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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 59/70] x86/bugframe: CFI hardening
Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 12:51:16 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220214125127.17985-60-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220214125127.17985-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

Control Flow Integrity schemes use toolchain and optionally hardware support
to help protect against call/jump/return oriented programming attacks.

Use cf_check to annotate function pointer targets for the toolchain.

run_in_exception_handler() managed to escape typechecking, as the compiler
can't see where function pointer gets called.  After adding some ad-hoc
typechecking, it turns out that dump_execution_state() alone differs in
const-ness from the other users of run_in_exception_handler().

Introduce a new show_execution_state_nonconst() to make the typechecking
happy.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
 xen/arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h       | 10 +++++++++-
 xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h |  4 +++-
 xen/arch/x86/traps.c                 |  5 +++++
 xen/common/keyhandler.c              |  4 ++--
 xen/drivers/char/ehci-dbgp.c         |  2 +-
 xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c           |  2 +-
 xen/include/xen/lib.h                |  2 +-
 7 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h
index 9bb4a194202f..b7265bdfbe33 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h
@@ -65,7 +65,15 @@ struct bug_frame {
     unreachable();                                              \
 } while (0)
 
-#define run_in_exception_handler(fn) BUG_FRAME(BUGFRAME_run_fn, 0, fn, 0, NULL)
+/*
+ * TODO: untangle header dependences, break BUILD_BUG_ON() out of xen/lib.h,
+ * and use a real static inline here to get proper type checking of fn().
+ */
+#define run_in_exception_handler(fn)                            \
+    do {                                                        \
+        (void)((fn) == (void (*)(struct cpu_user_regs *))NULL); \
+        BUG_FRAME(BUGFRAME_run_fn, 0, fn, 0, NULL);             \
+    } while ( 0 )
 
 #define assert_failed(msg) do {                                 \
     BUG_FRAME(BUGFRAME_assert, __LINE__, __FILE__, 1, msg);     \
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 23639d5479a3..8e2816fae9b9 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -496,7 +496,9 @@ void show_code(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
 void show_stack_overflow(unsigned int cpu, const struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
 void show_registers(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
 void show_execution_state(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
-#define dump_execution_state() run_in_exception_handler(show_execution_state)
+void cf_check show_execution_state_nonconst(struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
+#define dump_execution_state() \
+    run_in_exception_handler(show_execution_state_nonconst)
 void show_page_walk(unsigned long addr);
 void noreturn fatal_trap(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs, bool_t show_remote);
 
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index 7b957101934e..a2278d9499d0 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -681,6 +681,11 @@ void show_execution_state(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
     console_unlock_recursive_irqrestore(flags);
 }
 
+void cf_check show_execution_state_nonconst(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+{
+    show_execution_state(regs);
+}
+
 void vcpu_show_execution_state(struct vcpu *v)
 {
     unsigned long flags = 0;
diff --git a/xen/common/keyhandler.c b/xen/common/keyhandler.c
index 5dc650a37c5c..b6e22d8120b1 100644
--- a/xen/common/keyhandler.c
+++ b/xen/common/keyhandler.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void cf_check show_handlers(unsigned char key)
 
 static cpumask_t dump_execstate_mask;
 
-void dump_execstate(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+void cf_check dump_execstate(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 {
     unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
 
@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ static void cf_check run_all_keyhandlers(
     tasklet_schedule(&run_all_keyhandlers_tasklet);
 }
 
-static void do_debugger_trap_fatal(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+static void cf_check do_debugger_trap_fatal(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 {
     (void)debugger_trap_fatal(0xf001, regs);
 
diff --git a/xen/drivers/char/ehci-dbgp.c b/xen/drivers/char/ehci-dbgp.c
index e205c0da6a61..16c8ff394d5c 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/char/ehci-dbgp.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/char/ehci-dbgp.c
@@ -1247,7 +1247,7 @@ static int cf_check ehci_dbgp_getc(struct serial_port *port, char *pc)
 /* Safe: ehci_dbgp_poll() runs as timer handler, so not reentrant. */
 static struct serial_port *poll_port;
 
-static void _ehci_dbgp_poll(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+static void cf_check _ehci_dbgp_poll(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 {
     struct serial_port *port = poll_port;
     struct ehci_dbgp *dbgp = port->uart;
diff --git a/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c b/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c
index 8df1ee4d5c2c..e5b4a9085516 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/char/ns16550.c
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ static void cf_check ns16550_interrupt(
 /* Safe: ns16550_poll() runs as softirq so not reentrant on a given CPU. */
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct serial_port *, poll_port);
 
-static void __ns16550_poll(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+static void cf_check __ns16550_poll(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 {
     struct serial_port *port = this_cpu(poll_port);
     struct ns16550 *uart = port->uart;
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/lib.h b/xen/include/xen/lib.h
index c6987973bf88..3a1fdaf7e35a 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/lib.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/lib.h
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ extern char *print_tainted(char *str);
 extern void add_taint(unsigned int taint);
 
 struct cpu_user_regs;
-void dump_execstate(struct cpu_user_regs *);
+void cf_check dump_execstate(struct cpu_user_regs *);
 
 void init_constructors(void);
 
-- 
2.11.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-02-14 13:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-14 12:50 [PATCH v2 00/70] x86: Support for CET Indirect Branch Tracking Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 01/70] xen/domain: Improve pirq handling Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 02/70] xen/sort: Switch to an extern inline implementation Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:13   ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-14 18:30     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:17   ` Julien Grall
2022-02-16  3:46     ` Stefano Stabellini
2022-02-16  9:29       ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-16 10:44       ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16 11:46         ` Julien Grall
2022-02-16 11:55           ` Bertrand Marquis
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 03/70] xen/xsm: Move {do,compat}_flask_op() declarations into a header Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 14:36   ` Daniel P. Smith
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 04/70] x86/pv-shim: Don't modify the hypercall table Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:33   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 13:50     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:56       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 22:17         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 10:20           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 10:34             ` Juergen Gross
2022-02-21 19:21             ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-22  8:41               ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 05/70] x86: Don't use the hypercall table for calling compat hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 06/70] x86: Introduce support for CET-IBT Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 14:01   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:54     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 11:32       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 07/70] x86: Build check for embedded endbr64 instructions Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 15:12   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 17:52     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  8:41       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 11:55         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 08/70] xen: CFI hardening for x86 hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 09/70] xen: CFI hardening for custom_param() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 10/70] xen: CFI hardening for __initcall() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 11/70] xen: CFI hardening for notifier callbacks Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 12/70] xen: CFI hardening for acpi_table_parse() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 13/70] xen: CFI hardening for continue_hypercall_on_cpu() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 14/70] xen: CFI hardening for init_timer() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 15/70] xen: CFI hardening for call_rcu() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 16/70] xen: CFI hardening for IPIs Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 17/70] xen: CFI hardening for open_softirq() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 18/70] xsm/flask/ss: CFI hardening Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 19/70] xsm: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 20/70] xen/sched: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 21/70] xen/evtchn: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 16:53   ` David Vrabel
2022-02-14 16:59     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 22/70] xen/hypfs: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 23/70] xen/tasklet: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 24/70] xen/keyhandler: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 25/70] xen/vpci: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 26/70] xen/decompress: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 27/70] xen/iommu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 28/70] xen/video: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 29/70] xen/console: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 30/70] xen/misc: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 31/70] x86: CFI hardening for request_irq() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 32/70] x86/hvm: CFI hardening for hvm_funcs Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 33/70] x86/hvm: CFI hardening for device emulation Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 34/70] x86/emul: CFI hardening Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:38   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 13:43     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 14:13       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:34         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 11:49           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 35/70] x86/ucode: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 36/70] x86/power: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 37/70] x86/apic: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 38/70] x86/nmi: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 39/70] x86/mtrr: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 40/70] x86/idle: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 41/70] x86/quirks: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:50 ` [PATCH v2 42/70] x86/hvmsave: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 43/70] x86/mce: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 44/70] x86/pmu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 45/70] x86/cpu: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 46/70] x86/guest: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 47/70] x86/logdirty: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 48/70] x86/shadow: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 49/70] x86/hap: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 50/70] x86/p2m: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 51/70] x86/irq: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 52/70] x86/apei: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 53/70] x86/psr: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 54/70] x86/dpci: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 55/70] x86/pt: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 56/70] x86/time: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 57/70] x86/misc: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 58/70] x86/stack: " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 60/70] x86: Use control flow typechecking where possible Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:26   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 61/70] x86/setup: Read CR4 earlier in __start_xen() Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 62/70] x86/alternatives: Clear CR4.CET when clearing CR0.WP Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 63/70] x86/traps: Rework write_stub_trampoline() to not hardcode the jmp Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 64/70] x86: Introduce helpers/checks for endbr64 instructions Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 16:14   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:31   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 65/70] x86/emul: Update emulation stubs to be CET-IBT compatible Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 66/70] x86/entry: Make syscall/sysenter entrypoints " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 67/70] x86/entry: Make IDT " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 68/70] x86/setup: Rework MSR_S_CET handling for CET-IBT Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:46   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 20:58     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  8:49       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 69/70] x86/efi: Disable CET-IBT around Runtime Services calls Andrew Cooper
2022-02-15 16:53   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-15 23:00     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-16  9:14       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 12:51 ` [PATCH v2 70/70] x86: Enable CET Indirect Branch Tracking Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:10 ` [PATCH v2 00/70] x86: Support for " Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 13:43   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-14 14:15     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-14 14:38       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-16 21:59         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17  9:56           ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 10:01 ` [PATCH v2.1 6.5/70] x86/kexec: Annotate embedded data with ELF metadata Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 10:42   ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 12:06     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 14:48       ` Jan Beulich
2022-02-17 16:06         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-02-17 16:16           ` Jan Beulich

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