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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 21/70] xen/evtchn: CFI hardening
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 12:50:38 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214125127.17985-22-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214125127.17985-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.

Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
 xen/common/event_2l.c      | 21 ++++++++++++---------
 xen/common/event_channel.c |  3 ++-
 xen/common/event_fifo.c    | 30 ++++++++++++++++--------------
 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/common/event_2l.c b/xen/common/event_2l.c
index 7424320e525a..d40dd51ab555 100644
--- a/xen/common/event_2l.c
+++ b/xen/common/event_2l.c
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@
 
 #include <asm/guest_atomics.h>
 
-static void evtchn_2l_set_pending(struct vcpu *v, struct evtchn *evtchn)
+static void cf_check evtchn_2l_set_pending(
+    struct vcpu *v, struct evtchn *evtchn)
 {
     struct domain *d = v->domain;
     unsigned int port = evtchn->port;
@@ -41,12 +42,14 @@ static void evtchn_2l_set_pending(struct vcpu *v, struct evtchn *evtchn)
     evtchn_check_pollers(d, port);
 }
 
-static void evtchn_2l_clear_pending(struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn)
+static void cf_check evtchn_2l_clear_pending(
+    struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn)
 {
     guest_clear_bit(d, evtchn->port, &shared_info(d, evtchn_pending));
 }
 
-static void evtchn_2l_unmask(struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn)
+static void cf_check evtchn_2l_unmask(
+    struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn)
 {
     struct vcpu *v = d->vcpu[evtchn->notify_vcpu_id];
     unsigned int port = evtchn->port;
@@ -64,8 +67,8 @@ static void evtchn_2l_unmask(struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn)
     }
 }
 
-static bool evtchn_2l_is_pending(const struct domain *d,
-                                 const struct evtchn *evtchn)
+static bool cf_check evtchn_2l_is_pending(
+    const struct domain *d, const struct evtchn *evtchn)
 {
     evtchn_port_t port = evtchn->port;
     unsigned int max_ports = BITS_PER_EVTCHN_WORD(d) * BITS_PER_EVTCHN_WORD(d);
@@ -75,8 +78,8 @@ static bool evtchn_2l_is_pending(const struct domain *d,
             guest_test_bit(d, port, &shared_info(d, evtchn_pending)));
 }
 
-static bool evtchn_2l_is_masked(const struct domain *d,
-                                const struct evtchn *evtchn)
+static bool cf_check evtchn_2l_is_masked(
+    const struct domain *d, const struct evtchn *evtchn)
 {
     evtchn_port_t port = evtchn->port;
     unsigned int max_ports = BITS_PER_EVTCHN_WORD(d) * BITS_PER_EVTCHN_WORD(d);
@@ -86,8 +89,8 @@ static bool evtchn_2l_is_masked(const struct domain *d,
             guest_test_bit(d, port, &shared_info(d, evtchn_mask)));
 }
 
-static void evtchn_2l_print_state(struct domain *d,
-                                  const struct evtchn *evtchn)
+static void cf_check evtchn_2l_print_state(
+    struct domain *d, const struct evtchn *evtchn)
 {
     struct vcpu *v = d->vcpu[evtchn->notify_vcpu_id];
 
diff --git a/xen/common/event_channel.c b/xen/common/event_channel.c
index 2026bc30dc95..183e78ac17f1 100644
--- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
+++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
@@ -99,7 +99,8 @@ static xen_event_channel_notification_t __read_mostly
     xen_consumers[NR_XEN_CONSUMERS];
 
 /* Default notification action: wake up from wait_on_xen_event_channel(). */
-static void default_xen_notification_fn(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port)
+static void cf_check default_xen_notification_fn(
+    struct vcpu *v, unsigned int port)
 {
     /* Consumer needs notification only if blocked. */
     if ( test_and_clear_bit(_VPF_blocked_in_xen, &v->pause_flags) )
diff --git a/xen/common/event_fifo.c b/xen/common/event_fifo.c
index 2fb01b82db84..ed4d3beb10f3 100644
--- a/xen/common/event_fifo.c
+++ b/xen/common/event_fifo.c
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static inline event_word_t *evtchn_fifo_word_from_port(const struct domain *d,
     return d->evtchn_fifo->event_array[p] + w;
 }
 
-static void evtchn_fifo_init(struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn)
+static void cf_check evtchn_fifo_init(struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn)
 {
     event_word_t *word;
 
@@ -158,7 +158,8 @@ static bool_t evtchn_fifo_set_link(struct domain *d, event_word_t *word,
     return 1;
 }
 
-static void evtchn_fifo_set_pending(struct vcpu *v, struct evtchn *evtchn)
+static void cf_check evtchn_fifo_set_pending(
+    struct vcpu *v, struct evtchn *evtchn)
 {
     struct domain *d = v->domain;
     unsigned int port;
@@ -317,7 +318,8 @@ static void evtchn_fifo_set_pending(struct vcpu *v, struct evtchn *evtchn)
         evtchn_check_pollers(d, port);
 }
 
-static void evtchn_fifo_clear_pending(struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn)
+static void cf_check evtchn_fifo_clear_pending(
+    struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn)
 {
     event_word_t *word;
 
@@ -334,7 +336,7 @@ static void evtchn_fifo_clear_pending(struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn)
     guest_clear_bit(d, EVTCHN_FIFO_PENDING, word);
 }
 
-static void evtchn_fifo_unmask(struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn)
+static void cf_check evtchn_fifo_unmask(struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn)
 {
     struct vcpu *v = d->vcpu[evtchn->notify_vcpu_id];
     event_word_t *word;
@@ -350,32 +352,32 @@ static void evtchn_fifo_unmask(struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn)
         evtchn_fifo_set_pending(v, evtchn);
 }
 
-static bool evtchn_fifo_is_pending(const struct domain *d,
-                                   const struct evtchn *evtchn)
+static bool cf_check evtchn_fifo_is_pending(
+    const struct domain *d, const struct evtchn *evtchn)
 {
     const event_word_t *word = evtchn_fifo_word_from_port(d, evtchn->port);
 
     return word && guest_test_bit(d, EVTCHN_FIFO_PENDING, word);
 }
 
-static bool_t evtchn_fifo_is_masked(const struct domain *d,
-                                    const struct evtchn *evtchn)
+static bool cf_check evtchn_fifo_is_masked(
+    const struct domain *d, const struct evtchn *evtchn)
 {
     const event_word_t *word = evtchn_fifo_word_from_port(d, evtchn->port);
 
     return !word || guest_test_bit(d, EVTCHN_FIFO_MASKED, word);
 }
 
-static bool_t evtchn_fifo_is_busy(const struct domain *d,
-                                  const struct evtchn *evtchn)
+static bool cf_check evtchn_fifo_is_busy(
+    const struct domain *d, const struct evtchn *evtchn)
 {
     const event_word_t *word = evtchn_fifo_word_from_port(d, evtchn->port);
 
     return word && guest_test_bit(d, EVTCHN_FIFO_LINKED, word);
 }
 
-static int evtchn_fifo_set_priority(struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn,
-                                    unsigned int priority)
+static int cf_check evtchn_fifo_set_priority(
+    struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn, unsigned int priority)
 {
     if ( priority > EVTCHN_FIFO_PRIORITY_MIN )
         return -EINVAL;
@@ -390,8 +392,8 @@ static int evtchn_fifo_set_priority(struct domain *d, struct evtchn *evtchn,
     return 0;
 }
 
-static void evtchn_fifo_print_state(struct domain *d,
-                                    const struct evtchn *evtchn)
+static void cf_check evtchn_fifo_print_state(
+    struct domain *d, const struct evtchn *evtchn)
 {
     event_word_t *word;
 
-- 
2.11.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-02-14 13:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-14 12:50 [PATCH v2 00/70] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 01/70] xen/domain: Improve pirq handling Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 02/70] xen/sort: Switch to an extern inline implementation Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:13   ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-14 18:30     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:17   ` Julien Grall
2022-02-16  3:46     ` Stefano Stabellini
2022-02-16  9:29       ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-16 10:44       ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16 11:46         ` Julien Grall
2022-02-16 11:55           ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 03/70] xen/xsm: Move {do,compat}_flask_op() declarations into a header Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 14:36   ` Daniel P. Smith
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 04/70] x86/pv-shim: Don't modify the hypercall table Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:33   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 13:50     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:56       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 22:17         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 10:20           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 10:34             ` Juergen Gross
2022-02-21 19:21             ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-22  8:41               ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 05/70] x86: Don't use the hypercall table for calling compat hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 06/70] x86: Introduce support for CET-IBT Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 14:01   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:54     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 11:32       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 07/70] x86: Build check for embedded endbr64 instructions Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 15:12   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 17:52     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  8:41       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 11:55         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 08/70] xen: CFI hardening for x86 hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 09/70] xen: CFI hardening for custom_param() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 10/70] xen: CFI hardening for __initcall() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 11/70] xen: CFI hardening for notifier callbacks Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 12/70] xen: CFI hardening for acpi_table_parse() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 13/70] xen: CFI hardening for continue_hypercall_on_cpu() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 14/70] xen: CFI hardening for init_timer() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 15/70] xen: CFI hardening for call_rcu() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 16/70] xen: CFI hardening for IPIs Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 17/70] xen: CFI hardening for open_softirq() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 18/70] xsm/flask/ss: CFI hardening Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 19/70] xsm: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 20/70] xen/sched: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2022-02-14 16:53   ` [PATCH v2 21/70] xen/evtchn: " David Vrabel
2022-02-14 16:59     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 22/70] xen/hypfs: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 23/70] xen/tasklet: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 24/70] xen/keyhandler: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 25/70] xen/vpci: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 26/70] xen/decompress: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 27/70] xen/iommu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 28/70] xen/video: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 29/70] xen/console: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 30/70] xen/misc: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 31/70] x86: CFI hardening for request_irq() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 32/70] x86/hvm: CFI hardening for hvm_funcs Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 33/70] x86/hvm: CFI hardening for device emulation Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 34/70] x86/emul: CFI hardening Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:38   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 13:43     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 14:13       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:34         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 11:49           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 35/70] x86/ucode: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 36/70] x86/power: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 37/70] x86/apic: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 38/70] x86/nmi: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 39/70] x86/mtrr: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 40/70] x86/idle: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 41/70] x86/quirks: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 42/70] x86/hvmsave: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 43/70] x86/mce: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 44/70] x86/pmu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 45/70] x86/cpu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 46/70] x86/guest: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 47/70] x86/logdirty: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 48/70] x86/shadow: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 49/70] x86/hap: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 50/70] x86/p2m: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 51/70] x86/irq: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 52/70] x86/apei: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 53/70] x86/psr: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 54/70] x86/dpci: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 55/70] x86/pt: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 56/70] x86/time: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 57/70] x86/misc: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 58/70] x86/stack: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 59/70] x86/bugframe: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 60/70] x86: Use control flow typechecking where possible Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:26   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 61/70] x86/setup: Read CR4 earlier in __start_xen() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 62/70] x86/alternatives: Clear CR4.CET when clearing CR0.WP Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 63/70] x86/traps: Rework write_stub_trampoline() to not hardcode the jmp Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 64/70] x86: Introduce helpers/checks for endbr64 instructions Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 16:14   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:31   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 65/70] x86/emul: Update emulation stubs to be CET-IBT compatible Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 66/70] x86/entry: Make syscall/sysenter entrypoints " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 67/70] x86/entry: Make IDT " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 68/70] x86/setup: Rework MSR_S_CET handling for CET-IBT Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:46   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 20:58     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  8:49       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 69/70] x86/efi: Disable CET-IBT around Runtime Services calls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:53   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 23:00     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  9:14       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 70/70] x86: Enable CET Indirect Branch Tracking Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:10 ` [PATCH v2 00/70] x86: Support for " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:43   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 14:15     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 14:38       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:59         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17  9:56           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 10:01 ` [PATCH v2.1 6.5/70] x86/kexec: Annotate embedded data with ELF metadata Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 10:42   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 12:06     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 14:48       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 16:06         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 16:16           ` Jan Beulich

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