gfn's current
> > + * attributes, which are the source of truth for such VMs. Note, this
> > + * wrong for nested MMUs as the GPA is an L2 GPA, but KVM doesn't
> > + * currently supported nested virtualization (among many other things)
> > + * for software-protected VMs.
> > + */
> > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM) &&
> > + !(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK) &&
> > + vcpu->kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM &&
> > + kvm_mem_is_private(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(cr2_or_gpa)))
> > + error_code |= PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS;
> > +
> >
>
> ... I am wondering how we figure out whether a fault is private for TDX?
Read the next few patches :-)
The sanity check gets moved to the legacy #PF handler (any error code with bits
63:32!=0 yells) and SVM's #NPF handler (error code with synthetic bits set yells),
leaving VMX free and clear to stuff PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS as appropriate.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-29 15:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 83+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-28 2:41 [PATCH 00/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Page fault and MMIO cleanups Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 2:41 ` [PATCH 01/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Exit to userspace with -EFAULT if private fault hits emulation Sean Christopherson
2024-03-01 8:48 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-07 12:52 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-03-12 2:59 ` Binbin Wu
2024-04-04 16:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-08 4:22 ` Yan Zhao
2024-04-04 16:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 2:41 ` [PATCH 02/16] KVM: x86: Remove separate "bit" defines for page fault error code masks Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 12:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-29 18:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 20:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-29 13:43 ` Dongli Zhang
2024-02-29 15:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 2:41 ` [PATCH 03/16] KVM: x86: Define more SEV+ page fault error bits/flags for #NPF Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 4:43 ` Dongli Zhang
2024-02-28 16:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 2:41 ` [PATCH 04/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Pass full 64-bit error code when handling page faults Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 7:30 ` Dongli Zhang
2024-02-28 16:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 13:32 ` Dongli Zhang
2024-03-05 3:55 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-02-28 2:41 ` [PATCH 05/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Use synthetic page fault error code to indicate private faults Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 11:16 ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-29 15:17 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-03-06 9:43 ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-06 14:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07 9:05 ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-07 14:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-12 5:34 ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-28 2:41 ` [PATCH 06/16] KVM: x86/mmu: WARN if upper 32 bits of legacy #PF error code are non-zero Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 22:11 ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-29 23:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-12 5:44 ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-28 2:41 ` [PATCH 07/16] KVM: x86: Move synthetic PFERR_* sanity checks to SVM's #NPF handler Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 22:19 ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-29 22:52 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 23:14 ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-12 9:44 ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-28 2:41 ` [PATCH 08/16] KVM: x86/mmu: WARN and skip MMIO cache on private, reserved page faults Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 22:26 ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-29 23:06 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 23:21 ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-04 15:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-05 21:32 ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06 0:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 2:41 ` [PATCH 09/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Move private vs. shared check above slot validity checks Sean Christopherson
2024-03-05 23:06 ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06 0:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06 1:22 ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06 2:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06 22:06 ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06 23:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07 0:28 ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-08 4:54 ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-08 23:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-11 4:43 ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-12 0:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 2:41 ` [PATCH 10/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Don't force emulation of L2 accesses to non-APIC internal slots Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07 0:03 ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28 2:41 ` [PATCH 11/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Explicitly disallow private accesses to emulated MMIO Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06 22:35 ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06 22:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06 22:49 ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06 23:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06 23:20 ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-07 17:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-08 0:09 ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28 2:41 ` [PATCH 12/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Move slot checks from __kvm_faultin_pfn() to kvm_faultin_pfn() Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07 0:11 ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28 2:41 ` [PATCH 13/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Handle no-slot faults at the beginning of kvm_faultin_pfn() Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07 0:48 ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-07 0:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 2:41 ` [PATCH 14/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Set kvm_page_fault.hva to KVM_HVA_ERR_BAD for "no slot" faults Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07 0:50 ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-07 1:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28 2:41 ` [PATCH 15/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Initialize kvm_page_fault's pfn and hva to error values Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07 0:46 ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28 2:41 ` [PATCH 16/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Sanity check that __kvm_faultin_pfn() doesn't create noslot pfns Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07 0:46 ` Huang, Kai
2024-04-17 12:48 ` [PATCH 00/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Page fault and MMIO cleanups Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-18 15:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-19 6:47 ` Xiaoyao Li
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