From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>, selinux@vger.kernel.org, Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com, Serge Ayoun <serge.ayoun@intel.com>, Shay Katz-zamir <shay.katz-zamir@intel.com>, Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>, Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>, Kai Svahn <kai.svahn@intel.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>, Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>, David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>, Philip Tricca <philip.b.tricca@intel.com> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2019 18:27:17 +0300 Message-ID: <20190610152717.GB3752@linux.intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20190606021145.12604-3-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 07:11:42PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > [SNAP] Same general criticism as for the previous patch: try to say things as they are without anything extra. > A third alternative would be to pull the protection bits from the page's > SECINFO, i.e. make decisions based on the protections enforced by > hardware. However, with SGX2, userspace can extend the hardware- > enforced protections via ENCLU[EMODPE], e.g. can add a page as RW and > later convert it to RX. With SGX2, making a decision based on the > initial protections would either create a security hole or force SGX to > dynamically track "dirty" pages (see first alternative above). > > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> 'flags' should would renamed as 'secinfo_flags_mask' even if the name is longish. It would use the same values as the SECINFO flags. The field in struct sgx_encl_page should have the same name. That would express exactly relation between SECINFO and the new field. I would have never asked on last iteration why SECINFO is not enough with a better naming. The same field can be also used to cage page type to a subset of values. /Jarkko
next prev parent reply index Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2019-06-06 2:11 [RFC PATCH v2 0/5] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Sean Christopherson 2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/5] mm: Introduce vm_ops->may_mprotect() Sean Christopherson 2019-06-10 15:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-10 15:55 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-10 17:47 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-10 19:49 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-10 22:06 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/5] x86/sgx: Require userspace to define enclave pages' protection bits Sean Christopherson 2019-06-10 15:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message] 2019-06-10 16:15 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-10 17:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-10 18:17 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-12 19:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-10 18:29 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-10 19:15 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-10 22:28 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-12 0:09 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-12 14:34 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-12 18:20 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/5] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves Sean Christopherson 2019-06-10 16:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-10 16:44 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-11 17:21 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/5] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson 2019-06-07 19:58 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-10 16:21 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-10 16:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-06 2:11 ` [RFC PATCH v2 5/5] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation Sean Christopherson 2019-06-07 21:16 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-10 16:46 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-17 16:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2019-06-10 7:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks Cedric Xing 2019-06-10 7:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 1/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Add " Cedric Xing 2019-06-10 7:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux Cedric Xing 2019-06-11 13:40 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-11 22:02 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-12 9:32 ` Dr. Greg 2019-06-12 14:25 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-13 7:25 ` Dr. Greg 2019-06-12 19:30 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-12 22:02 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-13 0:10 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-13 1:02 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-13 17:02 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-13 23:03 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-13 23:17 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-14 0:31 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-14 0:46 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-14 15:38 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-16 22:14 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-17 16:49 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-17 17:08 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-18 15:40 ` Dr. Greg 2019-06-14 17:16 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-14 17:45 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-14 17:53 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-14 20:01 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-16 22:16 ` Andy Lutomirski 2019-06-14 23:19 ` Dr. Greg 2019-06-11 22:55 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-13 18:00 ` Stephen Smalley 2019-06-13 19:48 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-13 21:09 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-13 21:02 ` Xing, Cedric 2019-06-14 0:37 ` Sean Christopherson 2019-06-10 7:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 3/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Call new LSM hooks from SGX subsystem Cedric Xing 2019-06-10 17:36 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/3] security/x86/sgx: SGX specific LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
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