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From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 16/18] net: mpls: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 18:22:09 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAPcyv4h1Uvke8d8JThHMLuci5HMKLf3hHgtkpcch1QSpq35M+Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180110015713.im4atka6sahz7ucx@ast-mbp>

On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 5:57 PM, Alexei Starovoitov
<alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 04:48:24PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
>>
>> #define __nospec_array_ptr(base, idx, sz)                               \
>> ({                                                                      \
>>         union { typeof(&base[0]) _ptr; unsigned long _bit; } __u;       \
>>         unsigned long _i = (idx);                                       \
>>         unsigned long _s = (sz);                                        \
>>         unsigned long _v = (long)(_i | _s - 1 - _i)                     \
>>                                         >> BITS_PER_LONG - 1;           \
>>         unsigned long _mask = _v * ~0UL;                                 \
>>         OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(_mask);                                      \
>>         __u._ptr = &base[_i & _mask];                                   \
>>         __u._bit &= _mask;                                              \
>>         __u._ptr;                                                       \
>> })
>
> _v * ~0UL doesn't seem right and non intuitive.
> What's wrong with:
>   unsigned long _mask = ~(long)(_i | _s - 1 - _i) >> BITS_PER_LONG - 1;

Yeah, I noticed it was ok immediately after I sent that.

> and why OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR ?

It was in Linus' original. but that was when it had the ternary
conditional, I'll drop it. It does not change the generated assembly.

> Could you remove '&' ?

Yes, that should be __u.ptr = base + (i & _mask)

> since in doesn't work for:
> struct {
>   int fd[4];
>   ...
> } *fdt;
> it cannot be used as array_acces(fdt->fd, ...);
>
> Could you please drop nospec_ prefix since it is misleading ?

When you came up with that tweak you noted:

"The following:
[..]
is generic and no speculative flows."

> This macro doesn't prevent speculation.

It masks dangerous speculation. At least, I read nospec as "No
Spectre" and it is a prefix used in the Spectre-v2 patches.

I also want to include the option, with a static branch, to switch it
to the hard "no speculation" version with an ifence if worse comes to
worse and we find a compiler / cpu where it doesn't work. The default
will be the fast and practical implementation.

> I think array_access() was the best name so far.

For other usages I need the pointer to the array element, also
array_access() by itself is unsuitable for __fcheck_files because we
still need rcu_dereference_raw() on the element de-reference. So, I
think it's better to get a sanitized array element pointer which can
be used with rcu, READ_ONCE(), etc... directly rather than try to do
the access in the same macro.

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-10  2:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 161+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-06  1:09 [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:09 ` [PATCH 01/18] asm-generic/barrier: add generic nospec helpers Dan Williams
2018-01-06  2:55   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06  5:23     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 17:08       ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 02/18] Documentation: document " Dan Williams
2018-01-08 16:29   ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-01-08 17:09     ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-08 21:19       ` Jonathan Corbet
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 03/18] arm64: implement nospec_ptr() Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 04/18] arm: " Dan Williams
2018-01-10  2:04   ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-10  7:40     ` Hanjun Guo
2018-01-10 17:24       ` Laura Abbott
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 05/18] x86: implement nospec_barrier() Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok Dan Williams
2018-01-06  2:52   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06  3:09     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06 23:31       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-07  1:20         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 21:09           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08 23:44             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-08 23:53               ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  5:47     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 12:32     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 17:56       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06 18:13       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 18:29         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 18:39           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 18:54             ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 19:25               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 19:36                 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 19:41                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08 10:02                   ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-01-06 18:38         ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 18:51           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 19:55             ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 20:09               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 20:22                 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 21:17                   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-06 21:21                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-06 23:05                     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-07  3:38                       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-07  6:33                         ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 19:47                           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-07 20:12                             ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 20:17                               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-07 20:56                                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08  2:23                                   ` David Miller
2018-01-08  7:38                                     ` Greg KH
2018-01-07 22:15                                 ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07 20:15                             ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08  2:24                               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-08  9:51                                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 18:21                                   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-08 12:00                             ` David Laight
2018-01-08 12:12                               ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08 12:33                                 ` David Laight
2018-01-07 10:08                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08  2:09                           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-07 13:59                         ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08  2:57                           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-08  9:57                             ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-06 20:42           ` Willy Tarreau
2018-01-07  1:36             ` David Miller
2018-01-07 17:19               ` James Bottomley
2018-01-07 18:31                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-08  2:04                   ` David Miller
2018-01-07 19:24                 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-09 21:41     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 21:47       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 21:49         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 21:59           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 22:23             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-09 22:35               ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 07/18] [media] uvcvideo: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-06  9:09   ` Greg KH
2018-01-06  9:40     ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 17:41       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-07  9:09         ` Greg KH
2018-01-07 19:37           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09  8:40       ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-09 10:04         ` Greg KH
2018-01-09 14:26           ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-09 14:47             ` Greg KH
2018-01-08 11:23   ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-09  2:11     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 08/18] carl9170: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:01   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 14:23   ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-06 15:06     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 16:38       ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-06 16:34     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 09/18] p54: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:01   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 10/18] qla2xxx: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06  9:03   ` Greg KH
2018-01-06  9:42     ` Greg KH
2018-01-11 22:15     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  7:27       ` Greg KH
2018-01-12 15:25         ` James Bottomley
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 11/18] cw1200: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:10 ` [PATCH 12/18] Thermal/int340x: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:53   ` Srinivas Pandruvada
2018-01-06  1:57     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 17:24       ` Srinivas Pandruvada
2018-01-06 10:03   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 13/18] ipv6: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:04   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06 14:48   ` Stephen Hemminger
2018-01-06 18:05     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 14/18] ipv4: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06  9:00   ` Greg KH
2018-01-06  9:01   ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 12:23     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-06 15:14       ` Greg KH
2018-01-06 16:29         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 18:10           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:04   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 15/18] vfs, fdtable: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:05   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 16/18] net: mpls: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06 10:06   ` Sergei Shtylyov
2018-01-09  3:11   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-09  3:42     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09  4:13       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09  4:21         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-10  0:48         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10  1:33           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10  1:57           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-10  2:22             ` Dan Williams [this message]
2018-01-10  3:07               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-10  3:27           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-09 16:17       ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-09 18:01         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-10  0:54           ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-10  1:31             ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 17/18] udf: " Dan Williams
2018-01-08 10:20   ` Jan Kara
2018-01-06  1:11 ` [PATCH 18/18] userns: " Dan Williams
2018-01-06  2:22 ` [PATCH 00/18] " Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-06  6:30   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08 10:08     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 11:14       ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-08 11:43       ` Alan Cox
2018-01-08 11:55         ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-08 18:33         ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-08 16:20     ` Bart Van Assche
2018-01-06 18:56 ` Florian Fainelli
2018-01-06 18:59   ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-06 19:37 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-06 20:07   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-08  4:49 ` Bart Van Assche
2018-01-08 13:33   ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-09 19:34 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-09 19:44   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-09 20:55     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-11  9:54       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-11 15:58         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-11 16:34           ` Daniel Borkmann
2018-01-13 11:33 ` QingFeng Hao

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