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From: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
To: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()
Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2019 05:16:55 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d6726d0f-3412-b5e9-fbd1-2dae302f0ef3@roeck-us.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMo8BfJHcLQ_TuacCwdhQYB-nhpdBrCq5EuB=E7SafP15=kd3A@mail.gmail.com>

Hi Max,

On 10/6/19 9:04 PM, Max Filippov wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 6, 2019 at 3:25 PM Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> wrote:
>> this patch causes all my sparc64 emulations to stall during boot. It causes
>> all alpha emulations to crash with [1a] and [1b] when booting from a virtual
>> disk, and one of the xtensa emulations to crash with [2].
> 
> [...]
> 
>> [2]
>>
>> Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000000000004
>> reboot(50): Oops -1
>> pc = [<0000000000000004>]  ra = [<fffffc00004512e4>]  ps = 0000    Tainted: G      D
>> pc is at 0x4
>> ra is at filldir64+0x64/0x320
>> v0 = 0000000000000000  t0 = 0000000067736d6b  t1 = 000000012011445b
>> t2 = 0000000000000000  t3 = 0000000000000000  t4 = 0000000000007ef8
>> t5 = 0000000120114448  t6 = 0000000000000000  t7 = fffffc0007eec000
>> s0 = fffffc000792b5c3  s1 = 0000000000000004  s2 = 0000000000000018
>> s3 = fffffc0007eefec8  s4 = 0000000000000008  s5 = 00000000f00000a3
>> s6 = 000000000000000b
>> a0 = fffffc000792b5c3  a1 = 2f2f2f2f2f2f2f2f  a2 = 0000000000000004
>> a3 = 000000000000000b  a4 = 00000000f00000a3  a5 = 0000000000000008
>> t8 = 0000000000000018  t9 = 0000000000000000  t10= 0000000022e1d02a
>> t11= 000000011fd6f3b8  pv = fffffc0000b9a810  at = 0000000022e1ccf8
>> gp = fffffc0000f03930  sp = (____ptrval____)
>> Trace:
>> [<fffffc00004ccba0>] proc_readdir_de+0x170/0x300
>> [<fffffc0000451280>] filldir64+0x0/0x320
>> [<fffffc00004c565c>] proc_root_readdir+0x3c/0x80
>> [<fffffc0000450c68>] iterate_dir+0x198/0x240
>> [<fffffc00004518b8>] ksys_getdents64+0xa8/0x160
>> [<fffffc0000451990>] sys_getdents64+0x20/0x40
>> [<fffffc0000451280>] filldir64+0x0/0x320
>> [<fffffc0000311634>] entSys+0xa4/0xc0
> 
> This doesn't look like a dump from xtensa core.
> v5.4-rc2 kernel doesn't crash for me on xtensa, but the userspace
> doesn't work well, because all directories appear to be empty.
> 
> __put_user/__get_user don't do unaligned access on xtensa,
> they check address alignment and return -EFAULT if it's bad.
> 
You are right, sorry; I must have mixed that up. xtensa doesn't crash.
The boot stalls, similar to sparc64. This is only seen with my nommu
test (de212:kc705-nommu:nommu_kc705_defconfig). xtensa mmu tests are fine,
at least for me, but then I only run tests with initrd (which for some
reason doesn't crash on alpha either).

Guenter

  reply	other threads:[~2019-10-07 12:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-06 22:20 [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user() Guenter Roeck
2019-10-06 23:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-06 23:35   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07  0:04     ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07  1:17       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07  1:24         ` Al Viro
2019-10-07  2:06           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07  2:50             ` Al Viro
2019-10-07  3:11               ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 15:40                 ` David Laight
2019-10-07 18:11                   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08  9:58                     ` David Laight
2019-10-07 17:34                 ` Al Viro
2019-10-07 18:13                   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 18:22                     ` Al Viro
2019-10-07 18:26                 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 18:36                   ` Tony Luck
2019-10-07 19:08                     ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 19:49                       ` Tony Luck
2019-10-07 20:04                         ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08  3:29                   ` Al Viro
2019-10-08  4:09                     ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08  4:14                       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-08  5:02                         ` Al Viro
2019-10-08  4:24                       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-10 19:55                         ` Al Viro
2019-10-10 22:12                           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-11  0:11                             ` Al Viro
2019-10-11  0:31                               ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-13 18:13                                 ` Al Viro
2019-10-13 18:43                                   ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-13 19:10                                     ` Al Viro
2019-10-13 19:22                                       ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-13 19:59                                         ` Al Viro
2019-10-13 20:20                                           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-15  3:46                                             ` Michael Ellerman
2019-10-15 18:08                                           ` Al Viro
2019-10-15 19:00                                             ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-15 19:40                                               ` Al Viro
2019-10-15 20:18                                                 ` Al Viro
2019-10-16 12:12                                             ` [RFC] change of calling conventions for arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser() Al Viro
2019-10-16 12:24                                               ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-10-16 20:25                                         ` [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:36                                           ` [RFC][PATCHES] drivers/scsi/sg.c uaccess cleanups/fixes Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                             ` [RFC PATCH 1/8] sg_ioctl(): fix copyout handling Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 2/8] sg_new_write(): replace access_ok() + __copy_from_user() with copy_from_user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 3/8] sg_write(): __get_user() can fail Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 4/8] sg_read(): simplify reading ->pack_id of userland sg_io_hdr_t Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 5/8] sg_new_write(): don't bother with access_ok Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 6/8] sg_read(): get rid of access_ok()/__copy_..._user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 7/8] sg_write(): get rid of access_ok()/__copy_from_user()/__get_user() Al Viro
2019-10-17 19:39                                               ` [RFC PATCH 8/8] SG_IO: get rid of access_ok() Al Viro
2019-10-17 21:44                                             ` [RFC][PATCHES] drivers/scsi/sg.c uaccess cleanups/fixes Douglas Gilbert
2019-11-05  4:54                                             ` Martin K. Petersen
2019-11-05  5:25                                               ` Al Viro
2019-11-06  4:29                                                 ` Martin K. Petersen
2019-10-18  0:27                                           ` [RFC] csum_and_copy_from_user() semantics Al Viro
2019-10-25 14:01                                       ` [PATCH] Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user() Thomas Gleixner
2019-10-08  4:57                       ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 13:14                         ` Greg KH
2019-10-08 15:29                           ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 15:38                             ` Greg KH
2019-10-08 17:06                               ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 19:58                   ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 20:16                     ` Al Viro
2019-10-08 20:34                     ` Al Viro
2019-10-07  2:30         ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07  3:12           ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07  0:23   ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07  4:04 ` Max Filippov
2019-10-07 12:16   ` Guenter Roeck [this message]
2019-10-07 19:21 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-10-07 20:29   ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-07 23:27   ` Guenter Roeck
2019-10-08  6:28     ` Geert Uytterhoeven

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