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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com
Subject: [PATCH 02/90] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 17:44:49 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190419004617.64627-3-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190419004617.64627-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h         |  1 +
 security/apparmor/include/net.h   |  6 ++-
 security/apparmor/lsm.c           | 38 ++++-----------
 security/security.c               | 36 +++++++++++++-
 security/selinux/hooks.c          | 78 +++++++++++++++----------------
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h |  5 ++
 security/selinux/netlabel.c       | 23 ++++-----
 security/smack/smack.h            |  5 ++
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c        | 64 ++++++++++++-------------
 security/smack/smack_netfilter.c  |  8 ++--
 10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index cdc5730666d6..1dbed888dab0 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2055,6 +2055,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {
 	int	lbs_cred;
 	int	lbs_file;
 	int	lbs_inode;
+	int	lbs_sock;
 	int	lbs_superblock;
 	int	lbs_ipc;
 	int	lbs_msg_msg;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
index 7334ac966d01..adac04e3b3cc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -55,7 +55,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {
 	struct aa_label *peer;
 };
 
-#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock(const struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
 #define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
 #define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P)				  \
 	struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK),		  \
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 49d664ddff44..2716e7731279 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -757,33 +757,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginfo
 	return error;
 }
 
-/**
- * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
- */
-static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
-{
-	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
-
-	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
-	if (!ctx)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /**
  * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
  */
 static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
 
-	SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
 	aa_put_label(ctx->label);
 	aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
-	kfree(ctx);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -792,8 +774,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
 				       struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
-	struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *new = aa_sock(newsk);
 
 	new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
 	new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
@@ -844,7 +826,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 		label = aa_get_current_label();
 
 	if (sock->sk) {
-		struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
+		struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sock->sk);
 
 		aa_put_label(ctx->label);
 		ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
@@ -1029,7 +1011,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
  */
 static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
 
 	if (!skb->secmark)
 		return 0;
@@ -1042,7 +1024,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
 
 	if (ctx->peer)
 		return ctx->peer;
@@ -1126,7 +1108,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
  */
 static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 {
-	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
 
 	if (!ctx->label)
 		ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
@@ -1136,7 +1118,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 static int apparmor_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				      struct request_sock *req)
 {
-	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+	struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = aa_sock(sk);
 
 	if (!skb->secmark)
 		return 0;
@@ -1153,6 +1135,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *),
 	.lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx),
 	.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
+	.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx),
 };
 
 static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1189,7 +1172,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
 
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
 
@@ -1581,7 +1563,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,
 	if (sk == NULL)
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
 
-	ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
+	ctx = aa_sock(sk);
 	if (!apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND,
 				    skb->secmark, sk))
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 550988a0f024..e32b7180282e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/msg.h>
 #include <net/flow.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
 
 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR	2
 
@@ -172,6 +173,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
 	lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
 }
@@ -306,6 +308,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
 	init_debug("inode blob size      = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
 	init_debug("ipc blob size        = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
 	init_debug("msg_msg blob size    = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
+	init_debug("sock blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_sock);
 	init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
 	init_debug("task blob size       = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
 
@@ -605,6 +608,28 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
 		panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
 }
 
+/**
+ * lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob
+ * @sock: the sock that needs a blob
+ * @priority: allocation mode
+ *
+ * Allocate the sock blob for all the modules
+ *
+ * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_sock_alloc(struct sock *sock, gfp_t priority)
+{
+	if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock == 0) {
+		sock->sk_security = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	sock->sk_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority);
+	if (sock->sk_security == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
  * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
@@ -2048,12 +2073,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
 
 int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+	int rc = lsm_sock_alloc(sk, priority);
+
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		return rc;
+	rc = call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
+	if (unlikely(rc))
+		security_sk_free(sk);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
+	kfree(sk->sk_security);
+	sk->sk_security = NULL;
 }
 
 void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7478d8eda00a..f38a6f484613 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4319,7 +4319,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
 
 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 
@@ -4376,7 +4376,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 	isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
 
 	if (sock->sk) {
-		sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
 		sksec->sclass = sclass;
 		sksec->sid = sid;
 		/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
@@ -4392,8 +4392,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
 				     struct socket *sockb)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk);
 
 	sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
 	sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
@@ -4408,7 +4408,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	u16 family;
 	int err;
 
@@ -4540,7 +4540,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
 					 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	int err;
 
 	err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
@@ -4711,9 +4711,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 					      struct sock *other,
 					      struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock);
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other);
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk);
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 	int err;
@@ -4745,8 +4745,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 					struct socket *other)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-	struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 
@@ -4788,7 +4788,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				       u16 family)
 {
 	int err = 0;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
@@ -4821,7 +4821,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -4889,13 +4889,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
-					    int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+					    __user char *optval,
+					    __user int *optlen,
+					    unsigned int len)
 {
 	int err = 0;
 	char *scontext;
 	u32 scontext_len;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
 	u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
 
 	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
@@ -4955,34 +4957,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
 
 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
-	sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
-	if (!sksec)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 	sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 	sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
 	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
-	sk->sk_security = sksec;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
-	sk->sk_security = NULL;
 	selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
-	kfree(sksec);
 }
 
 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
-	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
 
 	newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
 	newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
@@ -4996,7 +4991,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
 	if (!sk)
 		*secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
 	else {
-		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 		*secid = sksec->sid;
 	}
@@ -5006,7 +5001,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec =
 		inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 	if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
 	    sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
@@ -5021,7 +5016,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 				      struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 	u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -5172,8 +5167,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
 static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
 				  struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
-	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
 
 	/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
 	 * the non-sctp clone version.
@@ -5190,7 +5185,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				     struct request_sock *req)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	int err;
 	u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
 	u32 connsid;
@@ -5211,7 +5206,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
 				   const struct request_sock *req)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
 
 	newsksec->sid = req->secid;
 	newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
@@ -5228,7 +5223,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 	/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
 	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
@@ -5312,7 +5307,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
 {
 	struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 	/* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
 	 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
@@ -5353,7 +5348,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	int err = 0;
 	u32 perm;
 	struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 	if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
 		err = -EINVAL;
@@ -5494,7 +5489,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			return NF_ACCEPT;
 
 		/* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
-		sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 		sid = sksec->sid;
 	} else
 		sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
@@ -5533,7 +5528,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 	if (sk == NULL)
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
-	sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 	ad.u.net = &net;
@@ -5625,7 +5620,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		u32 skb_sid;
 		struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
 
-		sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 		if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
 			return NF_DROP;
 		/* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
@@ -5654,7 +5649,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	} else {
 		/* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
 		 * associated socket. */
-		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 		peer_sid = sksec->sid;
 		secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
 	}
@@ -6633,6 +6628,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
 	.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
 	.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
+	.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct),
 	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
 };
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index d08d7e5d2f93..29f02b8f8f31 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -194,4 +194,9 @@ static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock(
 	return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock;
 }
 
+static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+	return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
 #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 186e727b737b..c40914a157b7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
 #include <linux/ip.h>
 #include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
 static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	int rc;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
 
 	if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
@@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(
 							const struct sock *sk,
 							u32 sid)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;
 
 	if (secattr == NULL)
@@ -249,7 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	 * being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */
 	sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
 	if (sk != NULL) {
-		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 		if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
 			return 0;
@@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(ep->base.sk);
 	struct sockaddr *addr;
 	struct sockaddr_in addr4;
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
@@ -370,7 +371,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
  */
 void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 	if (family == PF_INET)
 		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
@@ -388,8 +389,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
  */
 void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
-	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk);
 
 	newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
 }
@@ -407,7 +408,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 {
 	int rc;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
 
 	if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
@@ -522,7 +523,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 
 	if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -560,7 +561,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
 						struct sockaddr *addr)
 {
 	int rc;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
 
 	/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -599,7 +600,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
 					 struct sockaddr *addr)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk);
 
 	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
 	    sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index caecbcba9942..4ac4bf3310d7 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -375,6 +375,11 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)
 	return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc;
 }
 
+static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock(const struct sock *sock)
+{
+	return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock;
+}
+
 static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock(
 					const struct super_block *superblock)
 {
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 807eff2ccce9..fd69e1bd841b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
 		if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
 			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 
 		if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
 			isp = ssp->smk_in;
@@ -1821,7 +1821,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
 
 	if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
 		sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
-		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 		tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
 		/*
 		 * If the receiving process can't write to the
@@ -2231,11 +2231,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
 static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
-	struct socket_smack *ssp;
-
-	ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
-	if (ssp == NULL)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 
 	/*
 	 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
@@ -2249,11 +2245,10 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 	}
 	ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
 
-	sk->sk_security = ssp;
-
 	return 0;
 }
 
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
 /**
  * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
  * @sk: the socket
@@ -2262,7 +2257,6 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
  */
 static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 {
-#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
 	struct smk_port_label *spp;
 
 	if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
@@ -2275,9 +2269,8 @@ static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}
-#endif
-	kfree(sk->sk_security);
 }
+#endif
 
 /**
 * smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
@@ -2395,7 +2388,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
 static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -2440,7 +2433,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
 	int rc;
 	int sk_lbl;
 	struct smack_known *hkp;
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
@@ -2516,7 +2509,7 @@ static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 	struct smk_port_label *spp;
 	unsigned short port = 0;
 
@@ -2603,7 +2596,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
 				int act)
 {
 	struct smk_port_label *spp;
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
 	unsigned short port;
 	struct smack_known *object;
@@ -2697,7 +2690,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 	if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
 		ssp->smk_in = skp;
@@ -2745,7 +2738,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 	 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
 	 */
 	if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
-		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 		ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
 		ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
 	}
@@ -2770,8 +2763,8 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
 		                   struct socket *sockb)
 {
-	struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
-	struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *asp = smack_sock(socka->sk);
+	struct socket_smack *bsp = smack_sock(sockb->sk);
 
 	asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
 	bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
@@ -2825,7 +2818,7 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
 		return 0;
 
 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
-	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 #endif
 
 	switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
@@ -3566,9 +3559,9 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct smack_known *okp;
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
-	struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
-	struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock);
+	struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
+	struct socket_smack *nsp = smack_sock(newsk);
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc = 0;
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -3614,8 +3607,8 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
  */
 static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
 {
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
-	struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
+	struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
@@ -3652,7 +3645,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 	struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
 #endif
 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 	struct smack_known *rsp;
 #endif
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -3817,7 +3810,7 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
 static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -3934,7 +3927,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
 	int slen = 1;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 	if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
 		rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
 		slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
@@ -3984,7 +3977,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
 
 	switch (family) {
 	case PF_UNIX:
-		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 		s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
 		break;
 	case PF_INET:
@@ -3997,7 +3990,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
 		 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
 		 */
 		if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
-			ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+			ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
 		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
 		rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
 		if (rc == 0) {
@@ -4035,7 +4028,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 	    (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
 		return;
 
-	ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 	ssp->smk_in = skp;
 	ssp->smk_out = skp;
 	/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
@@ -4055,7 +4048,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 {
 	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 	struct sockaddr_in addr;
 	struct iphdr *hdr;
@@ -4154,7 +4147,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
 				 const struct request_sock *req)
 {
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
 	if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
@@ -4558,6 +4551,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
 	.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
 	.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+	.lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack),
 	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
 };
 
@@ -4667,7 +4661,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+#endif
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index e36d17835d4f..701a1cc1bdcc 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,
 	struct socket_smack *ssp;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
-	if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
-		ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+		ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 		skp = ssp->smk_out;
 		skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
 	}
@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,
 	struct socket_smack *ssp;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
-	if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
-		ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	if (sk && smack_sock(sk)) {
+		ssp = smack_sock(sk);
 		skp = ssp->smk_out;
 		skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
 	}
-- 
2.19.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-04-19  0:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-04-19  0:44 [PATCH 00/90] LSM: Module stacking for all Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:44 ` [PATCH 01/90] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:44 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2019-04-19  0:44 ` [PATCH 03/90] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:44 ` [PATCH 04/90] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:44 ` [PATCH 05/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:44 ` [PATCH 06/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:44 ` [PATCH 07/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:44 ` [PATCH 08/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:44 ` [PATCH 09/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:44 ` [PATCH 10/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:44 ` [PATCH 11/90] LSM: Fix logical operation in lsm_export checks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:44 ` [PATCH 12/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 13/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 14/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 15/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 16/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 17/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 18/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 19/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 20/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 21/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 22/90] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 23/90] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 24/90] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 25/90] Audit: Convert osid " Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 26/90] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 27/90] NET: Change the UNIXCB from a secid to an lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 28/90] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 29/90] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 30/90] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 31/90] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 32/90] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 33/90] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 34/90] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 35/90] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 36/90] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 37/90] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 38/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 39/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 40/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 41/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_notifysecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 42/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in dentry_init_security hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 43/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 44/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_notifysecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 45/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 46/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 47/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in release_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 48/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_release_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 49/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 50/90] fs: remove lsm_context scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 51/90] LSM: Add the release function to the lsm_context Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 52/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_setsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 53/90] LSM: Use lsm_context in security_inode_setsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 54/90] kernfs: remove lsm_context scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 55/90] LSM: Remove unused macro Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 56/90] LSM: Special handling for secctx lsm hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 57/90] SELinux: Use blob offset in current_sid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 58/90] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 59/90] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 60/90] LSM: Add secmark_relabel_packet to the set of one call hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 61/90] LSM: Make getting the secmark right cleaner Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 62/90] netfilter: Fix memory leak introduced with lsm_context Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 63/90] Smack: Consolidate secmark conversions Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 64/90] netfilter: Remove unnecessary NULL check in lsm_context Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 65/90] LSM: Add secmark refcounting to call_one list Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 66/90] LSM: refactor security_setprocattr Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 67/90] Smack: Detect if secmarks can be safely used Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 68/90] LSM: Support multiple LSMs using inode_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 69/90] LSM: Use full security context in security_inode_setsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-22 13:13   ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-04-22 20:45     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-04-22 21:01       ` Tetsuo Handa
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 70/90] LSM: Correct handling of ENOSYS in inode_setxattr Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 71/90] LSM: Infrastructure security blobs for mount options Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:45 ` [PATCH 72/90] LSM: Fix for security_init_inode_security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:46 ` [PATCH 73/90] Smack: Advertise the secid to netlabel Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:46 ` [PATCH 74/90] LSM: Change error detection for UDP peer security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:46 ` [PATCH 75/90] Smack: Fix setting of the CIPSO MLS_CAT flags Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:46 ` [PATCH 76/90] Smack: Set netlabel flags properly on new label import Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:46 ` [PATCH 77/90] Netlabel: Add a secattr comparison API function Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:46 ` [PATCH 78/90] Smack: Let netlabel do the work on the ambient domain Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:46 ` [PATCH 79/90] Smack: Don't set the socket label on each send Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:46 ` [PATCH 80/90] Smack: Let netlabel do the work on connections Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19  0:46 ` [PATCH 81/90] Netlabel: Return the labeling type on socket Casey Schaufler
2019-04-19 15:27 ` [PATCH 00/90] LSM: Module stacking for all Stephen Smalley
2019-04-21 17:31   ` Casey Schaufler
2019-04-22 12:46     ` Stephen Smalley
2019-04-22 16:10       ` Casey Schaufler

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