From: Dov Murik <firstname.lastname@example.org> To: email@example.com Cc: "Tom Lendacky" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Ashish Kalra" <email@example.com>, "Brijesh Singh" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Eduardo Habkost" <email@example.com>, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Connor Kuehl" <email@example.com>, "Laszlo Ersek" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "James Bottomley" <email@example.com>, "Richard Henderson" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <email@example.com>, "Dov Murik" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum" <email@example.com>, "Jim Cadden" <firstname.lastname@example.org>, "Paolo Bonzini" <email@example.com>, "Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <firstname.lastname@example.org> Subject: [PATCH v3 0/2] x86/sev: Measured Linux SEV guest with kernel/initrd/cmdline Date: Thu, 24 Jun 2021 10:20:38 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <email@example.com> (raw) Currently booting with -kernel/-initrd/-append is not supported in SEV confidential guests, because the content of these blobs is not measured and therefore not trusted by the SEV guest. However, in some cases the kernel, initrd, and cmdline are not secret but should not be modified by the host. In such a case, we want to verify inside the trusted VM that the kernel, initrd, and cmdline are indeed the ones expected by the Guest Owner, and only if that is the case go on and boot them up (removing the need for grub inside OVMF in that mode). To support that, OVMF adds a special area for hashes of kernel/initrd/cmdline; that area is expected to be filled by QEMU and encrypted as part of the initial SEV guest launch. This in turn makes the hashes part of the PSP measured content, and OVMF can trust these inputs if they match the hashes. This series adds an SEV function to generate the table of hashes for OVMF and encrypt it (patch 1/2), and calls this function if SEV is enabled when the kernel/initrd/cmdline are prepared (patch 2/2). Corresponding OVMF support was submitted to edk2-devel  (patch series "Measured SEV boot with kernel/initrd/cmdline"); it's still under review.  https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/topic/patch_v1_0_8_measured_sev/83074450 --- v3 changes: - initrd hash is now mandatory; if no -initrd is passed, calculate the hash of the empty buffer. This is now aligned with the OVMF behaviour which verifies the empty initrd (correctly). - make SevHashTable entries fixed: 3 entries for cmdline, initrd, and kernel. - in sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes: first calculate all the hashes, only then fill-in the hashes table in the guest's memory. - Use g_assert_not_reached in sev-stub.c. - Use QEMU_PACKED attribute for structs. - Use QemuUUID type for guids. - in sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes: use ARRAY_SIZE(iov) instead of literal 2. v2: https://firstname.lastname@example.org/ v2 changes: - Extract main functionality to sev.c (with empty stub in sev-stub.c) - Use sev_enabled() instead of machine->cgs->ready to detect SEV guest - Coding style changes v1: https://email@example.com/ Dov Murik (2): sev/i386: Introduce sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes for measured linux boot x86/sev: generate SEV kernel loader hashes in x86_load_linux target/i386/sev_i386.h | 12 ++++ hw/i386/x86.c | 25 +++++++- target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 ++ target/i386/sev.c | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 178 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) base-commit: b22726abdfa54592d6ad88f65b0297c0e8b363e2 -- 2.25.1
next reply other threads:[~2021-06-24 10:22 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-06-24 10:20 Dov Murik [this message] 2021-06-24 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] sev/i386: Introduce sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes for measured linux boot Dov Murik 2021-07-01 17:23 ` Connor Kuehl 2021-07-02 12:29 ` Dov Murik 2021-06-24 10:20 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] x86/sev: generate SEV kernel loader hashes in x86_load_linux Dov Murik 2021-07-08 16:41 ` [PATCH v3 0/2] x86/sev: Measured Linux SEV guest with kernel/initrd/cmdline Connor Kuehl 2021-07-08 17:03 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2021-07-08 17:16 ` Connor Kuehl 2021-07-29 19:31 ` Dov Murik 2021-07-30 14:47 ` Connor Kuehl 2021-07-30 18:02 ` Dov Murik 2021-07-30 18:14 ` Connor Kuehl 2021-07-09 6:55 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
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