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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 41/70] x86/quirks: CFI hardening
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 12:50:58 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214125127.17985-42-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214125127.17985-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.

Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
 xen/arch/x86/dmi_scan.c               | 10 +++++-----
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/quirks.c             |  2 +-
 xen/arch/x86/shutdown.c               |  2 +-
 xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig-shared.c |  8 ++++----
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/dmi_scan.c b/xen/arch/x86/dmi_scan.c
index d27cd3450a29..81f80c053a7a 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/dmi_scan.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/dmi_scan.c
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ static void __init dmi_save_ident(const struct dmi_header *dm, int slot, int str
 #define NO_MATCH	{ DMI_NONE, NULL}
 #define MATCH		DMI_MATCH
 
-static int __init ich10_bios_quirk(const struct dmi_system_id *d)
+static int __init cf_check ich10_bios_quirk(const struct dmi_system_id *d)
 {
     u32 port, smictl;
 
@@ -499,14 +499,14 @@ static int __init ich10_bios_quirk(const struct dmi_system_id *d)
     return 0;
 }
 
-static __init int reset_videomode_after_s3(const struct dmi_blacklist *d)
+static __init int cf_check reset_videomode_after_s3(const struct dmi_blacklist *d)
 {
 	/* See wakeup.S */
 	acpi_video_flags |= 2;
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static __init int dmi_disable_acpi(const struct dmi_blacklist *d)
+static __init int cf_check dmi_disable_acpi(const struct dmi_blacklist *d)
 { 
 	if (!acpi_force) { 
 		printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s detected: acpi off\n",d->ident);
@@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ static __init int dmi_disable_acpi(const struct dmi_blacklist *d)
 /*
  * Limit ACPI to CPU enumeration for HT
  */
-static __init int force_acpi_ht(const struct dmi_blacklist *d)
+static __init int cf_check force_acpi_ht(const struct dmi_blacklist *d)
 { 
 	if (!acpi_force) { 
 		printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s detected: force use of acpi=ht\n", d->ident);
@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ static const struct dmi_blacklist __initconstrel dmi_blacklist[] = {
  *	out of here.
  */
 
-static void __init dmi_decode(const struct dmi_header *dm)
+static void __init cf_check dmi_decode(const struct dmi_header *dm)
 {
 #ifdef DMI_DEBUG
 	const uint8_t *data = (const void *)dm;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/quirks.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/quirks.c
index 917356b1312c..2adab1f4b84b 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/quirks.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/quirks.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 s8 __read_mostly hvm_port80_allowed = -1;
 boolean_param("hvm_port80", hvm_port80_allowed);
 
-static int __init dmi_hvm_deny_port80(const struct dmi_system_id *id)
+static int __init cf_check dmi_hvm_deny_port80(const struct dmi_system_id *id)
 {
     printk(XENLOG_WARNING "%s: port 0x80 access %s allowed for HVM guests\n",
            id->ident, hvm_port80_allowed > 0 ? "forcibly" : "not");
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/shutdown.c b/xen/arch/x86/shutdown.c
index 30985d36a612..7619544d14da 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/shutdown.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/shutdown.c
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static void default_reboot_type(void)
         reboot_type = BOOT_ACPI;
 }
 
-static int __init override_reboot(const struct dmi_system_id *d)
+static int __init cf_check override_reboot(const struct dmi_system_id *d)
 {
     enum reboot_type type = (long)d->driver_data;
 
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig-shared.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig-shared.c
index 2fa7f3f0bc4b..74b22b71a19c 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig-shared.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mmconfig-shared.c
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static int __init cf_check parse_mmcfg(const char *s)
 }
 custom_param("mmcfg", parse_mmcfg);
 
-static const char __init *pci_mmcfg_e7520(void)
+static const char *__init cf_check pci_mmcfg_e7520(void)
 {
     u32 win;
     win = pci_conf_read16(PCI_SBDF(0, 0, 0, 0), 0xce);
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static const char __init *pci_mmcfg_e7520(void)
     return "Intel Corporation E7520 Memory Controller Hub";
 }
 
-static const char __init *pci_mmcfg_intel_945(void)
+static const char *__init cf_check pci_mmcfg_intel_945(void)
 {
     u32 pciexbar, mask = 0, len = 0;
 
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static const char __init *pci_mmcfg_intel_945(void)
     return "Intel Corporation 945G/GZ/P/PL Express Memory Controller Hub";
 }
 
-static const char __init *pci_mmcfg_amd_fam10h(void)
+static const char *__init cf_check pci_mmcfg_amd_fam10h(void)
 {
     uint32_t address;
     uint64_t base, msr_content;
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static const char __init *pci_mmcfg_amd_fam10h(void)
     return "AMD Family 10h NB";
 }
 
-static const char __init *pci_mmcfg_nvidia_mcp55(void)
+static const char *__init cf_check pci_mmcfg_nvidia_mcp55(void)
 {
     static bool_t __initdata mcp55_checked;
     int bus, i;
-- 
2.11.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-02-14 13:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-14 12:50 [PATCH v2 00/70] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 01/70] xen/domain: Improve pirq handling Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 02/70] xen/sort: Switch to an extern inline implementation Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:13   ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-14 18:30     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:17   ` Julien Grall
2022-02-16  3:46     ` Stefano Stabellini
2022-02-16  9:29       ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-16 10:44       ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16 11:46         ` Julien Grall
2022-02-16 11:55           ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 03/70] xen/xsm: Move {do,compat}_flask_op() declarations into a header Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 14:36   ` Daniel P. Smith
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 04/70] x86/pv-shim: Don't modify the hypercall table Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:33   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 13:50     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:56       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 22:17         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 10:20           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 10:34             ` Juergen Gross
2022-02-21 19:21             ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-22  8:41               ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 05/70] x86: Don't use the hypercall table for calling compat hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 06/70] x86: Introduce support for CET-IBT Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 14:01   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:54     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 11:32       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 07/70] x86: Build check for embedded endbr64 instructions Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 15:12   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 17:52     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  8:41       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 11:55         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 08/70] xen: CFI hardening for x86 hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 09/70] xen: CFI hardening for custom_param() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 10/70] xen: CFI hardening for __initcall() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 11/70] xen: CFI hardening for notifier callbacks Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 12/70] xen: CFI hardening for acpi_table_parse() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 13/70] xen: CFI hardening for continue_hypercall_on_cpu() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 14/70] xen: CFI hardening for init_timer() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 15/70] xen: CFI hardening for call_rcu() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 16/70] xen: CFI hardening for IPIs Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 17/70] xen: CFI hardening for open_softirq() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 18/70] xsm/flask/ss: CFI hardening Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 19/70] xsm: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 20/70] xen/sched: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 21/70] xen/evtchn: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 16:53   ` David Vrabel
2022-02-14 16:59     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 22/70] xen/hypfs: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 23/70] xen/tasklet: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 24/70] xen/keyhandler: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 25/70] xen/vpci: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 26/70] xen/decompress: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 27/70] xen/iommu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 28/70] xen/video: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 29/70] xen/console: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 30/70] xen/misc: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 31/70] x86: CFI hardening for request_irq() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 32/70] x86/hvm: CFI hardening for hvm_funcs Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 33/70] x86/hvm: CFI hardening for device emulation Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 34/70] x86/emul: CFI hardening Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:38   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 13:43     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 14:13       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:34         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 11:49           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 35/70] x86/ucode: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 36/70] x86/power: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 37/70] x86/apic: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 38/70] x86/nmi: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 39/70] x86/mtrr: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 40/70] x86/idle: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 42/70] x86/hvmsave: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 43/70] x86/mce: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 44/70] x86/pmu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 45/70] x86/cpu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 46/70] x86/guest: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 47/70] x86/logdirty: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 48/70] x86/shadow: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 49/70] x86/hap: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 50/70] x86/p2m: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 51/70] x86/irq: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 52/70] x86/apei: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 53/70] x86/psr: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 54/70] x86/dpci: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 55/70] x86/pt: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 56/70] x86/time: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 57/70] x86/misc: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 58/70] x86/stack: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 59/70] x86/bugframe: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 60/70] x86: Use control flow typechecking where possible Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:26   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 61/70] x86/setup: Read CR4 earlier in __start_xen() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 62/70] x86/alternatives: Clear CR4.CET when clearing CR0.WP Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 63/70] x86/traps: Rework write_stub_trampoline() to not hardcode the jmp Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 64/70] x86: Introduce helpers/checks for endbr64 instructions Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 16:14   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:31   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 65/70] x86/emul: Update emulation stubs to be CET-IBT compatible Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 66/70] x86/entry: Make syscall/sysenter entrypoints " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 67/70] x86/entry: Make IDT " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 68/70] x86/setup: Rework MSR_S_CET handling for CET-IBT Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:46   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 20:58     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  8:49       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 69/70] x86/efi: Disable CET-IBT around Runtime Services calls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:53   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 23:00     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  9:14       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 70/70] x86: Enable CET Indirect Branch Tracking Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:10 ` [PATCH v2 00/70] x86: Support for " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:43   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 14:15     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 14:38       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:59         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17  9:56           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 10:01 ` [PATCH v2.1 6.5/70] x86/kexec: Annotate embedded data with ELF metadata Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 10:42   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 12:06     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 14:48       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 16:06         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 16:16           ` Jan Beulich

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