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From: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()
Date: Sun, 6 Oct 2019 19:30:16 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c3e9ec03-5eb5-75bb-98da-63eaa9246cff@roeck-us.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=whAQWEMADgxb_qAw=nEY4OnuDn6HU4UCSDMNT5ULKvg3g@mail.gmail.com>

On 10/6/19 6:17 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 6, 2019 at 5:04 PM Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> wrote:
[ ... ]
> And yes, I'll fix that name copy loop in filldir to align the
> destination first, *but* if I'm right, it means that something like
> this should also likely cause issues:
> 
>    #define _GNU_SOURCE
>    #include <unistd.h>
>    #include <sys/mman.h>
> 
>    int main(int argc, char **argv)
>    {
>          void *mymap;
>          uid_t *bad_ptr = (void *) 0x01;
> 
>          /* Create unpopulated memory area */
>          mymap = mmap(NULL, 16384, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE
> | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
> 
>          /* Unaligned uidpointer in that memory area */
>          bad_ptr = mymap+1;
> 
>          /* Make the kernel do put_user() on it */
>          return getresuid(bad_ptr, bad_ptr+1, bad_ptr+2);
>    }
> 
> because that simple user mode program should cause that same "page
> fault on unaligned put_user()" behavior as far as I can tell.
> 
> Mind humoring me and trying that on your alpha machine (or emulator,
> or whatever)?
> 

Here you are. This is with v5.4-rc2 and your previous patch applied
on top.

/ # ./mmtest
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000000000004
mmtest(75): Oops -1
pc = [<0000000000000004>]  ra = [<fffffc0000311584>]  ps = 0000    Not tainted
pc is at 0x4
ra is at entSys+0xa4/0xc0
v0 = fffffffffffffff2  t0 = 0000000000000000  t1 = 0000000000000000
t2 = 0000000000000000  t3 = 0000000000000000  t4 = 0000000000000000
t5 = 000000000000fffe  t6 = 0000000000000000  t7 = fffffc0007edc000
s0 = 0000000000000000  s1 = 00000001200006f0  s2 = 00000001200df19f
s3 = 00000001200ea0b9  s4 = 0000000120114630  s5 = 00000001201145d8
s6 = 000000011f955c50
a0 = 000002000002c001  a1 = 000002000002c005  a2 = 000002000002c009
a3 = 0000000000000000  a4 = ffffffffffffffff  a5 = 0000000000000000
t8 = 0000000000000000  t9 = fffffc0000000000  t10= 0000000000000000
t11= 000000011f955788  pv = fffffc0000349450  at = 00000000f8db54d3
gp = fffffc0000f2a160  sp = 00000000ab237c72
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Trace:

Code:
  00000000
  00063301
  000007b6
  00001111
  00003f8d

Segmentation fault

Guenter

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-10-07  2:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-06 22:20 [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user() Guenter Roeck
2019-10-06 23:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-06 23:35   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07  0:04     ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07  1:17       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07  1:24         ` Al Viro
2019-10-07  2:06           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07  2:50             ` Al Viro
2019-10-07  3:11               ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 15:40                 ` David Laight
2019-10-07 18:11                   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08  9:58                     ` David Laight
2019-10-07 17:34                 ` Al Viro
2019-10-07 18:13                   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 18:22                     ` Al Viro
2019-10-07 18:26                 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 18:36                   ` Tony Luck
2019-10-07 19:08                     ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 19:49                       ` Tony Luck
2019-10-07 20:04                         ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08  3:29                   ` Al Viro
2019-10-08  4:09                     ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08  4:14                       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08  5:02                         ` Al Viro
2019-10-08  4:24                       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-10 19:55                         ` Al Viro
2019-10-10 22:12                           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-11  0:11                             ` Al Viro
2019-10-11  0:31                               ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-13 18:13                                 ` Al Viro
2019-10-13 18:43                                   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-13 19:10                                     ` Al Viro
2019-10-13 19:22                                       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-13 19:59                                         ` Al Viro
2019-10-13 20:20                                           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-15  3:46                                             ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-15 18:08                                           ` Al Viro
2019-10-15 19:00                                             ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-15 19:40                                               ` Al Viro
2019-10-15 20:18                                                 ` Al Viro
2019-10-16 12:12                                             ` [RFC] change of calling conventions for arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser() Al Viro
2019-10-16 12:24                                               ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-10-16 20:25                                         ` [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:36                                           ` [RFC][PATCHES] drivers/scsi/sg.c uaccess cleanups/fixes Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                             ` [RFC PATCH 1/8] sg_ioctl(): fix copyout handling Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 2/8] sg_new_write(): replace access_ok() + __copy_from_user() with copy_from_user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 3/8] sg_write(): __get_user() can fail Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 4/8] sg_read(): simplify reading ->pack_id of userland sg_io_hdr_t Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 5/8] sg_new_write(): don't bother with access_ok Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 6/8] sg_read(): get rid of access_ok()/__copy_..._user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 7/8] sg_write(): get rid of access_ok()/__copy_from_user()/__get_user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 8/8] SG_IO: get rid of access_ok() Al Viro
2019-10-17 21:44                                             ` [RFC][PATCHES] drivers/scsi/sg.c uaccess cleanups/fixes Douglas Gilbert
2019-11-05  4:54                                             ` Martin K. Petersen
2019-11-05  5:25                                               ` Al Viro
2019-11-06  4:29                                                 ` Martin K. Petersen
2019-10-18  0:27                                           ` [RFC] csum_and_copy_from_user() semantics Al Viro
2019-10-25 14:01                                       ` [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user() Thomas Gleixner
2019-10-08  4:57                       ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 13:14                         ` Greg KH
2019-10-08 15:29                           ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 15:38                             ` Greg KH
2019-10-08 17:06                               ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 19:58                   ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 20:16                     ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 20:34                     ` Al Viro
2019-10-07  2:30         ` Guenter Roeck [this message]
2019-10-07  3:12           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07  0:23   ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07  4:04 ` Max Filippov
2019-10-07 12:16   ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07 19:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 20:29   ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07 23:27   ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-08  6:28     ` Geert Uytterhoeven

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