From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com
Subject: [PATCH 18/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 17:45:05 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190419004617.64627-19-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190419004617.64627-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert security_secid_to_secctx to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved
that will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
drivers/android/binder.c | 4 +++-
include/linux/security.h | 9 +++++++--
include/net/scm.h | 4 +---
kernel/audit.c | 9 +++++++--
kernel/auditsc.c | 13 +++++++++----
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 5 ++---
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 8 ++++++--
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 8 ++++++--
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 +++---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 9 ++++++---
security/security.c | 8 ++------
13 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
index 8685882da64c..9119333f794b 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
+++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
@@ -3120,9 +3120,11 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {
u32 secid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid);
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
if (ret) {
return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
return_error_param = ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 991d2d2e290e..5cea6260bbd9 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
*secid = data->apparmor;
break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK | LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
+ /* For scaffolding only */
+ *secid = data->selinux;
+ break;
default:
pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
data->flags);
@@ -436,7 +440,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,
struct lsm_export *l);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -1214,7 +1218,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l,
+ char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
index 13b8a369fd89..b5d1c24318e3 100644
--- a/include/net/scm.h
+++ b/include/net/scm.h
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ struct scm_cookie {
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
struct scm_creds creds; /* Skb credentials */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
- u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
struct lsm_export le; /* Passed LSM data */
#endif
};
@@ -48,7 +47,6 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->le);
- lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &scm->secid);
}
#else
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
@@ -99,7 +97,7 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct sc
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&scm->le, &secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index c89ea48c70a6..b5d96a0320fb 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1430,7 +1430,10 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
len = 0;
if (audit_sig_sid) {
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+ struct lsm_export le;
+
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, audit_sig_sid);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -2073,12 +2076,14 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
unsigned len;
int error;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
if (!sid)
return 0;
- error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 822ba35e4e64..83aba0336eac 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -946,6 +946,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
+ struct lsm_export le;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
if (!ab)
@@ -955,7 +956,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
if (sid) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
} else {
@@ -1197,7 +1199,9 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
if (osid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ struct lsm_export le;
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
} else {
@@ -1348,9 +1352,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
if (n->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(
- n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, n->osid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
if (call_panic)
*call_panic = 2;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index b8ef7677a7e5..a4f37ba6dbe2 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -132,15 +132,14 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct lsm_export le;
char *secdata;
- u32 seclen, secid;
+ u32 seclen;
int err;
err = security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(NULL, skb, &le);
if (err)
return;
- lsm_export_secid(&le, &secid);
- err = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secdata, &seclen);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secdata, &seclen);
if (err)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 66c596d287a5..b069277450c5 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -330,8 +330,10 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)
struct nlattr *nest_secctx;
int len, ret;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
@@ -615,8 +617,10 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK
int len, ret;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, NULL, &len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, NULL, &len);
if (ret)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index c2ae14c720b4..12318026d8d4 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -175,8 +175,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)
int ret;
u32 len;
char *secctx;
+ struct lsm_export le;
- ret = security_secid_to_secctx(ct->secmark, &secctx, &len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, ct->secmark);
+ ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &len);
if (ret)
return;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
index 0dcc3592d053..4c74c383e26b 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
@@ -309,13 +309,17 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)
{
u32 seclen = 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK)
+ struct lsm_export le;
+
if (!skb || !sk_fullsock(skb->sk))
return 0;
read_lock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
- if (skb->secmark)
- security_secid_to_secctx(skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen);
+ if (skb->secmark) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, skb->secmark);
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le, secdata, &seclen);
+ }
read_unlock_bh(&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
#endif
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index fc38934ccb35..00922f55dd9e 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
char *secctx = NULL;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
addr_len != sizeof(struct in6_addr))
@@ -451,7 +452,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,
unlhsh_add_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (audit_buf != NULL) {
- if (security_secid_to_secctx(secid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
&secctx,
&secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
@@ -488,6 +490,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -507,8 +510,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,
addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -550,6 +555,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
struct net_device *dev;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
spin_lock(&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
list_entry = netlbl_af6list_remove(addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -568,8 +574,10 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,
addr, mask);
if (dev != NULL)
dev_put(dev);
+ if (entry != NULL)
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, entry->secid);
if (entry != NULL &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(entry->secid,
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le,
&secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_obj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1092,6 +1100,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
u32 secid;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1146,7 +1155,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,
secid = addr6->secid;
}
- ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ ret_val = security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_len);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto list_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 4676f5bb16ae..1079cdea872c 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
char *secctx;
u32 secctx_len;
+ struct lsm_export le;
if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
return NULL;
@@ -112,10 +113,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
audit_info->sessionid);
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, audit_info->secid);
if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
- security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
- &secctx,
- &secctx_len) == 0) {
+ security_secid_to_secctx(&le, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
}
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index ddb838a1b74c..4d4107927ba2 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -143,17 +143,20 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid;
+ lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &(UNIXCB(skb).secid));
}
static inline void unix_set_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- scm->secid = UNIXCB(skb).secid;
+ lsm_export_to_all(&scm->le, UNIXCB(skb).secid);
}
static inline bool unix_secdata_eq(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return (scm->secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
+ u32 best_secid;
+
+ lsm_export_secid(&scm->le, &best_secid);
+ return (best_secid == UNIXCB(skb).secid);
}
#else
static inline void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 868e9ae6b48c..b6a096be95ac 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1957,13 +1957,9 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
-int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+int security_secid_to_secctx(struct lsm_export *l, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- struct lsm_export data;
-
- lsm_export_to_all(&data, secid);
- return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, &data, secdata,
- seclen);
+ return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, l, secdata, seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
--
2.19.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-19 0:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-19 0:44 [PATCH 00/90] LSM: Module stacking for all Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 01/90] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 02/90] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 03/90] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 04/90] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 05/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 06/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 07/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 08/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 09/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 10/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 11/90] LSM: Fix logical operation in lsm_export checks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:44 ` [PATCH 12/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 13/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 14/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 15/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 16/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 17/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 19/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 20/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 21/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 22/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 23/90] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 24/90] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 25/90] Audit: Convert osid " Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 26/90] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 27/90] NET: Change the UNIXCB from a secid to an lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 28/90] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 29/90] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 30/90] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 31/90] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 32/90] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 33/90] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 34/90] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 35/90] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 36/90] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 37/90] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 38/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 39/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 40/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 41/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_notifysecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 42/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in dentry_init_security hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 43/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 44/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 45/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 46/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 47/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 48/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_release_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 49/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 50/90] fs: remove lsm_context scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 51/90] LSM: Add the release function to the lsm_context Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 52/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_setsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 53/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_setsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 54/90] kernfs: remove lsm_context scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 55/90] LSM: Remove unused macro Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 56/90] LSM: Special handling for secctx lsm hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 57/90] SELinux: Use blob offset in current_sid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 58/90] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 59/90] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 60/90] LSM: Add secmark_relabel_packet to the set of one call hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 61/90] LSM: Make getting the secmark right cleaner Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 62/90] netfilter: Fix memory leak introduced with lsm_context Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 63/90] Smack: Consolidate secmark conversions Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 64/90] netfilter: Remove unnecessary NULL check in lsm_context Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 65/90] LSM: Add secmark refcounting to call_one list Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 66/90] LSM: refactor security_setprocattr Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 67/90] Smack: Detect if secmarks can be safely used Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 68/90] LSM: Support multiple LSMs using inode_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 69/90] LSM: Use full security context in security_inode_setsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-22 13:13 ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-04-22 20:45 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-04-22 21:01 ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 70/90] LSM: Correct handling of ENOSYS in inode_setxattr Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 71/90] LSM: Infrastructure security blobs for mount options Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:45 ` [PATCH 72/90] LSM: Fix for security_init_inode_security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 73/90] Smack: Advertise the secid to netlabel Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 74/90] LSM: Change error detection for UDP peer security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 75/90] Smack: Fix setting of the CIPSO MLS_CAT flags Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 76/90] Smack: Set netlabel flags properly on new label import Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 77/90] Netlabel: Add a secattr comparison API function Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 78/90] Smack: Let netlabel do the work on the ambient domain Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 79/90] Smack: Don't set the socket label on each send Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 80/90] Smack: Let netlabel do the work on connections Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 0:46 ` [PATCH 81/90] Netlabel: Return the labeling type on socket Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 15:27 ` [PATCH 00/90] LSM: Module stacking for all Stephen Smalley
2019-04-21 17:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-04-22 12:46 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-04-22 16:10 ` Casey Schaufler
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