linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2019 21:09:14 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHk-=wiAyZmsEp6oQQgHiuaDU0bLj=OVHSGV_OfvHRSXNPYABw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191008032912.GQ26530@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2505 bytes --]

On Mon, Oct 7, 2019 at 8:29 PM Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
>
> For x86?  Sure, why not...  Note, BTW, that for short constant-sized
> copies we *do* STAC/CLAC at the call site - see those
>                 __uaccess_begin_nospec();
> in raw_copy_{from,to}_user() in the switches...

Yeah, an that code almost never actually triggers in practice. The
code is pointless and dead.

The thing is, it's only ever used for the double undescore versions,
and the ones that do have have it are almost never constant sizes in
the first place.

And yes, there's like a couple of cases in the whole kernel.

Just remove those constant size cases. They are pointless and just
complicate our headers and slow down the compile for no good reason.

Try the attached patch, and then count the number of "rorx"
instructions in the kernel. Hint: not many. On my personal config,
this triggers 15 times in the whole kernel build (not counting
modules).

It's not worth it. The "speedup" from using __copy_{to,from}_user()
with the fancy inlining is negligible. All the cost is in the
STAC/CLAC anyway, the code might as well be deleted.

> 1) cross-architecture user_access_begin_dont_use(): on everything
> except x86 it's empty, on x86 - __uaccess_begin_nospec().

No, just do a proper range check, and use user_access_begin()

Stop trying to optimize that range check away. It's a couple of fast
instructions.

The only ones who don't want the range check are the actual kernel
copy ones, but they don't want the user_access_begin() either.

> void *copy_mount_options(const void __user * data)
> {
>         unsigned offs, size;
>         char *copy;
>
>         if (!data)
>                 return NULL;
>
>         copy = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
>         if (!copy)
>                 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>
>         offs = (unsigned long)untagged_addr(data) & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
>
>         if (copy_from_user(copy, data, PAGE_SIZE - offs)) {
>                 kfree(copy);
>                 return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
>         }
>         if (offs) {
>                 if (copy_from_user(copy, data + PAGE_SIZE - offs, offs))
>                         memset(copy + PAGE_SIZE - offs, 0, offs);
>         }
>         return copy;
> }
>
> on the theory that any fault halfway through a page means a race with
> munmap/mprotect/etc. and we can just pretend we'd lost the race entirely.
> And to hell with exact_copy_from_user(), byte-by-byte copying, etc.

Looks reasonable.

              Linus

[-- Attachment #2: patch.diff --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 2965 bytes --]

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
index 5cd1caa8bc65..db58c4436ce3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ copy_to_user_mcsafe(void *to, const void *from, unsigned len)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+#define marker(x) asm volatile("rorx $" #x ",%rax,%rdx")
+
 static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
 raw_copy_from_user(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned long size)
 {
@@ -72,30 +74,35 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned long size)
 	switch (size) {
 	case 1:
 		__uaccess_begin_nospec();
+		marker(1);
 		__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u8 *)dst, (u8 __user *)src,
 			      ret, "b", "b", "=q", 1);
 		__uaccess_end();
 		return ret;
 	case 2:
 		__uaccess_begin_nospec();
+		marker(2);
 		__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u16 *)dst, (u16 __user *)src,
 			      ret, "w", "w", "=r", 2);
 		__uaccess_end();
 		return ret;
 	case 4:
 		__uaccess_begin_nospec();
+		marker(4);
 		__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u32 *)dst, (u32 __user *)src,
 			      ret, "l", "k", "=r", 4);
 		__uaccess_end();
 		return ret;
 	case 8:
 		__uaccess_begin_nospec();
+		marker(8);
 		__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src,
 			      ret, "q", "", "=r", 8);
 		__uaccess_end();
 		return ret;
 	case 10:
 		__uaccess_begin_nospec();
+		marker(10);
 		__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src,
 			       ret, "q", "", "=r", 10);
 		if (likely(!ret))
@@ -106,6 +113,7 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned long size)
 		return ret;
 	case 16:
 		__uaccess_begin_nospec();
+		marker(16);
 		__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src,
 			       ret, "q", "", "=r", 16);
 		if (likely(!ret))
@@ -129,30 +137,35 @@ raw_copy_to_user(void __user *dst, const void *src, unsigned long size)
 	switch (size) {
 	case 1:
 		__uaccess_begin();
+		marker(51);
 		__put_user_asm(*(u8 *)src, (u8 __user *)dst,
 			      ret, "b", "b", "iq", 1);
 		__uaccess_end();
 		return ret;
 	case 2:
 		__uaccess_begin();
+		marker(52);
 		__put_user_asm(*(u16 *)src, (u16 __user *)dst,
 			      ret, "w", "w", "ir", 2);
 		__uaccess_end();
 		return ret;
 	case 4:
 		__uaccess_begin();
+		marker(54);
 		__put_user_asm(*(u32 *)src, (u32 __user *)dst,
 			      ret, "l", "k", "ir", 4);
 		__uaccess_end();
 		return ret;
 	case 8:
 		__uaccess_begin();
+		marker(58);
 		__put_user_asm(*(u64 *)src, (u64 __user *)dst,
 			      ret, "q", "", "er", 8);
 		__uaccess_end();
 		return ret;
 	case 10:
 		__uaccess_begin();
+		marker(60);
 		__put_user_asm(*(u64 *)src, (u64 __user *)dst,
 			       ret, "q", "", "er", 10);
 		if (likely(!ret)) {
@@ -164,6 +177,7 @@ raw_copy_to_user(void __user *dst, const void *src, unsigned long size)
 		return ret;
 	case 16:
 		__uaccess_begin();
+		marker(66);
 		__put_user_asm(*(u64 *)src, (u64 __user *)dst,
 			       ret, "q", "", "er", 16);
 		if (likely(!ret)) {

  reply	other threads:[~2019-10-08  4:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-06 22:20 [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user() Guenter Roeck
2019-10-06 23:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-06 23:35   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07  0:04     ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07  1:17       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07  1:24         ` Al Viro
2019-10-07  2:06           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07  2:50             ` Al Viro
2019-10-07  3:11               ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 15:40                 ` David Laight
2019-10-07 18:11                   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08  9:58                     ` David Laight
2019-10-07 17:34                 ` Al Viro
2019-10-07 18:13                   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 18:22                     ` Al Viro
2019-10-07 18:26                 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 18:36                   ` Tony Luck
2019-10-07 19:08                     ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 19:49                       ` Tony Luck
2019-10-07 20:04                         ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08  3:29                   ` Al Viro
2019-10-08  4:09                     ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2019-10-08  4:14                       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08  5:02                         ` Al Viro
2019-10-08  4:24                       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-10 19:55                         ` Al Viro
2019-10-10 22:12                           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-11  0:11                             ` Al Viro
2019-10-11  0:31                               ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-13 18:13                                 ` Al Viro
2019-10-13 18:43                                   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-13 19:10                                     ` Al Viro
2019-10-13 19:22                                       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-13 19:59                                         ` Al Viro
2019-10-13 20:20                                           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-15  3:46                                             ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-15 18:08                                           ` Al Viro
2019-10-15 19:00                                             ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-15 19:40                                               ` Al Viro
2019-10-15 20:18                                                 ` Al Viro
2019-10-16 12:12                                             ` [RFC] change of calling conventions for arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser() Al Viro
2019-10-16 12:24                                               ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-10-16 20:25                                         ` [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:36                                           ` [RFC][PATCHES] drivers/scsi/sg.c uaccess cleanups/fixes Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                             ` [RFC PATCH 1/8] sg_ioctl(): fix copyout handling Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 2/8] sg_new_write(): replace access_ok() + __copy_from_user() with copy_from_user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 3/8] sg_write(): __get_user() can fail Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 4/8] sg_read(): simplify reading ->pack_id of userland sg_io_hdr_t Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 5/8] sg_new_write(): don't bother with access_ok Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 6/8] sg_read(): get rid of access_ok()/__copy_..._user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 7/8] sg_write(): get rid of access_ok()/__copy_from_user()/__get_user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 8/8] SG_IO: get rid of access_ok() Al Viro
2019-10-17 21:44                                             ` [RFC][PATCHES] drivers/scsi/sg.c uaccess cleanups/fixes Douglas Gilbert
2019-11-05  4:54                                             ` Martin K. Petersen
2019-11-05  5:25                                               ` Al Viro
2019-11-06  4:29                                                 ` Martin K. Petersen
2019-10-18  0:27                                           ` [RFC] csum_and_copy_from_user() semantics Al Viro
2019-10-25 14:01                                       ` [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user() Thomas Gleixner
2019-10-08  4:57                       ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 13:14                         ` Greg KH
2019-10-08 15:29                           ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 15:38                             ` Greg KH
2019-10-08 17:06                               ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 19:58                   ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 20:16                     ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 20:34                     ` Al Viro
2019-10-07  2:30         ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07  3:12           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07  0:23   ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07  4:04 ` Max Filippov
2019-10-07 12:16   ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07 19:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 20:29   ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07 23:27   ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-08  6:28     ` Geert Uytterhoeven

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to='CAHk-=wiAyZmsEp6oQQgHiuaDU0bLj=OVHSGV_OfvHRSXNPYABw@mail.gmail.com' \
    --to=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux@roeck-us.net \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).