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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 49/70] x86/hap: CFI hardening
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 12:51:06 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214125127.17985-50-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214125127.17985-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.

Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
 xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/guest_walk.c |  4 ++--
 xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c        | 21 +++++++++++----------
 xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/private.h    | 30 ++++++++++++------------------
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/guest_walk.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/guest_walk.c
index 832a8058471e..1da8d3b99edc 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/guest_walk.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/guest_walk.c
@@ -36,14 +36,14 @@
 #include <asm/guest_pt.h>
 #include <asm/p2m.h>
 
-unsigned long hap_gva_to_gfn(GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS)(
+unsigned long cf_check hap_gva_to_gfn(GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS)(
     struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gva, uint32_t *pfec)
 {
     unsigned long cr3 = v->arch.hvm.guest_cr[3];
     return hap_p2m_ga_to_gfn(GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS)(v, p2m, cr3, gva, pfec, NULL);
 }
 
-unsigned long hap_p2m_ga_to_gfn(GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS)(
+unsigned long cf_check hap_p2m_ga_to_gfn(GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS)(
     struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long cr3,
     paddr_t ga, uint32_t *pfec, unsigned int *page_order)
 {
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
index ed5112b00b63..9d67a47f5fe9 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/hap.c
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static void hap_free(struct domain *d, mfn_t mfn)
     page_list_add_tail(pg, &d->arch.paging.hap.freelist);
 }
 
-static struct page_info *hap_alloc_p2m_page(struct domain *d)
+static struct page_info *cf_check hap_alloc_p2m_page(struct domain *d)
 {
     struct page_info *pg;
 
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static struct page_info *hap_alloc_p2m_page(struct domain *d)
     return pg;
 }
 
-static void hap_free_p2m_page(struct domain *d, struct page_info *pg)
+static void cf_check hap_free_p2m_page(struct domain *d, struct page_info *pg)
 {
     struct domain *owner = page_get_owner(pg);
 
@@ -662,8 +662,8 @@ void hap_vcpu_init(struct vcpu *v)
  * HAP guests can handle page faults (in the guest page tables) without
  * needing any action from Xen, so we should not be intercepting them.
  */
-static int hap_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long va,
-                          struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+static int cf_check hap_page_fault(
+    struct vcpu *v, unsigned long va, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 {
     struct domain *d = v->domain;
 
@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ static int hap_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long va,
  * should not be intercepting it.  However, we need to correctly handle
  * getting here from instruction emulation.
  */
-static bool_t hap_invlpg(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long linear)
+static bool cf_check hap_invlpg(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long linear)
 {
     /*
      * Emulate INVLPGA:
@@ -690,7 +690,8 @@ static bool_t hap_invlpg(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long linear)
     return 1;
 }
 
-static void hap_update_cr3(struct vcpu *v, int do_locking, bool noflush)
+static void cf_check hap_update_cr3(
+    struct vcpu *v, int do_locking, bool noflush)
 {
     v->arch.hvm.hw_cr[3] = v->arch.hvm.guest_cr[3];
     hvm_update_guest_cr3(v, noflush);
@@ -702,7 +703,7 @@ static bool flush_vcpu(const struct vcpu *v, const unsigned long *vcpu_bitmap)
 }
 
 /* Flush TLB of selected vCPUs.  NULL for all. */
-static bool flush_tlb(const unsigned long *vcpu_bitmap)
+static bool cf_check flush_tlb(const unsigned long *vcpu_bitmap)
 {
     static DEFINE_PER_CPU(cpumask_t, flush_cpumask);
     cpumask_t *mask = &this_cpu(flush_cpumask);
@@ -747,7 +748,7 @@ hap_paging_get_mode(struct vcpu *v)
                                       &hap_paging_protected_mode);
 }
 
-static void hap_update_paging_modes(struct vcpu *v)
+static void cf_check hap_update_paging_modes(struct vcpu *v)
 {
     struct domain *d = v->domain;
     unsigned long cr3_gfn = v->arch.hvm.guest_cr[3] >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -791,13 +792,13 @@ void hap_p2m_init(struct p2m_domain *p2m)
     p2m->write_p2m_entry_post = hap_write_p2m_entry_post;
 }
 
-static unsigned long hap_gva_to_gfn_real_mode(
+static unsigned long cf_check hap_gva_to_gfn_real_mode(
     struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gva, uint32_t *pfec)
 {
     return ((paddr_t)gva >> PAGE_SHIFT);
 }
 
-static unsigned long hap_p2m_ga_to_gfn_real_mode(
+static unsigned long cf_check hap_p2m_ga_to_gfn_real_mode(
     struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long cr3,
     paddr_t ga, uint32_t *pfec, unsigned int *page_order)
 {
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/private.h b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/private.h
index 973fbe8be59c..1040eaf69f43 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/private.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/private.h
@@ -24,27 +24,21 @@
 /********************************************/
 /*          GUEST TRANSLATION FUNCS         */
 /********************************************/
-unsigned long hap_gva_to_gfn_2_levels(struct vcpu *v,
-                                     struct p2m_domain *p2m,
-                                     unsigned long gva, 
-                                     uint32_t *pfec);
-unsigned long hap_gva_to_gfn_3_levels(struct vcpu *v,
-                                     struct p2m_domain *p2m,
-                                     unsigned long gva, 
-                                     uint32_t *pfec);
-unsigned long hap_gva_to_gfn_4_levels(struct vcpu *v,
-                                     struct p2m_domain *p2m,
-                                     unsigned long gva, 
-                                     uint32_t *pfec);
+unsigned long cf_check hap_gva_to_gfn_2_levels(
+    struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gva, uint32_t *pfec);
+unsigned long cf_check hap_gva_to_gfn_3_levels(
+    struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gva, uint32_t *pfec);
+unsigned long cf_check hap_gva_to_gfn_4_levels(
+    struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gva, uint32_t *pfec);
 
-unsigned long hap_p2m_ga_to_gfn_2_levels(struct vcpu *v,
-    struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long cr3,
+unsigned long cf_check hap_p2m_ga_to_gfn_2_levels(
+    struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long cr3,
     paddr_t ga, uint32_t *pfec, unsigned int *page_order);
-unsigned long hap_p2m_ga_to_gfn_3_levels(struct vcpu *v,
-    struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long cr3,
+unsigned long cf_check hap_p2m_ga_to_gfn_3_levels(
+    struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long cr3,
     paddr_t ga, uint32_t *pfec, unsigned int *page_order);
-unsigned long hap_p2m_ga_to_gfn_4_levels(struct vcpu *v,
-    struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long cr3,
+unsigned long cf_check hap_p2m_ga_to_gfn_4_levels(
+    struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long cr3,
     paddr_t ga, uint32_t *pfec, unsigned int *page_order);
 
 #endif /* __HAP_PRIVATE_H__ */
-- 
2.11.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-02-14 13:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-14 12:50 [PATCH v2 00/70] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 01/70] xen/domain: Improve pirq handling Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 02/70] xen/sort: Switch to an extern inline implementation Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:13   ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-14 18:30     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:17   ` Julien Grall
2022-02-16  3:46     ` Stefano Stabellini
2022-02-16  9:29       ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-16 10:44       ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16 11:46         ` Julien Grall
2022-02-16 11:55           ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 03/70] xen/xsm: Move {do,compat}_flask_op() declarations into a header Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 14:36   ` Daniel P. Smith
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 04/70] x86/pv-shim: Don't modify the hypercall table Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:33   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 13:50     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:56       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 22:17         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 10:20           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 10:34             ` Juergen Gross
2022-02-21 19:21             ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-22  8:41               ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 05/70] x86: Don't use the hypercall table for calling compat hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 06/70] x86: Introduce support for CET-IBT Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 14:01   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:54     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 11:32       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 07/70] x86: Build check for embedded endbr64 instructions Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 15:12   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 17:52     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  8:41       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 11:55         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 08/70] xen: CFI hardening for x86 hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 09/70] xen: CFI hardening for custom_param() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 10/70] xen: CFI hardening for __initcall() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 11/70] xen: CFI hardening for notifier callbacks Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 12/70] xen: CFI hardening for acpi_table_parse() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 13/70] xen: CFI hardening for continue_hypercall_on_cpu() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 14/70] xen: CFI hardening for init_timer() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 15/70] xen: CFI hardening for call_rcu() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 16/70] xen: CFI hardening for IPIs Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 17/70] xen: CFI hardening for open_softirq() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 18/70] xsm/flask/ss: CFI hardening Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 19/70] xsm: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 20/70] xen/sched: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 21/70] xen/evtchn: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 16:53   ` David Vrabel
2022-02-14 16:59     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 22/70] xen/hypfs: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 23/70] xen/tasklet: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 24/70] xen/keyhandler: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 25/70] xen/vpci: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 26/70] xen/decompress: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 27/70] xen/iommu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 28/70] xen/video: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 29/70] xen/console: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 30/70] xen/misc: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 31/70] x86: CFI hardening for request_irq() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 32/70] x86/hvm: CFI hardening for hvm_funcs Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 33/70] x86/hvm: CFI hardening for device emulation Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 34/70] x86/emul: CFI hardening Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:38   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 13:43     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 14:13       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:34         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 11:49           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 35/70] x86/ucode: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 36/70] x86/power: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 37/70] x86/apic: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 38/70] x86/nmi: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 39/70] x86/mtrr: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 40/70] x86/idle: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 41/70] x86/quirks: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 42/70] x86/hvmsave: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 43/70] x86/mce: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 44/70] x86/pmu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 45/70] x86/cpu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 46/70] x86/guest: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 47/70] x86/logdirty: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 48/70] x86/shadow: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 50/70] x86/p2m: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 51/70] x86/irq: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 52/70] x86/apei: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 53/70] x86/psr: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 54/70] x86/dpci: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 55/70] x86/pt: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 56/70] x86/time: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 57/70] x86/misc: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 58/70] x86/stack: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 59/70] x86/bugframe: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 60/70] x86: Use control flow typechecking where possible Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:26   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 61/70] x86/setup: Read CR4 earlier in __start_xen() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 62/70] x86/alternatives: Clear CR4.CET when clearing CR0.WP Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 63/70] x86/traps: Rework write_stub_trampoline() to not hardcode the jmp Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 64/70] x86: Introduce helpers/checks for endbr64 instructions Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 16:14   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:31   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 65/70] x86/emul: Update emulation stubs to be CET-IBT compatible Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 66/70] x86/entry: Make syscall/sysenter entrypoints " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 67/70] x86/entry: Make IDT " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 68/70] x86/setup: Rework MSR_S_CET handling for CET-IBT Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:46   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 20:58     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  8:49       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 69/70] x86/efi: Disable CET-IBT around Runtime Services calls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:53   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 23:00     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  9:14       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 70/70] x86: Enable CET Indirect Branch Tracking Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:10 ` [PATCH v2 00/70] x86: Support for " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:43   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 14:15     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 14:38       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:59         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17  9:56           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 10:01 ` [PATCH v2.1 6.5/70] x86/kexec: Annotate embedded data with ELF metadata Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 10:42   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 12:06     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 14:48       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 16:06         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 16:16           ` Jan Beulich

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