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From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
	Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok
Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 12:17:11 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+55aFwYEr-x3teixCh5QtyMzXZKdNUkoF4xiw+1zg08PSsvpw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180107201211.GA9996@1wt.eu>

On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 12:12 PM, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> wrote:
>
> Linus, no need to explain that to me, I'm precisely trying to see how
> to disable PTI for a specific process because I face up to 45% loss in
> certain circumstances, making it a no-go. But while a few of us have
> very specific workloads emphasizing this impact, others have very
> different ones and will not notice. For example my laptop did boot
> pretty fine and I didn't notice anything until I fire a network
> benchmark.

Sure, most people have hardware where the bottleneck is entirely
elsewhere (slow network, rotating disk, whatever).

But this whole "normal people won't notice" is dangerous thinking.
They may well notice very much, we simply don't know what they are
doing.

Quite honesty, it's equally correct to say "normal people won't be
affected by the security issue in the first place".

That laptop that you didn't have any issues with? Likely it never had
an exploit running on it either!

So the whole "normal people" argument is pure and utter garbage. It's
wrong. It's pure shit when it comes to performance, but it's also pure
shit when it comes to the security issue.

Don't use it.

We need to fix the security problem, but we need to do it *without*
these braindead arguments that performance is somehow secondary.

               Linus

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-07 20:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 162+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-06  1:09 [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:09 ` [PATCH 01/18] asm-generic/barrier: add generic nospec helpers Dan Williams
2018-01-06  2:55   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06  5:23     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 17:08       ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 02/18] Documentation: document " Dan Williams
2018-01-08 16:29   ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-01-08 17:09     ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-08 21:19       ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 03/18] arm64: implement nospec_ptr() Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 04/18] arm: " Dan Williams
2018-01-10  2:04   ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-10  7:40     ` Hanjun Guo
2018-01-10 17:24       ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 05/18] x86: implement nospec_barrier() Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok Dan Williams
2018-01-06  2:52   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06  3:09     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06 23:31       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-07  1:20         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 21:09           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08 23:44             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 23:53               ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  5:47     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 12:32     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 17:56       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06 18:13       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 18:29         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 18:39           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 18:54             ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 19:25               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 19:36                 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 19:41                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 10:02                   ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-06 18:38         ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 18:51           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 19:55             ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 20:09               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 20:22                 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 21:17                   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 21:21                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-06 23:05                     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-07  3:38                       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-07  6:33                         ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 19:47                           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-07 20:12                             ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 20:17                               ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2018-01-07 20:56                                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08  2:23                                   ` David Miller
2018-01-08  7:38                                     ` Greg KH
2018-01-07 22:15                                 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 20:15                             ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08  2:24                               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-08  9:51                                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 18:21                                   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-08 12:00                             ` David Laight
2018-01-08 12:12                               ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08 12:33                                 ` David Laight
2018-01-07 10:08                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08  2:09                           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-07 13:59                         ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08  2:57                           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-08  9:57                             ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-06 20:42           ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07  1:36             ` David Miller
2018-01-07 17:19               ` James Bottomley
2018-01-07 18:31                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08  2:04                   ` David Miller
2018-01-07 19:24                 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-09 21:41     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 21:47       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 21:49         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 21:59           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 22:23             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 22:35               ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 07/18] [media] uvcvideo: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-06  9:09   ` Greg KH
2018-01-06  9:40     ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 17:41       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-07  9:09         ` Greg KH
2018-01-07 19:37           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09  8:40       ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-09 10:04         ` Greg KH
2018-01-09 14:26           ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-09 14:47             ` Greg KH
2018-01-08 11:23   ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-09  2:11     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 08/18] carl9170: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:01   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 14:23   ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-06 15:06     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 16:38       ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-06 16:34     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 09/18] p54: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:01   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 10/18] qla2xxx: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06  9:03   ` Greg KH
2018-01-06  9:42     ` Greg KH
2018-01-11 22:15     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  7:27       ` Greg KH
2018-01-12 15:25         ` James Bottomley
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 11/18] cw1200: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 12/18] Thermal/int340x: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:53   ` Srinivas Pandruvada
2018-01-06  1:57     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 17:24       ` Srinivas Pandruvada
2018-01-06 10:03   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 13/18] ipv6: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:04   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 14:48   ` Stephen Hemminger
2018-01-06 18:05     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 14/18] ipv4: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06  9:00   ` Greg KH
2018-01-06  9:01   ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 12:23     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 15:14       ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 16:29         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 18:10           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:04   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 15/18] vfs, fdtable: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:05   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 16/18] net: mpls: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:06   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-09  3:11   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-09  3:42     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09  4:13       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09  4:21         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-10  0:48         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10  1:33           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10  1:57           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-10  2:22             ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10  3:07               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-10  3:27           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09 16:17       ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-09 18:01         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10  0:54           ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-10  1:31             ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 17/18] udf: " Dan Williams
2018-01-08 10:20   ` Jan Kara
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 18/18] userns: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06  2:22 ` [PATCH 00/18] " Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-06  6:30   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08 10:08     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 11:14       ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-08 11:43       ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08 11:55         ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 18:33         ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-08 16:20     ` Bart Van Assche
2018-01-06 18:56 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-01-06 18:59   ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-06 19:37 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 20:07   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08  4:49 ` Bart Van Assche
2018-01-08 13:33   ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-09 19:34 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-09 19:44   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 20:55     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-11  9:54       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-11 15:58         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-11 16:34           ` Daniel Borkmann
2018-01-13 11:33 ` QingFeng Hao
2018-01-09  0:12 [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok Linus Torvalds

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