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* [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 001/173] kernel/module: Fix memleak in module_add_modinfo_attrs() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (178 more replies)
  0 siblings, 179 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches,
	ben.hutchings, lkft-triage, stable

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.171 release.
There are 173 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Feb 2020 15:16:41 +0000.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.171-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 4.14.171-rc1

Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
    libertas: make lbs_ibss_join_existing() return error code on rates overflow

Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
    libertas: don't exit from lbs_ibss_join_existing() with RCU read lock held

Qing Xu <m1s5p6688@gmail.com>
    mwifiex: Fix possible buffer overflows in mwifiex_cmd_append_vsie_tlv()

Qing Xu <m1s5p6688@gmail.com>
    mwifiex: Fix possible buffer overflows in mwifiex_ret_wmm_get_status()

Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
    dm: fix potential for q->make_request_fn NULL pointer

Anand Lodnoor <anand.lodnoor@broadcom.com>
    scsi: megaraid_sas: Do not initiate OCR if controller is not in ready state

Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
    pinctrl: sh-pfc: r8a7778: Fix duplicate SDSELF_B and SD1_CLK_B

Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
    media: i2c: adv748x: Fix unsafe macros

Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
    crypto: atmel-sha - fix error handling when setting hmac key

Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
    crypto: artpec6 - return correct error code for failed setkey()

Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
    KVM: arm/arm64: Fix young bit from mmu notifier

Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
    arm64: cpufeature: Fix the type of no FP/SIMD capability

Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
    ARM: 8949/1: mm: mark free_memmap as __init

Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
    KVM: arm/arm64: vgic-its: Fix restoration of unmapped collections

Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
    powerpc/pseries: Allow not having ibm, hypertas-functions::hcall-multi-tce for DDW

Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
    powerpc/pseries/vio: Fix iommu_table use-after-free refcount warning

Zhengyuan Liu <liuzhengyuan@kylinos.cn>
    tools/power/acpi: fix compilation error

Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
    ARM: dts: at91: sama5d3: define clock rate range for tcb1

Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
    ARM: dts: at91: sama5d3: fix maximum peripheral clock rates

Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
    platform/x86: intel_mid_powerbtn: Take a copy of ddata

Jose Abreu <Jose.Abreu@synopsys.com>
    ARC: [plat-axs10x]: Add missing multicast filter number to GMAC node

Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
    rtc: cmos: Stop using shared IRQ

Paul Kocialkowski <paul.kocialkowski@bootlin.com>
    rtc: hym8563: Return -EINVAL if the time is known to be invalid

Shubhrajyoti Datta <shubhrajyoti.datta@xilinx.com>
    serial: uartps: Add a timeout to the tx empty wait

Robert Milkowski <rmilkowski@gmail.com>
    NFSv4: try lease recovery on NFS4ERR_EXPIRED

Trond Myklebust <trondmy@gmail.com>
    NFS/pnfs: Fix pnfs_generic_prepare_to_resend_writes()

Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
    nfs: NFS_SWAP should depend on SWAP

Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
    PCI: Don't disable bridge BARs when assigning bus resources

Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
    PCI/switchtec: Fix vep_vector_number ioread width

Bean Huo <beanhuo@micron.com>
    scsi: ufs: Fix ufshcd_probe_hba() reture value in case ufshcd_scsi_add_wlus() fails

Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com>
    RDMA/netlink: Do not always generate an ACK for some netlink operations

Sunil Muthuswamy <sunilmut@microsoft.com>
    hv_sock: Remove the accept port restriction

Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
    ASoC: pcm: update FE/BE trigger order based on the command

David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
    rxrpc: Fix service call disconnection

Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
    perf/core: Fix mlock accounting in perf_mmap()

Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
    clocksource: Prevent double add_timer_on() for watchdog_timer

Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
    cifs: fail i/o on soft mounts if sessionsetup errors out

Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
    KVM: s390: do not clobber registers during guest reset/store status

Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
    KVM: Play nice with read-only memslots when querying host page size

Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
    KVM: Use vcpu-specific gva->hva translation when querying host page size

Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
    KVM: nVMX: vmread should not set rflags to specify success in case of #PF

Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
    KVM: VMX: Add non-canonical check on writes to RTIT address MSRs

Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
    KVM: x86/mmu: Apply max PA check for MMIO sptes to 32-bit KVM

Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
    KVM: x86: Fix potential put_fpu() w/o load_fpu() on MPX platform

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    btrfs: flush write bio if we loop in extent_write_cache_pages

Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
    KVM: x86: Protect pmu_intel.c from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks

Wayne Lin <Wayne.Lin@amd.com>
    drm/dp_mst: Remove VCPI while disabling topology mgr

Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@microchip.com>
    drm: atmel-hlcdc: enable clock before configuring timing engine

Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
    Btrfs: fix race between adding and putting tree mod seq elements and nodes

David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
    btrfs: remove trivial locking wrappers of tree mod log

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    btrfs: free block groups after free'ing fs trees

Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
    btrfs: use bool argument in free_root_pointers()

Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
    Btrfs: fix missing hole after hole punching and fsync when using NO_HOLES

Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
    Btrfs: fix assertion failure on fsync with NO_HOLES enabled

Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
    btrfs: Get rid of the confusing btrfs_file_extent_inline_len

Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
    ext4: fix deadlock allocating crypto bounce page from mempool

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    bonding/alb: properly access headers in bond_alb_xmit()

Harini Katakam <harini.katakam@xilinx.com>
    net: macb: Limit maximum GEM TX length in TSO

Harini Katakam <harini.katakam@xilinx.com>
    net: macb: Remove unnecessary alignment check for TSO

Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
    net: systemport: Avoid RBUF stuck in Wake-on-LAN mode

Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
    net_sched: fix a resource leak in tcindex_set_parms()

Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
    net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Only 7278 supports 2Gb/sec IMP port

Andreas Kemnade <andreas@kemnade.info>
    mfd: rn5t618: Mark ADC control register volatile

Marco Felsch <m.felsch@pengutronix.de>
    mfd: da9062: Fix watchdog compatible string

Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
    ubi: Fix an error pointer dereference in error handling code

Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
    ubi: fastmap: Fix inverted logic in seen selfcheck

Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
    nfsd: fix jiffies/time_t mixup in LRU list

Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
    nfsd: fix delay timer on 32-bit architectures

Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
    IB/core: Fix ODP get user pages flow

Prabhath Sajeepa <psajeepa@purestorage.com>
    IB/mlx5: Fix outstanding_pi index for GSI qps

Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
    net: tulip: Adjust indentation in {dmfe, uli526x}_init_module

Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
    net: smc911x: Adjust indentation in smc911x_phy_configure

Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
    ppp: Adjust indentation into ppp_async_input

Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
    NFC: pn544: Adjust indentation in pn544_hci_check_presence

Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
    powerpc/44x: Adjust indentation in ibm4xx_denali_fixup_memsize

Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
    ext2: Adjust indentation in ext2_fill_super

Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
    phy: qualcomm: Adjust indentation in read_poll_timeout

Asutosh Das <asutoshd@codeaurora.org>
    scsi: ufs: Recheck bkops level if bkops is disabled

Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
    scsi: qla4xxx: Adjust indentation in qla4xxx_mem_free

Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
    scsi: csiostor: Adjust indentation in csio_device_reset

Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
    scsi: qla2xxx: Fix the endianness of the qla82xx_get_fw_size() return type

Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
    clk: tegra: Mark fuse clock as critical

Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
    KVM: x86: Free wbinvd_dirty_mask if vCPU creation fails

Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
    KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Free shared page if mmu initialization fails

Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
    KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Uninit vCPU if vcore creation fails

Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
    KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks

Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
    KVM: x86: Protect x86_decode_insn from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks

Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
    KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks in x86.c

Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
    KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks

Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
    KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in pmu.h from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks

Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
    KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_write_indirect() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks

Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
    KVM: x86: Protect kvm_hv_msr_[get|set]_crash_data() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks

Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
    KVM: x86: Protect kvm_lapic_reg_write() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks

Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
    KVM: x86: Protect DR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks

Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
    KVM: x86: Refactor prefix decoding to prevent Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks

Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
    KVM: x86: Refactor picdev_write() to prevent Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks

Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
    xen/balloon: Support xend-based toolstack take two

Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
    tools/kvm_stat: Fix kvm_exit filter name

Roberto Bergantinos Corpas <rbergant@redhat.com>
    sunrpc: expiry_time should be seconds not timeval

Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
    mwifiex: fix unbalanced locking in mwifiex_process_country_ie()

Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
    iwlwifi: don't throw error when trying to remove IGTK

Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
    ARM: tegra: Enable PLLP bypass during Tegra124 LP1

Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
    btrfs: set trans->drity in btrfs_commit_transaction

Trond Myklebust <trondmy@gmail.com>
    NFS: Directory page cache pages need to be locked when read

Trond Myklebust <trondmy@gmail.com>
    NFS: Fix memory leaks and corruption in readdir

Arun Easi <aeasi@marvell.com>
    scsi: qla2xxx: Fix unbound NVME response length

Chuhong Yuan <hslester96@gmail.com>
    crypto: picoxcell - adjust the position of tasklet_init and fix missed tasklet_kill

Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
    crypto: api - Fix race condition in crypto_spawn_alg

Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
    crypto: atmel-aes - Fix counter overflow in CTR mode

Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
    crypto: pcrypt - Do not clear MAY_SLEEP flag in original request

Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
    crypto: ccp - set max RSA modulus size for v3 platform devices as well

Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
    samples/bpf: Don't try to remove user's homedir on clean

Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
    ftrace: Protect ftrace_graph_hash with ftrace_sync

Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
    ftrace: Add comment to why rcu_dereference_sched() is open coded

Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
    tracing: Annotate ftrace_graph_notrace_hash pointer with __rcu

Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
    tracing: Annotate ftrace_graph_hash pointer with __rcu

Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
    padata: Remove broken queue flushing

Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
    dm crypt: fix benbi IV constructor crash if used in authenticated mode

Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
    dm space map common: fix to ensure new block isn't already in use

Dmitry Fomichev <dmitry.fomichev@wdc.com>
    dm zoned: support zone sizes smaller than 128MiB

Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
    of: Add OF_DMA_DEFAULT_COHERENT & select it on powerpc

Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
    PM: core: Fix handling of devices deleted during system-wide resume

Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net>
    f2fs: code cleanup for f2fs_statfs_project()

Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net>
    f2fs: fix miscounted block limit in f2fs_statfs_project()

Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net>
    f2fs: choose hardlimit when softlimit is larger than hardlimit in f2fs_statfs_project()

Sven Van Asbroeck <thesven73@gmail.com>
    power: supply: ltc2941-battery-gauge: fix use-after-free

Quinn Tran <qutran@marvell.com>
    scsi: qla2xxx: Fix mtcp dump collection failure

Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
    crypto: api - Check spawn->alg under lock in crypto_drop_spawn

Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com>
    hv_balloon: Balloon up according to request page number

Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
    ubifs: don't trigger assertion on invalid no-key filename

Michał Mirosław <mirq-linux@rere.qmqm.pl>
    mmc: sdhci-of-at91: fix memleak on clk_get failure

Yurii Monakov <monakov.y@gmail.com>
    PCI: keystone: Fix link training retries initiation

Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
    ubifs: Fix deadlock in concurrent bulk-read and writepage

Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
    ubifs: Fix FS_IOC_SETFLAGS unexpectedly clearing encrypt flag

Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
    ubifs: Reject unsupported ioctl flags explicitly

Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
    alarmtimer: Unregister wakeup source when module get fails

Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
    ACPI: video: Do not export a non working backlight interface on MSI MS-7721 boards

Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
    mmc: spi: Toggle SPI polarity, do not hardcode it

Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com>
    powerpc/pseries: Advance pfn if section is not present in lmb_is_removable()

Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.ibm.com>
    powerpc/xmon: don't access ASDR in VMs

Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com>
    s390/mm: fix dynamic pagetable upgrade for hugetlbfs

Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@dlink.ru>
    MIPS: fix indentation of the 'RELOCS' message

Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
    KVM: arm64: Only sign-extend MMIO up to register width

Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
    platform/x86: intel_scu_ipc: Fix interrupt support

Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
    irqdomain: Fix a memory leak in irq_domain_push_irq()

Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
    lib/test_kasan.c: fix memory leak in kmalloc_oob_krealloc_more()

Helen Koike <helen.koike@collabora.com>
    media: v4l2-rect.h: fix v4l2_rect_map_inside() top/left adjustments

John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
    media/v4l2-core: set pages dirty upon releasing DMA buffers

Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
    ALSA: dummy: Fix PCM format loop in proc output

Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
    usb: gadget: f_ecm: Use atomic_t to track in-flight request

Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
    usb: gadget: f_ncm: Use atomic_t to track in-flight request

Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com>
    usb: gadget: legacy: set max_speed to super-speed

Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
    brcmfmac: Fix memory leak in brcmf_usbdev_qinit

Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
    tracing: Fix sched switch start/stop refcount racy updates

Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
    mfd: dln2: More sanity checking for endpoints

Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
    media: uvcvideo: Avoid cyclic entity chains due to malformed USB descriptors

David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
    rxrpc: Fix NULL pointer deref due to call->conn being cleared on disconnect

David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
    rxrpc: Fix insufficient receive notification generation

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    tcp: clear tp->segs_{in|out} in tcp_disconnect()

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    tcp: clear tp->data_segs{in|out} in tcp_disconnect()

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    tcp: clear tp->delivered in tcp_disconnect()

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    tcp: clear tp->total_retrans in tcp_disconnect()

Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
    bnxt_en: Fix TC queue mapping.

Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
    net_sched: fix an OOB access in cls_tcindex

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    net: hsr: fix possible NULL deref in hsr_handle_frame()

Ridge Kennedy <ridge.kennedy@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
    l2tp: Allow duplicate session creation with UDP

Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
    gtp: use __GFP_NOWARN to avoid memalloc warning

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    cls_rsvp: fix rsvp_policy

Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
    sparc32: fix struct ipc64_perm type definition

Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
    iwlwifi: mvm: fix NVM check for 3168 devices

Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
    x86/cpu: Update cached HLE state on write to TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR

Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
    media: iguanair: fix endpoint sanity check

YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
    kernel/module: Fix memleak in module_add_modinfo_attrs()


-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                           |    4 +-
 arch/arc/boot/dts/axs10x_mb.dtsi                   |    1 +
 arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3.dtsi                     |   28 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_can.dtsi                 |    4 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_tcb1.dtsi                |    1 +
 arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_uart.dtsi                |    4 +-
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h                 |    5 +
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmio.h                    |    2 +
 arch/arm/mach-tegra/sleep-tegra30.S                |   11 +
 arch/arm/mm/init.c                                 |    2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h               |    5 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmio.h                  |    6 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                     |    2 +-
 arch/mips/Makefile.postlink                        |    2 +-
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig                               |    1 +
 arch/powerpc/boot/4xx.c                            |    2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c                       |    4 +-
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c                       |    4 +-
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hotplug-memory.c    |    4 +-
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c             |   43 +-
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vio.c               |    2 +
 arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c                           |    9 +-
 arch/s390/include/asm/page.h                       |    2 +
 arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c                           |    6 +-
 arch/s390/mm/hugetlbpage.c                         |  100 +-
 arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/ipcbuf.h               |   22 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c                          |   13 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c                             |   27 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c                              |   10 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/i8259.c                               |    6 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c                              |   15 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c                               |   13 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c                                 |    6 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mtrr.c                                |    8 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/pmu.h                                 |   18 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/pmu_intel.c                           |   24 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                                 |    4 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                             | 8033 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                                 |   27 +-
 crypto/algapi.c                                    |   22 +-
 crypto/api.c                                       |    3 +-
 crypto/internal.h                                  |    1 -
 crypto/pcrypt.c                                    |    1 -
 drivers/acpi/video_detect.c                        |   13 +
 drivers/base/power/main.c                          |   42 +-
 drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra-periph.c               |    6 +-
 drivers/crypto/atmel-aes.c                         |   37 +-
 drivers/crypto/atmel-sha.c                         |    7 +-
 drivers/crypto/axis/artpec6_crypto.c               |    2 +-
 drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-dev-v3.c                    |    1 +
 drivers/crypto/picoxcell_crypto.c                  |   15 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/atmel-hlcdc/atmel_hlcdc_crtc.c     |    8 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_mst_topology.c              |   12 +
 drivers/hv/hv_balloon.c                            |   13 +-
 drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c                     |    2 +-
 drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c                 |    4 +-
 drivers/infiniband/core/umem_odp.c                 |    2 +-
 drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/gsi.c                   |    3 +-
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c                              |   10 +-
 drivers/md/dm-zoned-metadata.c                     |   23 +-
 drivers/md/dm.c                                    |    9 +-
 drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-common.c   |   27 +
 drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-common.h   |    2 +
 drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-disk.c     |    6 +-
 drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-metadata.c |    5 +-
 drivers/media/i2c/adv748x/adv748x.h                |    8 +-
 drivers/media/rc/iguanair.c                        |    2 +-
 drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c                 |   12 +
 drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-dma-sg.c          |    5 +-
 drivers/mfd/da9062-core.c                          |    2 +-
 drivers/mfd/dln2.c                                 |   13 +-
 drivers/mfd/rn5t618.c                              |    1 +
 drivers/mmc/host/mmc_spi.c                         |   11 +-
 drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-at91.c                   |    9 +-
 drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap.c                          |   23 +-
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c                     |   44 +-
 drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c                          |    4 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bcmsysport.c         |    3 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c          |    2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c           |   14 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/dmfe.c              |    7 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/uli526x.c           |    4 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/smsc/smc911x.c                |    2 +-
 drivers/net/gtp.c                                  |    6 +-
 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c                        |   18 +-
 .../net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c |    1 +
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/nvm.c       |    2 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/sta.c       |   10 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/libertas/cfg.c        |    2 +
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c        |    7 +
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c   |    1 +
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c         |    4 +
 drivers/nfc/pn544/pn544.c                          |    2 +-
 drivers/of/Kconfig                                 |    4 +
 drivers/of/address.c                               |    6 +-
 drivers/pci/dwc/pci-keystone-dw.c                  |    2 +-
 drivers/pci/setup-bus.c                            |   20 +-
 drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c                     |    2 +-
 drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-apq8064-sata.c       |    2 +-
 drivers/pinctrl/sh-pfc/pfc-r8a7778.c               |    4 +-
 drivers/platform/x86/intel_mid_powerbtn.c          |    5 +-
 drivers/platform/x86/intel_scu_ipc.c               |   21 +-
 drivers/power/supply/ltc2941-battery-gauge.c       |    2 +-
 drivers/rtc/rtc-cmos.c                             |    2 +-
 drivers/rtc/rtc-hym8563.c                          |    2 +-
 drivers/scsi/csiostor/csio_scsi.c                  |    2 +-
 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c          |    3 +-
 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c        |    3 +-
 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.h        |    1 +
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_dbg.c                     |    6 -
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_dbg.h                     |    6 +
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_isr.c                     |   12 +
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_mbx.c                     |    3 +-
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_nx.c                      |    7 +-
 drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c                      |    2 +-
 drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c                          |    6 +-
 drivers/tty/serial/xilinx_uartps.c                 |   14 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ecm.c                |   16 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c                |   17 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/cdc2.c                   |    2 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/g_ffs.c                  |    2 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/multi.c                  |    2 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/ncm.c                    |    2 +-
 drivers/xen/xen-balloon.c                          |    2 +-
 fs/btrfs/ctree.c                                   |   64 +-
 fs/btrfs/ctree.h                                   |   32 +-
 fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.c                             |    8 +-
 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c                                 |   22 +-
 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c                               |    8 +
 fs/btrfs/file-item.c                               |    2 +-
 fs/btrfs/file.c                                    |    3 +-
 fs/btrfs/inode.c                                   |   12 +-
 fs/btrfs/print-tree.c                              |    4 +-
 fs/btrfs/send.c                                    |   17 +-
 fs/btrfs/tests/btrfs-tests.c                       |    1 -
 fs/btrfs/transaction.c                             |    8 +
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c                                |  397 +-
 fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c                                  |   10 +-
 fs/ext2/super.c                                    |    6 +-
 fs/ext4/page-io.c                                  |   19 +-
 fs/f2fs/super.c                                    |   14 +-
 fs/nfs/Kconfig                                     |    2 +-
 fs/nfs/dir.c                                       |   47 +-
 fs/nfs/direct.c                                    |    4 +-
 fs/nfs/nfs3xdr.c                                   |    5 +-
 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c                                  |    5 +
 fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c                                   |    5 +-
 fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c                                  |    7 +-
 fs/nfs/write.c                                     |    4 +-
 fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c                              |    2 +-
 fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c                                |    2 +-
 fs/nfsd/state.h                                    |    2 +-
 fs/ubifs/dir.c                                     |    2 +
 fs/ubifs/file.c                                    |    4 +-
 fs/ubifs/ioctl.c                                   |   11 +-
 include/linux/kvm_host.h                           |    2 +-
 include/media/v4l2-rect.h                          |    8 +-
 include/trace/events/btrfs.h                       |    2 +-
 kernel/events/core.c                               |   10 +-
 kernel/irq/irqdomain.c                             |    1 +
 kernel/module.c                                    |    2 +
 kernel/padata.c                                    |   46 +-
 kernel/time/alarmtimer.c                           |    8 +-
 kernel/time/clocksource.c                          |   11 +-
 kernel/trace/ftrace.c                              |   15 +-
 kernel/trace/trace.h                               |   29 +-
 kernel/trace/trace_sched_switch.c                  |    4 +-
 lib/test_kasan.c                                   |    1 +
 net/hsr/hsr_slave.c                                |    2 +
 net/ipv4/tcp.c                                     |    6 +
 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c                               |    7 +-
 net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h                            |    1 +
 net/rxrpc/call_object.c                            |    4 +-
 net/rxrpc/conn_client.c                            |    3 +-
 net/rxrpc/conn_object.c                            |    3 +-
 net/rxrpc/input.c                                  |    3 +-
 net/rxrpc/output.c                                 |   26 +-
 net/sched/cls_rsvp.h                               |    6 +-
 net/sched/cls_tcindex.c                            |   43 +-
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c                  |    4 +
 net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c                   |   68 +-
 samples/bpf/Makefile                               |    2 +-
 sound/drivers/dummy.c                              |    2 +-
 sound/soc/soc-pcm.c                                |   95 +-
 tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat                        |    8 +-
 tools/power/acpi/Makefile.config                   |    2 +-
 virt/kvm/arm/mmio.c                                |    6 +
 virt/kvm/arm/mmu.c                                 |    3 +-
 virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c                       |    3 +-
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c                                |    4 +-
 190 files changed, 9334 insertions(+), 990 deletions(-)



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 001/173] kernel/module: Fix memleak in module_add_modinfo_attrs()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 002/173] media: iguanair: fix endpoint sanity check Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (177 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Miroslav Benes, YueHaibing,
	Jessica Yu, Sasha Levin

From: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit f6d061d617124abbd55396a3bc37b9bf7d33233c ]

In module_add_modinfo_attrs() if sysfs_create_file() fails
on the first iteration of the loop (so i = 0), we forget to
free the modinfo_attrs.

Fixes: bc6f2a757d52 ("kernel/module: Fix mem leak in module_add_modinfo_attrs")
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/module.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index feb1e0fbc3e85..2806c9b6577c1 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -1730,6 +1730,8 @@ static int module_add_modinfo_attrs(struct module *mod)
 error_out:
 	if (i > 0)
 		module_remove_modinfo_attrs(mod, --i);
+	else
+		kfree(mod->modinfo_attrs);
 	return error;
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 002/173] media: iguanair: fix endpoint sanity check
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 001/173] kernel/module: Fix memleak in module_add_modinfo_attrs() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 003/173] x86/cpu: Update cached HLE state on write to TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (176 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Oliver Neukum, Johan Hovold,
	Sean Young, Mauro Carvalho Chehab, Sasha Levin

From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 1b257870a78b0a9ce98fdfb052c58542022ffb5b ]

Make sure to use the current alternate setting, which need not be the
first one by index, when verifying the endpoint descriptors and
initialising the URBs.

Failing to do so could cause the driver to misbehave or trigger a WARN()
in usb_submit_urb() that kernels with panic_on_warn set would choke on.

Fixes: 26ff63137c45 ("[media] Add support for the IguanaWorks USB IR Transceiver")
Fixes: ab1cbdf159be ("media: iguanair: add sanity checks")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>     # 3.6
Cc: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean@mess.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/media/rc/iguanair.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/media/rc/iguanair.c b/drivers/media/rc/iguanair.c
index 3c2e248ceca87..03dbbfba71fc6 100644
--- a/drivers/media/rc/iguanair.c
+++ b/drivers/media/rc/iguanair.c
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ static int iguanair_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
 	int ret, pipein, pipeout;
 	struct usb_host_interface *idesc;
 
-	idesc = intf->altsetting;
+	idesc = intf->cur_altsetting;
 	if (idesc->desc.bNumEndpoints < 2)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 003/173] x86/cpu: Update cached HLE state on write to TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 001/173] kernel/module: Fix memleak in module_add_modinfo_attrs() Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 002/173] media: iguanair: fix endpoint sanity check Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 004/173] iwlwifi: mvm: fix NVM check for 3168 devices Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (175 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pawan Gupta, Thomas Gleixner,
	Neelima Krishnan, Dave Hansen, Josh Poimboeuf, Sasha Levin

From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 5efc6fa9044c3356d6046c6e1da6d02572dbed6b ]

/proc/cpuinfo currently reports Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) feature to
be present on boot cpu even if it was disabled during the bootup. This
is because cpuinfo_x86->x86_capability HLE bit is not updated after TSX
state is changed via the new MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL.

Update the cached HLE bit also since it is expected to change after an
update to CPUID_CLEAR bit in MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL.

Fixes: 95c5824f75f3 ("x86/cpu: Add a "tsx=" cmdline option with TSX disabled by default")
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2529b99546294c893dfa1c89e2b3e46da3369a59.1578685425.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c | 13 +++++++------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
index 3e20d322bc98b..032509adf9de9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
@@ -115,11 +115,12 @@ void __init tsx_init(void)
 		tsx_disable();
 
 		/*
-		 * tsx_disable() will change the state of the
-		 * RTM CPUID bit.  Clear it here since it is now
-		 * expected to be not set.
+		 * tsx_disable() will change the state of the RTM and HLE CPUID
+		 * bits. Clear them here since they are now expected to be not
+		 * set.
 		 */
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_HLE);
 	} else if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_ENABLE) {
 
 		/*
@@ -131,10 +132,10 @@ void __init tsx_init(void)
 		tsx_enable();
 
 		/*
-		 * tsx_enable() will change the state of the
-		 * RTM CPUID bit.  Force it here since it is now
-		 * expected to be set.
+		 * tsx_enable() will change the state of the RTM and HLE CPUID
+		 * bits. Force them here since they are now expected to be set.
 		 */
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_HLE);
 	}
 }
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 004/173] iwlwifi: mvm: fix NVM check for 3168 devices
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 003/173] x86/cpu: Update cached HLE state on write to TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 005/173] sparc32: fix struct ipc64_perm type definition Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (174 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Stefan Sperling, Luca Coelho, Sasha Levin

From: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit b3f20e098293892388d6a0491d6bbb2efb46fbff ]

We had a check on !NVM_EXT and then a check for NVM_SDP in the else
block of this if.  The else block, obviously, could only be reached if
using NVM_EXT, so it would never be NVM_SDP.

Fix that by checking whether the nvm_type is IWL_NVM instead of
checking for !IWL_NVM_EXT to solve this issue.

Reported-by: Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/nvm.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/nvm.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/nvm.c
index ca2d66ce84247..8f3032b7174d3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/nvm.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/nvm.c
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ iwl_parse_nvm_sections(struct iwl_mvm *mvm)
 	int regulatory_type;
 
 	/* Checking for required sections */
-	if (mvm->trans->cfg->nvm_type != IWL_NVM_EXT) {
+	if (mvm->trans->cfg->nvm_type == IWL_NVM) {
 		if (!mvm->nvm_sections[NVM_SECTION_TYPE_SW].data ||
 		    !mvm->nvm_sections[mvm->cfg->nvm_hw_section_num].data) {
 			IWL_ERR(mvm, "Can't parse empty OTP/NVM sections\n");
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 005/173] sparc32: fix struct ipc64_perm type definition
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 004/173] iwlwifi: mvm: fix NVM check for 3168 devices Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 006/173] cls_rsvp: fix rsvp_policy Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (173 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sam Ravnborg, Dmitry V . Levin,
	Rich Felker, libc-alpha, Arnd Bergmann, David S. Miller,
	Sasha Levin

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

[ Upstream commit 34ca70ef7d3a9fa7e89151597db5e37ae1d429b4 ]

As discussed in the strace issue tracker, it appears that the sparc32
sysvipc support has been broken for the past 11 years. It was however
working in compat mode, which is how it must have escaped most of the
regular testing.

The problem is that a cleanup patch inadvertently changed the uid/gid
fields in struct ipc64_perm from 32-bit types to 16-bit types in uapi
headers.

Both glibc and uclibc-ng still use the original types, so they should
work fine with compat mode, but not natively.  Change the definitions
to use __kernel_uid32_t and __kernel_gid32_t again.

Fixes: 83c86984bff2 ("sparc: unify ipcbuf.h")
Link: https://github.com/strace/strace/issues/116
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.29
Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Cc: "Dmitry V . Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: libc-alpha@sourceware.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/ipcbuf.h | 22 +++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/ipcbuf.h b/arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/ipcbuf.h
index 9d0d125500e24..084b8949ddff6 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/ipcbuf.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/ipcbuf.h
@@ -15,19 +15,19 @@
 
 struct ipc64_perm
 {
-	__kernel_key_t	key;
-	__kernel_uid_t	uid;
-	__kernel_gid_t	gid;
-	__kernel_uid_t	cuid;
-	__kernel_gid_t	cgid;
+	__kernel_key_t		key;
+	__kernel_uid32_t	uid;
+	__kernel_gid32_t	gid;
+	__kernel_uid32_t	cuid;
+	__kernel_gid32_t	cgid;
 #ifndef __arch64__
-	unsigned short	__pad0;
+	unsigned short		__pad0;
 #endif
-	__kernel_mode_t	mode;
-	unsigned short	__pad1;
-	unsigned short	seq;
-	unsigned long long __unused1;
-	unsigned long long __unused2;
+	__kernel_mode_t		mode;
+	unsigned short		__pad1;
+	unsigned short		seq;
+	unsigned long long	__unused1;
+	unsigned long long	__unused2;
 };
 
 #endif /* __SPARC_IPCBUF_H */
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 006/173] cls_rsvp: fix rsvp_policy
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (4 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 005/173] sparc32: fix struct ipc64_perm type definition Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 007/173] gtp: use __GFP_NOWARN to avoid memalloc warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (172 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, syzbot, Cong Wang,
	Jakub Kicinski

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit cb3c0e6bdf64d0d124e94ce43cbe4ccbb9b37f51 ]

NLA_BINARY can be confusing, since .len value represents
the max size of the blob.

cls_rsvp really wants user space to provide long enough data
for TCA_RSVP_DST and TCA_RSVP_SRC attributes.

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in rsvp_get net/sched/cls_rsvp.h:258 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in gen_handle net/sched/cls_rsvp.h:402 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in rsvp_change+0x1ae9/0x4220 net/sched/cls_rsvp.h:572
CPU: 1 PID: 13228 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1c9/0x220 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:118
 __msan_warning+0x58/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:215
 rsvp_get net/sched/cls_rsvp.h:258 [inline]
 gen_handle net/sched/cls_rsvp.h:402 [inline]
 rsvp_change+0x1ae9/0x4220 net/sched/cls_rsvp.h:572
 tc_new_tfilter+0x31fe/0x5010 net/sched/cls_api.c:2104
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xcb7/0x1570 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5415
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x451/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5442
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0xf9e/0x1100 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
 netlink_sendmsg+0x1248/0x14d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:659 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x12b6/0x1350 net/socket.c:2330
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2384 [inline]
 __sys_sendmsg+0x451/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2417
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2426 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg+0x97/0xb0 net/socket.c:2424
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2424
 do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45b349
Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f269d43dc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f269d43e6d4 RCX: 000000000045b349
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000075bfc8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 00000000000009c2 R14: 00000000004cb338 R15: 000000000075bfd4

Uninit was created at:
 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:144 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x66/0xd0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:127
 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x8a/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:82
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2774 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb40/0x1200 mm/slub.c:4382
 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:141 [inline]
 __alloc_skb+0x2fd/0xac0 net/core/skbuff.c:209
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1049 [inline]
 netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1174 [inline]
 netlink_sendmsg+0x7d3/0x14d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:659 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x12b6/0x1350 net/socket.c:2330
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2384 [inline]
 __sys_sendmsg+0x451/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2417
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2426 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg+0x97/0xb0 net/socket.c:2424
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2424
 do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: 6fa8c0144b77 ("[NET_SCHED]: Use nla_policy for attribute validation in classifiers")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sched/cls_rsvp.h |    6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/net/sched/cls_rsvp.h
+++ b/net/sched/cls_rsvp.h
@@ -475,10 +475,8 @@ static u32 gen_tunnel(struct rsvp_head *
 
 static const struct nla_policy rsvp_policy[TCA_RSVP_MAX + 1] = {
 	[TCA_RSVP_CLASSID]	= { .type = NLA_U32 },
-	[TCA_RSVP_DST]		= { .type = NLA_BINARY,
-				    .len = RSVP_DST_LEN * sizeof(u32) },
-	[TCA_RSVP_SRC]		= { .type = NLA_BINARY,
-				    .len = RSVP_DST_LEN * sizeof(u32) },
+	[TCA_RSVP_DST]		= { .len = RSVP_DST_LEN * sizeof(u32) },
+	[TCA_RSVP_SRC]		= { .len = RSVP_DST_LEN * sizeof(u32) },
 	[TCA_RSVP_PINFO]	= { .len = sizeof(struct tc_rsvp_pinfo) },
 };
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 007/173] gtp: use __GFP_NOWARN to avoid memalloc warning
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (5 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 006/173] cls_rsvp: fix rsvp_policy Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 008/173] l2tp: Allow duplicate session creation with UDP Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (171 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Taehee Yoo, David S. Miller

From: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit bd5cd35b782abf5437fbd01dfaee12437d20e832 ]

gtp hashtable size is received by user-space.
So, this hashtable size could be too large. If so, kmalloc will internally
print a warning message.
This warning message is actually not necessary for the gtp module.
So, this patch adds __GFP_NOWARN to avoid this message.

Splat looks like:
[ 2171.200049][ T1860] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1860 at mm/page_alloc.c:4713 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x2f3/0x740
[ 2171.238885][ T1860] Modules linked in: gtp veth openvswitch nsh nf_conncount nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv]
[ 2171.262680][ T1860] CPU: 1 PID: 1860 Comm: gtp-link Not tainted 5.5.0+ #321
[ 2171.263567][ T1860] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 2171.264681][ T1860] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x2f3/0x740
[ 2171.265332][ T1860] Code: 64 fe ff ff 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 0f 02 00 48 05 f0 12 00 00 41 be 01 00 00 00 49 89 47 0
[ 2171.267301][ T1860] RSP: 0018:ffff8880b51af1f0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 2171.268320][ T1860] RAX: ffffed1016a35e43 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 2171.269517][ T1860] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000b RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 2171.270305][ T1860] RBP: 0000000000040cc0 R08: ffffed1018893109 R09: dffffc0000000000
[ 2171.275973][ T1860] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed1018893108 R12: 1ffff11016a35e43
[ 2171.291039][ T1860] R13: 000000000000000b R14: 000000000000000b R15: 00000000000f4240
[ 2171.292328][ T1860] FS:  00007f53cbc83740(0000) GS:ffff8880da000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 2171.293409][ T1860] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 2171.294586][ T1860] CR2: 000055f540014508 CR3: 00000000b49f2004 CR4: 00000000000606e0
[ 2171.295424][ T1860] Call Trace:
[ 2171.295756][ T1860]  ? mark_held_locks+0xa5/0xe0
[ 2171.296659][ T1860]  ? __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x21b0/0x21b0
[ 2171.298283][ T1860]  ? gtp_encap_enable_socket+0x13e/0x400 [gtp]
[ 2171.298962][ T1860]  ? alloc_pages_current+0xc1/0x1a0
[ 2171.299475][ T1860]  kmalloc_order+0x22/0x80
[ 2171.299936][ T1860]  kmalloc_order_trace+0x1d/0x140
[ 2171.300437][ T1860]  __kmalloc+0x302/0x3a0
[ 2171.300896][ T1860]  gtp_newlink+0x293/0xba0 [gtp]
[ ... ]

Fixes: 459aa660eb1d ("gtp: add initial driver for datapath of GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP-U)")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/gtp.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/gtp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/gtp.c
@@ -771,11 +771,13 @@ static int gtp_hashtable_new(struct gtp_
 {
 	int i;
 
-	gtp->addr_hash = kmalloc(sizeof(struct hlist_head) * hsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	gtp->addr_hash = kmalloc(sizeof(struct hlist_head) * hsize,
+				 GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
 	if (gtp->addr_hash == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	gtp->tid_hash = kmalloc(sizeof(struct hlist_head) * hsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	gtp->tid_hash = kmalloc(sizeof(struct hlist_head) * hsize,
+				GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
 	if (gtp->tid_hash == NULL)
 		goto err1;
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 008/173] l2tp: Allow duplicate session creation with UDP
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (6 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 007/173] gtp: use __GFP_NOWARN to avoid memalloc warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 009/173] net: hsr: fix possible NULL deref in hsr_handle_frame() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (170 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ridge Kennedy, James Chapman,
	David S. Miller

From: Ridge Kennedy <ridge.kennedy@alliedtelesis.co.nz>

[ Upstream commit 0d0d9a388a858e271bb70e71e99e7fe2a6fd6f64 ]

In the past it was possible to create multiple L2TPv3 sessions with the
same session id as long as the sessions belonged to different tunnels.
The resulting sessions had issues when used with IP encapsulated tunnels,
but worked fine with UDP encapsulated ones. Some applications began to
rely on this behaviour to avoid having to negotiate unique session ids.

Some time ago a change was made to require session ids to be unique across
all tunnels, breaking the applications making use of this "feature".

This change relaxes the duplicate session id check to allow duplicates
if both of the colliding sessions belong to UDP encapsulated tunnels.

Fixes: dbdbc73b4478 ("l2tp: fix duplicate session creation")
Signed-off-by: Ridge Kennedy <ridge.kennedy@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Acked-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
+++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
@@ -358,8 +358,13 @@ static int l2tp_session_add_to_tunnel(st
 
 		spin_lock_bh(&pn->l2tp_session_hlist_lock);
 
+		/* IP encap expects session IDs to be globally unique, while
+		 * UDP encap doesn't.
+		 */
 		hlist_for_each_entry(session_walk, g_head, global_hlist)
-			if (session_walk->session_id == session->session_id) {
+			if (session_walk->session_id == session->session_id &&
+			    (session_walk->tunnel->encap == L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_IP ||
+			     tunnel->encap == L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_IP)) {
 				err = -EEXIST;
 				goto err_tlock_pnlock;
 			}



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 009/173] net: hsr: fix possible NULL deref in hsr_handle_frame()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (7 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 008/173] l2tp: Allow duplicate session creation with UDP Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 010/173] net_sched: fix an OOB access in cls_tcindex Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (169 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, syzbot, David S. Miller

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 2b5b8251bc9fe2f9118411f037862ee17cf81e97 ]

hsr_port_get_rcu() can return NULL, so we need to be careful.

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037]
CPU: 1 PID: 10249 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.5.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:199 [inline]
RIP: 0010:hsr_addr_is_self+0x86/0x330 net/hsr/hsr_framereg.c:44
Code: 04 00 f3 f3 f3 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 e8 6b ff 94 f9 4c 89 f2 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 75 02 00 00 48 8b 43 30 49 39 c6 49 89 47 c0 0f
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000da8a90 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff87e0cc33
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffffffff87e035d5 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc90000da8b20 R08: ffff88808e7de040 R09: ffffed1015d2707c
R10: ffffed1015d2707b R11: ffff8880ae9383db R12: ffff8880a689bc5e
R13: 1ffff920001b5153 R14: 0000000000000030 R15: ffffc90000da8af8
FS:  00007fd7a42be700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32338000 CR3: 00000000a928c000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 hsr_handle_frame+0x1c5/0x630 net/hsr/hsr_slave.c:31
 __netif_receive_skb_core+0xfbc/0x30b0 net/core/dev.c:5099
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xa8/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:5196
 __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1d0 net/core/dev.c:5312
 process_backlog+0x206/0x750 net/core/dev.c:6144
 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6582 [inline]
 net_rx_action+0x508/0x1120 net/core/dev.c:6650
 __do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292
 do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1082
 </IRQ>

Fixes: c5a759117210 ("net/hsr: Use list_head (and rcu) instead of array for slave devices.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/hsr/hsr_slave.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/hsr/hsr_slave.c
+++ b/net/hsr/hsr_slave.c
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ static rx_handler_result_t hsr_handle_fr
 
 	rcu_read_lock(); /* hsr->node_db, hsr->ports */
 	port = hsr_port_get_rcu(skb->dev);
+	if (!port)
+		goto finish_pass;
 
 	if (hsr_addr_is_self(port->hsr, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source)) {
 		/* Directly kill frames sent by ourselves */



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 010/173] net_sched: fix an OOB access in cls_tcindex
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (8 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 009/173] net: hsr: fix possible NULL deref in hsr_handle_frame() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 011/173] bnxt_en: Fix TC queue mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (168 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, John Fastabend,
	Jamal Hadi Salim, Jiri Pirko, Jakub Kicinski, Cong Wang,
	David S. Miller, syzbot+35d4dea36c387813ed31

From: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 599be01ee567b61f4471ee8078870847d0a11e8e ]

As Eric noticed, tcindex_alloc_perfect_hash() uses cp->hash
to compute the size of memory allocation, but cp->hash is
set again after the allocation, this caused an out-of-bound
access.

So we have to move all cp->hash initialization and computation
before the memory allocation. Move cp->mask and cp->shift together
as cp->hash may need them for computation too.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+35d4dea36c387813ed31@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 331b72922c5f ("net: sched: RCU cls_tcindex")
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sched/cls_tcindex.c |   40 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

--- a/net/sched/cls_tcindex.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_tcindex.c
@@ -351,12 +351,31 @@ tcindex_set_parms(struct net *net, struc
 	cp->fall_through = p->fall_through;
 	cp->tp = tp;
 
+	if (tb[TCA_TCINDEX_HASH])
+		cp->hash = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_TCINDEX_HASH]);
+
+	if (tb[TCA_TCINDEX_MASK])
+		cp->mask = nla_get_u16(tb[TCA_TCINDEX_MASK]);
+
+	if (tb[TCA_TCINDEX_SHIFT])
+		cp->shift = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_TCINDEX_SHIFT]);
+
+	if (!cp->hash) {
+		/* Hash not specified, use perfect hash if the upper limit
+		 * of the hashing index is below the threshold.
+		 */
+		if ((cp->mask >> cp->shift) < PERFECT_HASH_THRESHOLD)
+			cp->hash = (cp->mask >> cp->shift) + 1;
+		else
+			cp->hash = DEFAULT_HASH_SIZE;
+	}
+
 	if (p->perfect) {
 		int i;
 
 		if (tcindex_alloc_perfect_hash(cp) < 0)
 			goto errout;
-		for (i = 0; i < cp->hash; i++)
+		for (i = 0; i < min(cp->hash, p->hash); i++)
 			cp->perfect[i].res = p->perfect[i].res;
 		balloc = 1;
 	}
@@ -368,15 +387,6 @@ tcindex_set_parms(struct net *net, struc
 	if (old_r)
 		cr = r->res;
 
-	if (tb[TCA_TCINDEX_HASH])
-		cp->hash = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_TCINDEX_HASH]);
-
-	if (tb[TCA_TCINDEX_MASK])
-		cp->mask = nla_get_u16(tb[TCA_TCINDEX_MASK]);
-
-	if (tb[TCA_TCINDEX_SHIFT])
-		cp->shift = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_TCINDEX_SHIFT]);
-
 	err = -EBUSY;
 
 	/* Hash already allocated, make sure that we still meet the
@@ -394,16 +404,6 @@ tcindex_set_parms(struct net *net, struc
 	if (tb[TCA_TCINDEX_FALL_THROUGH])
 		cp->fall_through = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_TCINDEX_FALL_THROUGH]);
 
-	if (!cp->hash) {
-		/* Hash not specified, use perfect hash if the upper limit
-		 * of the hashing index is below the threshold.
-		 */
-		if ((cp->mask >> cp->shift) < PERFECT_HASH_THRESHOLD)
-			cp->hash = (cp->mask >> cp->shift) + 1;
-		else
-			cp->hash = DEFAULT_HASH_SIZE;
-	}
-
 	if (!cp->perfect && !cp->h)
 		cp->alloc_hash = cp->hash;
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 011/173] bnxt_en: Fix TC queue mapping.
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (9 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 010/173] net_sched: fix an OOB access in cls_tcindex Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 012/173] tcp: clear tp->total_retrans in tcp_disconnect() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (167 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Michael Chan, Jakub Kicinski

From: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>

[ Upstream commit 18e4960c18f484ac288f41b43d0e6c4c88e6ea78 ]

The driver currently only calls netdev_set_tc_queue when the number of
TCs is greater than 1.  Instead, the comparison should be greater than
or equal to 1.  Even with 1 TC, we need to set the queue mapping.

This bug can cause warnings when the number of TCs is changed back to 1.

Fixes: 7809592d3e2e ("bnxt_en: Enable MSIX early in bnxt_init_one().")
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
@@ -5375,7 +5375,7 @@ static void bnxt_setup_msix(struct bnxt
 	int tcs, i;
 
 	tcs = netdev_get_num_tc(dev);
-	if (tcs > 1) {
+	if (tcs) {
 		int i, off, count;
 
 		for (i = 0; i < tcs; i++) {



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 012/173] tcp: clear tp->total_retrans in tcp_disconnect()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (10 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 011/173] bnxt_en: Fix TC queue mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 013/173] tcp: clear tp->delivered " Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (166 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, SeongJae Park, Jakub Kicinski

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit c13c48c00a6bc1febc73902505bdec0967bd7095 ]

total_retrans needs to be cleared in tcp_disconnect().

tcp_disconnect() is rarely used, but it is worth fixing it.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -2366,6 +2366,7 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int
 	tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open);
 	tp->is_sack_reneg = 0;
 	tcp_clear_retrans(tp);
+	tp->total_retrans = 0;
 	inet_csk_delack_init(sk);
 	/* Initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS to avoid division by 0
 	 * issue in __tcp_select_window()



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 013/173] tcp: clear tp->delivered in tcp_disconnect()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (11 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 012/173] tcp: clear tp->total_retrans in tcp_disconnect() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` " Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 014/173] tcp: clear tp->data_segs{in|out} " Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (165 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, Yuchung Cheng,
	Neal Cardwell, Soheil Hassas Yeganeh, Jakub Kicinski

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 2fbdd56251b5c62f96589f39eded277260de7267 ]

tp->delivered needs to be cleared in tcp_disconnect().

tcp_disconnect() is rarely used, but it is worth fixing it.

Fixes: ddf1af6fa00e ("tcp: new delivery accounting")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -2363,6 +2363,7 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int
 	tp->snd_ssthresh = TCP_INFINITE_SSTHRESH;
 	tp->snd_cwnd_cnt = 0;
 	tp->window_clamp = 0;
+	tp->delivered = 0;
 	tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open);
 	tp->is_sack_reneg = 0;
 	tcp_clear_retrans(tp);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 014/173] tcp: clear tp->data_segs{in|out} in tcp_disconnect()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (12 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 013/173] tcp: clear tp->delivered " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` " Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 015/173] tcp: clear tp->segs_{in|out} " Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (164 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, Martin KaFai Lau,
	Yuchung Cheng, Neal Cardwell, Jakub Kicinski

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit db7ffee6f3eb3683cdcaeddecc0a630a14546fe3 ]

tp->data_segs_in and tp->data_segs_out need to be cleared
in tcp_disconnect().

tcp_disconnect() is rarely used, but it is worth fixing it.

Fixes: a44d6eacdaf5 ("tcp: Add RFC4898 tcpEStatsPerfDataSegsOut/In")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -2381,6 +2381,8 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int
 	tcp_saved_syn_free(tp);
 	tp->bytes_acked = 0;
 	tp->bytes_received = 0;
+	tp->data_segs_in = 0;
+	tp->data_segs_out = 0;
 
 	/* Clean up fastopen related fields */
 	tcp_free_fastopen_req(tp);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 015/173] tcp: clear tp->segs_{in|out} in tcp_disconnect()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (13 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 014/173] tcp: clear tp->data_segs{in|out} " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` " Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 016/173] rxrpc: Fix insufficient receive notification generation Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (163 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet,
	Marcelo Ricardo Leitner, Yuchung Cheng, Neal Cardwell,
	Jakub Kicinski

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 784f8344de750a41344f4bbbebb8507a730fc99c ]

tp->segs_in and tp->segs_out need to be cleared in tcp_disconnect().

tcp_disconnect() is rarely used, but it is worth fixing it.

Fixes: 2efd055c53c0 ("tcp: add tcpi_segs_in and tcpi_segs_out to tcp_info")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -2379,6 +2379,8 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int
 	dst_release(sk->sk_rx_dst);
 	sk->sk_rx_dst = NULL;
 	tcp_saved_syn_free(tp);
+	tp->segs_in = 0;
+	tp->segs_out = 0;
 	tp->bytes_acked = 0;
 	tp->bytes_received = 0;
 	tp->data_segs_in = 0;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 016/173] rxrpc: Fix insufficient receive notification generation
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (14 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 015/173] tcp: clear tp->segs_{in|out} " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 017/173] rxrpc: Fix NULL pointer deref due to call->conn being cleared on disconnect Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (162 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Howells

From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit f71dbf2fb28489a79bde0dca1c8adfb9cdb20a6b ]

In rxrpc_input_data(), rxrpc_notify_socket() is called if the base sequence
number of the packet is immediately following the hard-ack point at the end
of the function.  However, this isn't sufficient, since the recvmsg side
may have been advancing the window and then overrun the position in which
we're adding - at which point rx_hard_ack >= seq0 and no notification is
generated.

Fix this by always generating a notification at the end of the input
function.

Without this, a long call may stall, possibly indefinitely.

Fixes: 248f219cb8bc ("rxrpc: Rewrite the data and ack handling code")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/rxrpc/input.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/rxrpc/input.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/input.c
@@ -585,8 +585,7 @@ ack:
 				  immediate_ack, true,
 				  rxrpc_propose_ack_input_data);
 
-	if (sp->hdr.seq == READ_ONCE(call->rx_hard_ack) + 1)
-		rxrpc_notify_socket(call);
+	rxrpc_notify_socket(call);
 	_leave(" [queued]");
 }
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 017/173] rxrpc: Fix NULL pointer deref due to call->conn being cleared on disconnect
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (15 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 016/173] rxrpc: Fix insufficient receive notification generation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 018/173] media: uvcvideo: Avoid cyclic entity chains due to malformed USB descriptors Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (161 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Howells

From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 5273a191dca65a675dc0bcf3909e59c6933e2831 ]

When a call is disconnected, the connection pointer from the call is
cleared to make sure it isn't used again and to prevent further attempted
transmission for the call.  Unfortunately, there might be a daemon trying
to use it at the same time to transmit a packet.

Fix this by keeping call->conn set, but setting a flag on the call to
indicate disconnection instead.

Remove also the bits in the transmission functions where the conn pointer is
checked and a ref taken under spinlock as this is now redundant.

Fixes: 8d94aa381dab ("rxrpc: Calls shouldn't hold socket refs")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h |    1 +
 net/rxrpc/call_object.c |    4 ++--
 net/rxrpc/conn_client.c |    3 +--
 net/rxrpc/conn_object.c |    4 ++--
 net/rxrpc/output.c      |   26 +++++++++-----------------
 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

--- a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
+++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
@@ -451,6 +451,7 @@ enum rxrpc_call_flag {
 	RXRPC_CALL_SEND_PING,		/* A ping will need to be sent */
 	RXRPC_CALL_PINGING,		/* Ping in process */
 	RXRPC_CALL_RETRANS_TIMEOUT,	/* Retransmission due to timeout occurred */
+	RXRPC_CALL_DISCONNECTED,	/* The call has been disconnected */
 };
 
 /*
--- a/net/rxrpc/call_object.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/call_object.c
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ void rxrpc_release_call(struct rxrpc_soc
 
 	_debug("RELEASE CALL %p (%d CONN %p)", call, call->debug_id, conn);
 
-	if (conn)
+	if (conn && !test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_DISCONNECTED, &call->flags))
 		rxrpc_disconnect_call(call);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < RXRPC_RXTX_BUFF_SIZE; i++) {
@@ -639,6 +639,7 @@ static void rxrpc_rcu_destroy_call(struc
 {
 	struct rxrpc_call *call = container_of(rcu, struct rxrpc_call, rcu);
 
+	rxrpc_put_connection(call->conn);
 	rxrpc_put_peer(call->peer);
 	kfree(call->rxtx_buffer);
 	kfree(call->rxtx_annotations);
@@ -660,7 +661,6 @@ void rxrpc_cleanup_call(struct rxrpc_cal
 
 	ASSERTCMP(call->state, ==, RXRPC_CALL_COMPLETE);
 	ASSERT(test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_RELEASED, &call->flags));
-	ASSERTCMP(call->conn, ==, NULL);
 
 	/* Clean up the Rx/Tx buffer */
 	for (i = 0; i < RXRPC_RXTX_BUFF_SIZE; i++)
--- a/net/rxrpc/conn_client.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_client.c
@@ -762,9 +762,9 @@ void rxrpc_disconnect_client_call(struct
 	struct rxrpc_net *rxnet = rxrpc_net(sock_net(&call->socket->sk));
 
 	trace_rxrpc_client(conn, channel, rxrpc_client_chan_disconnect);
-	call->conn = NULL;
 
 	spin_lock(&conn->channel_lock);
+	set_bit(RXRPC_CALL_DISCONNECTED, &call->flags);
 
 	/* Calls that have never actually been assigned a channel can simply be
 	 * discarded.  If the conn didn't get used either, it will follow
@@ -863,7 +863,6 @@ out:
 	spin_unlock(&rxnet->client_conn_cache_lock);
 out_2:
 	spin_unlock(&conn->channel_lock);
-	rxrpc_put_connection(conn);
 	_leave("");
 	return;
 
--- a/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c
@@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ void __rxrpc_disconnect_call(struct rxrp
 
 	_enter("%d,%x", conn->debug_id, call->cid);
 
+	set_bit(RXRPC_CALL_DISCONNECTED, &call->flags);
+
 	if (rcu_access_pointer(chan->call) == call) {
 		/* Save the result of the call so that we can repeat it if necessary
 		 * through the channel, whilst disposing of the actual call record.
@@ -207,9 +209,7 @@ void rxrpc_disconnect_call(struct rxrpc_
 	__rxrpc_disconnect_call(conn, call);
 	spin_unlock(&conn->channel_lock);
 
-	call->conn = NULL;
 	conn->idle_timestamp = jiffies;
-	rxrpc_put_connection(conn);
 }
 
 /*
--- a/net/rxrpc/output.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/output.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static size_t rxrpc_fill_out_ack(struct
  */
 int rxrpc_send_ack_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, bool ping)
 {
-	struct rxrpc_connection *conn = NULL;
+	struct rxrpc_connection *conn;
 	struct rxrpc_ack_buffer *pkt;
 	struct msghdr msg;
 	struct kvec iov[2];
@@ -106,18 +106,14 @@ int rxrpc_send_ack_packet(struct rxrpc_c
 	int ret;
 	u8 reason;
 
-	spin_lock_bh(&call->lock);
-	if (call->conn)
-		conn = rxrpc_get_connection_maybe(call->conn);
-	spin_unlock_bh(&call->lock);
-	if (!conn)
+	if (test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_DISCONNECTED, &call->flags))
 		return -ECONNRESET;
 
 	pkt = kzalloc(sizeof(*pkt), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!pkt) {
-		rxrpc_put_connection(conn);
+	if (!pkt)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	}
+
+	conn = call->conn;
 
 	msg.msg_name	= &call->peer->srx.transport;
 	msg.msg_namelen	= call->peer->srx.transport_len;
@@ -204,7 +200,6 @@ int rxrpc_send_ack_packet(struct rxrpc_c
 	}
 
 out:
-	rxrpc_put_connection(conn);
 	kfree(pkt);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -214,20 +209,18 @@ out:
  */
 int rxrpc_send_abort_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call)
 {
-	struct rxrpc_connection *conn = NULL;
+	struct rxrpc_connection *conn;
 	struct rxrpc_abort_buffer pkt;
 	struct msghdr msg;
 	struct kvec iov[1];
 	rxrpc_serial_t serial;
 	int ret;
 
-	spin_lock_bh(&call->lock);
-	if (call->conn)
-		conn = rxrpc_get_connection_maybe(call->conn);
-	spin_unlock_bh(&call->lock);
-	if (!conn)
+	if (test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_DISCONNECTED, &call->flags))
 		return -ECONNRESET;
 
+	conn = call->conn;
+
 	msg.msg_name	= &call->peer->srx.transport;
 	msg.msg_namelen	= call->peer->srx.transport_len;
 	msg.msg_control	= NULL;
@@ -255,7 +248,6 @@ int rxrpc_send_abort_packet(struct rxrpc
 	ret = kernel_sendmsg(conn->params.local->socket,
 			     &msg, iov, 1, sizeof(pkt));
 
-	rxrpc_put_connection(conn);
 	return ret;
 }
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 018/173] media: uvcvideo: Avoid cyclic entity chains due to malformed USB descriptors
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (16 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 017/173] rxrpc: Fix NULL pointer deref due to call->conn being cleared on disconnect Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 019/173] mfd: dln2: More sanity checking for endpoints Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (160 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andrey Konovalov, Will Deacon,
	Laurent Pinchart, Mauro Carvalho Chehab

From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

commit 68035c80e129c4cfec659aac4180354530b26527 upstream.

Way back in 2017, fuzzing the 4.14-rc2 USB stack with syzkaller kicked
up the following WARNING from the UVC chain scanning code:

  | list_add double add: new=ffff880069084010, prev=ffff880069084010,
  | next=ffff880067d22298.
  | ------------[ cut here ]------------
  | WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1846 at lib/list_debug.c:31 __list_add_valid+0xbd/0xf0
  | Modules linked in:
  | CPU: 1 PID: 1846 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted
  | 4.14.0-rc2-42613-g1488251d1a98 #238
  | Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  | Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
  | task: ffff88006b01ca40 task.stack: ffff880064358000
  | RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0xbd/0xf0 lib/list_debug.c:29
  | RSP: 0018:ffff88006435ddd0 EFLAGS: 00010286
  | RAX: 0000000000000058 RBX: ffff880067d22298 RCX: 0000000000000000
  | RDX: 0000000000000058 RSI: ffffffff85a58800 RDI: ffffed000c86bbac
  | RBP: ffff88006435dde8 R08: 1ffff1000c86ba52 R09: 0000000000000000
  | R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880069084010
  | R13: ffff880067d22298 R14: ffff880069084010 R15: ffff880067d222a0
  | FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88006c900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  | CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  | CR2: 0000000020004ff2 CR3: 000000006b447000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
  | Call Trace:
  |  __list_add ./include/linux/list.h:59
  |  list_add_tail+0x8c/0x1b0 ./include/linux/list.h:92
  |  uvc_scan_chain_forward.isra.8+0x373/0x416
  | drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c:1471
  |  uvc_scan_chain drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c:1585
  |  uvc_scan_device drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c:1769
  |  uvc_probe+0x77f2/0x8f00 drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c:2104

Looking into the output from usbmon, the interesting part is the
following data packet:

  ffff880069c63e00 30710169 C Ci:1:002:0 0 143 = 09028f00 01030080
  00090403 00000e01 00000924 03000103 7c003328 010204db

If we drop the lead configuration and interface descriptors, we're left
with an output terminal descriptor describing a generic display:

  /* Output terminal descriptor */
  buf[0]	09
  buf[1]	24
  buf[2]	03	/* UVC_VC_OUTPUT_TERMINAL */
  buf[3]	00	/* ID */
  buf[4]	01	/* type == 0x0301 (UVC_OTT_DISPLAY) */
  buf[5]	03
  buf[6]	7c
  buf[7]	00	/* source ID refers to self! */
  buf[8]	33

The problem with this descriptor is that it is self-referential: the
source ID of 0 matches itself! This causes the 'struct uvc_entity'
representing the display to be added to its chain list twice during
'uvc_scan_chain()': once via 'uvc_scan_chain_entity()' when it is
processed directly from the 'dev->entities' list and then again
immediately afterwards when trying to follow the source ID in
'uvc_scan_chain_forward()'

Add a check before adding an entity to a chain list to ensure that the
entity is not already part of a chain.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-media/CAAeHK+z+Si69jUR+N-SjN9q4O+o5KFiNManqEa-PjUta7EOb7A@mail.gmail.com/

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: c0efd232929c ("V4L/DVB (8145a): USB Video Class driver")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c
@@ -1446,6 +1446,11 @@ static int uvc_scan_chain_forward(struct
 			break;
 		if (forward == prev)
 			continue;
+		if (forward->chain.next || forward->chain.prev) {
+			uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_DESCR, "Found reference to "
+				"entity %d already in chain.\n", forward->id);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 
 		switch (UVC_ENTITY_TYPE(forward)) {
 		case UVC_VC_EXTENSION_UNIT:
@@ -1527,6 +1532,13 @@ static int uvc_scan_chain_backward(struc
 				return -1;
 			}
 
+			if (term->chain.next || term->chain.prev) {
+				uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_DESCR, "Found reference to "
+					"entity %d already in chain.\n",
+					term->id);
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+
 			if (uvc_trace_param & UVC_TRACE_PROBE)
 				printk(KERN_CONT " %d", term->id);
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 019/173] mfd: dln2: More sanity checking for endpoints
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (17 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 018/173] media: uvcvideo: Avoid cyclic entity chains due to malformed USB descriptors Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 020/173] tracing: Fix sched switch start/stop refcount racy updates Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (159 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Oliver Neukum, Lee Jones,
	syzbot+48a2851be24583b864dc

From: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>

commit 2b8bd606b1e60ca28c765f69c1eedd7d2a2e9dca upstream.

It is not enough to check for the number of endpoints.
The types must also be correct.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+48a2851be24583b864dc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/mfd/dln2.c |   13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/mfd/dln2.c
+++ b/drivers/mfd/dln2.c
@@ -729,6 +729,8 @@ static int dln2_probe(struct usb_interfa
 		      const struct usb_device_id *usb_id)
 {
 	struct usb_host_interface *hostif = interface->cur_altsetting;
+	struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epin;
+	struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epout;
 	struct device *dev = &interface->dev;
 	struct dln2_dev *dln2;
 	int ret;
@@ -738,12 +740,19 @@ static int dln2_probe(struct usb_interfa
 	    hostif->desc.bNumEndpoints < 2)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
+	epin = &hostif->endpoint[0].desc;
+	epout = &hostif->endpoint[1].desc;
+	if (!usb_endpoint_is_bulk_out(epout))
+		return -ENODEV;
+	if (!usb_endpoint_is_bulk_in(epin))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
 	dln2 = kzalloc(sizeof(*dln2), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!dln2)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	dln2->ep_out = hostif->endpoint[0].desc.bEndpointAddress;
-	dln2->ep_in = hostif->endpoint[1].desc.bEndpointAddress;
+	dln2->ep_out = epout->bEndpointAddress;
+	dln2->ep_in = epin->bEndpointAddress;
 	dln2->usb_dev = usb_get_dev(interface_to_usbdev(interface));
 	dln2->interface = interface;
 	usb_set_intfdata(interface, dln2);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 020/173] tracing: Fix sched switch start/stop refcount racy updates
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (18 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 019/173] mfd: dln2: More sanity checking for endpoints Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 021/173] brcmfmac: Fix memory leak in brcmf_usbdev_qinit Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (158 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Steven Rostedt (VMware),
	Joel Fernandes (Google),
	Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner, Paul E. McKenney,
	syzbot+774fddf07b7ab29a1e55, Mathieu Desnoyers

From: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>

commit 64ae572bc7d0060429e40e1c8d803ce5eb31a0d6 upstream.

Reading the sched_cmdline_ref and sched_tgid_ref initial state within
tracing_start_sched_switch without holding the sched_register_mutex is
racy against concurrent updates, which can lead to tracepoint probes
being registered more than once (and thus trigger warnings within
tracepoint.c).

[ May be the fix for this bug ]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000ab6f84056c786b93@google.com

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190817141208.15226-1-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CC: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CC: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
CC: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CC: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+774fddf07b7ab29a1e55@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: d914ba37d7145 ("tracing: Add support for recording tgid of tasks")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/trace/trace_sched_switch.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/trace/trace_sched_switch.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_sched_switch.c
@@ -89,8 +89,10 @@ static void tracing_sched_unregister(voi
 
 static void tracing_start_sched_switch(int ops)
 {
-	bool sched_register = (!sched_cmdline_ref && !sched_tgid_ref);
+	bool sched_register;
+
 	mutex_lock(&sched_register_mutex);
+	sched_register = (!sched_cmdline_ref && !sched_tgid_ref);
 
 	switch (ops) {
 	case RECORD_CMDLINE:



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 021/173] brcmfmac: Fix memory leak in brcmf_usbdev_qinit
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (19 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 020/173] tracing: Fix sched switch start/stop refcount racy updates Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 022/173] usb: gadget: legacy: set max_speed to super-speed Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (157 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Navid Emamdoost, Kalle Valo

From: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>

commit 4282dc057d750c6a7dd92953564b15c26b54c22c upstream.

In the implementation of brcmf_usbdev_qinit() the allocated memory for
reqs is leaking if usb_alloc_urb() fails. Release reqs in the error
handling path.

Fixes: 71bb244ba2fd ("brcm80211: fmac: add USB support for bcm43235/6/8 chipsets")
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/usb.c
@@ -441,6 +441,7 @@ fail:
 			usb_free_urb(req->urb);
 		list_del(q->next);
 	}
+	kfree(reqs);
 	return NULL;
 
 }



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 022/173] usb: gadget: legacy: set max_speed to super-speed
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (20 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 021/173] brcmfmac: Fix memory leak in brcmf_usbdev_qinit Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 023/173] usb: gadget: f_ncm: Use atomic_t to track in-flight request Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (156 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Roger Quadros, Felipe Balbi

From: Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com>

commit 463f67aec2837f981b0a0ce8617721ff59685c00 upstream.

These interfaces do support super-speed so let's not
limit maximum speed to high-speed.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/cdc2.c  |    2 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/g_ffs.c |    2 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/multi.c |    2 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/ncm.c   |    2 +-
 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/cdc2.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/cdc2.c
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static struct usb_composite_driver cdc_d
 	.name		= "g_cdc",
 	.dev		= &device_desc,
 	.strings	= dev_strings,
-	.max_speed	= USB_SPEED_HIGH,
+	.max_speed	= USB_SPEED_SUPER,
 	.bind		= cdc_bind,
 	.unbind		= cdc_unbind,
 };
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/g_ffs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/g_ffs.c
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static struct usb_composite_driver gfs_d
 	.name		= DRIVER_NAME,
 	.dev		= &gfs_dev_desc,
 	.strings	= gfs_dev_strings,
-	.max_speed	= USB_SPEED_HIGH,
+	.max_speed	= USB_SPEED_SUPER,
 	.bind		= gfs_bind,
 	.unbind		= gfs_unbind,
 };
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/multi.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/multi.c
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ static struct usb_composite_driver multi
 	.name		= "g_multi",
 	.dev		= &device_desc,
 	.strings	= dev_strings,
-	.max_speed	= USB_SPEED_HIGH,
+	.max_speed	= USB_SPEED_SUPER,
 	.bind		= multi_bind,
 	.unbind		= multi_unbind,
 	.needs_serial	= 1,
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/ncm.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/ncm.c
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ static struct usb_composite_driver ncm_d
 	.name		= "g_ncm",
 	.dev		= &device_desc,
 	.strings	= dev_strings,
-	.max_speed	= USB_SPEED_HIGH,
+	.max_speed	= USB_SPEED_SUPER,
 	.bind		= gncm_bind,
 	.unbind		= gncm_unbind,
 };



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 023/173] usb: gadget: f_ncm: Use atomic_t to track in-flight request
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (21 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 022/173] usb: gadget: legacy: set max_speed to super-speed Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 024/173] usb: gadget: f_ecm: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (155 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Bryan ODonoghue, Felipe Balbi

From: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>

commit 5b24c28cfe136597dc3913e1c00b119307a20c7e upstream.

Currently ncm->notify_req is used to flag when a request is in-flight.
ncm->notify_req is set to NULL and when a request completes it is
subsequently reset.

This is fundamentally buggy in that the unbind logic of the NCM driver will
unconditionally free ncm->notify_req leading to a NULL pointer dereference.

Fixes: 40d133d7f542 ("usb: gadget: f_ncm: convert to new function interface with backward compatibility")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c |   17 +++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ struct f_ncm {
 	struct usb_ep			*notify;
 	struct usb_request		*notify_req;
 	u8				notify_state;
+	atomic_t			notify_count;
 	bool				is_open;
 
 	const struct ndp_parser_opts	*parser_opts;
@@ -553,7 +554,7 @@ static void ncm_do_notify(struct f_ncm *
 	int				status;
 
 	/* notification already in flight? */
-	if (!req)
+	if (atomic_read(&ncm->notify_count))
 		return;
 
 	event = req->buf;
@@ -593,7 +594,8 @@ static void ncm_do_notify(struct f_ncm *
 	event->bmRequestType = 0xA1;
 	event->wIndex = cpu_to_le16(ncm->ctrl_id);
 
-	ncm->notify_req = NULL;
+	atomic_inc(&ncm->notify_count);
+
 	/*
 	 * In double buffering if there is a space in FIFO,
 	 * completion callback can be called right after the call,
@@ -603,7 +605,7 @@ static void ncm_do_notify(struct f_ncm *
 	status = usb_ep_queue(ncm->notify, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	spin_lock(&ncm->lock);
 	if (status < 0) {
-		ncm->notify_req = req;
+		atomic_dec(&ncm->notify_count);
 		DBG(cdev, "notify --> %d\n", status);
 	}
 }
@@ -638,17 +640,19 @@ static void ncm_notify_complete(struct u
 	case 0:
 		VDBG(cdev, "Notification %02x sent\n",
 		     event->bNotificationType);
+		atomic_dec(&ncm->notify_count);
 		break;
 	case -ECONNRESET:
 	case -ESHUTDOWN:
+		atomic_set(&ncm->notify_count, 0);
 		ncm->notify_state = NCM_NOTIFY_NONE;
 		break;
 	default:
 		DBG(cdev, "event %02x --> %d\n",
 			event->bNotificationType, req->status);
+		atomic_dec(&ncm->notify_count);
 		break;
 	}
-	ncm->notify_req = req;
 	ncm_do_notify(ncm);
 	spin_unlock(&ncm->lock);
 }
@@ -1632,6 +1636,11 @@ static void ncm_unbind(struct usb_config
 	ncm_string_defs[0].id = 0;
 	usb_free_all_descriptors(f);
 
+	if (atomic_read(&ncm->notify_count)) {
+		usb_ep_dequeue(ncm->notify, ncm->notify_req);
+		atomic_set(&ncm->notify_count, 0);
+	}
+
 	kfree(ncm->notify_req->buf);
 	usb_ep_free_request(ncm->notify, ncm->notify_req);
 }



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 024/173] usb: gadget: f_ecm: Use atomic_t to track in-flight request
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (22 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 023/173] usb: gadget: f_ncm: Use atomic_t to track in-flight request Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` " Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 025/173] ALSA: dummy: Fix PCM format loop in proc output Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (154 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Bryan ODonoghue, Felipe Balbi

From: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>

commit d710562e01c48d59be3f60d58b7a85958b39aeda upstream.

Currently ecm->notify_req is used to flag when a request is in-flight.
ecm->notify_req is set to NULL and when a request completes it is
subsequently reset.

This is fundamentally buggy in that the unbind logic of the ECM driver will
unconditionally free ecm->notify_req leading to a NULL pointer dereference.

Fixes: da741b8c56d6 ("usb ethernet gadget: split CDC Ethernet function")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ecm.c |   16 ++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ecm.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ecm.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ struct f_ecm {
 	struct usb_ep			*notify;
 	struct usb_request		*notify_req;
 	u8				notify_state;
+	atomic_t			notify_count;
 	bool				is_open;
 
 	/* FIXME is_open needs some irq-ish locking
@@ -384,7 +385,7 @@ static void ecm_do_notify(struct f_ecm *
 	int				status;
 
 	/* notification already in flight? */
-	if (!req)
+	if (atomic_read(&ecm->notify_count))
 		return;
 
 	event = req->buf;
@@ -424,10 +425,10 @@ static void ecm_do_notify(struct f_ecm *
 	event->bmRequestType = 0xA1;
 	event->wIndex = cpu_to_le16(ecm->ctrl_id);
 
-	ecm->notify_req = NULL;
+	atomic_inc(&ecm->notify_count);
 	status = usb_ep_queue(ecm->notify, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (status < 0) {
-		ecm->notify_req = req;
+		atomic_dec(&ecm->notify_count);
 		DBG(cdev, "notify --> %d\n", status);
 	}
 }
@@ -452,17 +453,19 @@ static void ecm_notify_complete(struct u
 	switch (req->status) {
 	case 0:
 		/* no fault */
+		atomic_dec(&ecm->notify_count);
 		break;
 	case -ECONNRESET:
 	case -ESHUTDOWN:
+		atomic_set(&ecm->notify_count, 0);
 		ecm->notify_state = ECM_NOTIFY_NONE;
 		break;
 	default:
 		DBG(cdev, "event %02x --> %d\n",
 			event->bNotificationType, req->status);
+		atomic_dec(&ecm->notify_count);
 		break;
 	}
-	ecm->notify_req = req;
 	ecm_do_notify(ecm);
 }
 
@@ -909,6 +912,11 @@ static void ecm_unbind(struct usb_config
 
 	usb_free_all_descriptors(f);
 
+	if (atomic_read(&ecm->notify_count)) {
+		usb_ep_dequeue(ecm->notify, ecm->notify_req);
+		atomic_set(&ecm->notify_count, 0);
+	}
+
 	kfree(ecm->notify_req->buf);
 	usb_ep_free_request(ecm->notify, ecm->notify_req);
 }



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 025/173] ALSA: dummy: Fix PCM format loop in proc output
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (23 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 024/173] usb: gadget: f_ecm: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 026/173] media/v4l2-core: set pages dirty upon releasing DMA buffers Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (153 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Takashi Iwai

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit 2acf25f13ebe8beb40e97a1bbe76f36277c64f1e upstream.

The loop termination for iterating over all formats should contain
SNDRV_PCM_FORMAT_LAST, not less than it.

Fixes: 9b151fec139d ("ALSA: dummy - Add debug proc file")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200201080530.22390-3-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 sound/drivers/dummy.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/sound/drivers/dummy.c
+++ b/sound/drivers/dummy.c
@@ -933,7 +933,7 @@ static void print_formats(struct snd_dum
 {
 	int i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < SNDRV_PCM_FORMAT_LAST; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i <= SNDRV_PCM_FORMAT_LAST; i++) {
 		if (dummy->pcm_hw.formats & (1ULL << i))
 			snd_iprintf(buffer, " %s", snd_pcm_format_name(i));
 	}



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 026/173] media/v4l2-core: set pages dirty upon releasing DMA buffers
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (24 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 025/173] ALSA: dummy: Fix PCM format loop in proc output Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 027/173] media: v4l2-rect.h: fix v4l2_rect_map_inside() top/left adjustments Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (152 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, John Hubbard, Christoph Hellwig,
	Hans Verkuil, Mauro Carvalho Chehab, Alex Williamson,
	Aneesh Kumar K.V, Björn Töpel, Daniel Vetter,
	Dan Williams, Ira Weiny, Jan Kara, Jason Gunthorpe,
	Jason Gunthorpe, Jens Axboe, Jerome Glisse, Jonathan Corbet,
	Kirill A. Shutemov, Leon Romanovsky, Mike Rapoport,
	Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds

From: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>

commit 3c7470b6f68434acae459482ab920d1e3fabd1c7 upstream.

After DMA is complete, and the device and CPU caches are synchronized,
it's still required to mark the CPU pages as dirty, if the data was
coming from the device.  However, this driver was just issuing a bare
put_page() call, without any set_page_dirty*() call.

Fix the problem, by calling set_page_dirty_lock() if the CPU pages were
potentially receiving data from the device.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200107224558.2362728-11-jhubbard@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-dma-sg.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-dma-sg.c
+++ b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf-dma-sg.c
@@ -352,8 +352,11 @@ int videobuf_dma_free(struct videobuf_dm
 	BUG_ON(dma->sglen);
 
 	if (dma->pages) {
-		for (i = 0; i < dma->nr_pages; i++)
+		for (i = 0; i < dma->nr_pages; i++) {
+			if (dma->direction == DMA_FROM_DEVICE)
+				set_page_dirty_lock(dma->pages[i]);
 			put_page(dma->pages[i]);
+		}
 		kfree(dma->pages);
 		dma->pages = NULL;
 	}



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 027/173] media: v4l2-rect.h: fix v4l2_rect_map_inside() top/left adjustments
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (25 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 026/173] media/v4l2-core: set pages dirty upon releasing DMA buffers Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 028/173] lib/test_kasan.c: fix memory leak in kmalloc_oob_krealloc_more() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (151 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Helen Koike, Hans Verkuil,
	Mauro Carvalho Chehab

From: Helen Koike <helen.koike@collabora.com>

commit f51e50db4c20d46930b33be3f208851265694f3e upstream.

boundary->width and boundary->height are sizes relative to
boundary->left and boundary->top coordinates, but they were not being
taken into consideration to adjust r->left and r->top, leading to the
following error:

Consider the follow as initial values for boundary and r:

struct v4l2_rect boundary = {
	.left = 100,
	.top = 100,
	.width = 800,
	.height = 600,
}

struct v4l2_rect r = {
	.left = 0,
	.top = 0,
	.width = 1920,
	.height = 960,
}

calling v4l2_rect_map_inside(&r, &boundary) was modifying r to:

r = {
	.left = 0,
	.top = 0,
	.width = 800,
	.height = 600,
}

Which is wrongly outside the boundary rectangle, because:

	v4l2_rect_set_max_size(r, boundary); // r->width = 800, r->height = 600
	...
	if (r->left + r->width > boundary->width) // true
		r->left = boundary->width - r->width; // r->left = 800 - 800
	if (r->top + r->height > boundary->height) // true
		r->top = boundary->height - r->height; // r->height = 600 - 600

Fix this by considering top/left coordinates from boundary.

Fixes: ac49de8c49d7 ("[media] v4l2-rect.h: new header with struct v4l2_rect helper functions")
Signed-off-by: Helen Koike <helen.koike@collabora.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>      # for v4.7 and up
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 include/media/v4l2-rect.h |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/include/media/v4l2-rect.h
+++ b/include/media/v4l2-rect.h
@@ -75,10 +75,10 @@ static inline void v4l2_rect_map_inside(
 		r->left = boundary->left;
 	if (r->top < boundary->top)
 		r->top = boundary->top;
-	if (r->left + r->width > boundary->width)
-		r->left = boundary->width - r->width;
-	if (r->top + r->height > boundary->height)
-		r->top = boundary->height - r->height;
+	if (r->left + r->width > boundary->left + boundary->width)
+		r->left = boundary->left + boundary->width - r->width;
+	if (r->top + r->height > boundary->top + boundary->height)
+		r->top = boundary->top + boundary->height - r->height;
 }
 
 /**



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 028/173] lib/test_kasan.c: fix memory leak in kmalloc_oob_krealloc_more()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (26 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 027/173] media: v4l2-rect.h: fix v4l2_rect_map_inside() top/left adjustments Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 029/173] irqdomain: Fix a memory leak in irq_domain_push_irq() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (150 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Gustavo A. R. Silva, Dmitry Vyukov,
	Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds

From: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>

commit 3e21d9a501bf99aee2e5835d7f34d8c823f115b5 upstream.

In case memory resources for _ptr2_ were allocated, release them before
return.

Notice that in case _ptr1_ happens to be NULL, krealloc() behaves
exactly like kmalloc().

Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1490594 ("Resource leak")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200123160115.GA4202@embeddedor
Fixes: 3f15801cdc23 ("lib: add kasan test module")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 lib/test_kasan.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/lib/test_kasan.c
+++ b/lib/test_kasan.c
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ static noinline void __init kmalloc_oob_
 	if (!ptr1 || !ptr2) {
 		pr_err("Allocation failed\n");
 		kfree(ptr1);
+		kfree(ptr2);
 		return;
 	}
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 029/173] irqdomain: Fix a memory leak in irq_domain_push_irq()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (27 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 028/173] lib/test_kasan.c: fix memory leak in kmalloc_oob_krealloc_more() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 030/173] platform/x86: intel_scu_ipc: Fix interrupt support Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (149 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kevin Hao, Marc Zyngier

From: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>

commit 0f394daef89b38d58c91118a2b08b8a1b316703b upstream.

Fix a memory leak reported by kmemleak:
unreferenced object 0xffff000bc6f50e80 (size 128):
  comm "kworker/23:2", pid 201, jiffies 4294894947 (age 942.132s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 41 00 00 00 86 c0 03 00 00 00 00 00  ....A...........
    00 a0 b2 c6 0b 00 ff ff 40 51 fd 10 00 80 ff ff  ........@Q......
  backtrace:
    [<00000000e62d2240>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1a4/0x320
    [<00000000279143c9>] irq_domain_push_irq+0x7c/0x188
    [<00000000d9f4c154>] thunderx_gpio_probe+0x3ac/0x438
    [<00000000fd09ec22>] pci_device_probe+0xe4/0x198
    [<00000000d43eca75>] really_probe+0xdc/0x320
    [<00000000d3ebab09>] driver_probe_device+0x5c/0xf0
    [<000000005b3ecaa0>] __device_attach_driver+0x88/0xc0
    [<000000004e5915f5>] bus_for_each_drv+0x7c/0xc8
    [<0000000079d4db41>] __device_attach+0xe4/0x140
    [<00000000883bbda9>] device_initial_probe+0x18/0x20
    [<000000003be59ef6>] bus_probe_device+0x98/0xa0
    [<0000000039b03d3f>] deferred_probe_work_func+0x74/0xa8
    [<00000000870934ce>] process_one_work+0x1c8/0x470
    [<00000000e3cce570>] worker_thread+0x1f8/0x428
    [<000000005d64975e>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
    [<00000000f0eaa764>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

Fixes: 495c38d3001f ("irqdomain: Add irq_domain_{push,pop}_irq() functions")
Signed-off-by: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120043547.22271-1-haokexin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/irq/irqdomain.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/kernel/irq/irqdomain.c
+++ b/kernel/irq/irqdomain.c
@@ -1538,6 +1538,7 @@ int irq_domain_push_irq(struct irq_domai
 	if (rv) {
 		/* Restore the original irq_data. */
 		*root_irq_data = *child_irq_data;
+		kfree(child_irq_data);
 		goto error;
 	}
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 030/173] platform/x86: intel_scu_ipc: Fix interrupt support
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (28 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 029/173] irqdomain: Fix a memory leak in irq_domain_push_irq() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 031/173] KVM: arm64: Only sign-extend MMIO up to register width Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (148 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Mika Westerberg, Andy Shevchenko

From: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>

commit e48b72a568bbd641c91dad354138d3c17d03ee6f upstream.

Currently the driver has disabled interrupt support for Tangier but
actually interrupt works just fine if the command is not written twice
in a row. Also we need to ack the interrupt in the handler.

Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/platform/x86/intel_scu_ipc.c |   21 ++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/platform/x86/intel_scu_ipc.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_scu_ipc.c
@@ -69,26 +69,22 @@
 struct intel_scu_ipc_pdata_t {
 	u32 i2c_base;
 	u32 i2c_len;
-	u8 irq_mode;
 };
 
 static const struct intel_scu_ipc_pdata_t intel_scu_ipc_lincroft_pdata = {
 	.i2c_base = 0xff12b000,
 	.i2c_len = 0x10,
-	.irq_mode = 0,
 };
 
 /* Penwell and Cloverview */
 static const struct intel_scu_ipc_pdata_t intel_scu_ipc_penwell_pdata = {
 	.i2c_base = 0xff12b000,
 	.i2c_len = 0x10,
-	.irq_mode = 1,
 };
 
 static const struct intel_scu_ipc_pdata_t intel_scu_ipc_tangier_pdata = {
 	.i2c_base  = 0xff00d000,
 	.i2c_len = 0x10,
-	.irq_mode = 0,
 };
 
 struct intel_scu_ipc_dev {
@@ -101,6 +97,9 @@ struct intel_scu_ipc_dev {
 
 static struct intel_scu_ipc_dev  ipcdev; /* Only one for now */
 
+#define IPC_STATUS		0x04
+#define IPC_STATUS_IRQ		BIT(2)
+
 /*
  * IPC Read Buffer (Read Only):
  * 16 byte buffer for receiving data from SCU, if IPC command
@@ -122,11 +121,8 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(ipclock); /* lock us
  */
 static inline void ipc_command(struct intel_scu_ipc_dev *scu, u32 cmd)
 {
-	if (scu->irq_mode) {
-		reinit_completion(&scu->cmd_complete);
-		writel(cmd | IPC_IOC, scu->ipc_base);
-	}
-	writel(cmd, scu->ipc_base);
+	reinit_completion(&scu->cmd_complete);
+	writel(cmd | IPC_IOC, scu->ipc_base);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -612,9 +608,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(intel_scu_ipc_i2c_cntrl);
 static irqreturn_t ioc(int irq, void *dev_id)
 {
 	struct intel_scu_ipc_dev *scu = dev_id;
+	int status = ipc_read_status(scu);
 
-	if (scu->irq_mode)
-		complete(&scu->cmd_complete);
+	writel(status | IPC_STATUS_IRQ, scu->ipc_base + IPC_STATUS);
+	complete(&scu->cmd_complete);
 
 	return IRQ_HANDLED;
 }
@@ -640,8 +637,6 @@ static int ipc_probe(struct pci_dev *pde
 	if (!pdata)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	scu->irq_mode = pdata->irq_mode;
-
 	err = pcim_enable_device(pdev);
 	if (err)
 		return err;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 031/173] KVM: arm64: Only sign-extend MMIO up to register width
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (29 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 030/173] platform/x86: intel_scu_ipc: Fix interrupt support Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 032/173] MIPS: fix indentation of the RELOCS message Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (147 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Christoffer Dall, Marc Zyngier

From: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>

commit b6ae256afd32f96bec0117175b329d0dd617655e upstream.

On AArch64 you can do a sign-extended load to either a 32-bit or 64-bit
register, and we should only sign extend the register up to the width of
the register as specified in the operation (by using the 32-bit Wn or
64-bit Xn register specifier).

As it turns out, the architecture provides this decoding information in
the SF ("Sixty-Four" -- how cute...) bit.

Let's take advantage of this with the usual 32-bit/64-bit header file
dance and do the right thing on AArch64 hosts.

Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191212195055.5541-1-christoffer.dall@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h   |    5 +++++
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmio.h      |    2 ++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h |    5 +++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmio.h    |    6 ++----
 virt/kvm/arm/mmio.c                  |    6 ++++++
 5 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
@@ -144,6 +144,11 @@ static inline bool kvm_vcpu_dabt_issext(
 	return kvm_vcpu_get_hsr(vcpu) & HSR_SSE;
 }
 
+static inline bool kvm_vcpu_dabt_issf(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
 static inline int kvm_vcpu_dabt_get_rd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return (kvm_vcpu_get_hsr(vcpu) & HSR_SRT_MASK) >> HSR_SRT_SHIFT;
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmio.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmio.h
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
 struct kvm_decode {
 	unsigned long rt;
 	bool sign_extend;
+	/* Not used on 32-bit arm */
+	bool sixty_four;
 };
 
 void kvm_mmio_write_buf(void *buf, unsigned int len, unsigned long data);
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
@@ -188,6 +188,11 @@ static inline bool kvm_vcpu_dabt_issext(
 	return !!(kvm_vcpu_get_hsr(vcpu) & ESR_ELx_SSE);
 }
 
+static inline bool kvm_vcpu_dabt_issf(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return !!(kvm_vcpu_get_hsr(vcpu) & ESR_ELx_SF);
+}
+
 static inline int kvm_vcpu_dabt_get_rd(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return (kvm_vcpu_get_hsr(vcpu) & ESR_ELx_SRT_MASK) >> ESR_ELx_SRT_SHIFT;
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmio.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmio.h
@@ -21,13 +21,11 @@
 #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_arm.h>
 
-/*
- * This is annoying. The mmio code requires this, even if we don't
- * need any decoding. To be fixed.
- */
 struct kvm_decode {
 	unsigned long rt;
 	bool sign_extend;
+	/* Witdth of the register accessed by the faulting instruction is 64-bits */
+	bool sixty_four;
 };
 
 void kvm_mmio_write_buf(void *buf, unsigned int len, unsigned long data);
--- a/virt/kvm/arm/mmio.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/arm/mmio.c
@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ int kvm_handle_mmio_return(struct kvm_vc
 			data = (data ^ mask) - mask;
 		}
 
+		if (!vcpu->arch.mmio_decode.sixty_four)
+			data = data & 0xffffffff;
+
 		trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_READ, len, run->mmio.phys_addr,
 			       &data);
 		data = vcpu_data_host_to_guest(vcpu, data, len);
@@ -137,6 +140,7 @@ static int decode_hsr(struct kvm_vcpu *v
 	unsigned long rt;
 	int access_size;
 	bool sign_extend;
+	bool sixty_four;
 
 	if (kvm_vcpu_dabt_iss1tw(vcpu)) {
 		/* page table accesses IO mem: tell guest to fix its TTBR */
@@ -150,11 +154,13 @@ static int decode_hsr(struct kvm_vcpu *v
 
 	*is_write = kvm_vcpu_dabt_iswrite(vcpu);
 	sign_extend = kvm_vcpu_dabt_issext(vcpu);
+	sixty_four = kvm_vcpu_dabt_issf(vcpu);
 	rt = kvm_vcpu_dabt_get_rd(vcpu);
 
 	*len = access_size;
 	vcpu->arch.mmio_decode.sign_extend = sign_extend;
 	vcpu->arch.mmio_decode.rt = rt;
+	vcpu->arch.mmio_decode.sixty_four = sixty_four;
 
 	return 0;
 }



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 032/173] MIPS: fix indentation of the RELOCS message
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (30 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 031/173] KVM: arm64: Only sign-extend MMIO up to register width Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 033/173] s390/mm: fix dynamic pagetable upgrade for hugetlbfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (146 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Alexander Lobakin, Paul Burton,
	Ralf Baechle, James Hogan, Masahiro Yamada, Rob Herring,
	linux-mips

From: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@dlink.ru>

commit a53998802e178451701d59d38e36f551422977ba upstream.

quiet_cmd_relocs lacks a whitespace which results in:

  LD      vmlinux
  SORTEX  vmlinux
  SYSMAP  System.map
  RELOCS vmlinux
  Building modules, stage 2.
  MODPOST 64 modules

After this patch:

  LD      vmlinux
  SORTEX  vmlinux
  SYSMAP  System.map
  RELOCS  vmlinux
  Building modules, stage 2.
  MODPOST 64 modules

Typo is present in kernel tree since the introduction of relocatable
kernel support in commit e818fac595ab ("MIPS: Generate relocation table
when CONFIG_RELOCATABLE"), but the relocation scripts were moved to
Makefile.postlink later with commit 44079d3509ae ("MIPS: Use
Makefile.postlink to insert relocations into vmlinux").

Fixes: 44079d3509ae ("MIPS: Use Makefile.postlink to insert relocations into vmlinux")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.11+
Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@dlink.ru>
[paulburton@kernel.org: Fixup commit references in commit message.]
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/mips/Makefile.postlink |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/mips/Makefile.postlink
+++ b/arch/mips/Makefile.postlink
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ __archpost:
 include scripts/Kbuild.include
 
 CMD_RELOCS = arch/mips/boot/tools/relocs
-quiet_cmd_relocs = RELOCS $@
+quiet_cmd_relocs = RELOCS  $@
       cmd_relocs = $(CMD_RELOCS) $@
 
 # `@true` prevents complaint when there is nothing to be done



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 033/173] s390/mm: fix dynamic pagetable upgrade for hugetlbfs
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (31 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 032/173] MIPS: fix indentation of the RELOCS message Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 034/173] powerpc/xmon: dont access ASDR in VMs Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (145 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Gerald Schaefer, Vasily Gorbik

From: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com>

commit 5f490a520bcb393389a4d44bec90afcb332eb112 upstream.

Commit ee71d16d22bb ("s390/mm: make TASK_SIZE independent from the number
of page table levels") changed the logic of TASK_SIZE and also removed the
arch_mmap_check() implementation for s390. This combination has a subtle
effect on how get_unmapped_area() for hugetlbfs pages works. It is now
possible that a user process establishes a hugetlbfs mapping at an address
above 4 TB, without triggering a dynamic pagetable upgrade from 3 to 4
levels.

This is because hugetlbfs mappings will not use mm->get_unmapped_area, but
rather file->f_op->get_unmapped_area, which currently is the generic
implementation of hugetlb_get_unmapped_area() that does not know about s390
dynamic pagetable upgrades, but with the new definition of TASK_SIZE, it
will now allow mappings above 4 TB.

Subsequent access to such a mapped address above 4 TB will result in a page
fault loop, because the CPU cannot translate such a large address with 3
pagetable levels. The fault handler will try to map in a hugepage at the
address, but due to the folded pagetable logic it will end up with creating
entries in the 3 level pagetable, possibly overwriting existing mappings,
and then it all repeats when the access is retried.

Apart from the page fault loop, this can have various nasty effects, e.g.
kernel panic from one of the BUG_ON() checks in memory management code,
or even data loss if an existing mapping gets overwritten.

Fix this by implementing HAVE_ARCH_HUGETLB_UNMAPPED_AREA support for s390,
providing an s390 version for hugetlb_get_unmapped_area() with pagetable
upgrade support similar to arch_get_unmapped_area(), which will then be
used instead of the generic version.

Fixes: ee71d16d22bb ("s390/mm: make TASK_SIZE independent from the number of page table levels")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.12+
Signed-off-by: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/s390/include/asm/page.h |    2 
 arch/s390/mm/hugetlbpage.c   |  100 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/page.h
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
 #define ARCH_HAS_PREPARE_HUGEPAGE
 #define ARCH_HAS_HUGEPAGE_CLEAR_FLUSH
 
+#define HAVE_ARCH_HUGETLB_UNMAPPED_AREA
+
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
--- a/arch/s390/mm/hugetlbpage.c
+++ b/arch/s390/mm/hugetlbpage.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  *  IBM System z Huge TLB Page Support for Kernel.
  *
- *    Copyright IBM Corp. 2007,2016
+ *    Copyright IBM Corp. 2007,2020
  *    Author(s): Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com>
  */
 
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
 
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 /*
  * If the bit selected by single-bit bitmask "a" is set within "x", move
@@ -243,3 +246,98 @@ static __init int setup_hugepagesz(char
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("hugepagesz=", setup_hugepagesz);
+
+static unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmapped_area_bottomup(struct file *file,
+		unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
+		unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct hstate *h = hstate_file(file);
+	struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
+
+	info.flags = 0;
+	info.length = len;
+	info.low_limit = current->mm->mmap_base;
+	info.high_limit = TASK_SIZE;
+	info.align_mask = PAGE_MASK & ~huge_page_mask(h);
+	info.align_offset = 0;
+	return vm_unmapped_area(&info);
+}
+
+static unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *file,
+		unsigned long addr0, unsigned long len,
+		unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct hstate *h = hstate_file(file);
+	struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
+	unsigned long addr;
+
+	info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN;
+	info.length = len;
+	info.low_limit = max(PAGE_SIZE, mmap_min_addr);
+	info.high_limit = current->mm->mmap_base;
+	info.align_mask = PAGE_MASK & ~huge_page_mask(h);
+	info.align_offset = 0;
+	addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
+
+	/*
+	 * A failed mmap() very likely causes application failure,
+	 * so fall back to the bottom-up function here. This scenario
+	 * can happen with large stack limits and large mmap()
+	 * allocations.
+	 */
+	if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK) {
+		VM_BUG_ON(addr != -ENOMEM);
+		info.flags = 0;
+		info.low_limit = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+		info.high_limit = TASK_SIZE;
+		addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
+	}
+
+	return addr;
+}
+
+unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
+		unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct hstate *h = hstate_file(file);
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (len & ~huge_page_mask(h))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (len > TASK_SIZE - mmap_min_addr)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (flags & MAP_FIXED) {
+		if (prepare_hugepage_range(file, addr, len))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		goto check_asce_limit;
+	}
+
+	if (addr) {
+		addr = ALIGN(addr, huge_page_size(h));
+		vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
+		if (TASK_SIZE - len >= addr && addr >= mmap_min_addr &&
+		    (!vma || addr + len <= vm_start_gap(vma)))
+			goto check_asce_limit;
+	}
+
+	if (mm->get_unmapped_area == arch_get_unmapped_area)
+		addr = hugetlb_get_unmapped_area_bottomup(file, addr, len,
+				pgoff, flags);
+	else
+		addr = hugetlb_get_unmapped_area_topdown(file, addr, len,
+				pgoff, flags);
+	if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
+		return addr;
+
+check_asce_limit:
+	if (addr + len > current->mm->context.asce_limit &&
+	    addr + len <= TASK_SIZE) {
+		rc = crst_table_upgrade(mm, addr + len);
+		if (rc)
+			return (unsigned long) rc;
+	}
+	return addr;
+}



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 034/173] powerpc/xmon: dont access ASDR in VMs
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (32 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 033/173] s390/mm: fix dynamic pagetable upgrade for hugetlbfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 035/173] powerpc/pseries: Advance pfn if section is not present in lmb_is_removable() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (144 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sukadev Bhattiprolu,
	Andrew Donnellan, Michael Ellerman

From: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.ibm.com>

commit c2a20711fc181e7f22ee5c16c28cb9578af84729 upstream.

ASDR is HV-privileged and must only be accessed in HV-mode.
Fixes a Program Check (0x700) when xmon in a VM dumps SPRs.

Fixes: d1e1b351f50f ("powerpc/xmon: Add ISA v3.0 SPRs to SPR dump")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200107021633.GB29843@us.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c |    9 ++++-----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c
@@ -1830,15 +1830,14 @@ static void dump_300_sprs(void)
 
 	printf("pidr   = %.16lx  tidr  = %.16lx\n",
 		mfspr(SPRN_PID), mfspr(SPRN_TIDR));
-	printf("asdr   = %.16lx  psscr = %.16lx\n",
-		mfspr(SPRN_ASDR), hv ? mfspr(SPRN_PSSCR)
-					: mfspr(SPRN_PSSCR_PR));
+	printf("psscr  = %.16lx\n",
+		hv ? mfspr(SPRN_PSSCR) : mfspr(SPRN_PSSCR_PR));
 
 	if (!hv)
 		return;
 
-	printf("ptcr   = %.16lx\n",
-		mfspr(SPRN_PTCR));
+	printf("ptcr   = %.16lx  asdr  = %.16lx\n",
+		mfspr(SPRN_PTCR), mfspr(SPRN_ASDR));
 #endif
 }
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 035/173] powerpc/pseries: Advance pfn if section is not present in lmb_is_removable()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (33 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 034/173] powerpc/xmon: dont access ASDR in VMs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 036/173] mmc: spi: Toggle SPI polarity, do not hardcode it Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (143 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pingfan Liu, Michael Ellerman

From: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com>

commit fbee6ba2dca30d302efe6bddb3a886f5e964a257 upstream.

In lmb_is_removable(), if a section is not present, it should continue
to test the rest of the sections in the block. But the current code
fails to do so.

Fixes: 51925fb3c5c9 ("powerpc/pseries: Implement memory hotplug remove in the kernel")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.1+
Signed-off-by: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1578632042-12415-1-git-send-email-kernelfans@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hotplug-memory.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hotplug-memory.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hotplug-memory.c
@@ -452,8 +452,10 @@ static bool lmb_is_removable(struct of_d
 
 	for (i = 0; i < scns_per_block; i++) {
 		pfn = PFN_DOWN(phys_addr);
-		if (!pfn_present(pfn))
+		if (!pfn_present(pfn)) {
+			phys_addr += MIN_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE;
 			continue;
+		}
 
 		rc &= is_mem_section_removable(pfn, PAGES_PER_SECTION);
 		phys_addr += MIN_MEMORY_BLOCK_SIZE;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 036/173] mmc: spi: Toggle SPI polarity, do not hardcode it
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (34 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 035/173] powerpc/pseries: Advance pfn if section is not present in lmb_is_removable() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:18 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 037/173] ACPI: video: Do not export a non working backlight interface on MSI MS-7721 boards Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (142 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Phil Elwell, Mark Brown,
	Linus Walleij, Ulf Hansson

From: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>

commit af3ed119329cf9690598c5a562d95dfd128e91d6 upstream.

The code in mmc_spi_initsequence() tries to send a burst with
high chipselect and for this reason hardcodes the device into
SPI_CS_HIGH.

This is not good because the SPI_CS_HIGH flag indicates
logical "asserted" CS not always the physical level. In
some cases the signal is inverted in the GPIO library and
in that case SPI_CS_HIGH is already set, and enforcing
SPI_CS_HIGH again will actually drive it low.

Instead of hard-coding this, toggle the polarity so if the
default is LOW it goes high to assert chipselect but if it
is already high then toggle it low instead.

Cc: Phil Elwell <phil@raspberrypi.org>
Reported-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191204152749.12652-1-linus.walleij@linaro.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/mmc/host/mmc_spi.c |   11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/mmc/host/mmc_spi.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/mmc_spi.c
@@ -1154,17 +1154,22 @@ static void mmc_spi_initsequence(struct
 	 * SPI protocol.  Another is that when chipselect is released while
 	 * the card returns BUSY status, the clock must issue several cycles
 	 * with chipselect high before the card will stop driving its output.
+	 *
+	 * SPI_CS_HIGH means "asserted" here. In some cases like when using
+	 * GPIOs for chip select, SPI_CS_HIGH is set but this will be logically
+	 * inverted by gpiolib, so if we want to ascertain to drive it high
+	 * we should toggle the default with an XOR as we do here.
 	 */
-	host->spi->mode |= SPI_CS_HIGH;
+	host->spi->mode ^= SPI_CS_HIGH;
 	if (spi_setup(host->spi) != 0) {
 		/* Just warn; most cards work without it. */
 		dev_warn(&host->spi->dev,
 				"can't change chip-select polarity\n");
-		host->spi->mode &= ~SPI_CS_HIGH;
+		host->spi->mode ^= SPI_CS_HIGH;
 	} else {
 		mmc_spi_readbytes(host, 18);
 
-		host->spi->mode &= ~SPI_CS_HIGH;
+		host->spi->mode ^= SPI_CS_HIGH;
 		if (spi_setup(host->spi) != 0) {
 			/* Wot, we can't get the same setup we had before? */
 			dev_err(&host->spi->dev,



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 037/173] ACPI: video: Do not export a non working backlight interface on MSI MS-7721 boards
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (35 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:18 ` [PATCH 4.14 036/173] mmc: spi: Toggle SPI polarity, do not hardcode it Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 038/173] alarmtimer: Unregister wakeup source when module get fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (141 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Hans de Goede, Rafael J. Wysocki

From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>

commit d21a91629f4b8e794fc4c0e0c17c85cedf1d806c upstream.

Despite our heuristics to not wrongly export a non working ACPI backlight
interface on desktop machines, we still end up exporting one on desktops
using a motherboard from the MSI MS-7721 series.

I've looked at improving the heuristics, but in this case a quirk seems
to be the only way to solve this.

While at it also add a comment to separate the video_detect_force_none
entries in the video_detect_dmi_table from other type of entries, as we
already do for the other entry types.

Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
BugLink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1783786
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/acpi/video_detect.c |   13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/video_detect.c
@@ -328,6 +328,11 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id video_
 		DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Precision 7510"),
 		},
 	},
+
+	/*
+	 * Desktops which falsely report a backlight and which our heuristics
+	 * for this do not catch.
+	 */
 	{
 	 .callback = video_detect_force_none,
 	 .ident = "Dell OptiPlex 9020M",
@@ -336,6 +341,14 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id video_
 		DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "OptiPlex 9020M"),
 		},
 	},
+	{
+	 .callback = video_detect_force_none,
+	 .ident = "MSI MS-7721",
+	 .matches = {
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "MSI"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "MS-7721"),
+		},
+	},
 	{ },
 };
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 038/173] alarmtimer: Unregister wakeup source when module get fails
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (36 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 037/173] ACPI: video: Do not export a non working backlight interface on MSI MS-7721 boards Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 039/173] ubifs: Reject unsupported ioctl flags explicitly Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (140 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Stephen Boyd, Thomas Gleixner,
	Douglas Anderson

From: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>

commit 6b6d188aae79a630957aefd88ff5c42af6553ee3 upstream.

The alarmtimer_rtc_add_device() function creates a wakeup source and then
tries to grab a module reference. If that fails the function returns early
with an error code, but fails to remove the wakeup source.

Cleanup this exit path so there is no dangling wakeup source, which is
named 'alarmtime' left allocated which will conflict with another RTC
device that may be registered later.

Fixes: 51218298a25e ("alarmtimer: Ensure RTC module is not unloaded")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200109155910.907-2-swboyd@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/time/alarmtimer.c |    8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/time/alarmtimer.c
+++ b/kernel/time/alarmtimer.c
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ static int alarmtimer_rtc_add_device(str
 	unsigned long flags;
 	struct rtc_device *rtc = to_rtc_device(dev);
 	struct wakeup_source *__ws;
+	int ret = 0;
 
 	if (rtcdev)
 		return -EBUSY;
@@ -105,8 +106,8 @@ static int alarmtimer_rtc_add_device(str
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&rtcdev_lock, flags);
 	if (!rtcdev) {
 		if (!try_module_get(rtc->owner)) {
-			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rtcdev_lock, flags);
-			return -1;
+			ret = -1;
+			goto unlock;
 		}
 
 		rtcdev = rtc;
@@ -115,11 +116,12 @@ static int alarmtimer_rtc_add_device(str
 		ws = __ws;
 		__ws = NULL;
 	}
+unlock:
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rtcdev_lock, flags);
 
 	wakeup_source_unregister(__ws);
 
-	return 0;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static inline void alarmtimer_rtc_timer_init(void)



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 039/173] ubifs: Reject unsupported ioctl flags explicitly
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (37 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 038/173] alarmtimer: Unregister wakeup source when module get fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 040/173] ubifs: Fix FS_IOC_SETFLAGS unexpectedly clearing encrypt flag Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (139 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Hou Tao, Richard Weinberger

From: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>

commit 2fe8b2d5578d7d142982e3bf62e4c0caf8b8fe02 upstream.

Reject unsupported ioctl flags explicitly, so the following command
on a regular ubifs file will fail:
	chattr +d ubifs_file

And xfstests generic/424 will pass.

Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ubifs/ioctl.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/ubifs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/ioctl.c
@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include "ubifs.h"
 
+/* Need to be kept consistent with checked flags in ioctl2ubifs() */
+#define UBIFS_SUPPORTED_IOCTL_FLAGS \
+	(FS_COMPR_FL | FS_SYNC_FL | FS_APPEND_FL | \
+	 FS_IMMUTABLE_FL | FS_DIRSYNC_FL)
+
 /**
  * ubifs_set_inode_flags - set VFS inode flags.
  * @inode: VFS inode to set flags for
@@ -166,6 +171,9 @@ long ubifs_ioctl(struct file *file, unsi
 		if (get_user(flags, (int __user *) arg))
 			return -EFAULT;
 
+		if (flags & ~UBIFS_SUPPORTED_IOCTL_FLAGS)
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 		if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
 			flags &= ~FS_DIRSYNC_FL;
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 040/173] ubifs: Fix FS_IOC_SETFLAGS unexpectedly clearing encrypt flag
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (38 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 039/173] ubifs: Reject unsupported ioctl flags explicitly Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 041/173] ubifs: Fix deadlock in concurrent bulk-read and writepage Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (138 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Biggers, Richard Weinberger

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

commit 2b57067a7778484c10892fa191997bfda29fea13 upstream.

UBIFS's implementation of FS_IOC_SETFLAGS fails to preserve existing
inode flags that aren't settable by FS_IOC_SETFLAGS, namely the encrypt
flag.  This causes the encrypt flag to be unexpectedly cleared.

Fix it by preserving existing unsettable flags, like ext4 and f2fs do.

Test case with kvm-xfstests shell:

    FSTYP=ubifs KEYCTL_PROG=keyctl
    . fs/ubifs/config
    . ~/xfstests/common/encrypt
    dev=$(__blkdev_to_ubi_volume /dev/vdc)
    ubiupdatevol -t $dev
    mount $dev /mnt -t ubifs
    k=$(_generate_session_encryption_key)
    mkdir /mnt/edir
    xfs_io -c "set_encpolicy $k" /mnt/edir
    echo contents > /mnt/edir/file
    chattr +i /mnt/edir/file
    chattr -i /mnt/edir/file

With the bug, the following errors occur on the last command:

    [   18.081559] fscrypt (ubifs, inode 67): Inconsistent encryption context (parent directory: 65)
    chattr: Operation not permitted while reading flags on /mnt/edir/file

Fixes: d475a507457b ("ubifs: Add skeleton for fscrypto")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ubifs/ioctl.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/ubifs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/ioctl.c
@@ -129,7 +129,8 @@ static int setflags(struct inode *inode,
 		}
 	}
 
-	ui->flags = ioctl2ubifs(flags);
+	ui->flags &= ~ioctl2ubifs(UBIFS_SUPPORTED_IOCTL_FLAGS);
+	ui->flags |= ioctl2ubifs(flags);
 	ubifs_set_inode_flags(inode);
 	inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
 	release = ui->dirty;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 041/173] ubifs: Fix deadlock in concurrent bulk-read and writepage
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (39 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 040/173] ubifs: Fix FS_IOC_SETFLAGS unexpectedly clearing encrypt flag Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 042/173] PCI: keystone: Fix link training retries initiation Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (137 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Zhihao Cheng, zhangyi (F),
	Stable, Richard Weinberger

From: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>

commit f5de5b83303e61b1f3fb09bd77ce3ac2d7a475f2 upstream.

In ubifs, concurrent execution of writepage and bulk read on the same file
may cause ABBA deadlock, for example (Reproduce method see Link):

Process A(Bulk-read starts from page4)         Process B(write page4 back)
  vfs_read                                       wb_workfn or fsync
  ...                                            ...
  generic_file_buffered_read                     write_cache_pages
    ubifs_readpage                                 LOCK(page4)

      ubifs_bulk_read                              ubifs_writepage
        LOCK(ui->ui_mutex)                           ubifs_write_inode

	  ubifs_do_bulk_read                           LOCK(ui->ui_mutex)
	    find_or_create_page(alloc page4)                  ↑
	      LOCK(page4)                   <--     ABBA deadlock occurs!

In order to ensure the serialization execution of bulk read, we can't
remove the big lock 'ui->ui_mutex' in ubifs_bulk_read(). Instead, we
allow ubifs_do_bulk_read() to lock page failed by replacing
find_or_create_page(FGP_LOCK) with
pagecache_get_page(FGP_LOCK | FGP_NOWAIT).

Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4793e7c5e1c ("UBIFS: add bulk-read facility")
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206153
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ubifs/file.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/ubifs/file.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/file.c
@@ -797,7 +797,9 @@ static int ubifs_do_bulk_read(struct ubi
 
 		if (page_offset > end_index)
 			break;
-		page = find_or_create_page(mapping, page_offset, ra_gfp_mask);
+		page = pagecache_get_page(mapping, page_offset,
+				 FGP_LOCK|FGP_ACCESSED|FGP_CREAT|FGP_NOWAIT,
+				 ra_gfp_mask);
 		if (!page)
 			break;
 		if (!PageUptodate(page))



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 042/173] PCI: keystone: Fix link training retries initiation
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (40 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 041/173] ubifs: Fix deadlock in concurrent bulk-read and writepage Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 043/173] mmc: sdhci-of-at91: fix memleak on clk_get failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (136 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Yurii Monakov, Lorenzo Pieralisi,
	Andrew Murray, Sasha Levin

From: Yurii Monakov <monakov.y@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 6df19872d881641e6394f93ef2938cffcbdae5bb ]

ks_pcie_stop_link() function does not clear LTSSM_EN_VAL bit so
link training was not triggered more than once after startup.
In configurations where link can be unstable during early boot,
for example, under low temperature, it will never be established.

Fixes: 0c4ffcfe1fbc ("PCI: keystone: Add TI Keystone PCIe driver")
Signed-off-by: Yurii Monakov <monakov.y@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Murray <andrew.murray@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/pci/dwc/pci-keystone-dw.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pci/dwc/pci-keystone-dw.c b/drivers/pci/dwc/pci-keystone-dw.c
index 2fb20b887d2a5..4cf2662930d86 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/dwc/pci-keystone-dw.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/dwc/pci-keystone-dw.c
@@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ void ks_dw_pcie_initiate_link_train(struct keystone_pcie *ks_pcie)
 	/* Disable Link training */
 	val = ks_dw_app_readl(ks_pcie, CMD_STATUS);
 	val &= ~LTSSM_EN_VAL;
-	ks_dw_app_writel(ks_pcie, CMD_STATUS, LTSSM_EN_VAL | val);
+	ks_dw_app_writel(ks_pcie, CMD_STATUS, val);
 
 	/* Initiate Link Training */
 	val = ks_dw_app_readl(ks_pcie, CMD_STATUS);
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 043/173] mmc: sdhci-of-at91: fix memleak on clk_get failure
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (41 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 042/173] PCI: keystone: Fix link training retries initiation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 044/173] ubifs: dont trigger assertion on invalid no-key filename Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (135 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Michał Mirosław,
	Ludovic Desroches, Adrian Hunter, Ulf Hansson, Sasha Levin

From: Michał Mirosław <mirq-linux@rere.qmqm.pl>

[ Upstream commit a04184ce777b46e92c2b3c93c6dcb2754cb005e1 ]

sdhci_alloc_host() does its work not using managed infrastructure, so
needs explicit free on error path. Add it where needed.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: bb5f8ea4d514 ("mmc: sdhci-of-at91: introduce driver for the Atmel SDMMC")
Signed-off-by: Michał Mirosław <mirq-linux@rere.qmqm.pl>
Acked-by: Ludovic Desroches <ludovic.desroches@microchip.com>
Acked-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b2a44d5be2e06ff075f32477e466598bb0f07b36.1577961679.git.mirq-linux@rere.qmqm.pl
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-at91.c | 9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-at91.c b/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-at91.c
index 564e7be21e068..1dadd460cc8fb 100644
--- a/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-at91.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-of-at91.c
@@ -331,19 +331,22 @@ static int sdhci_at91_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	priv->mainck = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, "baseclk");
 	if (IS_ERR(priv->mainck)) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to get baseclk\n");
-		return PTR_ERR(priv->mainck);
+		ret = PTR_ERR(priv->mainck);
+		goto sdhci_pltfm_free;
 	}
 
 	priv->hclock = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, "hclock");
 	if (IS_ERR(priv->hclock)) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to get hclock\n");
-		return PTR_ERR(priv->hclock);
+		ret = PTR_ERR(priv->hclock);
+		goto sdhci_pltfm_free;
 	}
 
 	priv->gck = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, "multclk");
 	if (IS_ERR(priv->gck)) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to get multclk\n");
-		return PTR_ERR(priv->gck);
+		ret = PTR_ERR(priv->gck);
+		goto sdhci_pltfm_free;
 	}
 
 	ret = sdhci_at91_set_clks_presets(&pdev->dev);
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 044/173] ubifs: dont trigger assertion on invalid no-key filename
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (42 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 043/173] mmc: sdhci-of-at91: fix memleak on clk_get failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 045/173] hv_balloon: Balloon up according to request page number Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (134 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Biggers, Sasha Levin

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

[ Upstream commit f0d07a98a070bb5e443df19c3aa55693cbca9341 ]

If userspace provides an invalid fscrypt no-key filename which encodes a
hash value with any of the UBIFS node type bits set (i.e. the high 3
bits), gracefully report ENOENT rather than triggering ubifs_assert().

Test case with kvm-xfstests shell:

    . fs/ubifs/config
    . ~/xfstests/common/encrypt
    dev=$(__blkdev_to_ubi_volume /dev/vdc)
    ubiupdatevol $dev -t
    mount $dev /mnt -t ubifs
    mkdir /mnt/edir
    xfs_io -c set_encpolicy /mnt/edir
    rm /mnt/edir/_,,,,,DAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

With the bug, the following assertion fails on the 'rm' command:

    [   19.066048] UBIFS error (ubi0:0 pid 379): ubifs_assert_failed: UBIFS assert failed: !(hash & ~UBIFS_S_KEY_HASH_MASK), in fs/ubifs/key.h:170

Fixes: f4f61d2cc6d8 ("ubifs: Implement encrypted filenames")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.10+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120223201.241390-5-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/ubifs/dir.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ubifs/dir.c b/fs/ubifs/dir.c
index 4e6e32c0c08a4..358abc26dbc0b 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/dir.c
@@ -253,6 +253,8 @@ static struct dentry *ubifs_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (nm.hash) {
 		ubifs_assert(fname_len(&nm) == 0);
 		ubifs_assert(fname_name(&nm) == NULL);
+		if (nm.hash & ~UBIFS_S_KEY_HASH_MASK)
+			goto done; /* ENOENT */
 		dent_key_init_hash(c, &key, dir->i_ino, nm.hash);
 		err = ubifs_tnc_lookup_dh(c, &key, dent, nm.minor_hash);
 	} else {
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 045/173] hv_balloon: Balloon up according to request page number
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (43 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 044/173] ubifs: dont trigger assertion on invalid no-key filename Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 046/173] crypto: api - Check spawn->alg under lock in crypto_drop_spawn Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (133 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Vitaly Kuznetsov, Tianyu Lan,
	Michael Kelley, Sasha Levin

From: Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com>

commit d33c240d47dab4fd15123d9e73fc8810cbc6ed6a upstream.

Current code has assumption that balloon request memory size aligns
with 2MB. But actually Hyper-V doesn't guarantee such alignment. When
balloon driver receives non-aligned balloon request, it produces warning
and balloon up more memory than requested in order to keep 2MB alignment.
Remove the warning and balloon up memory according to actual requested
memory size.

Fixes: f6712238471a ("hv: hv_balloon: avoid memory leak on alloc_error of 2MB memory block")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/hv/hv_balloon.c |   13 +++----------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hv/hv_balloon.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/hv_balloon.c
@@ -1170,10 +1170,7 @@ static unsigned int alloc_balloon_pages(
 	unsigned int i = 0;
 	struct page *pg;
 
-	if (num_pages < alloc_unit)
-		return 0;
-
-	for (i = 0; (i * alloc_unit) < num_pages; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < num_pages / alloc_unit; i++) {
 		if (bl_resp->hdr.size + sizeof(union dm_mem_page_range) >
 			PAGE_SIZE)
 			return i * alloc_unit;
@@ -1207,7 +1204,7 @@ static unsigned int alloc_balloon_pages(
 
 	}
 
-	return num_pages;
+	return i * alloc_unit;
 }
 
 static void balloon_up(struct work_struct *dummy)
@@ -1222,9 +1219,6 @@ static void balloon_up(struct work_struc
 	long avail_pages;
 	unsigned long floor;
 
-	/* The host balloons pages in 2M granularity. */
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(num_pages % PAGES_IN_2M != 0);
-
 	/*
 	 * We will attempt 2M allocations. However, if we fail to
 	 * allocate 2M chunks, we will go back to 4k allocations.
@@ -1234,14 +1228,13 @@ static void balloon_up(struct work_struc
 	avail_pages = si_mem_available();
 	floor = compute_balloon_floor();
 
-	/* Refuse to balloon below the floor, keep the 2M granularity. */
+	/* Refuse to balloon below the floor. */
 	if (avail_pages < num_pages || avail_pages - num_pages < floor) {
 		pr_warn("Balloon request will be partially fulfilled. %s\n",
 			avail_pages < num_pages ? "Not enough memory." :
 			"Balloon floor reached.");
 
 		num_pages = avail_pages > floor ? (avail_pages - floor) : 0;
-		num_pages -= num_pages % PAGES_IN_2M;
 	}
 
 	while (!done) {



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 046/173] crypto: api - Check spawn->alg under lock in crypto_drop_spawn
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (44 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 045/173] hv_balloon: Balloon up according to request page number Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 047/173] scsi: qla2xxx: Fix mtcp dump collection failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (132 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Herbert Xu

From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

commit 7db3b61b6bba4310f454588c2ca6faf2958ad79f upstream.

We need to check whether spawn->alg is NULL under lock as otherwise
the algorithm could be removed from under us after we have checked
it and found it to be non-NULL.  This could cause us to remove the
spawn from a non-existent list.

Fixes: 7ede5a5ba55a ("crypto: api - Fix crypto_drop_spawn crash...")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 crypto/algapi.c |    6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/crypto/algapi.c
+++ b/crypto/algapi.c
@@ -652,11 +652,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_grab_spawn);
 
 void crypto_drop_spawn(struct crypto_spawn *spawn)
 {
-	if (!spawn->alg)
-		return;
-
 	down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
-	list_del(&spawn->list);
+	if (spawn->alg)
+		list_del(&spawn->list);
 	up_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_drop_spawn);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 047/173] scsi: qla2xxx: Fix mtcp dump collection failure
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (45 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 046/173] crypto: api - Check spawn->alg under lock in crypto_drop_spawn Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 048/173] power: supply: ltc2941-battery-gauge: fix use-after-free Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (131 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Quinn Tran, Himanshu Madhani,
	Martin K. Petersen

From: Quinn Tran <qutran@marvell.com>

commit 641e0efddcbde52461e017136acd3ce7f2ef0c14 upstream.

MTCP dump failed due to MB Reg 10 was picking garbage data from stack
memory.

Fixes: 81178772b636a ("[SCSI] qla2xxx: Implemetation of mctp.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191217220617.28084-14-hmadhani@marvell.com
Signed-off-by: Quinn Tran <qutran@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <hmadhani@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_mbx.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_mbx.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_mbx.c
@@ -5853,9 +5853,8 @@ qla2x00_dump_mctp_data(scsi_qla_host_t *
 	mcp->mb[7] = LSW(MSD(req_dma));
 	mcp->mb[8] = MSW(addr);
 	/* Setting RAM ID to valid */
-	mcp->mb[10] |= BIT_7;
 	/* For MCTP RAM ID is 0x40 */
-	mcp->mb[10] |= 0x40;
+	mcp->mb[10] = BIT_7 | 0x40;
 
 	mcp->out_mb |= MBX_10|MBX_8|MBX_7|MBX_6|MBX_5|MBX_4|MBX_3|MBX_2|MBX_1|
 	    MBX_0;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 048/173] power: supply: ltc2941-battery-gauge: fix use-after-free
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (46 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 047/173] scsi: qla2xxx: Fix mtcp dump collection failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 049/173] f2fs: choose hardlimit when softlimit is larger than hardlimit in f2fs_statfs_project() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (130 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sven Van Asbroeck, Sebastian Reichel

From: Sven Van Asbroeck <thesven73@gmail.com>

commit a60ec78d306c6548d4adbc7918b587a723c555cc upstream.

This driver's remove path calls cancel_delayed_work().
However, that function does not wait until the work function
finishes. This could mean that the work function is still
running after the driver's remove function has finished,
which would result in a use-after-free.

Fix by calling cancel_delayed_work_sync(), which ensures that
that the work is properly cancelled, no longer running, and
unable to re-schedule itself.

This issue was detected with the help of Coccinelle.

Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sven Van Asbroeck <TheSven73@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/power/supply/ltc2941-battery-gauge.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/power/supply/ltc2941-battery-gauge.c
+++ b/drivers/power/supply/ltc2941-battery-gauge.c
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ static int ltc294x_i2c_remove(struct i2c
 {
 	struct ltc294x_info *info = i2c_get_clientdata(client);
 
-	cancel_delayed_work(&info->work);
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&info->work);
 	power_supply_unregister(info->supply);
 	return 0;
 }



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 049/173] f2fs: choose hardlimit when softlimit is larger than hardlimit in f2fs_statfs_project()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (47 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 048/173] power: supply: ltc2941-battery-gauge: fix use-after-free Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 050/173] f2fs: fix miscounted block limit " Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (129 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable

From: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net>

commit 909110c060f22e65756659ec6fa957ae75777e00 upstream.

Setting softlimit larger than hardlimit seems meaningless
for disk quota but currently it is allowed. In this case,
there may be a bit of comfusion for users when they run
df comamnd to directory which has project quota.

For example, we set 20M softlimit and 10M hardlimit of
block usage limit for project quota of test_dir(project id 123).

[root@hades f2fs]# repquota -P -a
---
 fs/f2fs/super.c |   20 ++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -912,9 +912,13 @@ static int f2fs_statfs_project(struct su
 		return PTR_ERR(dquot);
 	spin_lock(&dq_data_lock);
 
-	limit = (dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bsoftlimit ?
-		 dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bsoftlimit :
-		 dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bhardlimit) >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
+	limit = 0;
+	if (dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bsoftlimit)
+		limit = dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bsoftlimit;
+	if (dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bhardlimit &&
+			(!limit || dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bhardlimit < limit))
+		limit = dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bhardlimit;
+
 	if (limit && buf->f_blocks > limit) {
 		curblock = dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_curspace >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
 		buf->f_blocks = limit;
@@ -923,9 +927,13 @@ static int f2fs_statfs_project(struct su
 			 (buf->f_blocks - curblock) : 0;
 	}
 
-	limit = dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_isoftlimit ?
-		dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_isoftlimit :
-		dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_ihardlimit;
+	limit = 0;
+	if (dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_isoftlimit)
+		limit = dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_isoftlimit;
+	if (dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_ihardlimit &&
+			(!limit || dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_ihardlimit < limit))
+		limit = dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_ihardlimit;
+
 	if (limit && buf->f_files > limit) {
 		buf->f_files = limit;
 		buf->f_ffree =



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 050/173] f2fs: fix miscounted block limit in f2fs_statfs_project()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (48 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 049/173] f2fs: choose hardlimit when softlimit is larger than hardlimit in f2fs_statfs_project() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` " Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 051/173] f2fs: code cleanup for f2fs_statfs_project() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (128 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable

From: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net>

commit acdf2172172a511f97fa21ed0ee7609a6d3b3a07 upstream.

statfs calculates Total/Used/Avail disk space in block unit,
so we should translate soft/hard prjquota limit to block unit
as well.

Below testing result shows the block/inode numbers of
Total/Used/Avail from df command are all correct afer
applying this patch.

[root@localhost quota-tools]\# ./repquota -P /dev/sdb1
---
 fs/f2fs/super.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -918,6 +918,8 @@ static int f2fs_statfs_project(struct su
 	if (dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bhardlimit &&
 			(!limit || dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bhardlimit < limit))
 		limit = dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bhardlimit;
+	if (limit)
+		limit >>= sb->s_blocksize_bits;
 
 	if (limit && buf->f_blocks > limit) {
 		curblock = dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_curspace >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 051/173] f2fs: code cleanup for f2fs_statfs_project()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (49 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 050/173] f2fs: fix miscounted block limit " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 052/173] PM: core: Fix handling of devices deleted during system-wide resume Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (127 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Chengguang Xu, Chao Yu, Jaegeuk Kim

From: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net>

commit bf2cbd3c57159c2b639ee8797b52ab5af180bf83 upstream.

Calling min_not_zero() to simplify complicated prjquota
limit comparison in f2fs_statfs_project().

Signed-off-by: Chengguang Xu <cgxu519@mykernel.net>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/f2fs/super.c |   16 ++++------------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -912,12 +912,8 @@ static int f2fs_statfs_project(struct su
 		return PTR_ERR(dquot);
 	spin_lock(&dq_data_lock);
 
-	limit = 0;
-	if (dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bsoftlimit)
-		limit = dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bsoftlimit;
-	if (dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bhardlimit &&
-			(!limit || dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bhardlimit < limit))
-		limit = dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bhardlimit;
+	limit = min_not_zero(dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bsoftlimit,
+					dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_bhardlimit);
 	if (limit)
 		limit >>= sb->s_blocksize_bits;
 
@@ -929,12 +925,8 @@ static int f2fs_statfs_project(struct su
 			 (buf->f_blocks - curblock) : 0;
 	}
 
-	limit = 0;
-	if (dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_isoftlimit)
-		limit = dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_isoftlimit;
-	if (dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_ihardlimit &&
-			(!limit || dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_ihardlimit < limit))
-		limit = dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_ihardlimit;
+	limit = min_not_zero(dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_isoftlimit,
+					dquot->dq_dqb.dqb_ihardlimit);
 
 	if (limit && buf->f_files > limit) {
 		buf->f_files = limit;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 052/173] PM: core: Fix handling of devices deleted during system-wide resume
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (50 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 051/173] f2fs: code cleanup for f2fs_statfs_project() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 053/173] of: Add OF_DMA_DEFAULT_COHERENT & select it on powerpc Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (126 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Chanho Min, Rafael J. Wysocki

From: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

commit 0552e05fdfea191a2cf3a0abd33574b5ef9ca818 upstream.

If a device is deleted by one of its system-wide resume callbacks
(for example, because it does not appear to be present or accessible
any more) along with its children, the resume of the children may
continue leading to use-after-free errors and other issues
(potentially).

Namely, if the device's children are resumed asynchronously, their
resume may have been scheduled already before the device's callback
runs and so the device may be deleted while dpm_wait_for_superior()
is being executed for them.  The memory taken up by the parent device
object may be freed then while dpm_wait() is waiting for the parent's
resume callback to complete, which leads to a use-after-free.
Moreover, the resume of the children is really not expected to
continue after they have been unregistered, so it must be terminated
right away in that case.

To address this problem, modify dpm_wait_for_superior() to check
if the target device is still there in the system-wide PM list of
devices and if so, to increment its parent's reference counter, both
under dpm_list_mtx which prevents device_del() running for the child
from dropping the parent's reference counter prematurely.

If the device is not present in the system-wide PM list of devices
any more, the resume of it cannot continue, so check that again after
dpm_wait() returns, which means that the parent's callback has been
completed, and pass the result of that check to the caller of
dpm_wait_for_superior() to allow it to abort the device's resume
if it is not there any more.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pm/1579568452-27253-1-git-send-email-chanho.min@lge.com
Reported-by: Chanho Min <chanho.min@lge.com>
Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/base/power/main.c |   42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/base/power/main.c
+++ b/drivers/base/power/main.c
@@ -269,10 +269,38 @@ static void dpm_wait_for_suppliers(struc
 	device_links_read_unlock(idx);
 }
 
-static void dpm_wait_for_superior(struct device *dev, bool async)
+static bool dpm_wait_for_superior(struct device *dev, bool async)
 {
-	dpm_wait(dev->parent, async);
+	struct device *parent;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the device is resumed asynchronously and the parent's callback
+	 * deletes both the device and the parent itself, the parent object may
+	 * be freed while this function is running, so avoid that by reference
+	 * counting the parent once more unless the device has been deleted
+	 * already (in which case return right away).
+	 */
+	mutex_lock(&dpm_list_mtx);
+
+	if (!device_pm_initialized(dev)) {
+		mutex_unlock(&dpm_list_mtx);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	parent = get_device(dev->parent);
+
+	mutex_unlock(&dpm_list_mtx);
+
+	dpm_wait(parent, async);
+	put_device(parent);
+
 	dpm_wait_for_suppliers(dev, async);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the parent's callback has deleted the device, attempting to resume
+	 * it would be invalid, so avoid doing that then.
+	 */
+	return device_pm_initialized(dev);
 }
 
 static void dpm_wait_for_consumers(struct device *dev, bool async)
@@ -551,7 +579,8 @@ static int device_resume_noirq(struct de
 	if (!dev->power.is_noirq_suspended)
 		goto Out;
 
-	dpm_wait_for_superior(dev, async);
+	if (!dpm_wait_for_superior(dev, async))
+		goto Out;
 
 	if (dev->pm_domain) {
 		info = "noirq power domain ";
@@ -691,7 +720,8 @@ static int device_resume_early(struct de
 	if (!dev->power.is_late_suspended)
 		goto Out;
 
-	dpm_wait_for_superior(dev, async);
+	if (!dpm_wait_for_superior(dev, async))
+		goto Out;
 
 	if (dev->pm_domain) {
 		info = "early power domain ";
@@ -823,7 +853,9 @@ static int device_resume(struct device *
 		goto Complete;
 	}
 
-	dpm_wait_for_superior(dev, async);
+	if (!dpm_wait_for_superior(dev, async))
+		goto Complete;
+
 	dpm_watchdog_set(&wd, dev);
 	device_lock(dev);
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 053/173] of: Add OF_DMA_DEFAULT_COHERENT & select it on powerpc
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (51 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 052/173] PM: core: Fix handling of devices deleted during system-wide resume Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 054/173] dm zoned: support zone sizes smaller than 128MiB Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (125 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Christian Zigotzky, Michael Ellerman,
	Ulf Hansson, Rob Herring

From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

commit dabf6b36b83a18d57e3d4b9d50544ed040d86255 upstream.

There's an OF helper called of_dma_is_coherent(), which checks if a
device has a "dma-coherent" property to see if the device is coherent
for DMA.

But on some platforms devices are coherent by default, and on some
platforms it's not possible to update existing device trees to add the
"dma-coherent" property.

So add a Kconfig symbol to allow arch code to tell
of_dma_is_coherent() that devices are coherent by default, regardless
of the presence of the property.

Select that symbol on powerpc when NOT_COHERENT_CACHE is not set, ie.
when the system has a coherent cache.

Fixes: 92ea637edea3 ("of: introduce of_dma_is_coherent() helper")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.16+
Reported-by: Christian Zigotzky <chzigotzky@xenosoft.de>
Tested-by: Christian Zigotzky <chzigotzky@xenosoft.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig |    1 +
 drivers/of/Kconfig   |    4 ++++
 drivers/of/address.c |    6 +++++-
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ config PPC
 	select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
 	select NO_BOOTMEM
 	select OF
+	select OF_DMA_DEFAULT_COHERENT		if !NOT_COHERENT_CACHE
 	select OF_EARLY_FLATTREE
 	select OF_RESERVED_MEM
 	select OLD_SIGACTION			if PPC32
--- a/drivers/of/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/of/Kconfig
@@ -112,4 +112,8 @@ config OF_OVERLAY
 config OF_NUMA
 	bool
 
+config OF_DMA_DEFAULT_COHERENT
+	# arches should select this if DMA is coherent by default for OF devices
+	bool
+
 endif # OF
--- a/drivers/of/address.c
+++ b/drivers/of/address.c
@@ -894,12 +894,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(of_dma_get_range);
  * @np:	device node
  *
  * It returns true if "dma-coherent" property was found
- * for this device in DT.
+ * for this device in the DT, or if DMA is coherent by
+ * default for OF devices on the current platform.
  */
 bool of_dma_is_coherent(struct device_node *np)
 {
 	struct device_node *node = of_node_get(np);
 
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_OF_DMA_DEFAULT_COHERENT))
+		return true;
+
 	while (node) {
 		if (of_property_read_bool(node, "dma-coherent")) {
 			of_node_put(node);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 054/173] dm zoned: support zone sizes smaller than 128MiB
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (52 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 053/173] of: Add OF_DMA_DEFAULT_COHERENT & select it on powerpc Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 055/173] dm space map common: fix to ensure new block isnt already in use Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (124 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dmitry Fomichev, Damien Le Moal,
	Mike Snitzer

From: Dmitry Fomichev <dmitry.fomichev@wdc.com>

commit b39962950339912978484cdac50069258545d753 upstream.

dm-zoned is observed to log failed kernel assertions and not work
correctly when operating against a device with a zone size smaller
than 128MiB (e.g. 32768 bits per 4K block). The reason is that the
bitmap size per zone is calculated as zero with such a small zone
size. Fix this problem and also make the code related to zone bitmap
management be able to handle per zone bitmaps smaller than a single
block.

A dm-zoned-tools patch is required to properly format dm-zoned devices
with zone sizes smaller than 128MiB.

Fixes: 3b1a94c88b79 ("dm zoned: drive-managed zoned block device target")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Fomichev <dmitry.fomichev@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/md/dm-zoned-metadata.c |   23 ++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/md/dm-zoned-metadata.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-zoned-metadata.c
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ struct dmz_metadata {
 
 	sector_t		zone_bitmap_size;
 	unsigned int		zone_nr_bitmap_blocks;
+	unsigned int		zone_bits_per_mblk;
 
 	unsigned int		nr_bitmap_blocks;
 	unsigned int		nr_map_blocks;
@@ -1165,7 +1166,10 @@ static int dmz_init_zones(struct dmz_met
 
 	/* Init */
 	zmd->zone_bitmap_size = dev->zone_nr_blocks >> 3;
-	zmd->zone_nr_bitmap_blocks = zmd->zone_bitmap_size >> DMZ_BLOCK_SHIFT;
+	zmd->zone_nr_bitmap_blocks =
+		max_t(sector_t, 1, zmd->zone_bitmap_size >> DMZ_BLOCK_SHIFT);
+	zmd->zone_bits_per_mblk = min_t(sector_t, dev->zone_nr_blocks,
+					DMZ_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS);
 
 	/* Allocate zone array */
 	zmd->zones = kcalloc(dev->nr_zones, sizeof(struct dm_zone), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1982,7 +1986,7 @@ int dmz_copy_valid_blocks(struct dmz_met
 		dmz_release_mblock(zmd, to_mblk);
 		dmz_release_mblock(zmd, from_mblk);
 
-		chunk_block += DMZ_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS;
+		chunk_block += zmd->zone_bits_per_mblk;
 	}
 
 	to_zone->weight = from_zone->weight;
@@ -2043,7 +2047,7 @@ int dmz_validate_blocks(struct dmz_metad
 
 		/* Set bits */
 		bit = chunk_block & DMZ_BLOCK_MASK_BITS;
-		nr_bits = min(nr_blocks, DMZ_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS - bit);
+		nr_bits = min(nr_blocks, zmd->zone_bits_per_mblk - bit);
 
 		count = dmz_set_bits((unsigned long *)mblk->data, bit, nr_bits);
 		if (count) {
@@ -2122,7 +2126,7 @@ int dmz_invalidate_blocks(struct dmz_met
 
 		/* Clear bits */
 		bit = chunk_block & DMZ_BLOCK_MASK_BITS;
-		nr_bits = min(nr_blocks, DMZ_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS - bit);
+		nr_bits = min(nr_blocks, zmd->zone_bits_per_mblk - bit);
 
 		count = dmz_clear_bits((unsigned long *)mblk->data,
 				       bit, nr_bits);
@@ -2182,6 +2186,7 @@ static int dmz_to_next_set_block(struct
 {
 	struct dmz_mblock *mblk;
 	unsigned int bit, set_bit, nr_bits;
+	unsigned int zone_bits = zmd->zone_bits_per_mblk;
 	unsigned long *bitmap;
 	int n = 0;
 
@@ -2196,15 +2201,15 @@ static int dmz_to_next_set_block(struct
 		/* Get offset */
 		bitmap = (unsigned long *) mblk->data;
 		bit = chunk_block & DMZ_BLOCK_MASK_BITS;
-		nr_bits = min(nr_blocks, DMZ_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS - bit);
+		nr_bits = min(nr_blocks, zone_bits - bit);
 		if (set)
-			set_bit = find_next_bit(bitmap, DMZ_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS, bit);
+			set_bit = find_next_bit(bitmap, zone_bits, bit);
 		else
-			set_bit = find_next_zero_bit(bitmap, DMZ_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS, bit);
+			set_bit = find_next_zero_bit(bitmap, zone_bits, bit);
 		dmz_release_mblock(zmd, mblk);
 
 		n += set_bit - bit;
-		if (set_bit < DMZ_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS)
+		if (set_bit < zone_bits)
 			break;
 
 		nr_blocks -= nr_bits;
@@ -2307,7 +2312,7 @@ static void dmz_get_zone_weight(struct d
 		/* Count bits in this block */
 		bitmap = mblk->data;
 		bit = chunk_block & DMZ_BLOCK_MASK_BITS;
-		nr_bits = min(nr_blocks, DMZ_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS - bit);
+		nr_bits = min(nr_blocks, zmd->zone_bits_per_mblk - bit);
 		n += dmz_count_bits(bitmap, bit, nr_bits);
 
 		dmz_release_mblock(zmd, mblk);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 055/173] dm space map common: fix to ensure new block isnt already in use
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (53 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 054/173] dm zoned: support zone sizes smaller than 128MiB Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 056/173] dm crypt: fix benbi IV constructor crash if used in authenticated mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (123 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Wheeler, Joe Thornber, Mike Snitzer

From: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>

commit 4feaef830de7ffdd8352e1fe14ad3bf13c9688f8 upstream.

The space-maps track the reference counts for disk blocks allocated by
both the thin-provisioning and cache targets.  There are variants for
tracking metadata blocks and data blocks.

Transactionality is implemented by never touching blocks from the
previous transaction, so we can rollback in the event of a crash.

When allocating a new block we need to ensure the block is free (has
reference count of 0) in both the current and previous transaction.
Prior to this fix we were doing this by searching for a free block in
the previous transaction, and relying on a 'begin' counter to track
where the last allocation in the current transaction was.  This
'begin' field was not being updated in all code paths (eg, increment
of a data block reference count due to breaking sharing of a neighbour
block in the same btree leaf).

This fix keeps the 'begin' field, but now it's just a hint to speed up
the search.  Instead the current transaction is searched for a free
block, and then the old transaction is double checked to ensure it's
free.  Much simpler.

This fixes reports of sm_disk_new_block()'s BUG_ON() triggering when
DM thin-provisioning's snapshots are heavily used.

Reported-by: Eric Wheeler <dm-devel@lists.ewheeler.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-common.c   |   27 +++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-common.h   |    2 +
 drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-disk.c     |    6 +++-
 drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-metadata.c |    5 +++
 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-common.c
+++ b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-common.c
@@ -382,6 +382,33 @@ int sm_ll_find_free_block(struct ll_disk
 	return -ENOSPC;
 }
 
+int sm_ll_find_common_free_block(struct ll_disk *old_ll, struct ll_disk *new_ll,
+	                         dm_block_t begin, dm_block_t end, dm_block_t *b)
+{
+	int r;
+	uint32_t count;
+
+	do {
+		r = sm_ll_find_free_block(new_ll, begin, new_ll->nr_blocks, b);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+
+		/* double check this block wasn't used in the old transaction */
+		if (*b >= old_ll->nr_blocks)
+			count = 0;
+		else {
+			r = sm_ll_lookup(old_ll, *b, &count);
+			if (r)
+				break;
+
+			if (count)
+				begin = *b + 1;
+		}
+	} while (count);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
 static int sm_ll_mutate(struct ll_disk *ll, dm_block_t b,
 			int (*mutator)(void *context, uint32_t old, uint32_t *new),
 			void *context, enum allocation_event *ev)
--- a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-common.h
+++ b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-common.h
@@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ int sm_ll_lookup_bitmap(struct ll_disk *
 int sm_ll_lookup(struct ll_disk *ll, dm_block_t b, uint32_t *result);
 int sm_ll_find_free_block(struct ll_disk *ll, dm_block_t begin,
 			  dm_block_t end, dm_block_t *result);
+int sm_ll_find_common_free_block(struct ll_disk *old_ll, struct ll_disk *new_ll,
+	                         dm_block_t begin, dm_block_t end, dm_block_t *result);
 int sm_ll_insert(struct ll_disk *ll, dm_block_t b, uint32_t ref_count, enum allocation_event *ev);
 int sm_ll_inc(struct ll_disk *ll, dm_block_t b, enum allocation_event *ev);
 int sm_ll_dec(struct ll_disk *ll, dm_block_t b, enum allocation_event *ev);
--- a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-disk.c
+++ b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-disk.c
@@ -167,8 +167,10 @@ static int sm_disk_new_block(struct dm_s
 	enum allocation_event ev;
 	struct sm_disk *smd = container_of(sm, struct sm_disk, sm);
 
-	/* FIXME: we should loop round a couple of times */
-	r = sm_ll_find_free_block(&smd->old_ll, smd->begin, smd->old_ll.nr_blocks, b);
+	/*
+	 * Any block we allocate has to be free in both the old and current ll.
+	 */
+	r = sm_ll_find_common_free_block(&smd->old_ll, &smd->ll, smd->begin, smd->ll.nr_blocks, b);
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 
--- a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-metadata.c
+++ b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-space-map-metadata.c
@@ -447,7 +447,10 @@ static int sm_metadata_new_block_(struct
 	enum allocation_event ev;
 	struct sm_metadata *smm = container_of(sm, struct sm_metadata, sm);
 
-	r = sm_ll_find_free_block(&smm->old_ll, smm->begin, smm->old_ll.nr_blocks, b);
+	/*
+	 * Any block we allocate has to be free in both the old and current ll.
+	 */
+	r = sm_ll_find_common_free_block(&smm->old_ll, &smm->ll, smm->begin, smm->ll.nr_blocks, b);
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 056/173] dm crypt: fix benbi IV constructor crash if used in authenticated mode
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (54 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 055/173] dm space map common: fix to ensure new block isnt already in use Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 057/173] padata: Remove broken queue flushing Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (122 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jerad Simpson, Milan Broz, Mike Snitzer

From: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>

commit 4ea9471fbd1addb25a4d269991dc724e200ca5b5 upstream.

If benbi IV is used in AEAD construction, for example:
  cryptsetup luksFormat <device> --cipher twofish-xts-benbi --key-size 512 --integrity=hmac-sha256
the constructor uses wrong skcipher function and crashes:

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000014
 ...
 EIP: crypt_iv_benbi_ctr+0x15/0x70 [dm_crypt]
 Call Trace:
  ? crypt_subkey_size+0x20/0x20 [dm_crypt]
  crypt_ctr+0x567/0xfc0 [dm_crypt]
  dm_table_add_target+0x15f/0x340 [dm_mod]

Fix this by properly using crypt_aead_blocksize() in this case.

Fixes: ef43aa38063a6 ("dm crypt: add cryptographic data integrity protection (authenticated encryption)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+
Link: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=941051
Reported-by: Jerad Simpson <jbsimpson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c |   10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -485,8 +485,14 @@ static int crypt_iv_essiv_gen(struct cry
 static int crypt_iv_benbi_ctr(struct crypt_config *cc, struct dm_target *ti,
 			      const char *opts)
 {
-	unsigned bs = crypto_skcipher_blocksize(any_tfm(cc));
-	int log = ilog2(bs);
+	unsigned bs;
+	int log;
+
+	if (test_bit(CRYPT_MODE_INTEGRITY_AEAD, &cc->cipher_flags))
+		bs = crypto_aead_blocksize(any_tfm_aead(cc));
+	else
+		bs = crypto_skcipher_blocksize(any_tfm(cc));
+	log = ilog2(bs);
 
 	/* we need to calculate how far we must shift the sector count
 	 * to get the cipher block count, we use this shift in _gen */



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 057/173] padata: Remove broken queue flushing
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (55 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 056/173] dm crypt: fix benbi IV constructor crash if used in authenticated mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-14 19:46   ` [PATCH v2 4.14] " Daniel Jordan
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 058/173] tracing: Annotate ftrace_graph_hash pointer with __rcu Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (121 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 1 reply; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Herbert Xu, Daniel Jordan, Sasha Levin

From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

[ Upstream commit 07928d9bfc81640bab36f5190e8725894d93b659 ]

The function padata_flush_queues is fundamentally broken because
it cannot force padata users to complete the request that is
underway.  IOW padata has to passively wait for the completion
of any outstanding work.

As it stands flushing is used in two places.  Its use in padata_stop
is simply unnecessary because nothing depends on the queues to
be flushed afterwards.

The other use in padata_replace is more substantial as we depend
on it to free the old pd structure.  This patch instead uses the
pd->refcnt to dynamically free the pd structure once all requests
are complete.

Fixes: 2b73b07ab8a4 ("padata: Flush the padata queues actively")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/padata.c | 46 ++++++++++++----------------------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/padata.c b/kernel/padata.c
index 87540ce72aea6..ef4ba3d664dab 100644
--- a/kernel/padata.c
+++ b/kernel/padata.c
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
 
 #define MAX_OBJ_NUM 1000
 
+static void padata_free_pd(struct parallel_data *pd);
+
 static int padata_index_to_cpu(struct parallel_data *pd, int cpu_index)
 {
 	int cpu, target_cpu;
@@ -292,6 +294,7 @@ static void padata_serial_worker(struct work_struct *serial_work)
 	struct padata_serial_queue *squeue;
 	struct parallel_data *pd;
 	LIST_HEAD(local_list);
+	int cnt;
 
 	local_bh_disable();
 	squeue = container_of(serial_work, struct padata_serial_queue, work);
@@ -301,6 +304,8 @@ static void padata_serial_worker(struct work_struct *serial_work)
 	list_replace_init(&squeue->serial.list, &local_list);
 	spin_unlock(&squeue->serial.lock);
 
+	cnt = 0;
+
 	while (!list_empty(&local_list)) {
 		struct padata_priv *padata;
 
@@ -310,9 +315,12 @@ static void padata_serial_worker(struct work_struct *serial_work)
 		list_del_init(&padata->list);
 
 		padata->serial(padata);
-		atomic_dec(&pd->refcnt);
+		cnt++;
 	}
 	local_bh_enable();
+
+	if (atomic_sub_and_test(cnt, &pd->refcnt))
+		padata_free_pd(pd);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -435,8 +443,7 @@ static struct parallel_data *padata_alloc_pd(struct padata_instance *pinst,
 	setup_timer(&pd->timer, padata_reorder_timer, (unsigned long)pd);
 	atomic_set(&pd->seq_nr, -1);
 	atomic_set(&pd->reorder_objects, 0);
-	atomic_set(&pd->refcnt, 0);
-	pd->pinst = pinst;
+	atomic_set(&pd->refcnt, 1);
 	spin_lock_init(&pd->lock);
 
 	return pd;
@@ -460,31 +467,6 @@ static void padata_free_pd(struct parallel_data *pd)
 	kfree(pd);
 }
 
-/* Flush all objects out of the padata queues. */
-static void padata_flush_queues(struct parallel_data *pd)
-{
-	int cpu;
-	struct padata_parallel_queue *pqueue;
-	struct padata_serial_queue *squeue;
-
-	for_each_cpu(cpu, pd->cpumask.pcpu) {
-		pqueue = per_cpu_ptr(pd->pqueue, cpu);
-		flush_work(&pqueue->work);
-	}
-
-	del_timer_sync(&pd->timer);
-
-	if (atomic_read(&pd->reorder_objects))
-		padata_reorder(pd);
-
-	for_each_cpu(cpu, pd->cpumask.cbcpu) {
-		squeue = per_cpu_ptr(pd->squeue, cpu);
-		flush_work(&squeue->work);
-	}
-
-	BUG_ON(atomic_read(&pd->refcnt) != 0);
-}
-
 static void __padata_start(struct padata_instance *pinst)
 {
 	pinst->flags |= PADATA_INIT;
@@ -498,10 +480,6 @@ static void __padata_stop(struct padata_instance *pinst)
 	pinst->flags &= ~PADATA_INIT;
 
 	synchronize_rcu();
-
-	get_online_cpus();
-	padata_flush_queues(pinst->pd);
-	put_online_cpus();
 }
 
 /* Replace the internal control structure with a new one. */
@@ -522,8 +500,8 @@ static void padata_replace(struct padata_instance *pinst,
 	if (!cpumask_equal(pd_old->cpumask.cbcpu, pd_new->cpumask.cbcpu))
 		notification_mask |= PADATA_CPU_SERIAL;
 
-	padata_flush_queues(pd_old);
-	padata_free_pd(pd_old);
+	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&pd_old->refcnt))
+		padata_free_pd(pd_old);
 
 	if (notification_mask)
 		blocking_notifier_call_chain(&pinst->cpumask_change_notifier,
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 058/173] tracing: Annotate ftrace_graph_hash pointer with __rcu
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (56 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 057/173] padata: Remove broken queue flushing Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 059/173] tracing: Annotate ftrace_graph_notrace_hash " Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (120 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Joel Fernandes (Google),
	Amol Grover, Steven Rostedt (VMware),
	Sasha Levin

From: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 24a9729f831462b1d9d61dc85ecc91c59037243f ]

Fix following instances of sparse error
kernel/trace/ftrace.c:5664:29: error: incompatible types in comparison
kernel/trace/ftrace.c:5785:21: error: incompatible types in comparison
kernel/trace/ftrace.c:5864:36: error: incompatible types in comparison
kernel/trace/ftrace.c:5866:25: error: incompatible types in comparison

Use rcu_dereference_protected to access the __rcu annotated pointer.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200201072703.17330-1-frextrite@gmail.com

Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 2 +-
 kernel/trace/trace.h  | 9 ++++++---
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
index 3864d23414429..6af28692f0f53 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
@@ -5146,7 +5146,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ftrace_notrace_fops = {
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(graph_lock);
 
-struct ftrace_hash *ftrace_graph_hash = EMPTY_HASH;
+struct ftrace_hash __rcu *ftrace_graph_hash = EMPTY_HASH;
 struct ftrace_hash *ftrace_graph_notrace_hash = EMPTY_HASH;
 
 enum graph_filter_type {
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.h b/kernel/trace/trace.h
index dbb212c40a410..17f36488d3c84 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.h
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.h
@@ -868,22 +868,25 @@ extern void __trace_graph_return(struct trace_array *tr,
 				 unsigned long flags, int pc);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
-extern struct ftrace_hash *ftrace_graph_hash;
+extern struct ftrace_hash __rcu *ftrace_graph_hash;
 extern struct ftrace_hash *ftrace_graph_notrace_hash;
 
 static inline int ftrace_graph_addr(struct ftrace_graph_ent *trace)
 {
 	unsigned long addr = trace->func;
 	int ret = 0;
+	struct ftrace_hash *hash;
 
 	preempt_disable_notrace();
 
-	if (ftrace_hash_empty(ftrace_graph_hash)) {
+	hash = rcu_dereference_protected(ftrace_graph_hash, !preemptible());
+
+	if (ftrace_hash_empty(hash)) {
 		ret = 1;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (ftrace_lookup_ip(ftrace_graph_hash, addr)) {
+	if (ftrace_lookup_ip(hash, addr)) {
 
 		/*
 		 * This needs to be cleared on the return functions
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 059/173] tracing: Annotate ftrace_graph_notrace_hash pointer with __rcu
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (57 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 058/173] tracing: Annotate ftrace_graph_hash pointer with __rcu Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` " Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 060/173] ftrace: Add comment to why rcu_dereference_sched() is open coded Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (119 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Amol Grover, Steven Rostedt (VMware),
	Sasha Levin

From: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit fd0e6852c407dd9aefc594f54ddcc21d84803d3b ]

Fix following instances of sparse error
kernel/trace/ftrace.c:5667:29: error: incompatible types in comparison
kernel/trace/ftrace.c:5813:21: error: incompatible types in comparison
kernel/trace/ftrace.c:5868:36: error: incompatible types in comparison
kernel/trace/ftrace.c:5870:25: error: incompatible types in comparison

Use rcu_dereference_protected to dereference the newly annotated pointer.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200205055701.30195-1-frextrite@gmail.com

Signed-off-by: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 2 +-
 kernel/trace/trace.h  | 8 ++++++--
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
index 6af28692f0f53..dd9fdb52e24ad 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
@@ -5147,7 +5147,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ftrace_notrace_fops = {
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(graph_lock);
 
 struct ftrace_hash __rcu *ftrace_graph_hash = EMPTY_HASH;
-struct ftrace_hash *ftrace_graph_notrace_hash = EMPTY_HASH;
+struct ftrace_hash __rcu *ftrace_graph_notrace_hash = EMPTY_HASH;
 
 enum graph_filter_type {
 	GRAPH_FILTER_NOTRACE	= 0,
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.h b/kernel/trace/trace.h
index 17f36488d3c84..757bb1bffed99 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.h
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.h
@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ extern void __trace_graph_return(struct trace_array *tr,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
 extern struct ftrace_hash __rcu *ftrace_graph_hash;
-extern struct ftrace_hash *ftrace_graph_notrace_hash;
+extern struct ftrace_hash __rcu *ftrace_graph_notrace_hash;
 
 static inline int ftrace_graph_addr(struct ftrace_graph_ent *trace)
 {
@@ -922,10 +922,14 @@ static inline void ftrace_graph_addr_finish(struct ftrace_graph_ret *trace)
 static inline int ftrace_graph_notrace_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
+	struct ftrace_hash *notrace_hash;
 
 	preempt_disable_notrace();
 
-	if (ftrace_lookup_ip(ftrace_graph_notrace_hash, addr))
+	notrace_hash = rcu_dereference_protected(ftrace_graph_notrace_hash,
+						 !preemptible());
+
+	if (ftrace_lookup_ip(notrace_hash, addr))
 		ret = 1;
 
 	preempt_enable_notrace();
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 060/173] ftrace: Add comment to why rcu_dereference_sched() is open coded
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (58 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 059/173] tracing: Annotate ftrace_graph_notrace_hash " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 061/173] ftrace: Protect ftrace_graph_hash with ftrace_sync Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (118 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Joel Fernandes (Google),
	Steven Rostedt (VMware),
	Sasha Levin

From: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

[ Upstream commit 16052dd5bdfa16dbe18d8c1d4cde2ddab9d23177 ]

Because the function graph tracer can execute in sections where RCU is not
"watching", the rcu_dereference_sched() for the has needs to be open coded.
This is fine because the RCU "flavor" of the ftrace hash is protected by
its own RCU handling (it does its own little synchronization on every CPU
and does not rely on RCU sched).

Acked-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/trace/trace.h | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.h b/kernel/trace/trace.h
index 757bb1bffed99..99af95e294d8d 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.h
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.h
@@ -879,6 +879,11 @@ static inline int ftrace_graph_addr(struct ftrace_graph_ent *trace)
 
 	preempt_disable_notrace();
 
+	/*
+	 * Have to open code "rcu_dereference_sched()" because the
+	 * function graph tracer can be called when RCU is not
+	 * "watching".
+	 */
 	hash = rcu_dereference_protected(ftrace_graph_hash, !preemptible());
 
 	if (ftrace_hash_empty(hash)) {
@@ -926,6 +931,11 @@ static inline int ftrace_graph_notrace_addr(unsigned long addr)
 
 	preempt_disable_notrace();
 
+	/*
+	 * Have to open code "rcu_dereference_sched()" because the
+	 * function graph tracer can be called when RCU is not
+	 * "watching".
+	 */
 	notrace_hash = rcu_dereference_protected(ftrace_graph_notrace_hash,
 						 !preemptible());
 
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 061/173] ftrace: Protect ftrace_graph_hash with ftrace_sync
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (59 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 060/173] ftrace: Add comment to why rcu_dereference_sched() is open coded Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 062/173] samples/bpf: Dont try to remove users homedir on clean Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (117 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Paul E. McKenney,
	Joel Fernandes (Google), Steven Rostedt (VMware),
	Sasha Levin

From: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

[ Upstream commit 54a16ff6f2e50775145b210bcd94d62c3c2af117 ]

As function_graph tracer can run when RCU is not "watching", it can not be
protected by synchronize_rcu() it requires running a task on each CPU before
it can be freed. Calling schedule_on_each_cpu(ftrace_sync) needs to be used.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200205131110.GT2935@paulmck-ThinkPad-P72

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b9b0c831bed26 ("ftrace: Convert graph filter to use hash tables")
Reported-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 11 +++++++++--
 kernel/trace/trace.h  |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
index dd9fdb52e24ad..8974ecbcca3cb 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
@@ -5419,8 +5419,15 @@ ftrace_graph_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 
 		mutex_unlock(&graph_lock);
 
-		/* Wait till all users are no longer using the old hash */
-		synchronize_sched();
+		/*
+		 * We need to do a hard force of sched synchronization.
+		 * This is because we use preempt_disable() to do RCU, but
+		 * the function tracers can be called where RCU is not watching
+		 * (like before user_exit()). We can not rely on the RCU
+		 * infrastructure to do the synchronization, thus we must do it
+		 * ourselves.
+		 */
+		schedule_on_each_cpu(ftrace_sync);
 
 		free_ftrace_hash(old_hash);
 	}
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.h b/kernel/trace/trace.h
index 99af95e294d8d..c4c61ebb8d054 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.h
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.h
@@ -883,6 +883,7 @@ static inline int ftrace_graph_addr(struct ftrace_graph_ent *trace)
 	 * Have to open code "rcu_dereference_sched()" because the
 	 * function graph tracer can be called when RCU is not
 	 * "watching".
+	 * Protected with schedule_on_each_cpu(ftrace_sync)
 	 */
 	hash = rcu_dereference_protected(ftrace_graph_hash, !preemptible());
 
@@ -935,6 +936,7 @@ static inline int ftrace_graph_notrace_addr(unsigned long addr)
 	 * Have to open code "rcu_dereference_sched()" because the
 	 * function graph tracer can be called when RCU is not
 	 * "watching".
+	 * Protected with schedule_on_each_cpu(ftrace_sync)
 	 */
 	notrace_hash = rcu_dereference_protected(ftrace_graph_notrace_hash,
 						 !preemptible());
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 062/173] samples/bpf: Dont try to remove users homedir on clean
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (60 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 061/173] ftrace: Protect ftrace_graph_hash with ftrace_sync Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 063/173] crypto: ccp - set max RSA modulus size for v3 platform devices as well Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (116 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Toke Høiland-Jørgensen,
	Alexei Starovoitov, Jesper Dangaard Brouer

From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>

commit b2e5e93ae8af6a34bca536cdc4b453ab1e707b8b upstream.

The 'clean' rule in the samples/bpf Makefile tries to remove backup
files (ending in ~). However, if no such files exist, it will instead try
to remove the user's home directory. While the attempt is mostly harmless,
it does lead to a somewhat scary warning like this:

rm: cannot remove '~': Is a directory

Fix this by using find instead of shell expansion to locate any actual
backup files that need to be removed.

Fixes: b62a796c109c ("samples/bpf: allow make to be run from samples/bpf/ directory")
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/157952560126.1683545.7273054725976032511.stgit@toke.dk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 samples/bpf/Makefile |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/samples/bpf/Makefile
+++ b/samples/bpf/Makefile
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ all: $(LIBBPF)
 
 clean:
 	$(MAKE) -C ../../ M=$(CURDIR) clean
-	@rm -f *~
+	@find $(CURDIR) -type f -name '*~' -delete
 
 $(LIBBPF): FORCE
 	$(MAKE) -C $(dir $@) $(notdir $@)



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 063/173] crypto: ccp - set max RSA modulus size for v3 platform devices as well
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (61 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 062/173] samples/bpf: Dont try to remove users homedir on clean Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 064/173] crypto: pcrypt - Do not clear MAY_SLEEP flag in original request Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (115 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Gary R Hook, Ard Biesheuvel, Herbert Xu

From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>

commit 11548f5a5747813ff84bed6f2ea01100053b0d8d upstream.

AMD Seattle incorporates a non-PCI version of the v3 CCP crypto
accelerator, and this version was left behind when the maximum
RSA modulus size was parameterized in order to support v5 hardware
which supports larger moduli than v3 hardware does. Due to this
oversight, RSA acceleration no longer works at all on these systems.

Fix this by setting the .rsamax property to the appropriate value
for v3 platform hardware.

Fixes: e28c190db66830c0 ("csrypto: ccp - Expand RSA support for a v5 ccp")
Cc: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-dev-v3.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-dev-v3.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-dev-v3.c
@@ -590,6 +590,7 @@ const struct ccp_vdata ccpv3_platform =
 	.setup = NULL,
 	.perform = &ccp3_actions,
 	.offset = 0,
+	.rsamax = CCP_RSA_MAX_WIDTH,
 };
 
 const struct ccp_vdata ccpv3 = {



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 064/173] crypto: pcrypt - Do not clear MAY_SLEEP flag in original request
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (62 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 063/173] crypto: ccp - set max RSA modulus size for v3 platform devices as well Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 065/173] crypto: atmel-aes - Fix counter overflow in CTR mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (114 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Biggers, Herbert Xu

From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

commit e8d998264bffade3cfe0536559f712ab9058d654 upstream.

We should not be modifying the original request's MAY_SLEEP flag
upon completion.  It makes no sense to do so anyway.

Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Fixes: 5068c7a883d1 ("crypto: pcrypt - Add pcrypt crypto...")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 crypto/pcrypt.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

--- a/crypto/pcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/pcrypt.c
@@ -130,7 +130,6 @@ static void pcrypt_aead_done(struct cryp
 	struct padata_priv *padata = pcrypt_request_padata(preq);
 
 	padata->info = err;
-	req->base.flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
 
 	padata_do_serial(padata);
 }



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 065/173] crypto: atmel-aes - Fix counter overflow in CTR mode
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (63 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 064/173] crypto: pcrypt - Do not clear MAY_SLEEP flag in original request Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 066/173] crypto: api - Fix race condition in crypto_spawn_alg Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (113 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Tudor Ambarus, Herbert Xu

From: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>

commit 781a08d9740afa73357f1a60d45d7c93d7cca2dd upstream.

32 bit counter is not supported by neither of our AES IPs, all implement
a 16 bit block counter. Drop the 32 bit block counter logic.

Fixes: fcac83656a3e ("crypto: atmel-aes - fix the counter overflow in CTR mode")
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/crypto/atmel-aes.c |   37 ++++++++++++-------------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/crypto/atmel-aes.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/atmel-aes.c
@@ -91,7 +91,6 @@
 struct atmel_aes_caps {
 	bool			has_dualbuff;
 	bool			has_cfb64;
-	bool			has_ctr32;
 	bool			has_gcm;
 	bool			has_xts;
 	bool			has_authenc;
@@ -990,8 +989,9 @@ static int atmel_aes_ctr_transfer(struct
 	struct atmel_aes_ctr_ctx *ctx = atmel_aes_ctr_ctx_cast(dd->ctx);
 	struct ablkcipher_request *req = ablkcipher_request_cast(dd->areq);
 	struct scatterlist *src, *dst;
-	u32 ctr, blocks;
 	size_t datalen;
+	u32 ctr;
+	u16 blocks, start, end;
 	bool use_dma, fragmented = false;
 
 	/* Check for transfer completion. */
@@ -1003,27 +1003,17 @@ static int atmel_aes_ctr_transfer(struct
 	datalen = req->nbytes - ctx->offset;
 	blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(datalen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	ctr = be32_to_cpu(ctx->iv[3]);
-	if (dd->caps.has_ctr32) {
-		/* Check 32bit counter overflow. */
-		u32 start = ctr;
-		u32 end = start + blocks - 1;
-
-		if (end < start) {
-			ctr |= 0xffffffff;
-			datalen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * -start;
-			fragmented = true;
-		}
-	} else {
-		/* Check 16bit counter overflow. */
-		u16 start = ctr & 0xffff;
-		u16 end = start + (u16)blocks - 1;
-
-		if (blocks >> 16 || end < start) {
-			ctr |= 0xffff;
-			datalen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * (0x10000-start);
-			fragmented = true;
-		}
+
+	/* Check 16bit counter overflow. */
+	start = ctr & 0xffff;
+	end = start + blocks - 1;
+
+	if (blocks >> 16 || end < start) {
+		ctr |= 0xffff;
+		datalen = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * (0x10000 - start);
+		fragmented = true;
 	}
+
 	use_dma = (datalen >= ATMEL_AES_DMA_THRESHOLD);
 
 	/* Jump to offset. */
@@ -2536,7 +2526,6 @@ static void atmel_aes_get_cap(struct atm
 {
 	dd->caps.has_dualbuff = 0;
 	dd->caps.has_cfb64 = 0;
-	dd->caps.has_ctr32 = 0;
 	dd->caps.has_gcm = 0;
 	dd->caps.has_xts = 0;
 	dd->caps.has_authenc = 0;
@@ -2547,7 +2536,6 @@ static void atmel_aes_get_cap(struct atm
 	case 0x500:
 		dd->caps.has_dualbuff = 1;
 		dd->caps.has_cfb64 = 1;
-		dd->caps.has_ctr32 = 1;
 		dd->caps.has_gcm = 1;
 		dd->caps.has_xts = 1;
 		dd->caps.has_authenc = 1;
@@ -2556,7 +2544,6 @@ static void atmel_aes_get_cap(struct atm
 	case 0x200:
 		dd->caps.has_dualbuff = 1;
 		dd->caps.has_cfb64 = 1;
-		dd->caps.has_ctr32 = 1;
 		dd->caps.has_gcm = 1;
 		dd->caps.max_burst_size = 4;
 		break;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 066/173] crypto: api - Fix race condition in crypto_spawn_alg
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (64 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 065/173] crypto: atmel-aes - Fix counter overflow in CTR mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 067/173] crypto: picoxcell - adjust the position of tasklet_init and fix missed tasklet_kill Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (112 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Herbert Xu

From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

commit 73669cc556462f4e50376538d77ee312142e8a8a upstream.

The function crypto_spawn_alg is racy because it drops the lock
before shooting the dying algorithm.  The algorithm could disappear
altogether before we shoot it.

This patch fixes it by moving the shooting into the locked section.

Fixes: 6bfd48096ff8 ("[CRYPTO] api: Added spawns")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 crypto/algapi.c   |   16 +++++-----------
 crypto/api.c      |    3 +--
 crypto/internal.h |    1 -
 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/crypto/algapi.c
+++ b/crypto/algapi.c
@@ -662,22 +662,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_drop_spawn);
 static struct crypto_alg *crypto_spawn_alg(struct crypto_spawn *spawn)
 {
 	struct crypto_alg *alg;
-	struct crypto_alg *alg2;
 
 	down_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
 	alg = spawn->alg;
-	alg2 = alg;
-	if (alg2)
-		alg2 = crypto_mod_get(alg2);
-	up_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
-
-	if (!alg2) {
-		if (alg)
-			crypto_shoot_alg(alg);
-		return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
+	if (alg && !crypto_mod_get(alg)) {
+		alg->cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_DYING;
+		alg = NULL;
 	}
+	up_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
 
-	return alg;
+	return alg ?: ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
 }
 
 struct crypto_tfm *crypto_spawn_tfm(struct crypto_spawn *spawn, u32 type,
--- a/crypto/api.c
+++ b/crypto/api.c
@@ -339,13 +339,12 @@ static unsigned int crypto_ctxsize(struc
 	return len;
 }
 
-void crypto_shoot_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
+static void crypto_shoot_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
 {
 	down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
 	alg->cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_DYING;
 	up_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_shoot_alg);
 
 struct crypto_tfm *__crypto_alloc_tfm(struct crypto_alg *alg, u32 type,
 				      u32 mask)
--- a/crypto/internal.h
+++ b/crypto/internal.h
@@ -84,7 +84,6 @@ void crypto_alg_tested(const char *name,
 void crypto_remove_spawns(struct crypto_alg *alg, struct list_head *list,
 			  struct crypto_alg *nalg);
 void crypto_remove_final(struct list_head *list);
-void crypto_shoot_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg);
 struct crypto_tfm *__crypto_alloc_tfm(struct crypto_alg *alg, u32 type,
 				      u32 mask);
 void *crypto_create_tfm(struct crypto_alg *alg,



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 067/173] crypto: picoxcell - adjust the position of tasklet_init and fix missed tasklet_kill
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (65 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 066/173] crypto: api - Fix race condition in crypto_spawn_alg Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 068/173] scsi: qla2xxx: Fix unbound NVME response length Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (111 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Chuhong Yuan, Herbert Xu

From: Chuhong Yuan <hslester96@gmail.com>

commit 7f8c36fe9be46862c4f3c5302f769378028a34fa upstream.

Since tasklet is needed to be initialized before registering IRQ
handler, adjust the position of tasklet_init to fix the wrong order.

Besides, to fix the missed tasklet_kill, this patch adds a helper
function and uses devm_add_action to kill the tasklet automatically.

Fixes: ce92136843cb ("crypto: picoxcell - add support for the picoxcell crypto engines")
Signed-off-by: Chuhong Yuan <hslester96@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/crypto/picoxcell_crypto.c |   15 +++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/crypto/picoxcell_crypto.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/picoxcell_crypto.c
@@ -1616,6 +1616,11 @@ static const struct of_device_id spacc_o
 MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, spacc_of_id_table);
 #endif /* CONFIG_OF */
 
+static void spacc_tasklet_kill(void *data)
+{
+	tasklet_kill(data);
+}
+
 static int spacc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	int i, err, ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -1659,6 +1664,14 @@ static int spacc_probe(struct platform_d
 		return -ENXIO;
 	}
 
+	tasklet_init(&engine->complete, spacc_spacc_complete,
+		     (unsigned long)engine);
+
+	ret = devm_add_action(&pdev->dev, spacc_tasklet_kill,
+			      &engine->complete);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	if (devm_request_irq(&pdev->dev, irq->start, spacc_spacc_irq, 0,
 			     engine->name, engine)) {
 		dev_err(engine->dev, "failed to request IRQ\n");
@@ -1721,8 +1734,6 @@ static int spacc_probe(struct platform_d
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&engine->completed);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&engine->in_progress);
 	engine->in_flight = 0;
-	tasklet_init(&engine->complete, spacc_spacc_complete,
-		     (unsigned long)engine);
 
 	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, engine);
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 068/173] scsi: qla2xxx: Fix unbound NVME response length
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (66 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 067/173] crypto: picoxcell - adjust the position of tasklet_init and fix missed tasklet_kill Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 069/173] NFS: Fix memory leaks and corruption in readdir Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (110 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Arun Easi, Himanshu Madhani,
	Ewan D. Milne, Martin K. Petersen

From: Arun Easi <aeasi@marvell.com>

commit 00fe717ee1ea3c2979db4f94b1533c57aed8dea9 upstream.

On certain cases when response length is less than 32, NVME response data
is supplied inline in IOCB. This is indicated by some combination of state
flags. There was an instance when a high, and incorrect, response length
was indicated causing driver to overrun buffers. Fix this by checking and
limiting the response payload length.

Fixes: 7401bc18d1ee3 ("scsi: qla2xxx: Add FC-NVMe command handling")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200124045014.23554-1-hmadhani@marvell.com
Signed-off-by: Arun Easi <aeasi@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Madhani <hmadhani@marvell.com>
Reviewed-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_dbg.c |    6 ------
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_dbg.h |    6 ++++++
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_isr.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_dbg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_dbg.c
@@ -2517,12 +2517,6 @@ qla83xx_fw_dump_failed:
 /*                         Driver Debug Functions.                          */
 /****************************************************************************/
 
-static inline int
-ql_mask_match(uint32_t level)
-{
-	return (level & ql2xextended_error_logging) == level;
-}
-
 /*
  * This function is for formatting and logging debug information.
  * It is to be used when vha is available. It formats the message
--- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_dbg.h
+++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_dbg.h
@@ -374,3 +374,9 @@ extern int qla24xx_dump_ram(struct qla_h
 extern void qla24xx_pause_risc(struct device_reg_24xx __iomem *,
 	struct qla_hw_data *);
 extern int qla24xx_soft_reset(struct qla_hw_data *);
+
+static inline int
+ql_mask_match(uint level)
+{
+	return (level & ql2xextended_error_logging) == level;
+}
--- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_isr.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_isr.c
@@ -1853,6 +1853,18 @@ qla24xx_nvme_iocb_entry(scsi_qla_host_t
 		inbuf = (uint32_t *)&sts->nvme_ersp_data;
 		outbuf = (uint32_t *)fd->rspaddr;
 		iocb->u.nvme.rsp_pyld_len = le16_to_cpu(sts->nvme_rsp_pyld_len);
+		if (unlikely(iocb->u.nvme.rsp_pyld_len >
+		    sizeof(struct nvme_fc_ersp_iu))) {
+			if (ql_mask_match(ql_dbg_io)) {
+				WARN_ONCE(1, "Unexpected response payload length %u.\n",
+				    iocb->u.nvme.rsp_pyld_len);
+				ql_log(ql_log_warn, fcport->vha, 0x5100,
+				    "Unexpected response payload length %u.\n",
+				    iocb->u.nvme.rsp_pyld_len);
+			}
+			iocb->u.nvme.rsp_pyld_len =
+			    sizeof(struct nvme_fc_ersp_iu);
+		}
 		iter = iocb->u.nvme.rsp_pyld_len >> 2;
 		for (; iter; iter--)
 			*outbuf++ = swab32(*inbuf++);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 069/173] NFS: Fix memory leaks and corruption in readdir
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (67 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 068/173] scsi: qla2xxx: Fix unbound NVME response length Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 070/173] NFS: Directory page cache pages need to be locked when read Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (109 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Trond Myklebust, Benjamin Coddington,
	Anna Schumaker

From: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@gmail.com>

commit 4b310319c6a8ce708f1033d57145e2aa027a883c upstream.

nfs_readdir_xdr_to_array() must not exit without having initialised
the array, so that the page cache deletion routines can safely
call nfs_readdir_clear_array().
Furthermore, we should ensure that if we exit nfs_readdir_filler()
with an error, we free up any page contents to prevent a leak
if we try to fill the page again.

Fixes: 11de3b11e08c ("NFS: Fix a memory leak in nfs_readdir")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.37+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/nfs/dir.c |   17 +++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/nfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c
@@ -169,6 +169,17 @@ typedef struct {
 	bool eof;
 } nfs_readdir_descriptor_t;
 
+static
+void nfs_readdir_init_array(struct page *page)
+{
+	struct nfs_cache_array *array;
+
+	array = kmap_atomic(page);
+	memset(array, 0, sizeof(struct nfs_cache_array));
+	array->eof_index = -1;
+	kunmap_atomic(array);
+}
+
 /*
  * we are freeing strings created by nfs_add_to_readdir_array()
  */
@@ -181,6 +192,7 @@ void nfs_readdir_clear_array(struct page
 	array = kmap_atomic(page);
 	for (i = 0; i < array->size; i++)
 		kfree(array->array[i].string.name);
+	array->size = 0;
 	kunmap_atomic(array);
 }
 
@@ -617,6 +629,8 @@ int nfs_readdir_xdr_to_array(nfs_readdir
 	int status = -ENOMEM;
 	unsigned int array_size = ARRAY_SIZE(pages);
 
+	nfs_readdir_init_array(page);
+
 	entry.prev_cookie = 0;
 	entry.cookie = desc->last_cookie;
 	entry.eof = 0;
@@ -633,8 +647,6 @@ int nfs_readdir_xdr_to_array(nfs_readdir
 	}
 
 	array = kmap(page);
-	memset(array, 0, sizeof(struct nfs_cache_array));
-	array->eof_index = -1;
 
 	status = nfs_readdir_alloc_pages(pages, array_size);
 	if (status < 0)
@@ -688,6 +700,7 @@ int nfs_readdir_filler(nfs_readdir_descr
 	unlock_page(page);
 	return 0;
  error:
+	nfs_readdir_clear_array(page);
 	unlock_page(page);
 	return ret;
 }



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 070/173] NFS: Directory page cache pages need to be locked when read
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (68 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 069/173] NFS: Fix memory leaks and corruption in readdir Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 071/173] btrfs: set trans->drity in btrfs_commit_transaction Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (108 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Trond Myklebust, Benjamin Coddington,
	Anna Schumaker

From: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@gmail.com>

commit 114de38225d9b300f027e2aec9afbb6e0def154b upstream.

When a NFS directory page cache page is removed from the page cache,
its contents are freed through a call to nfs_readdir_clear_array().
To prevent the removal of the page cache entry until after we've
finished reading it, we must take the page lock.

Fixes: 11de3b11e08c ("NFS: Fix a memory leak in nfs_readdir")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.37+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/nfs/dir.c |   30 +++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/nfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c
@@ -708,8 +708,6 @@ int nfs_readdir_filler(nfs_readdir_descr
 static
 void cache_page_release(nfs_readdir_descriptor_t *desc)
 {
-	if (!desc->page->mapping)
-		nfs_readdir_clear_array(desc->page);
 	put_page(desc->page);
 	desc->page = NULL;
 }
@@ -723,19 +721,28 @@ struct page *get_cache_page(nfs_readdir_
 
 /*
  * Returns 0 if desc->dir_cookie was found on page desc->page_index
+ * and locks the page to prevent removal from the page cache.
  */
 static
-int find_cache_page(nfs_readdir_descriptor_t *desc)
+int find_and_lock_cache_page(nfs_readdir_descriptor_t *desc)
 {
 	int res;
 
 	desc->page = get_cache_page(desc);
 	if (IS_ERR(desc->page))
 		return PTR_ERR(desc->page);
-
-	res = nfs_readdir_search_array(desc);
+	res = lock_page_killable(desc->page);
 	if (res != 0)
-		cache_page_release(desc);
+		goto error;
+	res = -EAGAIN;
+	if (desc->page->mapping != NULL) {
+		res = nfs_readdir_search_array(desc);
+		if (res == 0)
+			return 0;
+	}
+	unlock_page(desc->page);
+error:
+	cache_page_release(desc);
 	return res;
 }
 
@@ -750,7 +757,7 @@ int readdir_search_pagecache(nfs_readdir
 		desc->last_cookie = 0;
 	}
 	do {
-		res = find_cache_page(desc);
+		res = find_and_lock_cache_page(desc);
 	} while (res == -EAGAIN);
 	return res;
 }
@@ -789,7 +796,6 @@ int nfs_do_filldir(nfs_readdir_descripto
 		desc->eof = 1;
 
 	kunmap(desc->page);
-	cache_page_release(desc);
 	dfprintk(DIRCACHE, "NFS: nfs_do_filldir() filling ended @ cookie %Lu; returning = %d\n",
 			(unsigned long long)*desc->dir_cookie, res);
 	return res;
@@ -835,13 +841,13 @@ int uncached_readdir(nfs_readdir_descrip
 
 	status = nfs_do_filldir(desc);
 
+ out_release:
+	nfs_readdir_clear_array(desc->page);
+	cache_page_release(desc);
  out:
 	dfprintk(DIRCACHE, "NFS: %s: returns %d\n",
 			__func__, status);
 	return status;
- out_release:
-	cache_page_release(desc);
-	goto out;
 }
 
 /* The file offset position represents the dirent entry number.  A
@@ -906,6 +912,8 @@ static int nfs_readdir(struct file *file
 			break;
 
 		res = nfs_do_filldir(desc);
+		unlock_page(desc->page);
+		cache_page_release(desc);
 		if (res < 0)
 			break;
 	} while (!desc->eof);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 071/173] btrfs: set trans->drity in btrfs_commit_transaction
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (69 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 070/173] NFS: Directory page cache pages need to be locked when read Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 072/173] ARM: tegra: Enable PLLP bypass during Tegra124 LP1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (107 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josef Bacik, David Sterba

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

commit d62b23c94952e78211a383b7d90ef0afbd9a3717 upstream.

If we abort a transaction we have the following sequence

if (!trans->dirty && list_empty(&trans->new_bgs))
	return;
WRITE_ONCE(trans->transaction->aborted, err);

The idea being if we didn't modify anything with our trans handle then
we don't really need to abort the whole transaction, maybe the other
trans handles are fine and we can carry on.

However in the case of create_snapshot we add a pending_snapshot object
to our transaction and then commit the transaction.  We don't actually
modify anything.  sync() behaves the same way, attach to an existing
transaction and commit it.  This means that if we have an IO error in
the right places we could abort the committing transaction with our
trans->dirty being not set and thus not set transaction->aborted.

This is a problem because in the create_snapshot() case we depend on
pending->error being set to something, or btrfs_commit_transaction
returning an error.

If we are not the trans handle that gets to commit the transaction, and
we're waiting on the commit to happen we get our return value from
cur_trans->aborted.  If this was not set to anything because sync() hit
an error in the transaction commit before it could modify anything then
cur_trans->aborted would be 0.  Thus we'd return 0 from
btrfs_commit_transaction() in create_snapshot.

This is a problem because we then try to do things with
pending_snapshot->snap, which will be NULL because we didn't create the
snapshot, and then we'll get a NULL pointer dereference like the
following

"BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000001f0"
RIP: 0010:btrfs_orphan_cleanup+0x2d/0x330
Call Trace:
 ? btrfs_mksubvol.isra.31+0x3f2/0x510
 btrfs_mksubvol.isra.31+0x4bc/0x510
 ? __sb_start_write+0xfa/0x200
 ? mnt_want_write_file+0x24/0x50
 btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x16c/0x1a0
 btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x11e/0x1a0
 btrfs_ioctl+0x1534/0x2c10
 ? free_debug_processing+0x262/0x2a3
 do_vfs_ioctl+0xa6/0x6b0
 ? do_sys_open+0x188/0x220
 ? syscall_trace_enter+0x1f8/0x330
 ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x1b0

In order to fix this we need to make sure anybody who calls
commit_transaction has trans->dirty set so that they properly set the
trans->transaction->aborted value properly so any waiters know bad
things happened.

This was found while I was running generic/475 with my modified
fsstress, it reproduced within a few runs.  I ran with this patch all
night and didn't see the problem again.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/btrfs/transaction.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/btrfs/transaction.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/transaction.c
@@ -1948,6 +1948,14 @@ int btrfs_commit_transaction(struct btrf
 	struct btrfs_transaction *prev_trans = NULL;
 	int ret;
 
+	/*
+	 * Some places just start a transaction to commit it.  We need to make
+	 * sure that if this commit fails that the abort code actually marks the
+	 * transaction as failed, so set trans->dirty to make the abort code do
+	 * the right thing.
+	 */
+	trans->dirty = true;
+
 	/* Stop the commit early if ->aborted is set */
 	if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(cur_trans->aborted))) {
 		ret = cur_trans->aborted;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 072/173] ARM: tegra: Enable PLLP bypass during Tegra124 LP1
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (70 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 071/173] btrfs: set trans->drity in btrfs_commit_transaction Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 073/173] iwlwifi: dont throw error when trying to remove IGTK Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (106 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jonathan Hunter, Stephen Warren,
	Thierry Reding

From: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>

commit 1a3388d506bf5b45bb283e6a4c4706cfb4897333 upstream.

For a little over a year, U-Boot has configured the flow controller to
perform automatic RAM re-repair on off->on power transitions of the CPU
rail[1]. This is mandatory for correct operation of Tegra124. However,
RAM re-repair relies on certain clocks, which the kernel must enable and
leave running. PLLP is one of those clocks. This clock is shut down
during LP1 in order to save power. Enable bypass (which I believe routes
osc_div_clk, essentially the crystal clock, to the PLL output) so that
this clock signal toggles even though the PLL is not active. This is
required so that LP1 power mode (system suspend) operates correctly.

The bypass configuration must then be undone when resuming from LP1, so
that all peripheral clocks run at the expected rate. Without this, many
peripherals won't work correctly; for example, the UART baud rate would
be incorrect.

NVIDIA's downstream kernel code only does this if not compiled for
Tegra30, so the added code is made conditional upon the chip ID.
NVIDIA's downstream code makes this change conditional upon the active
CPU cluster. The upstream kernel currently doesn't support cluster
switching, so this patch doesn't test the active CPU cluster ID.

[1] 3cc7942a4ae5 ARM: tegra: implement RAM repair

Reported-by: Jonathan Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm/mach-tegra/sleep-tegra30.S |   11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/arm/mach-tegra/sleep-tegra30.S
+++ b/arch/arm/mach-tegra/sleep-tegra30.S
@@ -382,6 +382,14 @@ _pll_m_c_x_done:
 	pll_locked r1, r0, CLK_RESET_PLLC_BASE
 	pll_locked r1, r0, CLK_RESET_PLLX_BASE
 
+	tegra_get_soc_id TEGRA_APB_MISC_BASE, r1
+	cmp	r1, #TEGRA30
+	beq	1f
+	ldr	r1, [r0, #CLK_RESET_PLLP_BASE]
+	bic	r1, r1, #(1<<31)	@ disable PllP bypass
+	str	r1, [r0, #CLK_RESET_PLLP_BASE]
+1:
+
 	mov32	r7, TEGRA_TMRUS_BASE
 	ldr	r1, [r7]
 	add	r1, r1, #LOCK_DELAY
@@ -641,7 +649,10 @@ tegra30_switch_cpu_to_clk32k:
 	str	r0, [r4, #PMC_PLLP_WB0_OVERRIDE]
 
 	/* disable PLLP, PLLA, PLLC and PLLX */
+	tegra_get_soc_id TEGRA_APB_MISC_BASE, r1
+	cmp	r1, #TEGRA30
 	ldr	r0, [r5, #CLK_RESET_PLLP_BASE]
+	orrne	r0, r0, #(1 << 31)	@ enable PllP bypass on fast cluster
 	bic	r0, r0, #(1 << 30)
 	str	r0, [r5, #CLK_RESET_PLLP_BASE]
 	ldr	r0, [r5, #CLK_RESET_PLLA_BASE]



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 073/173] iwlwifi: dont throw error when trying to remove IGTK
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (71 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 072/173] ARM: tegra: Enable PLLP bypass during Tegra124 LP1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 074/173] mwifiex: fix unbalanced locking in mwifiex_process_country_ie() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (105 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Luca Coelho, Kalle Valo

From: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>

commit 197288d5ba8a5289f22d3aeb4fca3824bfd9b4af upstream.

The IGTK keys are only removed by mac80211 after it has already
removed the AP station.  This causes the driver to throw an error
because mac80211 is trying to remove the IGTK when the station doesn't
exist anymore.

The firmware is aware that the station has been removed and can deal
with it the next time we try to add an IGTK for a station, so we
shouldn't try to remove the key if the station ID is
IWL_MVM_INVALID_STA.  Do this by removing the check for mvm_sta before
calling iwl_mvm_send_sta_igtk() and check return from that function
gracefully if the station ID is invalid.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.12+
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/sta.c |   10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/sta.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/sta.c
@@ -2981,6 +2981,10 @@ static int iwl_mvm_send_sta_igtk(struct
 	igtk_cmd.sta_id = cpu_to_le32(sta_id);
 
 	if (remove_key) {
+		/* This is a valid situation for IGTK */
+		if (sta_id == IWL_MVM_INVALID_STA)
+			return 0;
+
 		igtk_cmd.ctrl_flags |= cpu_to_le32(STA_KEY_NOT_VALID);
 	} else {
 		struct ieee80211_key_seq seq;
@@ -3285,9 +3289,9 @@ int iwl_mvm_remove_sta_key(struct iwl_mv
 	IWL_DEBUG_WEP(mvm, "mvm remove dynamic key: idx=%d sta=%d\n",
 		      keyconf->keyidx, sta_id);
 
-	if (mvm_sta && (keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC ||
-			keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128 ||
-			keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256))
+	if (keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC ||
+	    keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128 ||
+	    keyconf->cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256)
 		return iwl_mvm_send_sta_igtk(mvm, keyconf, sta_id, true);
 
 	if (!__test_and_clear_bit(keyconf->hw_key_idx, mvm->fw_key_table)) {



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 074/173] mwifiex: fix unbalanced locking in mwifiex_process_country_ie()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (72 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 073/173] iwlwifi: dont throw error when trying to remove IGTK Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 075/173] sunrpc: expiry_time should be seconds not timeval Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (104 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, huangwen, Ganapathi Bhat,
	Brian Norris, Kalle Valo

From: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>

commit 65b1aae0d9d5962faccc06bdb8e91a2a0b09451c upstream.

We called rcu_read_lock(), so we need to call rcu_read_unlock() before
we return.

Fixes: 3d94a4a8373b ("mwifiex: fix possible heap overflow in mwifiex_process_country_ie()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: huangwen <huangwenabc@gmail.com>
Cc: Ganapathi Bhat <ganapathi.bhat@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <ganapathi.bhat@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c
@@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ static int mwifiex_process_country_ie(st
 
 	if (country_ie_len >
 	    (IEEE80211_COUNTRY_STRING_LEN + MWIFIEX_MAX_TRIPLET_802_11D)) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 		mwifiex_dbg(priv->adapter, ERROR,
 			    "11D: country_ie_len overflow!, deauth AP\n");
 		return -EINVAL;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 075/173] sunrpc: expiry_time should be seconds not timeval
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (73 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 074/173] mwifiex: fix unbalanced locking in mwifiex_process_country_ie() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 076/173] tools/kvm_stat: Fix kvm_exit filter name Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (103 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Roberto Bergantinos Corpas,
	Frank Sorenson, J. Bruce Fields

From: Roberto Bergantinos Corpas <rbergant@redhat.com>

commit 3d96208c30f84d6edf9ab4fac813306ac0d20c10 upstream.

When upcalling gssproxy, cache_head.expiry_time is set as a
timeval, not seconds since boot. As such, RPC cache expiry
logic will not clean expired objects created under
auth.rpcsec.context cache.

This has proven to cause kernel memory leaks on field. Using
64 bit variants of getboottime/timespec

Expiration times have worked this way since 2010's c5b29f885afe "sunrpc:
use seconds since boot in expiry cache".  The gssproxy code introduced
in 2012 added gss_proxy_save_rsc and introduced the bug.  That's a while
for this to lurk, but it required a bit of an extreme case to make it
obvious.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Bergantinos Corpas <rbergant@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 030d794bf498 "SUNRPC: Use gssproxy upcall for server..."
Tested-By: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
@@ -1188,6 +1188,7 @@ static int gss_proxy_save_rsc(struct cac
 		dprintk("RPC:       No creds found!\n");
 		goto out;
 	} else {
+		struct timespec64 boot;
 
 		/* steal creds */
 		rsci.cred = ud->creds;
@@ -1208,6 +1209,9 @@ static int gss_proxy_save_rsc(struct cac
 						&expiry, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (status)
 			goto out;
+
+		getboottime64(&boot);
+		expiry -= boot.tv_sec;
 	}
 
 	rsci.h.expiry_time = expiry;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 076/173] tools/kvm_stat: Fix kvm_exit filter name
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (74 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 075/173] sunrpc: expiry_time should be seconds not timeval Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 077/173] xen/balloon: Support xend-based toolstack take two Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (102 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andrew Jones, Gavin Shan, Paolo Bonzini

From: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>

commit 5fcf3a55a62afb0760ccb6f391d62f20bce4a42f upstream.

The filter name is fixed to "exit_reason" for some kvm_exit events, no
matter what architect we have. Actually, the filter name ("exit_reason")
is only applicable to x86, meaning it's broken on other architects
including aarch64.

This fixes the issue by providing various kvm_exit filter names, depending
on architect we're on. Afterwards, the variable filter name is picked and
applied through ioctl(fd, SET_FILTER).

Reported-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat
+++ b/tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat
@@ -261,6 +261,7 @@ class ArchX86(Arch):
     def __init__(self, exit_reasons):
         self.sc_perf_evt_open = 298
         self.ioctl_numbers = IOCTL_NUMBERS
+        self.exit_reason_field = 'exit_reason'
         self.exit_reasons = exit_reasons
 
 
@@ -276,6 +277,7 @@ class ArchPPC(Arch):
         # numbers depend on the wordsize.
         char_ptr_size = ctypes.sizeof(ctypes.c_char_p)
         self.ioctl_numbers['SET_FILTER'] = 0x80002406 | char_ptr_size << 16
+        self.exit_reason_field = 'exit_nr'
         self.exit_reasons = {}
 
 
@@ -283,6 +285,7 @@ class ArchA64(Arch):
     def __init__(self):
         self.sc_perf_evt_open = 241
         self.ioctl_numbers = IOCTL_NUMBERS
+        self.exit_reason_field = 'esr_ec'
         self.exit_reasons = AARCH64_EXIT_REASONS
 
 
@@ -290,6 +293,7 @@ class ArchS390(Arch):
     def __init__(self):
         self.sc_perf_evt_open = 331
         self.ioctl_numbers = IOCTL_NUMBERS
+        self.exit_reason_field = None
         self.exit_reasons = None
 
 ARCH = Arch.get_arch()
@@ -513,8 +517,8 @@ class TracepointProvider(Provider):
         """
         filters = {}
         filters['kvm_userspace_exit'] = ('reason', USERSPACE_EXIT_REASONS)
-        if ARCH.exit_reasons:
-            filters['kvm_exit'] = ('exit_reason', ARCH.exit_reasons)
+        if ARCH.exit_reason_field and ARCH.exit_reasons:
+            filters['kvm_exit'] = (ARCH.exit_reason_field, ARCH.exit_reasons)
         return filters
 
     def get_available_fields(self):



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 077/173] xen/balloon: Support xend-based toolstack take two
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (75 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 076/173] tools/kvm_stat: Fix kvm_exit filter name Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 078/173] KVM: x86: Refactor picdev_write() to prevent Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (101 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Juergen Gross, Boris Ostrovsky

From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

commit eda4eabf86fd6806eaabc23fb90dd056fdac037b upstream.

Commit 3aa6c19d2f38be ("xen/balloon: Support xend-based toolstack")
tried to fix a regression with running on rather ancient Xen versions.
Unfortunately the fix was based on the assumption that xend would
just use another Xenstore node, but in reality only some downstream
versions of xend are doing that. The upstream xend does not write
that Xenstore node at all, so the problem must be fixed in another
way.

The easiest way to achieve that is to fall back to the behavior
before commit 96edd61dcf4436 ("xen/balloon: don't online new memory
initially") in case the static memory maximum can't be read.

This is achieved by setting static_max to the current number of
memory pages known by the system resulting in target_diff becoming
zero.

Fixes: 3aa6c19d2f38be ("xen/balloon: Support xend-based toolstack")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.13
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/xen/xen-balloon.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/xen/xen-balloon.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-balloon.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static void watch_target(struct xenbus_w
 				  "%llu", &static_max) == 1))
 			static_max >>= PAGE_SHIFT - 10;
 		else
-			static_max = new_target;
+			static_max = balloon_stats.current_pages;
 
 		target_diff = (xen_pv_domain() || xen_initial_domain()) ? 0
 				: static_max - balloon_stats.target_pages;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 078/173] KVM: x86: Refactor picdev_write() to prevent Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (76 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 077/173] xen/balloon: Support xend-based toolstack take two Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 079/173] KVM: x86: Refactor prefix decoding " Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (100 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nick Finco, Marios Pomonis,
	Andrew Honig, Jim Mattson, Paolo Bonzini

From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>

commit 14e32321f3606e4b0970200b6e5e47ee6f1e6410 upstream.

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in picdev_write().
It replaces index computations based on the (attacked-controlled) port
number with constants through a minor refactoring.

Fixes: 85f455f7ddbe ("KVM: Add support for in-kernel PIC emulation")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/i8259.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/i8259.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/i8259.c
@@ -460,10 +460,14 @@ static int picdev_write(struct kvm_pic *
 	switch (addr) {
 	case 0x20:
 	case 0x21:
+		pic_lock(s);
+		pic_ioport_write(&s->pics[0], addr, data);
+		pic_unlock(s);
+		break;
 	case 0xa0:
 	case 0xa1:
 		pic_lock(s);
-		pic_ioport_write(&s->pics[addr >> 7], addr, data);
+		pic_ioport_write(&s->pics[1], addr, data);
 		pic_unlock(s);
 		break;
 	case 0x4d0:



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 079/173] KVM: x86: Refactor prefix decoding to prevent Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (77 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 078/173] KVM: x86: Refactor picdev_write() to prevent Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` " Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 080/173] KVM: x86: Protect DR-based index computations from " Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (99 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Paolo Bonzini

From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>

commit 125ffc5e0a56a3eded608dc51e09d5ebf72cf652 upstream.

This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in
vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(), vmx_read_guest_seg_base(),
vmx_read_guest_seg_limit() and vmx_read_guest_seg_ar().  When
invoked from emulation, these functions contain index computations
based on the (attacker-influenced) segment value.  Using constants
prevents the attack.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c |   16 ++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -5094,16 +5094,28 @@ int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_c
 				ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 6;
 			break;
 		case 0x26:	/* ES override */
+			has_seg_override = true;
+			ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_ES;
+			break;
 		case 0x2e:	/* CS override */
+			has_seg_override = true;
+			ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_CS;
+			break;
 		case 0x36:	/* SS override */
+			has_seg_override = true;
+			ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_SS;
+			break;
 		case 0x3e:	/* DS override */
 			has_seg_override = true;
-			ctxt->seg_override = (ctxt->b >> 3) & 3;
+			ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_DS;
 			break;
 		case 0x64:	/* FS override */
+			has_seg_override = true;
+			ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_FS;
+			break;
 		case 0x65:	/* GS override */
 			has_seg_override = true;
-			ctxt->seg_override = ctxt->b & 7;
+			ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_GS;
 			break;
 		case 0x40 ... 0x4f: /* REX */
 			if (mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 080/173] KVM: x86: Protect DR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (78 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 079/173] KVM: x86: Refactor prefix decoding " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` " Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 081/173] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_lapic_reg_write() " Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (98 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nick Finco, Marios Pomonis,
	Andrew Honig, Jim Mattson, Paolo Bonzini

From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>

commit ea740059ecb37807ba47b84b33d1447435a8d868 upstream.

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in __kvm_set_dr() and
kvm_get_dr().
Both kvm_get_dr() and kvm_set_dr() (a wrapper of __kvm_set_dr()) are
exported symbols so KVM should tream them conservatively from a security
perspective.

Fixes: 020df0794f57 ("KVM: move DR register access handling into generic code")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -924,9 +924,11 @@ static u64 kvm_dr6_fixed(struct kvm_vcpu
 
 static int __kvm_set_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long val)
 {
+	size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vcpu->arch.db);
+
 	switch (dr) {
 	case 0 ... 3:
-		vcpu->arch.db[dr] = val;
+		vcpu->arch.db[array_index_nospec(dr, size)] = val;
 		if (!(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))
 			vcpu->arch.eff_db[dr] = val;
 		break;
@@ -963,9 +965,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_dr);
 
 int kvm_get_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long *val)
 {
+	size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vcpu->arch.db);
+
 	switch (dr) {
 	case 0 ... 3:
-		*val = vcpu->arch.db[dr];
+		*val = vcpu->arch.db[array_index_nospec(dr, size)];
 		break;
 	case 4:
 		/* fall through */



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 081/173] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_lapic_reg_write() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (79 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 080/173] KVM: x86: Protect DR-based index computations from " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` " Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 082/173] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_hv_msr_[get|set]_crash_data() " Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (97 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nick Finco, Marios Pomonis,
	Andrew Honig, Jim Mattson, Paolo Bonzini

From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>

commit 4bf79cb089f6b1c6c632492c0271054ce52ad766 upstream.

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in kvm_lapic_reg_write().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.

Fixes: 0105d1a52640 ("KVM: x2apic interface to lapic")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c |   13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
@@ -1754,15 +1754,20 @@ int kvm_lapic_reg_write(struct kvm_lapic
 	case APIC_LVTTHMR:
 	case APIC_LVTPC:
 	case APIC_LVT1:
-	case APIC_LVTERR:
+	case APIC_LVTERR: {
 		/* TODO: Check vector */
+		size_t size;
+		u32 index;
+
 		if (!kvm_apic_sw_enabled(apic))
 			val |= APIC_LVT_MASKED;
-
-		val &= apic_lvt_mask[(reg - APIC_LVTT) >> 4];
+		size = ARRAY_SIZE(apic_lvt_mask);
+		index = array_index_nospec(
+				(reg - APIC_LVTT) >> 4, size);
+		val &= apic_lvt_mask[index];
 		kvm_lapic_set_reg(apic, reg, val);
-
 		break;
+	}
 
 	case APIC_LVTT:
 		if (!kvm_apic_sw_enabled(apic))



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 082/173] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_hv_msr_[get|set]_crash_data() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (80 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 081/173] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_lapic_reg_write() " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` " Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 083/173] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_write_indirect() " Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (96 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nick Finco, Marios Pomonis,
	Andrew Honig, Paolo Bonzini

From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>

commit 8618793750071d66028584a83ed0b4fa7eb4f607 upstream.

This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in kvm_hv_msr_get_crash_data()
and kvm_hv_msr_set_crash_data().
These functions contain index computations that use the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.

Fixes: e7d9513b60e8 ("kvm/x86: added hyper-v crash msrs into kvm hyperv context")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
@@ -747,11 +747,12 @@ static int kvm_hv_msr_get_crash_data(str
 				     u32 index, u64 *pdata)
 {
 	struct kvm_hv *hv = &vcpu->kvm->arch.hyperv;
+	size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(hv->hv_crash_param);
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(index >= ARRAY_SIZE(hv->hv_crash_param)))
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(index >= size))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	*pdata = hv->hv_crash_param[index];
+	*pdata = hv->hv_crash_param[array_index_nospec(index, size)];
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -790,11 +791,12 @@ static int kvm_hv_msr_set_crash_data(str
 				     u32 index, u64 data)
 {
 	struct kvm_hv *hv = &vcpu->kvm->arch.hyperv;
+	size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(hv->hv_crash_param);
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(index >= ARRAY_SIZE(hv->hv_crash_param)))
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(index >= size))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	hv->hv_crash_param[index] = data;
+	hv->hv_crash_param[array_index_nospec(index, size)] = data;
 	return 0;
 }
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 083/173] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_write_indirect() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (81 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 082/173] KVM: x86: Protect kvm_hv_msr_[get|set]_crash_data() " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` " Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 084/173] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in pmu.h " Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (95 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nick Finco, Marios Pomonis,
	Andrew Honig, Jim Mattson, Paolo Bonzini

From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>

commit 670564559ca35b439c8d8861fc399451ddf95137 upstream.

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in ioapic_write_indirect().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) IOREGSEL register.

This patch depends on patch
"KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks".

Fixes: 70f93dae32ac ("KVM: Use temporary variable to shorten lines.")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c
@@ -297,6 +297,7 @@ static void ioapic_write_indirect(struct
 		ioapic_debug("change redir index %x val %x\n", index, val);
 		if (index >= IOAPIC_NUM_PINS)
 			return;
+		index = array_index_nospec(index, IOAPIC_NUM_PINS);
 		e = &ioapic->redirtbl[index];
 		mask_before = e->fields.mask;
 		/* Preserve read-only fields */



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 084/173] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in pmu.h from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (82 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 083/173] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_write_indirect() " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` " Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 085/173] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() " Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (94 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nick Finco, Marios Pomonis,
	Andrew Honig, Jim Mattson, Paolo Bonzini

From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>

commit 13c5183a4e643cc2b03a22d0e582c8e17bb7457d upstream.

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in the get_gp_pmc() and
get_fixed_pmc() functions.
They both contain index computations based on the (attacker-controlled)
MSR number.

Fixes: 25462f7f5295 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Define kvm_pmu_ops to support vPMU function dispatch")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/pmu.h |   18 ++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu.h
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 #ifndef __KVM_X86_PMU_H
 #define __KVM_X86_PMU_H
 
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
 #define vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu) (&(vcpu)->arch.pmu)
 #define pmu_to_vcpu(pmu)  (container_of((pmu), struct kvm_vcpu, arch.pmu))
 #define pmc_to_pmu(pmc)   (&(pmc)->vcpu->arch.pmu)
@@ -81,8 +83,12 @@ static inline bool pmc_is_enabled(struct
 static inline struct kvm_pmc *get_gp_pmc(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u32 msr,
 					 u32 base)
 {
-	if (msr >= base && msr < base + pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters)
-		return &pmu->gp_counters[msr - base];
+	if (msr >= base && msr < base + pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters) {
+		u32 index = array_index_nospec(msr - base,
+					       pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters);
+
+		return &pmu->gp_counters[index];
+	}
 
 	return NULL;
 }
@@ -92,8 +98,12 @@ static inline struct kvm_pmc *get_fixed_
 {
 	int base = MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR0;
 
-	if (msr >= base && msr < base + pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters)
-		return &pmu->fixed_counters[msr - base];
+	if (msr >= base && msr < base + pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters) {
+		u32 index = array_index_nospec(msr - base,
+					       pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters);
+
+		return &pmu->fixed_counters[index];
+	}
 
 	return NULL;
 }



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 085/173] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (83 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 084/173] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in pmu.h " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` " Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 086/173] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks in x86.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (93 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nick Finco, Marios Pomonis,
	Andrew Honig, Jim Mattson, Paolo Bonzini

From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>

commit 8c86405f606ca8508b8d9280680166ca26723695 upstream.

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in ioapic_read_indirect().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) IOREGSEL register.

Fixes: a2c118bfab8b ("KVM: Fix bounds checking in ioapic indirect register reads (CVE-2013-1798)")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c |   14 ++++++++------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/current.h>
@@ -73,13 +74,14 @@ static unsigned long ioapic_read_indirec
 	default:
 		{
 			u32 redir_index = (ioapic->ioregsel - 0x10) >> 1;
-			u64 redir_content;
+			u64 redir_content = ~0ULL;
 
-			if (redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS)
-				redir_content =
-					ioapic->redirtbl[redir_index].bits;
-			else
-				redir_content = ~0ULL;
+			if (redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS) {
+				u32 index = array_index_nospec(
+					redir_index, IOAPIC_NUM_PINS);
+
+				redir_content = ioapic->redirtbl[index].bits;
+			}
 
 			result = (ioapic->ioregsel & 0x1) ?
 			    (redir_content >> 32) & 0xffffffff :



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 086/173] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks in x86.c
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (84 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 085/173] KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 087/173] KVM: x86: Protect x86_decode_insn from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (92 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nick Finco, Marios Pomonis,
	Andrew Honig, Jim Mattson, Paolo Bonzini

From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>

commit 6ec4c5eee1750d5d17951c4e1960d953376a0dda upstream.

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in set_msr_mce() and
get_msr_mce().
Both functions contain index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.

Fixes: 890ca9aefa78 ("KVM: Add MCE support")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c |   10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -2165,7 +2165,10 @@ static int set_msr_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *
 	default:
 		if (msr >= MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL &&
 		    msr < MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(bank_num)) {
-			u32 offset = msr - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL;
+			u32 offset = array_index_nospec(
+				msr - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL,
+				MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(bank_num) - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL);
+
 			/* only 0 or all 1s can be written to IA32_MCi_CTL
 			 * some Linux kernels though clear bit 10 in bank 4 to
 			 * workaround a BIOS/GART TBL issue on AMD K8s, ignore
@@ -2549,7 +2552,10 @@ static int get_msr_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *
 	default:
 		if (msr >= MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL &&
 		    msr < MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(bank_num)) {
-			u32 offset = msr - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL;
+			u32 offset = array_index_nospec(
+				msr - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL,
+				MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(bank_num) - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL);
+
 			data = vcpu->arch.mce_banks[offset];
 			break;
 		}



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 087/173] KVM: x86: Protect x86_decode_insn from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (85 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 086/173] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks in x86.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 088/173] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit() " Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (91 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nick Finco, Marios Pomonis,
	Andrew Honig, Jim Mattson, Paolo Bonzini

From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>

commit 3c9053a2cae7ba2ba73766a34cea41baa70f57f7 upstream.

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in x86_decode_insn().
kvm_emulate_instruction() (an ancestor of x86_decode_insn()) is an exported
symbol, so KVM should treat it conservatively from a security perspective.

Fixes: 045a282ca415 ("KVM: emulator: implement fninit, fnstsw, fnstcw")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c |   11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -5199,10 +5199,15 @@ done_prefixes:
 			}
 			break;
 		case Escape:
-			if (ctxt->modrm > 0xbf)
-				opcode = opcode.u.esc->high[ctxt->modrm - 0xc0];
-			else
+			if (ctxt->modrm > 0xbf) {
+				size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(opcode.u.esc->high);
+				u32 index = array_index_nospec(
+					ctxt->modrm - 0xc0, size);
+
+				opcode = opcode.u.esc->high[index];
+			} else {
 				opcode = opcode.u.esc->op[(ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7];
+			}
 			break;
 		case InstrDual:
 			if ((ctxt->modrm >> 6) == 3)



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 088/173] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (86 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 087/173] KVM: x86: Protect x86_decode_insn from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` " Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 089/173] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Uninit vCPU if vcore creation fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (90 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nick Finco, Marios Pomonis,
	Andrew Honig, Jim Mattson, Paolo Bonzini

From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>

commit 25a5edea71b7c154b6a0b8cec14c711cafa31d26 upstream.

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.

Fixes: de9aef5e1ad6 ("KVM: MTRR: introduce fixed_mtrr_segment table")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/mtrr.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mtrr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mtrr.c
@@ -202,11 +202,15 @@ static bool fixed_msr_to_seg_unit(u32 ms
 		break;
 	case MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000 ... MSR_MTRRfix16K_A0000:
 		*seg = 1;
-		*unit = msr - MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000;
+		*unit = array_index_nospec(
+			msr - MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000,
+			MSR_MTRRfix16K_A0000 - MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000 + 1);
 		break;
 	case MSR_MTRRfix4K_C0000 ... MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000:
 		*seg = 2;
-		*unit = msr - MSR_MTRRfix4K_C0000;
+		*unit = array_index_nospec(
+			msr - MSR_MTRRfix4K_C0000,
+			MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000 - MSR_MTRRfix4K_C0000 + 1);
 		break;
 	default:
 		return false;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 089/173] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Uninit vCPU if vcore creation fails
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (87 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 088/173] KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit() " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 090/173] KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Free shared page if mmu initialization fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (89 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Greg Kurz, Sean Christopherson,
	Paul Mackerras, Paolo Bonzini

From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

commit 1a978d9d3e72ddfa40ac60d26301b154247ee0bc upstream.

Call kvm_vcpu_uninit() if vcore creation fails to avoid leaking any
resources allocated by kvm_vcpu_init(), i.e. the vcpu->run page.

Fixes: 371fefd6f2dc4 ("KVM: PPC: Allow book3s_hv guests to use SMT processor modes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c
@@ -1997,7 +1997,7 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *kvmppc_core_vcpu
 	mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
 
 	if (!vcore)
-		goto free_vcpu;
+		goto uninit_vcpu;
 
 	spin_lock(&vcore->lock);
 	++vcore->num_threads;
@@ -2014,6 +2014,8 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *kvmppc_core_vcpu
 
 	return vcpu;
 
+uninit_vcpu:
+	kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
 free_vcpu:
 	kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, vcpu);
 out:



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 090/173] KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Free shared page if mmu initialization fails
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (88 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 089/173] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Uninit vCPU if vcore creation fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 091/173] KVM: x86: Free wbinvd_dirty_mask if vCPU creation fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (88 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Greg Kurz, Sean Christopherson,
	Paul Mackerras, Paolo Bonzini

From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

commit cb10bf9194f4d2c5d830eddca861f7ca0fecdbb4 upstream.

Explicitly free the shared page if kvmppc_mmu_init() fails during
kvmppc_core_vcpu_create(), as the page is freed only in
kvmppc_core_vcpu_free(), which is not reached via kvm_vcpu_uninit().

Fixes: 96bc451a15329 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce shared page")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c
@@ -1482,10 +1482,12 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *kvmppc_core_vcpu
 
 	err = kvmppc_mmu_init(vcpu);
 	if (err < 0)
-		goto uninit_vcpu;
+		goto free_shared_page;
 
 	return vcpu;
 
+free_shared_page:
+	free_page((unsigned long)vcpu->arch.shared);
 uninit_vcpu:
 	kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
 free_shadow_vcpu:



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 091/173] KVM: x86: Free wbinvd_dirty_mask if vCPU creation fails
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (89 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 090/173] KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Free shared page if mmu initialization fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 092/173] clk: tegra: Mark fuse clock as critical Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (87 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini

From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

commit 16be9ddea268ad841457a59109963fff8c9de38d upstream.

Free the vCPU's wbinvd_dirty_mask if vCPU creation fails after
kvm_arch_vcpu_init(), e.g. when installing the vCPU's file descriptor.
Do the freeing by calling kvm_arch_vcpu_free() instead of open coding
the freeing.  This adds a likely superfluous, but ultimately harmless,
call to kvmclock_reset(), which only clears vcpu->arch.pv_time_enabled.
Using kvm_arch_vcpu_free() allows for additional cleanup in the future.

Fixes: f5f48ee15c2ee ("KVM: VMX: Execute WBINVD to keep data consistency with assigned devices")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -8063,7 +8063,7 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy(struct kvm_vc
 	kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
 	vcpu_put(vcpu);
 
-	kvm_x86_ops->vcpu_free(vcpu);
+	kvm_arch_vcpu_free(vcpu);
 }
 
 void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 092/173] clk: tegra: Mark fuse clock as critical
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (90 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 091/173] KVM: x86: Free wbinvd_dirty_mask if vCPU creation fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 093/173] scsi: qla2xxx: Fix the endianness of the qla82xx_get_fw_size() return type Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (86 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jonathan Hunter, Stephen Warren,
	Thierry Reding

From: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>

commit bf83b96f87ae2abb1e535306ea53608e8de5dfbb upstream.

For a little over a year, U-Boot on Tegra124 has configured the flow
controller to perform automatic RAM re-repair on off->on power
transitions of the CPU rail[1]. This is mandatory for correct operation
of Tegra124. However, RAM re-repair relies on certain clocks, which the
kernel must enable and leave running. The fuse clock is one of those
clocks. Mark this clock as critical so that LP1 power mode (system
suspend) operates correctly.

[1] 3cc7942a4ae5 ARM: tegra: implement RAM repair

Reported-by: Jonathan Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra-periph.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra-periph.c
+++ b/drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra-periph.c
@@ -825,7 +825,11 @@ static struct tegra_periph_init_data gat
 	GATE("vcp", "clk_m", 29, 0, tegra_clk_vcp, 0),
 	GATE("apbdma", "clk_m", 34, 0, tegra_clk_apbdma, 0),
 	GATE("kbc", "clk_32k", 36, TEGRA_PERIPH_ON_APB | TEGRA_PERIPH_NO_RESET, tegra_clk_kbc, 0),
-	GATE("fuse", "clk_m", 39, TEGRA_PERIPH_ON_APB, tegra_clk_fuse, 0),
+	/*
+	 * Critical for RAM re-repair operation, which must occur on resume
+	 * from LP1 system suspend and as part of CCPLEX cluster switching.
+	 */
+	GATE("fuse", "clk_m", 39, TEGRA_PERIPH_ON_APB, tegra_clk_fuse, CLK_IS_CRITICAL),
 	GATE("fuse_burn", "clk_m", 39, TEGRA_PERIPH_ON_APB, tegra_clk_fuse_burn, 0),
 	GATE("kfuse", "clk_m", 40, TEGRA_PERIPH_ON_APB, tegra_clk_kfuse, 0),
 	GATE("apbif", "clk_m", 107, TEGRA_PERIPH_ON_APB, tegra_clk_apbif, 0),



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 093/173] scsi: qla2xxx: Fix the endianness of the qla82xx_get_fw_size() return type
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (91 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 092/173] clk: tegra: Mark fuse clock as critical Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 094/173] scsi: csiostor: Adjust indentation in csio_device_reset Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (85 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Himanshu Madhani, Quinn Tran,
	Martin Wilck, Daniel Wagner, Roman Bolshakov, Bart Van Assche,
	Martin K. Petersen

From: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>

commit 3f5f7335e5e234e340b48ecb24c2aba98a61f934 upstream.

Since qla82xx_get_fw_size() returns a number in CPU-endian format, change
its return type from __le32 into u32. This patch does not change any
functionality.

Fixes: 9c2b297572bf ("[SCSI] qla2xxx: Support for loading Unified ROM Image (URI) format firmware file.")
Cc: Himanshu Madhani <hmadhani@marvell.com>
Cc: Quinn Tran <qutran@marvell.com>
Cc: Martin Wilck <mwilck@suse.com>
Cc: Daniel Wagner <dwagner@suse.de>
Cc: Roman Bolshakov <r.bolshakov@yadro.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191219004905.39586-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Reviewed-by: Daniel Wagner <dwagner@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Roman Bolshakov <r.bolshakov@yadro.com>
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_nx.c |    7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_nx.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_nx.c
@@ -1605,8 +1605,7 @@ qla82xx_get_bootld_offset(struct qla_hw_
 	return (u8 *)&ha->hablob->fw->data[offset];
 }
 
-static __le32
-qla82xx_get_fw_size(struct qla_hw_data *ha)
+static u32 qla82xx_get_fw_size(struct qla_hw_data *ha)
 {
 	struct qla82xx_uri_data_desc *uri_desc = NULL;
 
@@ -1617,7 +1616,7 @@ qla82xx_get_fw_size(struct qla_hw_data *
 			return cpu_to_le32(uri_desc->size);
 	}
 
-	return cpu_to_le32(*(u32 *)&ha->hablob->fw->data[FW_SIZE_OFFSET]);
+	return get_unaligned_le32(&ha->hablob->fw->data[FW_SIZE_OFFSET]);
 }
 
 static u8 *
@@ -1808,7 +1807,7 @@ qla82xx_fw_load_from_blob(struct qla_hw_
 	}
 
 	flashaddr = FLASH_ADDR_START;
-	size = (__force u32)qla82xx_get_fw_size(ha) / 8;
+	size = qla82xx_get_fw_size(ha) / 8;
 	ptr64 = (u64 *)qla82xx_get_fw_offs(ha);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 094/173] scsi: csiostor: Adjust indentation in csio_device_reset
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (92 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 093/173] scsi: qla2xxx: Fix the endianness of the qla82xx_get_fw_size() return type Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 095/173] scsi: qla4xxx: Adjust indentation in qla4xxx_mem_free Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (84 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nathan Chancellor, Martin K. Petersen

From: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>

commit a808a04c861782e31fc30e342a619c144aaee14a upstream.

Clang warns:

../drivers/scsi/csiostor/csio_scsi.c:1386:3: warning: misleading
indentation; statement is not part of the previous 'if'
[-Wmisleading-indentation]
         csio_lnodes_exit(hw, 1);
         ^
../drivers/scsi/csiostor/csio_scsi.c:1382:2: note: previous statement is
here
        if (*buf != '1')
        ^
1 warning generated.

This warning occurs because there is a space after the tab on this
line.  Remove it so that the indentation is consistent with the Linux
kernel coding style and clang no longer warns.

Fixes: a3667aaed569 ("[SCSI] csiostor: Chelsio FCoE offload driver")
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/818
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191218014726.8455-1-natechancellor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/scsi/csiostor/csio_scsi.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/csiostor/csio_scsi.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/csiostor/csio_scsi.c
@@ -1383,7 +1383,7 @@ csio_device_reset(struct device *dev,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Delete NPIV lnodes */
-	 csio_lnodes_exit(hw, 1);
+	csio_lnodes_exit(hw, 1);
 
 	/* Block upper IOs */
 	csio_lnodes_block_request(hw);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 095/173] scsi: qla4xxx: Adjust indentation in qla4xxx_mem_free
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (93 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 094/173] scsi: csiostor: Adjust indentation in csio_device_reset Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 096/173] scsi: ufs: Recheck bkops level if bkops is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (83 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Manish Rangankar, Nick Desaulniers,
	Nathan Chancellor, Martin K. Petersen

From: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>

commit aa8679736a82386551eb9f3ea0e6ebe2c0e99104 upstream.

Clang warns:

../drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c:4148:3: warning: misleading
indentation; statement is not part of the previous 'if'
[-Wmisleading-indentation]
         if (ha->fw_dump)
         ^
../drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c:4144:2: note: previous statement is
here
        if (ha->queues)
        ^
1 warning generated.

This warning occurs because there is a space after the tab on this
line.  Remove it so that the indentation is consistent with the Linux
kernel coding style and clang no longer warns.

Fixes: 068237c87c64 ("[SCSI] qla4xxx: Capture minidump for ISP82XX on firmware failure")
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/819
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191218015252.20890-1-natechancellor@gmail.com
Acked-by: Manish Rangankar <mrangankar@marvell.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c
@@ -4150,7 +4150,7 @@ static void qla4xxx_mem_free(struct scsi
 		dma_free_coherent(&ha->pdev->dev, ha->queues_len, ha->queues,
 				  ha->queues_dma);
 
-	 if (ha->fw_dump)
+	if (ha->fw_dump)
 		vfree(ha->fw_dump);
 
 	ha->queues_len = 0;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 096/173] scsi: ufs: Recheck bkops level if bkops is disabled
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (94 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 095/173] scsi: qla4xxx: Adjust indentation in qla4xxx_mem_free Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 097/173] phy: qualcomm: Adjust indentation in read_poll_timeout Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (82 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Bean Huo, Alim Akhtar, Asutosh Das,
	Can Guo, Martin K. Petersen

From: Asutosh Das <asutoshd@codeaurora.org>

commit 24366c2afbb0539fb14eff330d4e3a5db5c0a3ef upstream.

bkops level should be rechecked upon receiving an exception.  Currently the
level is being cached and never updated.

Update bkops each time the level is checked.  Also do not use the cached
bkops level value if it is disabled and then enabled.

Fixes: afdfff59a0e0 (scsi: ufs: handle non spec compliant bkops behaviour by device)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1574751214-8321-2-git-send-email-cang@qti.qualcomm.com
Reviewed-by: Bean Huo <beanhuo@micron.com>
Reviewed-by: Alim Akhtar <alim.akhtar@samsung.com>
Tested-by: Alim Akhtar <alim.akhtar@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Asutosh Das <asutoshd@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Can Guo <cang@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c
@@ -4812,6 +4812,7 @@ static int ufshcd_disable_auto_bkops(str
 
 	hba->auto_bkops_enabled = false;
 	trace_ufshcd_auto_bkops_state(dev_name(hba->dev), "Disabled");
+	hba->is_urgent_bkops_lvl_checked = false;
 out:
 	return err;
 }
@@ -4836,6 +4837,7 @@ static void ufshcd_force_reset_auto_bkop
 		hba->ee_ctrl_mask &= ~MASK_EE_URGENT_BKOPS;
 		ufshcd_disable_auto_bkops(hba);
 	}
+	hba->is_urgent_bkops_lvl_checked = false;
 }
 
 static inline int ufshcd_get_bkops_status(struct ufs_hba *hba, u32 *status)
@@ -4882,6 +4884,7 @@ static int ufshcd_bkops_ctrl(struct ufs_
 		err = ufshcd_enable_auto_bkops(hba);
 	else
 		err = ufshcd_disable_auto_bkops(hba);
+	hba->urgent_bkops_lvl = curr_status;
 out:
 	return err;
 }



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 097/173] phy: qualcomm: Adjust indentation in read_poll_timeout
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (95 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:19 ` [PATCH 4.14 096/173] scsi: ufs: Recheck bkops level if bkops is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 098/173] ext2: Adjust indentation in ext2_fill_super Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (81 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nathan Chancellor, Bjorn Andersson,
	Kishon Vijay Abraham I

From: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>

commit a89806c998ee123bb9c0f18526e55afd12c0c0ab upstream.

Clang warns:

../drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-apq8064-sata.c:83:4: warning:
misleading indentation; statement is not part of the previous 'if'
[-Wmisleading-indentation]
                 usleep_range(DELAY_INTERVAL_US, DELAY_INTERVAL_US + 50);
                 ^
../drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-apq8064-sata.c:80:3: note: previous
statement is here
                if (readl_relaxed(addr) & mask)
                ^
1 warning generated.

This warning occurs because there is a space after the tab on this line.
Remove it so that the indentation is consistent with the Linux kernel
coding style and clang no longer warns.

Fixes: 1de990d8a169 ("phy: qcom: Add driver for QCOM APQ8064 SATA PHY")
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/816
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kishon@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-apq8064-sata.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-apq8064-sata.c
+++ b/drivers/phy/qualcomm/phy-qcom-apq8064-sata.c
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int read_poll_timeout(void __iome
 		if (readl_relaxed(addr) & mask)
 			return 0;
 
-		 usleep_range(DELAY_INTERVAL_US, DELAY_INTERVAL_US + 50);
+		usleep_range(DELAY_INTERVAL_US, DELAY_INTERVAL_US + 50);
 	} while (!time_after(jiffies, timeout));
 
 	return (readl_relaxed(addr) & mask) ? 0 : -ETIMEDOUT;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 098/173] ext2: Adjust indentation in ext2_fill_super
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (96 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 097/173] phy: qualcomm: Adjust indentation in read_poll_timeout Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 099/173] powerpc/44x: Adjust indentation in ibm4xx_denali_fixup_memsize Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (80 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nathan Chancellor, Jan Kara

From: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>

commit d9e9866803f7b6c3fdd35d345e97fb0b2908bbbc upstream.

Clang warns:

../fs/ext2/super.c:1076:3: warning: misleading indentation; statement is
not part of the previous 'if' [-Wmisleading-indentation]
        sbi->s_groups_count = ((le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_count) -
        ^
../fs/ext2/super.c:1074:2: note: previous statement is here
        if (EXT2_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
        ^
1 warning generated.

This warning occurs because there is a space before the tab on this
line. Remove it so that the indentation is consistent with the Linux
kernel coding style and clang no longer warns.

Fixes: 41f04d852e35 ("[PATCH] ext2: fix mounts at 16T")
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/827
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191218031930.31393-1-natechancellor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/ext2/super.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/ext2/super.c
+++ b/fs/ext2/super.c
@@ -1077,9 +1077,9 @@ static int ext2_fill_super(struct super_
 
 	if (EXT2_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb) == 0)
 		goto cantfind_ext2;
- 	sbi->s_groups_count = ((le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_count) -
- 				le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) - 1)
- 					/ EXT2_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb)) + 1;
+	sbi->s_groups_count = ((le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_count) -
+				le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block) - 1)
+					/ EXT2_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb)) + 1;
 	db_count = (sbi->s_groups_count + EXT2_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb) - 1) /
 		   EXT2_DESC_PER_BLOCK(sb);
 	sbi->s_group_desc = kmalloc (db_count * sizeof (struct buffer_head *), GFP_KERNEL);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 099/173] powerpc/44x: Adjust indentation in ibm4xx_denali_fixup_memsize
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (97 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 098/173] ext2: Adjust indentation in ext2_fill_super Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 100/173] NFC: pn544: Adjust indentation in pn544_hci_check_presence Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (79 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nathan Chancellor, Nick Desaulniers,
	Michael Ellerman

From: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>

commit c3aae14e5d468d18dbb5d7c0c8c7e2968cc14aad upstream.

Clang warns:

../arch/powerpc/boot/4xx.c:231:3: warning: misleading indentation;
statement is not part of the previous 'else' [-Wmisleading-indentation]
        val = SDRAM0_READ(DDR0_42);
        ^
../arch/powerpc/boot/4xx.c:227:2: note: previous statement is here
        else
        ^

This is because there is a space at the beginning of this line; remove
it so that the indentation is consistent according to the Linux kernel
coding style and clang no longer warns.

Fixes: d23f5099297c ("[POWERPC] 4xx: Adds decoding of 440SPE memory size to boot wrapper library")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/780
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191209200338.12546-1-natechancellor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/powerpc/boot/4xx.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/boot/4xx.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/boot/4xx.c
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ void ibm4xx_denali_fixup_memsize(void)
 		dpath = 8; /* 64 bits */
 
 	/* get address pins (rows) */
- 	val = SDRAM0_READ(DDR0_42);
+	val = SDRAM0_READ(DDR0_42);
 
 	row = DDR_GET_VAL(val, DDR_APIN, DDR_APIN_SHIFT);
 	if (row > max_row)



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 100/173] NFC: pn544: Adjust indentation in pn544_hci_check_presence
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (98 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 099/173] powerpc/44x: Adjust indentation in ibm4xx_denali_fixup_memsize Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 101/173] ppp: Adjust indentation into ppp_async_input Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (78 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nathan Chancellor, David S. Miller

From: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>

commit 5080832627b65e3772a35d1dced68c64e2b24442 upstream.

Clang warns

../drivers/nfc/pn544/pn544.c:696:4: warning: misleading indentation;
statement is not part of the previous 'if' [-Wmisleading-indentation]
                 return nfc_hci_send_cmd(hdev, NFC_HCI_RF_READER_A_GATE,
                 ^
../drivers/nfc/pn544/pn544.c:692:3: note: previous statement is here
                if (target->nfcid1_len != 4 && target->nfcid1_len != 7 &&
                ^
1 warning generated.

This warning occurs because there is a space after the tab on this line.
Remove it so that the indentation is consistent with the Linux kernel
coding style and clang no longer warns.

Fixes: da052850b911 ("NFC: Add pn544 presence check for different targets")
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/814
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/nfc/pn544/pn544.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/nfc/pn544/pn544.c
+++ b/drivers/nfc/pn544/pn544.c
@@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ static int pn544_hci_check_presence(stru
 		    target->nfcid1_len != 10)
 			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-		 return nfc_hci_send_cmd(hdev, NFC_HCI_RF_READER_A_GATE,
+		return nfc_hci_send_cmd(hdev, NFC_HCI_RF_READER_A_GATE,
 				     PN544_RF_READER_CMD_ACTIVATE_NEXT,
 				     target->nfcid1, target->nfcid1_len, NULL);
 	} else if (target->supported_protocols & (NFC_PROTO_JEWEL_MASK |



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 101/173] ppp: Adjust indentation into ppp_async_input
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (99 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 100/173] NFC: pn544: Adjust indentation in pn544_hci_check_presence Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 102/173] net: smc911x: Adjust indentation in smc911x_phy_configure Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (77 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nathan Chancellor, David S. Miller

From: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>

commit 08cbc75f96029d3092664213a844a5e25523aa35 upstream.

Clang warns:

../drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:877:6: warning: misleading indentation;
statement is not part of the previous 'if' [-Wmisleading-indentation]
                                ap->rpkt = skb;
                                ^
../drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:875:5: note: previous statement is here
                                if (!skb)
                                ^
1 warning generated.

This warning occurs because there is a space before the tab on this
line. Clean up this entire block's indentation so that it is consistent
with the Linux kernel coding style and clang no longer warns.

Fixes: 6722e78c9005 ("[PPP]: handle misaligned accesses")
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/800
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c |   18 +++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c
@@ -878,15 +878,15 @@ ppp_async_input(struct asyncppp *ap, con
 				skb = dev_alloc_skb(ap->mru + PPP_HDRLEN + 2);
 				if (!skb)
 					goto nomem;
- 				ap->rpkt = skb;
- 			}
- 			if (skb->len == 0) {
- 				/* Try to get the payload 4-byte aligned.
- 				 * This should match the
- 				 * PPP_ALLSTATIONS/PPP_UI/compressed tests in
- 				 * process_input_packet, but we do not have
- 				 * enough chars here to test buf[1] and buf[2].
- 				 */
+				ap->rpkt = skb;
+			}
+			if (skb->len == 0) {
+				/* Try to get the payload 4-byte aligned.
+				 * This should match the
+				 * PPP_ALLSTATIONS/PPP_UI/compressed tests in
+				 * process_input_packet, but we do not have
+				 * enough chars here to test buf[1] and buf[2].
+				 */
 				if (buf[0] != PPP_ALLSTATIONS)
 					skb_reserve(skb, 2 + (buf[0] & 1));
 			}



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 102/173] net: smc911x: Adjust indentation in smc911x_phy_configure
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (100 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 101/173] ppp: Adjust indentation into ppp_async_input Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 103/173] net: tulip: Adjust indentation in {dmfe, uli526x}_init_module Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (76 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nathan Chancellor, David S. Miller

From: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>

commit 5c61e223004b3b5c3f1dd25718e979bc17a3b12d upstream.

Clang warns:

../drivers/net/ethernet/smsc/smc911x.c:939:3: warning: misleading
indentation; statement is not part of the previous 'if'
[-Wmisleading-indentation]
         if (!lp->ctl_rfduplx)
         ^
../drivers/net/ethernet/smsc/smc911x.c:936:2: note: previous statement
is here
        if (lp->ctl_rspeed != 100)
        ^
1 warning generated.

This warning occurs because there is a space after the tab on this line.
Remove it so that the indentation is consistent with the Linux kernel
coding style and clang no longer warns.

Fixes: 0a0c72c9118c ("[PATCH] RE: [PATCH 1/1] net driver: Add support for SMSC LAN911x line of ethernet chips")
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/796
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/smsc/smc911x.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/smsc/smc911x.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/smsc/smc911x.c
@@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ static void smc911x_phy_configure(struct
 	if (lp->ctl_rspeed != 100)
 		my_ad_caps &= ~(ADVERTISE_100BASE4|ADVERTISE_100FULL|ADVERTISE_100HALF);
 
-	 if (!lp->ctl_rfduplx)
+	if (!lp->ctl_rfduplx)
 		my_ad_caps &= ~(ADVERTISE_100FULL|ADVERTISE_10FULL);
 
 	/* Update our Auto-Neg Advertisement Register */



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 103/173] net: tulip: Adjust indentation in {dmfe, uli526x}_init_module
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (101 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 102/173] net: smc911x: Adjust indentation in smc911x_phy_configure Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 104/173] IB/mlx5: Fix outstanding_pi index for GSI qps Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (75 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nathan Chancellor, David S. Miller

From: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>

commit fe06bf3d83ef0d92f35a24e03297172e92ce9ce3 upstream.

Clang warns:

../drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/uli526x.c:1812:3: warning: misleading
indentation; statement is not part of the previous 'if'
[-Wmisleading-indentation]
        switch (mode) {
        ^
../drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/uli526x.c:1809:2: note: previous
statement is here
        if (cr6set)
        ^
1 warning generated.

../drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/dmfe.c:2217:3: warning: misleading
indentation; statement is not part of the previous 'if'
[-Wmisleading-indentation]
        switch(mode) {
        ^
../drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/dmfe.c:2214:2: note: previous
statement is here
        if (cr6set)
        ^
1 warning generated.

This warning occurs because there is a space before the tab on these
lines. Remove them so that the indentation is consistent with the Linux
kernel coding style and clang no longer warns.

While we are here, adjust the default block in dmfe_init_module to have
a proper break between the label and assignment and add a space between
the switch and opening parentheses to avoid a checkpatch warning.

Fixes: e1c3e5014040 ("[PATCH] initialisation cleanup for ULI526x-net-driver")
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/795
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/dmfe.c    |    7 ++++---
 drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/uli526x.c |    4 ++--
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/dmfe.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/dmfe.c
@@ -2224,15 +2224,16 @@ static int __init dmfe_init_module(void)
 	if (cr6set)
 		dmfe_cr6_user_set = cr6set;
 
- 	switch(mode) {
-   	case DMFE_10MHF:
+	switch (mode) {
+	case DMFE_10MHF:
 	case DMFE_100MHF:
 	case DMFE_10MFD:
 	case DMFE_100MFD:
 	case DMFE_1M_HPNA:
 		dmfe_media_mode = mode;
 		break;
-	default:dmfe_media_mode = DMFE_AUTO;
+	default:
+		dmfe_media_mode = DMFE_AUTO;
 		break;
 	}
 
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/uli526x.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/uli526x.c
@@ -1819,8 +1819,8 @@ static int __init uli526x_init_module(vo
 	if (cr6set)
 		uli526x_cr6_user_set = cr6set;
 
- 	switch (mode) {
-   	case ULI526X_10MHF:
+	switch (mode) {
+	case ULI526X_10MHF:
 	case ULI526X_100MHF:
 	case ULI526X_10MFD:
 	case ULI526X_100MFD:



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 104/173] IB/mlx5: Fix outstanding_pi index for GSI qps
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (102 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 103/173] net: tulip: Adjust indentation in {dmfe, uli526x}_init_module Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 105/173] IB/core: Fix ODP get user pages flow Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (74 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Prabhath Sajeepa, Leon Romanovsky,
	Jason Gunthorpe

From: Prabhath Sajeepa <psajeepa@purestorage.com>

commit b5671afe5e39ed71e94eae788bacdcceec69db09 upstream.

Commit b0ffeb537f3a ("IB/mlx5: Fix iteration overrun in GSI qps") changed
the way outstanding WRs are tracked for the GSI QP. But the fix did not
cover the case when a call to ib_post_send() fails and updates index to
track outstanding.

Since the prior commmit outstanding_pi should not be bounded otherwise the
loop generate_completions() will fail.

Fixes: b0ffeb537f3a ("IB/mlx5: Fix iteration overrun in GSI qps")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1576195889-23527-1-git-send-email-psajeepa@purestorage.com
Signed-off-by: Prabhath Sajeepa <psajeepa@purestorage.com>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/gsi.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/gsi.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/gsi.c
@@ -507,8 +507,7 @@ int mlx5_ib_gsi_post_send(struct ib_qp *
 		ret = ib_post_send(tx_qp, &cur_wr.wr, bad_wr);
 		if (ret) {
 			/* Undo the effect of adding the outstanding wr */
-			gsi->outstanding_pi = (gsi->outstanding_pi - 1) %
-					      gsi->cap.max_send_wr;
+			gsi->outstanding_pi--;
 			goto err;
 		}
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gsi->lock, flags);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 105/173] IB/core: Fix ODP get user pages flow
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (103 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 104/173] IB/mlx5: Fix outstanding_pi index for GSI qps Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 106/173] nfsd: fix delay timer on 32-bit architectures Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (73 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Yishai Hadas, Artemy Kovalyov,
	Jason Gunthorpe, Leon Romanovsky

From: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>

commit d07de8bd1709a80a282963ad7b2535148678a9e4 upstream.

The nr_pages argument of get_user_pages_remote() should always be in terms
of the system page size, not the MR page size. Use PAGE_SIZE instead of
umem_odp->page_shift.

Fixes: 403cd12e2cf7 ("IB/umem: Add contiguous ODP support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191222124649.52300-3-leon@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Artemy Kovalyov <artemyko@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/infiniband/core/umem_odp.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/umem_odp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/umem_odp.c
@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ int ib_umem_odp_map_dma_pages(struct ib_
 
 	while (bcnt > 0) {
 		const size_t gup_num_pages = min_t(size_t,
-				(bcnt + BIT(page_shift) - 1) >> page_shift,
+				ALIGN(bcnt, PAGE_SIZE) / PAGE_SIZE,
 				PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct page *));
 
 		down_read(&owning_mm->mmap_sem);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 106/173] nfsd: fix delay timer on 32-bit architectures
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (104 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 105/173] IB/core: Fix ODP get user pages flow Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 107/173] nfsd: fix jiffies/time_t mixup in LRU list Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (72 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Arnd Bergmann, J. Bruce Fields

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

commit 2561c92b12f4f4e386d453556685f75775c0938b upstream.

The nfsd4_cb_layout_done() function takes a 'time_t' value,
multiplied by NSEC_PER_SEC*2 to get a nanosecond value.

This works fine on 64-bit architectures, but on 32-bit, any
value over 1 second results in a signed integer overflow
with unexpected results.

Cast one input to a 64-bit type in order to produce the
same result that we have on 64-bit architectures, regarless
of the type of nfsd4_lease.

Fixes: 6b9b21073d3b ("nfsd: give up on CB_LAYOUTRECALLs after two lease periods")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c
@@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ nfsd4_cb_layout_done(struct nfsd4_callba
 
 		/* Client gets 2 lease periods to return it */
 		cutoff = ktime_add_ns(task->tk_start,
-					 nn->nfsd4_lease * NSEC_PER_SEC * 2);
+					 (u64)nn->nfsd4_lease * NSEC_PER_SEC * 2);
 
 		if (ktime_before(now, cutoff)) {
 			rpc_delay(task, HZ/100); /* 10 mili-seconds */



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 107/173] nfsd: fix jiffies/time_t mixup in LRU list
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (105 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 106/173] nfsd: fix delay timer on 32-bit architectures Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 108/173] ubi: fastmap: Fix inverted logic in seen selfcheck Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (71 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Arnd Bergmann, J. Bruce Fields

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

commit 9594497f2c78993cb66b696122f7c65528ace985 upstream.

The nfsd4_blocked_lock->nbl_time timestamp is recorded in jiffies,
but then compared to a CLOCK_REALTIME timestamp later on, which makes
no sense.

For consistency with the other timestamps, change this to use a time_t.

This is a change in behavior, which may cause regressions, but the
current code is not sensible. On a system with CONFIG_HZ=1000,
the 'time_after((unsigned long)nbl->nbl_time, (unsigned long)cutoff))'
check is false for roughly the first 18 days of uptime and then true
for the next 49 days.

Fixes: 7919d0a27f1e ("nfsd: add a LRU list for blocked locks")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c |    2 +-
 fs/nfsd/state.h     |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
@@ -6040,7 +6040,7 @@ nfsd4_lock(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struc
 	}
 
 	if (fl_flags & FL_SLEEP) {
-		nbl->nbl_time = jiffies;
+		nbl->nbl_time = get_seconds();
 		spin_lock(&nn->blocked_locks_lock);
 		list_add_tail(&nbl->nbl_list, &lock_sop->lo_blocked);
 		list_add_tail(&nbl->nbl_lru, &nn->blocked_locks_lru);
--- a/fs/nfsd/state.h
+++ b/fs/nfsd/state.h
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ static inline bool nfsd4_stateid_generat
 struct nfsd4_blocked_lock {
 	struct list_head	nbl_list;
 	struct list_head	nbl_lru;
-	unsigned long		nbl_time;
+	time_t			nbl_time;
 	struct file_lock	nbl_lock;
 	struct knfsd_fh		nbl_fh;
 	struct nfsd4_callback	nbl_cb;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 108/173] ubi: fastmap: Fix inverted logic in seen selfcheck
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (106 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 107/173] nfsd: fix jiffies/time_t mixup in LRU list Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 109/173] ubi: Fix an error pointer dereference in error handling code Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (70 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sascha Hauer, Richard Weinberger

From: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>

commit ef5aafb6e4e9942a28cd300bdcda21ce6cbaf045 upstream.

set_seen() sets the bit corresponding to the PEB number in the bitmap,
so when self_check_seen() wants to find PEBs that haven't been seen we
have to print the PEBs that have their bit cleared, not the ones which
have it set.

Fixes: 5d71afb00840 ("ubi: Use bitmaps in Fastmap self-check code")
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap.c
+++ b/drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int self_check_seen(struct ubi_de
 		return 0;
 
 	for (pnum = 0; pnum < ubi->peb_count; pnum++) {
-		if (test_bit(pnum, seen) && ubi->lookuptbl[pnum]) {
+		if (!test_bit(pnum, seen) && ubi->lookuptbl[pnum]) {
 			ubi_err(ubi, "self-check failed for PEB %d, fastmap didn't see it", pnum);
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 		}



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 109/173] ubi: Fix an error pointer dereference in error handling code
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (107 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 108/173] ubi: fastmap: Fix inverted logic in seen selfcheck Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 110/173] mfd: da9062: Fix watchdog compatible string Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (69 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dan Carpenter, Richard Weinberger

From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>

commit 5d3805af279c93ef49a64701f35254676d709622 upstream.

If "seen_pebs = init_seen(ubi);" fails then "seen_pebs" is an error pointer
and we try to kfree() it which results in an Oops.

This patch re-arranges the error handling so now it only frees things
which have been allocated successfully.

Fixes: daef3dd1f0ae ("UBI: Fastmap: Add self check to detect absent PEBs")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap.c |   21 ++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap.c
+++ b/drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap.c
@@ -1147,7 +1147,7 @@ static int ubi_write_fastmap(struct ubi_
 	struct rb_node *tmp_rb;
 	int ret, i, j, free_peb_count, used_peb_count, vol_count;
 	int scrub_peb_count, erase_peb_count;
-	unsigned long *seen_pebs = NULL;
+	unsigned long *seen_pebs;
 
 	fm_raw = ubi->fm_buf;
 	memset(ubi->fm_buf, 0, ubi->fm_size);
@@ -1161,7 +1161,7 @@ static int ubi_write_fastmap(struct ubi_
 	dvbuf = new_fm_vbuf(ubi, UBI_FM_DATA_VOLUME_ID);
 	if (!dvbuf) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out_kfree;
+		goto out_free_avbuf;
 	}
 
 	avhdr = ubi_get_vid_hdr(avbuf);
@@ -1170,7 +1170,7 @@ static int ubi_write_fastmap(struct ubi_
 	seen_pebs = init_seen(ubi);
 	if (IS_ERR(seen_pebs)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(seen_pebs);
-		goto out_kfree;
+		goto out_free_dvbuf;
 	}
 
 	spin_lock(&ubi->volumes_lock);
@@ -1338,7 +1338,7 @@ static int ubi_write_fastmap(struct ubi_
 	ret = ubi_io_write_vid_hdr(ubi, new_fm->e[0]->pnum, avbuf);
 	if (ret) {
 		ubi_err(ubi, "unable to write vid_hdr to fastmap SB!");
-		goto out_kfree;
+		goto out_free_seen;
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < new_fm->used_blocks; i++) {
@@ -1360,7 +1360,7 @@ static int ubi_write_fastmap(struct ubi_
 		if (ret) {
 			ubi_err(ubi, "unable to write vid_hdr to PEB %i!",
 				new_fm->e[i]->pnum);
-			goto out_kfree;
+			goto out_free_seen;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -1370,7 +1370,7 @@ static int ubi_write_fastmap(struct ubi_
 		if (ret) {
 			ubi_err(ubi, "unable to write fastmap to PEB %i!",
 				new_fm->e[i]->pnum);
-			goto out_kfree;
+			goto out_free_seen;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -1380,10 +1380,13 @@ static int ubi_write_fastmap(struct ubi_
 	ret = self_check_seen(ubi, seen_pebs);
 	dbg_bld("fastmap written!");
 
-out_kfree:
-	ubi_free_vid_buf(avbuf);
-	ubi_free_vid_buf(dvbuf);
+out_free_seen:
 	free_seen(seen_pebs);
+out_free_dvbuf:
+	ubi_free_vid_buf(dvbuf);
+out_free_avbuf:
+	ubi_free_vid_buf(avbuf);
+
 out:
 	return ret;
 }



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 110/173] mfd: da9062: Fix watchdog compatible string
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (108 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 109/173] ubi: Fix an error pointer dereference in error handling code Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 111/173] mfd: rn5t618: Mark ADC control register volatile Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (68 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Marco Felsch, Guenter Roeck,
	Adam Thomson, Lee Jones

From: Marco Felsch <m.felsch@pengutronix.de>

commit 1112ba02ff1190ca9c15a912f9269e54b46d2d82 upstream.

The watchdog driver compatible is "dlg,da9062-watchdog" and not
"dlg,da9062-wdt". Therefore the mfd-core can't populate the of_node and
fwnode. As result the watchdog driver can't parse the devicetree.

Fixes: 9b40b030c4ad ("mfd: da9062: Supply core driver")
Signed-off-by: Marco Felsch <m.felsch@pengutronix.de>
Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Adam Thomson <Adam.Thomson.Opensource@diasemi.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/mfd/da9062-core.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/mfd/da9062-core.c
+++ b/drivers/mfd/da9062-core.c
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ static const struct mfd_cell da9062_devs
 		.name		= "da9062-watchdog",
 		.num_resources	= ARRAY_SIZE(da9062_wdt_resources),
 		.resources	= da9062_wdt_resources,
-		.of_compatible  = "dlg,da9062-wdt",
+		.of_compatible  = "dlg,da9062-watchdog",
 	},
 	{
 		.name		= "da9062-thermal",



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 111/173] mfd: rn5t618: Mark ADC control register volatile
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (109 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 110/173] mfd: da9062: Fix watchdog compatible string Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 112/173] net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Only 7278 supports 2Gb/sec IMP port Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (67 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andreas Kemnade, Lee Jones

From: Andreas Kemnade <andreas@kemnade.info>

commit 2f3dc25c0118de03a00ddc88b61f7216854f534d upstream.

There is a bit which gets cleared after conversion.

Fixes: 9bb9e29c78f8 ("mfd: Add Ricoh RN5T618 PMIC core driver")
Signed-off-by: Andreas Kemnade <andreas@kemnade.info>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/mfd/rn5t618.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/mfd/rn5t618.c
+++ b/drivers/mfd/rn5t618.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ static bool rn5t618_volatile_reg(struct
 	case RN5T618_WATCHDOGCNT:
 	case RN5T618_DCIRQ:
 	case RN5T618_ILIMDATAH ... RN5T618_AIN0DATAL:
+	case RN5T618_ADCCNT3:
 	case RN5T618_IR_ADC1 ... RN5T618_IR_ADC3:
 	case RN5T618_IR_GPR:
 	case RN5T618_IR_GPF:



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 112/173] net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Only 7278 supports 2Gb/sec IMP port
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (110 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 111/173] mfd: rn5t618: Mark ADC control register volatile Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 113/173] net_sched: fix a resource leak in tcindex_set_parms() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (66 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Florian Fainelli, David S. Miller

From: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit de34d7084edd069dac5aa010cfe32bd8c4619fa6 ]

The 7445 switch clocking profiles do not allow us to run the IMP port at
2Gb/sec in a way that it is reliable and consistent. Make sure that the
setting is only applied to the 7278 family.

Fixes: 8f1880cbe8d0 ("net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Configure IMP port for 2Gb/sec")
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c
@@ -137,7 +137,9 @@ static void bcm_sf2_imp_setup(struct dsa
 
 		/* Force link status for IMP port */
 		reg = core_readl(priv, offset);
-		reg |= (MII_SW_OR | LINK_STS | GMII_SPEED_UP_2G);
+		reg |= (MII_SW_OR | LINK_STS);
+		if (priv->type == BCM7278_DEVICE_ID)
+			reg |= GMII_SPEED_UP_2G;
 		core_writel(priv, reg, offset);
 
 		/* Enable Broadcast, Multicast, Unicast forwarding to IMP port */



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 113/173] net_sched: fix a resource leak in tcindex_set_parms()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (111 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 112/173] net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Only 7278 supports 2Gb/sec IMP port Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 114/173] net: systemport: Avoid RBUF stuck in Wake-on-LAN mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (65 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jakub Kicinski, Jamal Hadi Salim,
	Jiri Pirko, Cong Wang, David S. Miller

From: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 52b5ae501c045010aeeb1d5ac0373ff161a88291 ]

Jakub noticed there is a potential resource leak in
tcindex_set_parms(): when tcindex_filter_result_init() fails
and it jumps to 'errout1' which doesn't release the memory
and resources allocated by tcindex_alloc_perfect_hash().

We should just jump to 'errout_alloc' which calls
tcindex_free_perfect_hash().

Fixes: b9a24bb76bf6 ("net_sched: properly handle failure case of tcf_exts_init()")
Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/sched/cls_tcindex.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/sched/cls_tcindex.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_tcindex.c
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ tcindex_set_parms(struct net *net, struc
 
 	err = tcindex_filter_result_init(&new_filter_result);
 	if (err < 0)
-		goto errout1;
+		goto errout_alloc;
 	if (old_r)
 		cr = r->res;
 
@@ -502,7 +502,6 @@ errout_alloc:
 		tcindex_free_perfect_hash(cp);
 	else if (balloc == 2)
 		kfree(cp->h);
-errout1:
 	tcf_exts_destroy(&new_filter_result.exts);
 errout:
 	kfree(cp);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 114/173] net: systemport: Avoid RBUF stuck in Wake-on-LAN mode
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (112 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 113/173] net_sched: fix a resource leak in tcindex_set_parms() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 115/173] net: macb: Remove unnecessary alignment check for TSO Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (64 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Florian Fainelli, David S. Miller

From: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 263a425a482fc495d6d3f9a29b9103a664c38b69 ]

After a number of suspend and resume cycles, it is possible for the RBUF
to be stuck in Wake-on-LAN mode, despite the MPD enable bit being
cleared which instructed the RBUF to exit that mode.

Avoid creating that problematic condition by clearing the RX_EN and
TX_EN bits in the UniMAC prior to disable the Magic Packet Detector
logic which is guaranteed to make the RBUF exit Wake-on-LAN mode.

Fixes: 83e82f4c706b ("net: systemport: add Wake-on-LAN support")
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bcmsysport.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bcmsysport.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bcmsysport.c
@@ -2329,6 +2329,9 @@ static int bcm_sysport_resume(struct dev
 
 	umac_reset(priv);
 
+	/* Disable the UniMAC RX/TX */
+	umac_enable_set(priv, CMD_RX_EN | CMD_TX_EN, 0);
+
 	/* We may have been suspended and never received a WOL event that
 	 * would turn off MPD detection, take care of that now
 	 */



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 115/173] net: macb: Remove unnecessary alignment check for TSO
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (113 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 114/173] net: systemport: Avoid RBUF stuck in Wake-on-LAN mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 116/173] net: macb: Limit maximum GEM TX length in TSO Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (63 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Harini Katakam, David S. Miller

From: Harini Katakam <harini.katakam@xilinx.com>

[ Upstream commit 41c1ef978c8d0259c6636e6d2d854777e92650eb ]

The IP TSO implementation does NOT require the length to be a
multiple of 8. That is only a requirement for UFO as per IP
documentation. Hence, exit macb_features_check function in the
beginning if the protocol is not UDP. Only when it is UDP,
proceed further to the alignment checks. Update comments to
reflect the same. Also remove dead code checking for protocol
TCP when calculating header length.

Fixes: 1629dd4f763c ("cadence: Add LSO support.")
Signed-off-by: Harini Katakam <harini.katakam@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c |    8 +++-----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c
@@ -1577,16 +1577,14 @@ static netdev_features_t macb_features_c
 
 	/* Validate LSO compatibility */
 
-	/* there is only one buffer */
-	if (!skb_is_nonlinear(skb))
+	/* there is only one buffer or protocol is not UDP */
+	if (!skb_is_nonlinear(skb) || (ip_hdr(skb)->protocol != IPPROTO_UDP))
 		return features;
 
 	/* length of header */
 	hdrlen = skb_transport_offset(skb);
-	if (ip_hdr(skb)->protocol == IPPROTO_TCP)
-		hdrlen += tcp_hdrlen(skb);
 
-	/* For LSO:
+	/* For UFO only:
 	 * When software supplies two or more payload buffers all payload buffers
 	 * apart from the last must be a multiple of 8 bytes in size.
 	 */



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 116/173] net: macb: Limit maximum GEM TX length in TSO
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (114 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 115/173] net: macb: Remove unnecessary alignment check for TSO Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 117/173] bonding/alb: properly access headers in bond_alb_xmit() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (62 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Harini Katakam, David S. Miller

From: Harini Katakam <harini.katakam@xilinx.com>

[ Upstream commit f822e9c4ffa511a5c681cf866287d9383a3b6f1b ]

GEM_MAX_TX_LEN currently resolves to 0x3FF8 for any IP version supporting
TSO with full 14bits of length field in payload descriptor. But an IP
errata causes false amba_error (bit 6 of ISR) when length in payload
descriptors is specified above 16387. The error occurs because the DMA
falsely concludes that there is not enough space in SRAM for incoming
payload. These errors were observed continuously under stress of large
packets using iperf on a version where SRAM was 16K for each queue. This
errata will be documented shortly and affects all versions since TSO
functionality was added. Hence limit the max length to 0x3FC0 (rounded).

Signed-off-by: Harini Katakam <harini.katakam@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c
@@ -66,7 +66,11 @@
 /* Max length of transmit frame must be a multiple of 8 bytes */
 #define MACB_TX_LEN_ALIGN	8
 #define MACB_MAX_TX_LEN		((unsigned int)((1 << MACB_TX_FRMLEN_SIZE) - 1) & ~((unsigned int)(MACB_TX_LEN_ALIGN - 1)))
-#define GEM_MAX_TX_LEN		((unsigned int)((1 << GEM_TX_FRMLEN_SIZE) - 1) & ~((unsigned int)(MACB_TX_LEN_ALIGN - 1)))
+/* Limit maximum TX length as per Cadence TSO errata. This is to avoid a
+ * false amba_error in TX path from the DMA assuming there is not enough
+ * space in the SRAM (16KB) even when there is.
+ */
+#define GEM_MAX_TX_LEN		(unsigned int)(0x3FC0)
 
 #define GEM_MTU_MIN_SIZE	ETH_MIN_MTU
 #define MACB_NETIF_LSO		NETIF_F_TSO



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 117/173] bonding/alb: properly access headers in bond_alb_xmit()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (115 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 116/173] net: macb: Limit maximum GEM TX length in TSO Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 118/173] ext4: fix deadlock allocating crypto bounce page from mempool Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (61 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, syzbot, Jay Vosburgh,
	Veaceslav Falico, Andy Gospodarek, David S. Miller

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 38f88c45404293bbc027b956def6c10cbd45c616 ]

syzbot managed to send an IPX packet through bond_alb_xmit()
and af_packet and triggered a use-after-free.

First, bond_alb_xmit() was using ipx_hdr() helper to reach
the IPX header, but ipx_hdr() was using the transport offset
instead of the network offset. In the particular syzbot
report transport offset was 0xFFFF

This patch removes ipx_hdr() since it was only (mis)used from bonding.

Then we need to make sure IPv4/IPv6/IPX headers are pulled
in skb->head before dereferencing anything.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bond_alb_xmit+0x153a/0x1590 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1452
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8801ce56dfff by task syz-executor.2/18108
 (if (ipx_hdr(skb)->ipx_checksum != IPX_NO_CHECKSUM) ...)

Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff8441fc42>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
 [<ffffffff8441fc42>] dump_stack+0x14d/0x20b lib/dump_stack.c:53
 [<ffffffff81a7dec4>] print_address_description+0x6f/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:282
 [<ffffffff81a7e0ec>] kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:380 [inline]
 [<ffffffff81a7e0ec>] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:438 [inline]
 [<ffffffff81a7e0ec>] kasan_report.cold+0x8c/0x2a0 mm/kasan/report.c:422
 [<ffffffff81a7dc4f>] __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:469
 [<ffffffff82c8c00a>] bond_alb_xmit+0x153a/0x1590 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1452
 [<ffffffff82c60c74>] __bond_start_xmit drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4199 [inline]
 [<ffffffff82c60c74>] bond_start_xmit+0x4f4/0x1570 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:4224
 [<ffffffff83baa558>] __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4525 [inline]
 [<ffffffff83baa558>] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4539 [inline]
 [<ffffffff83baa558>] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3611 [inline]
 [<ffffffff83baa558>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x168/0x910 net/core/dev.c:3627
 [<ffffffff83bacf35>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f55/0x33b0 net/core/dev.c:4238
 [<ffffffff83bae3a8>] dev_queue_xmit+0x18/0x20 net/core/dev.c:4278
 [<ffffffff84339189>] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3226 [inline]
 [<ffffffff84339189>] packet_sendmsg+0x4919/0x70b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3252
 [<ffffffff83b1ac0c>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:673 [inline]
 [<ffffffff83b1ac0c>] sock_sendmsg+0x12c/0x160 net/socket.c:684
 [<ffffffff83b1f5a2>] __sys_sendto+0x262/0x380 net/socket.c:1996
 [<ffffffff83b1f700>] SYSC_sendto net/socket.c:2008 [inline]
 [<ffffffff83b1f700>] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x60 net/socket.c:2004

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jay Vosburgh <j.vosburgh@gmail.com>
Cc: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c |   44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c
@@ -1403,26 +1403,31 @@ int bond_alb_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, s
 	bool do_tx_balance = true;
 	u32 hash_index = 0;
 	const u8 *hash_start = NULL;
-	struct ipv6hdr *ip6hdr;
 
 	skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
 	eth_data = eth_hdr(skb);
 
 	switch (ntohs(skb->protocol)) {
 	case ETH_P_IP: {
-		const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
+		const struct iphdr *iph;
 
 		if (ether_addr_equal_64bits(eth_data->h_dest, mac_bcast) ||
-		    (iph->daddr == ip_bcast) ||
-		    (iph->protocol == IPPROTO_IGMP)) {
+		    (!pskb_network_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*iph)))) {
+			do_tx_balance = false;
+			break;
+		}
+		iph = ip_hdr(skb);
+		if (iph->daddr == ip_bcast || iph->protocol == IPPROTO_IGMP) {
 			do_tx_balance = false;
 			break;
 		}
 		hash_start = (char *)&(iph->daddr);
 		hash_size = sizeof(iph->daddr);
-	}
 		break;
-	case ETH_P_IPV6:
+	}
+	case ETH_P_IPV6: {
+		const struct ipv6hdr *ip6hdr;
+
 		/* IPv6 doesn't really use broadcast mac address, but leave
 		 * that here just in case.
 		 */
@@ -1439,7 +1444,11 @@ int bond_alb_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, s
 			break;
 		}
 
-		/* Additianally, DAD probes should not be tx-balanced as that
+		if (!pskb_network_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*ip6hdr))) {
+			do_tx_balance = false;
+			break;
+		}
+		/* Additionally, DAD probes should not be tx-balanced as that
 		 * will lead to false positives for duplicate addresses and
 		 * prevent address configuration from working.
 		 */
@@ -1449,17 +1458,26 @@ int bond_alb_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, s
 			break;
 		}
 
-		hash_start = (char *)&(ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr);
-		hash_size = sizeof(ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr);
+		hash_start = (char *)&ip6hdr->daddr;
+		hash_size = sizeof(ip6hdr->daddr);
 		break;
-	case ETH_P_IPX:
-		if (ipx_hdr(skb)->ipx_checksum != IPX_NO_CHECKSUM) {
+	}
+	case ETH_P_IPX: {
+		const struct ipxhdr *ipxhdr;
+
+		if (pskb_network_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*ipxhdr))) {
+			do_tx_balance = false;
+			break;
+		}
+		ipxhdr = (struct ipxhdr *)skb_network_header(skb);
+
+		if (ipxhdr->ipx_checksum != IPX_NO_CHECKSUM) {
 			/* something is wrong with this packet */
 			do_tx_balance = false;
 			break;
 		}
 
-		if (ipx_hdr(skb)->ipx_type != IPX_TYPE_NCP) {
+		if (ipxhdr->ipx_type != IPX_TYPE_NCP) {
 			/* The only protocol worth balancing in
 			 * this family since it has an "ARP" like
 			 * mechanism
@@ -1468,9 +1486,11 @@ int bond_alb_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, s
 			break;
 		}
 
+		eth_data = eth_hdr(skb);
 		hash_start = (char *)eth_data->h_dest;
 		hash_size = ETH_ALEN;
 		break;
+	}
 	case ETH_P_ARP:
 		do_tx_balance = false;
 		if (bond_info->rlb_enabled)



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 118/173] ext4: fix deadlock allocating crypto bounce page from mempool
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (116 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 117/173] bonding/alb: properly access headers in bond_alb_xmit() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 119/173] btrfs: Get rid of the confusing btrfs_file_extent_inline_len Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (60 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Biggers, Theodore Tso, Sasha Levin

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 547c556f4db7c09447ecf5f833ab6aaae0c5ab58 ]

ext4_writepages() on an encrypted file has to encrypt the data, but it
can't modify the pagecache pages in-place, so it encrypts the data into
bounce pages and writes those instead.  All bounce pages are allocated
from a mempool using GFP_NOFS.

This is not correct use of a mempool, and it can deadlock.  This is
because GFP_NOFS includes __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM, which enables the "never
fail" mode for mempool_alloc() where a failed allocation will fall back
to waiting for one of the preallocated elements in the pool.

But since this mode is used for all a bio's pages and not just the
first, it can deadlock waiting for pages already in the bio to be freed.

This deadlock can be reproduced by patching mempool_alloc() to pretend
that pool->alloc() always fails (so that it always falls back to the
preallocations), and then creating an encrypted file of size > 128 KiB.

Fix it by only using GFP_NOFS for the first page in the bio.  For
subsequent pages just use GFP_NOWAIT, and if any of those fail, just
submit the bio and start a new one.

This will need to be fixed in f2fs too, but that's less straightforward.

Fixes: c9af28fdd449 ("ext4 crypto: don't let data integrity writebacks fail with ENOMEM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191231181149.47619-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/ext4/page-io.c | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/page-io.c b/fs/ext4/page-io.c
index db7590178dfcf..9cc79b7b0df11 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/page-io.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/page-io.c
@@ -481,17 +481,26 @@ int ext4_bio_write_page(struct ext4_io_submit *io,
 	    nr_to_submit) {
 		gfp_t gfp_flags = GFP_NOFS;
 
+		/*
+		 * Since bounce page allocation uses a mempool, we can only use
+		 * a waiting mask (i.e. request guaranteed allocation) on the
+		 * first page of the bio.  Otherwise it can deadlock.
+		 */
+		if (io->io_bio)
+			gfp_flags = GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN;
 	retry_encrypt:
 		data_page = fscrypt_encrypt_page(inode, page, PAGE_SIZE, 0,
 						page->index, gfp_flags);
 		if (IS_ERR(data_page)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(data_page);
-			if (ret == -ENOMEM && wbc->sync_mode == WB_SYNC_ALL) {
-				if (io->io_bio) {
+			if (ret == -ENOMEM &&
+			    (io->io_bio || wbc->sync_mode == WB_SYNC_ALL)) {
+				gfp_flags = GFP_NOFS;
+				if (io->io_bio)
 					ext4_io_submit(io);
-					congestion_wait(BLK_RW_ASYNC, HZ/50);
-				}
-				gfp_flags |= __GFP_NOFAIL;
+				else
+					gfp_flags |= __GFP_NOFAIL;
+				congestion_wait(BLK_RW_ASYNC, HZ/50);
 				goto retry_encrypt;
 			}
 			data_page = NULL;
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 119/173] btrfs: Get rid of the confusing btrfs_file_extent_inline_len
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (117 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 118/173] ext4: fix deadlock allocating crypto bounce page from mempool Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 120/173] Btrfs: fix assertion failure on fsync with NO_HOLES enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (59 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Qu Wenruo, David Sterba, Sasha Levin

From: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>

[ Upstream commit e41ca5897489b1c18af75ff0cc8f5c80260b3281 ]

We used to call btrfs_file_extent_inline_len() to get the uncompressed
data size of an inlined extent.

However this function is hiding evil, for compressed extent, it has no
choice but to directly read out ram_bytes from btrfs_file_extent_item.
While for uncompressed extent, it uses item size to calculate the real
data size, and ignoring ram_bytes completely.

In fact, for corrupted ram_bytes, due to above behavior kernel
btrfs_print_leaf() can't even print correct ram_bytes to expose the bug.

Since we have the tree-checker to verify all EXTENT_DATA, such mismatch
can be detected pretty easily, thus we can trust ram_bytes without the
evil btrfs_file_extent_inline_len().

Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/btrfs/ctree.h             | 26 --------------------------
 fs/btrfs/file-item.c         |  2 +-
 fs/btrfs/file.c              |  3 +--
 fs/btrfs/inode.c             | 12 ++++++------
 fs/btrfs/print-tree.c        |  4 ++--
 fs/btrfs/send.c              | 17 +++++++----------
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c          | 12 ++++--------
 include/trace/events/btrfs.h |  2 +-
 8 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h
index 588760c49fe28..664710848e6f1 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h
@@ -2408,32 +2408,6 @@ static inline u32 btrfs_file_extent_inline_item_len(
 	return btrfs_item_size(eb, e) - BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE_DATA_START;
 }
 
-/* this returns the number of file bytes represented by the inline item.
- * If an item is compressed, this is the uncompressed size
- */
-static inline u32 btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
-					int slot,
-					const struct btrfs_file_extent_item *fi)
-{
-	struct btrfs_map_token token;
-
-	btrfs_init_map_token(&token);
-	/*
-	 * return the space used on disk if this item isn't
-	 * compressed or encoded
-	 */
-	if (btrfs_token_file_extent_compression(eb, fi, &token) == 0 &&
-	    btrfs_token_file_extent_encryption(eb, fi, &token) == 0 &&
-	    btrfs_token_file_extent_other_encoding(eb, fi, &token) == 0) {
-		return btrfs_file_extent_inline_item_len(eb,
-							 btrfs_item_nr(slot));
-	}
-
-	/* otherwise use the ram bytes field */
-	return btrfs_token_file_extent_ram_bytes(eb, fi, &token);
-}
-
-
 /* btrfs_dev_stats_item */
 static inline u64 btrfs_dev_stats_value(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
 					const struct btrfs_dev_stats_item *ptr,
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/file-item.c b/fs/btrfs/file-item.c
index fdcb410026233..702b3606ad0ec 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/file-item.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/file-item.c
@@ -955,7 +955,7 @@ void btrfs_extent_item_to_extent_map(struct btrfs_inode *inode,
 			btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi);
 	} else if (type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
 		size_t size;
-		size = btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(leaf, slot, fi);
+		size = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi);
 		extent_end = ALIGN(extent_start + size,
 				   fs_info->sectorsize);
 	}
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/file.c b/fs/btrfs/file.c
index c68ce3412dc11..725544ec9c842 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/file.c
@@ -784,8 +784,7 @@ int __btrfs_drop_extents(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 				btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi);
 		} else if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
 			extent_end = key.offset +
-				btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(leaf,
-						     path->slots[0], fi);
+				btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi);
 		} else {
 			/* can't happen */
 			BUG();
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c
index f2dc517768f02..abecc4724a3bc 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c
@@ -1476,8 +1476,7 @@ static noinline int run_delalloc_nocow(struct inode *inode,
 			nocow = 1;
 		} else if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
 			extent_end = found_key.offset +
-				btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(leaf,
-						     path->slots[0], fi);
+				btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi);
 			extent_end = ALIGN(extent_end,
 					   fs_info->sectorsize);
 		} else {
@@ -4651,8 +4650,8 @@ int btrfs_truncate_inode_items(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 					BTRFS_I(inode), leaf, fi,
 					found_key.offset);
 			} else if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
-				item_end += btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(leaf,
-							 path->slots[0], fi);
+				item_end += btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf,
+									fi);
 
 				trace_btrfs_truncate_show_fi_inline(
 					BTRFS_I(inode), leaf, fi, path->slots[0],
@@ -7167,7 +7166,8 @@ struct extent_map *btrfs_get_extent(struct btrfs_inode *inode,
 						       extent_start);
 	} else if (found_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
 		size_t size;
-		size = btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(leaf, path->slots[0], item);
+
+		size = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, item);
 		extent_end = ALIGN(extent_start + size,
 				   fs_info->sectorsize);
 
@@ -7218,7 +7218,7 @@ struct extent_map *btrfs_get_extent(struct btrfs_inode *inode,
 		if (new_inline)
 			goto out;
 
-		size = btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(leaf, path->slots[0], item);
+		size = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, item);
 		extent_offset = page_offset(page) + pg_offset - extent_start;
 		copy_size = min_t(u64, PAGE_SIZE - pg_offset,
 				  size - extent_offset);
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/print-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/print-tree.c
index 569205e651c7d..47336d4b19d84 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/print-tree.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/print-tree.c
@@ -259,8 +259,8 @@ void btrfs_print_leaf(struct extent_buffer *l)
 					    struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
 			if (btrfs_file_extent_type(l, fi) ==
 			    BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
-				pr_info("\t\tinline extent data size %u\n",
-				       btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(l, i, fi));
+				pr_info("\t\tinline extent data size %llu\n",
+				       btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(l, fi));
 				break;
 			}
 			pr_info("\t\textent data disk bytenr %llu nr %llu\n",
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/send.c b/fs/btrfs/send.c
index 1211fdcd425dc..ca15d65a2070c 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/send.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/send.c
@@ -1545,7 +1545,7 @@ static int read_symlink(struct btrfs_root *root,
 	BUG_ON(compression);
 
 	off = btrfs_file_extent_inline_start(ei);
-	len = btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(path->nodes[0], path->slots[0], ei);
+	len = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(path->nodes[0], ei);
 
 	ret = fs_path_add_from_extent_buffer(dest, path->nodes[0], off, len);
 
@@ -5195,7 +5195,7 @@ static int clone_range(struct send_ctx *sctx,
 		ei = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
 		type = btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, ei);
 		if (type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
-			ext_len = btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(leaf, slot, ei);
+			ext_len = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, ei);
 			ext_len = PAGE_ALIGN(ext_len);
 		} else {
 			ext_len = btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, ei);
@@ -5271,8 +5271,7 @@ static int send_write_or_clone(struct send_ctx *sctx,
 			struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
 	type = btrfs_file_extent_type(path->nodes[0], ei);
 	if (type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
-		len = btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(path->nodes[0],
-						   path->slots[0], ei);
+		len = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(path->nodes[0], ei);
 		/*
 		 * it is possible the inline item won't cover the whole page,
 		 * but there may be items after this page.  Make
@@ -5405,7 +5404,7 @@ static int is_extent_unchanged(struct send_ctx *sctx,
 		}
 
 		if (right_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
-			right_len = btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(eb, slot, ei);
+			right_len = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(eb, ei);
 			right_len = PAGE_ALIGN(right_len);
 		} else {
 			right_len = btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(eb, ei);
@@ -5526,8 +5525,7 @@ static int get_last_extent(struct send_ctx *sctx, u64 offset)
 			    struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
 	type = btrfs_file_extent_type(path->nodes[0], fi);
 	if (type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
-		u64 size = btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(path->nodes[0],
-							path->slots[0], fi);
+		u64 size = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(path->nodes[0], fi);
 		extent_end = ALIGN(key.offset + size,
 				   sctx->send_root->fs_info->sectorsize);
 	} else {
@@ -5590,7 +5588,7 @@ static int range_is_hole_in_parent(struct send_ctx *sctx,
 		fi = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
 		if (btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, fi) ==
 		    BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
-			u64 size = btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(leaf, slot, fi);
+			u64 size = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi);
 
 			extent_end = ALIGN(key.offset + size,
 					   root->fs_info->sectorsize);
@@ -5636,8 +5634,7 @@ static int maybe_send_hole(struct send_ctx *sctx, struct btrfs_path *path,
 			    struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
 	type = btrfs_file_extent_type(path->nodes[0], fi);
 	if (type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
-		u64 size = btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(path->nodes[0],
-							path->slots[0], fi);
+		u64 size = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(path->nodes[0], fi);
 		extent_end = ALIGN(key->offset + size,
 				   sctx->send_root->fs_info->sectorsize);
 	} else {
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c b/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c
index 98c397eb054c5..65a986054f89e 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static noinline int replay_one_extent(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 		if (btrfs_file_extent_disk_bytenr(eb, item) == 0)
 			nbytes = 0;
 	} else if (found_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
-		size = btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(eb, slot, item);
+		size = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(eb, item);
 		nbytes = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(eb, item);
 		extent_end = ALIGN(start + size,
 				   fs_info->sectorsize);
@@ -3943,9 +3943,7 @@ static noinline int copy_items(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 					struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
 		if (btrfs_file_extent_type(src, extent) ==
 		    BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
-			len = btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(src,
-							   src_path->slots[0],
-							   extent);
+			len = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(src, extent);
 			*last_extent = ALIGN(key.offset + len,
 					     fs_info->sectorsize);
 		} else {
@@ -4010,7 +4008,7 @@ static noinline int copy_items(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 		extent = btrfs_item_ptr(src, i, struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
 		if (btrfs_file_extent_type(src, extent) ==
 		    BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
-			len = btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(src, i, extent);
+			len = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(src, extent);
 			extent_end = ALIGN(key.offset + len,
 					   fs_info->sectorsize);
 		} else {
@@ -4730,9 +4728,7 @@ static int btrfs_log_trailing_hole(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 
 		if (btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, extent) ==
 		    BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
-			len = btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(leaf,
-							   path->slots[0],
-							   extent);
+			len = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, extent);
 			ASSERT(len == i_size ||
 			       (len == fs_info->sectorsize &&
 				btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, extent) !=
diff --git a/include/trace/events/btrfs.h b/include/trace/events/btrfs.h
index 32d0c1fe2bfa7..3ebada29a313e 100644
--- a/include/trace/events/btrfs.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/btrfs.h
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(
 		__entry->extent_type	= btrfs_file_extent_type(l, fi);
 		__entry->compression	= btrfs_file_extent_compression(l, fi);
 		__entry->extent_start	= start;
-		__entry->extent_end	= (start + btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(l, slot, fi));
+		__entry->extent_end	= (start + btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(l, fi));
 	),
 
 	TP_printk_btrfs(
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 120/173] Btrfs: fix assertion failure on fsync with NO_HOLES enabled
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (118 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 119/173] btrfs: Get rid of the confusing btrfs_file_extent_inline_len Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 121/173] Btrfs: fix missing hole after hole punching and fsync when using NO_HOLES Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (58 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Filipe Manana, David Sterba, Sasha Levin

From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>

[ Upstream commit 0ccc3876e4b2a1559a4dbe3126dda4459d38a83b ]

Back in commit a89ca6f24ffe4 ("Btrfs: fix fsync after truncate when
no_holes feature is enabled") I added an assertion that is triggered when
an inline extent is found to assert that the length of the (uncompressed)
data the extent represents is the same as the i_size of the inode, since
that is true most of the time I couldn't find or didn't remembered about
any exception at that time. Later on the assertion was expanded twice to
deal with a case of a compressed inline extent representing a range that
matches the sector size followed by an expanding truncate, and another
case where fallocate can update the i_size of the inode without adding
or updating existing extents (if the fallocate range falls entirely within
the first block of the file). These two expansion/fixes of the assertion
were done by commit 7ed586d0a8241 ("Btrfs: fix assertion on fsync of
regular file when using no-holes feature") and commit 6399fb5a0b69a
("Btrfs: fix assertion failure during fsync in no-holes mode").
These however missed the case where an falloc expands the i_size of an
inode to exactly the sector size and inline extent exists, for example:

 $ mkfs.btrfs -f -O no-holes /dev/sdc
 $ mount /dev/sdc /mnt

 $ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xab 0 1096" /mnt/foobar
 wrote 1096/1096 bytes at offset 0
 1 KiB, 1 ops; 0.0002 sec (4.448 MiB/sec and 4255.3191 ops/sec)

 $ xfs_io -c "falloc 1096 3000" /mnt/foobar
 $ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/foobar
 Segmentation fault

 $ dmesg
 [701253.602385] assertion failed: len == i_size || (len == fs_info->sectorsize && btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, extent) != BTRFS_COMPRESS_NONE) || (len < i_size && i_size < fs_info->sectorsize), file: fs/btrfs/tree-log.c, line: 4727
 [701253.602962] ------------[ cut here ]------------
 [701253.603224] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3533!
 [701253.603503] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
 [701253.603774] CPU: 2 PID: 7192 Comm: xfs_io Tainted: G        W         5.0.0-rc8-btrfs-next-45 #1
 [701253.604054] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.2-0-gf9626ccb91-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
 [701253.604650] RIP: 0010:assfail.constprop.23+0x18/0x1a [btrfs]
 (...)
 [701253.605591] RSP: 0018:ffffbb48c186bc48 EFLAGS: 00010286
 [701253.605914] RAX: 00000000000000de RBX: ffff921d0a7afc08 RCX: 0000000000000000
 [701253.606244] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff921d36b16868 RDI: ffff921d36b16868
 [701253.606580] RBP: ffffbb48c186bcf0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
 [701253.606913] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff921d05d2de18
 [701253.607247] R13: ffff921d03b54000 R14: 0000000000000448 R15: ffff921d059ecf80
 [701253.607769] FS:  00007f14da906700(0000) GS:ffff921d36b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 [701253.608163] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 [701253.608516] CR2: 000056087ea9f278 CR3: 00000002268e8001 CR4: 00000000003606e0
 [701253.608880] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 [701253.609250] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 [701253.609608] Call Trace:
 [701253.609994]  btrfs_log_inode+0xdfb/0xe40 [btrfs]
 [701253.610383]  btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x2be/0xa60 [btrfs]
 [701253.610770]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x49/0xc0
 [701253.611150]  btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x4a/0x70 [btrfs]
 [701253.611537]  btrfs_sync_file+0x3b2/0x440 [btrfs]
 [701253.612010]  ? do_sysinfo+0xb0/0xf0
 [701253.612552]  do_fsync+0x38/0x60
 [701253.612988]  __x64_sys_fsync+0x10/0x20
 [701253.613360]  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0
 [701253.613733]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
 [701253.614103] RIP: 0033:0x7f14da4e66d0
 (...)
 [701253.615250] RSP: 002b:00007fffa670fdb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004a
 [701253.615647] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f14da4e66d0
 [701253.616047] RDX: 000056087ea9c260 RSI: 000056087ea9c260 RDI: 0000000000000003
 [701253.616450] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: 0000000000000010
 [701253.616854] R10: 000000000000009b R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000056087ea9c260
 [701253.617257] R13: 000056087ea9c240 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000056087ea9dd10
 (...)
 [701253.619941] ---[ end trace e088d74f132b6da5 ]---

Updating the assertion again to allow for this particular case would result
in a meaningless assertion, plus there is currently no risk of logging
content that would result in any corruption after a log replay if the size
of the data encoded in an inline extent is greater than the inode's i_size
(which is not currently possibe either with or without compression),
therefore just remove the assertion.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c | 9 +--------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c b/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c
index 65a986054f89e..3558697e4c042 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c
@@ -4727,15 +4727,8 @@ static int btrfs_log_trailing_hole(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 					struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
 
 		if (btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, extent) ==
-		    BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
-			len = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, extent);
-			ASSERT(len == i_size ||
-			       (len == fs_info->sectorsize &&
-				btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, extent) !=
-				BTRFS_COMPRESS_NONE) ||
-			       (len < i_size && i_size < fs_info->sectorsize));
+		    BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE)
 			return 0;
-		}
 
 		len = btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, extent);
 		/* Last extent goes beyond i_size, no need to log a hole. */
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 121/173] Btrfs: fix missing hole after hole punching and fsync when using NO_HOLES
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (119 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 120/173] Btrfs: fix assertion failure on fsync with NO_HOLES enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 122/173] btrfs: use bool argument in free_root_pointers() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (57 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josef Bacik, Filipe Manana,
	David Sterba, Sasha Levin

From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>

[ Upstream commit 0e56315ca147b3e60c7bf240233a301d3c7fb508 ]

When using the NO_HOLES feature, if we punch a hole into a file and then
fsync it, there are cases where a subsequent fsync will miss the fact that
a hole was punched, resulting in the holes not existing after replaying
the log tree.

Essentially these cases all imply that, tree-log.c:copy_items(), is not
invoked for the leafs that delimit holes, because nothing changed those
leafs in the current transaction. And it's precisely copy_items() where
we currenly detect and log holes, which works as long as the holes are
between file extent items in the input leaf or between the beginning of
input leaf and the previous leaf or between the last item in the leaf
and the next leaf.

First example where we miss a hole:

  *) The extent items of the inode span multiple leafs;

  *) The punched hole covers a range that affects only the extent items of
     the first leaf;

  *) The fsync operation is done in full mode (BTRFS_INODE_NEEDS_FULL_SYNC
     is set in the inode's runtime flags).

  That results in the hole not existing after replaying the log tree.

  For example, if the fs/subvolume tree has the following layout for a
  particular inode:

      Leaf N, generation 10:

      [ ... INODE_ITEM INODE_REF EXTENT_ITEM (0 64K) EXTENT_ITEM (64K 128K) ]

      Leaf N + 1, generation 10:

      [ EXTENT_ITEM (128K 64K) ... ]

  If at transaction 11 we punch a hole coverting the range [0, 128K[, we end
  up dropping the two extent items from leaf N, but we don't touch the other
  leaf, so we end up in the following state:

      Leaf N, generation 11:

      [ ... INODE_ITEM INODE_REF ]

      Leaf N + 1, generation 10:

      [ EXTENT_ITEM (128K 64K) ... ]

  A full fsync after punching the hole will only process leaf N because it
  was modified in the current transaction, but not leaf N + 1, since it
  was not modified in the current transaction (generation 10 and not 11).
  As a result the fsync will not log any holes, because it didn't process
  any leaf with extent items.

Second example where we will miss a hole:

  *) An inode as its items spanning 5 (or more) leafs;

  *) A hole is punched and it covers only the extents items of the 3rd
     leaf. This resulsts in deleting the entire leaf and not touching any
     of the other leafs.

  So the only leaf that is modified in the current transaction, when
  punching the hole, is the first leaf, which contains the inode item.
  During the full fsync, the only leaf that is passed to copy_items()
  is that first leaf, and that's not enough for the hole detection
  code in copy_items() to determine there's a hole between the last
  file extent item in the 2nd leaf and the first file extent item in
  the 3rd leaf (which was the 4th leaf before punching the hole).

Fix this by scanning all leafs and punch holes as necessary when doing a
full fsync (less common than a non-full fsync) when the NO_HOLES feature
is enabled. The lack of explicit file extent items to mark holes makes it
necessary to scan existing extents to determine if holes exist.

A test case for fstests follows soon.

Fixes: 16e7549f045d33 ("Btrfs: incompatible format change to remove hole extents")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c | 388 ++++++++++++--------------------------------
 1 file changed, 100 insertions(+), 288 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c b/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c
index 3558697e4c042..0b62c8080af06 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tree-log.c
@@ -3758,7 +3758,7 @@ static int log_inode_item(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 static noinline int copy_items(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 			       struct btrfs_inode *inode,
 			       struct btrfs_path *dst_path,
-			       struct btrfs_path *src_path, u64 *last_extent,
+			       struct btrfs_path *src_path,
 			       int start_slot, int nr, int inode_only,
 			       u64 logged_isize)
 {
@@ -3769,7 +3769,6 @@ static noinline int copy_items(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 	struct btrfs_file_extent_item *extent;
 	struct btrfs_inode_item *inode_item;
 	struct extent_buffer *src = src_path->nodes[0];
-	struct btrfs_key first_key, last_key, key;
 	int ret;
 	struct btrfs_key *ins_keys;
 	u32 *ins_sizes;
@@ -3777,9 +3776,6 @@ static noinline int copy_items(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 	int i;
 	struct list_head ordered_sums;
 	int skip_csum = inode->flags & BTRFS_INODE_NODATASUM;
-	bool has_extents = false;
-	bool need_find_last_extent = true;
-	bool done = false;
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ordered_sums);
 
@@ -3788,8 +3784,6 @@ static noinline int copy_items(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 	if (!ins_data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	first_key.objectid = (u64)-1;
-
 	ins_sizes = (u32 *)ins_data;
 	ins_keys = (struct btrfs_key *)(ins_data + nr * sizeof(u32));
 
@@ -3810,9 +3804,6 @@ static noinline int copy_items(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 
 		src_offset = btrfs_item_ptr_offset(src, start_slot + i);
 
-		if (i == nr - 1)
-			last_key = ins_keys[i];
-
 		if (ins_keys[i].type == BTRFS_INODE_ITEM_KEY) {
 			inode_item = btrfs_item_ptr(dst_path->nodes[0],
 						    dst_path->slots[0],
@@ -3826,20 +3817,6 @@ static noinline int copy_items(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 					   src_offset, ins_sizes[i]);
 		}
 
-		/*
-		 * We set need_find_last_extent here in case we know we were
-		 * processing other items and then walk into the first extent in
-		 * the inode.  If we don't hit an extent then nothing changes,
-		 * we'll do the last search the next time around.
-		 */
-		if (ins_keys[i].type == BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY) {
-			has_extents = true;
-			if (first_key.objectid == (u64)-1)
-				first_key = ins_keys[i];
-		} else {
-			need_find_last_extent = false;
-		}
-
 		/* take a reference on file data extents so that truncates
 		 * or deletes of this inode don't have to relog the inode
 		 * again
@@ -3905,167 +3882,6 @@ static noinline int copy_items(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 		kfree(sums);
 	}
 
-	if (!has_extents)
-		return ret;
-
-	if (need_find_last_extent && *last_extent == first_key.offset) {
-		/*
-		 * We don't have any leafs between our current one and the one
-		 * we processed before that can have file extent items for our
-		 * inode (and have a generation number smaller than our current
-		 * transaction id).
-		 */
-		need_find_last_extent = false;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Because we use btrfs_search_forward we could skip leaves that were
-	 * not modified and then assume *last_extent is valid when it really
-	 * isn't.  So back up to the previous leaf and read the end of the last
-	 * extent before we go and fill in holes.
-	 */
-	if (need_find_last_extent) {
-		u64 len;
-
-		ret = btrfs_prev_leaf(inode->root, src_path);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			return ret;
-		if (ret)
-			goto fill_holes;
-		if (src_path->slots[0])
-			src_path->slots[0]--;
-		src = src_path->nodes[0];
-		btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(src, &key, src_path->slots[0]);
-		if (key.objectid != btrfs_ino(inode) ||
-		    key.type != BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY)
-			goto fill_holes;
-		extent = btrfs_item_ptr(src, src_path->slots[0],
-					struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
-		if (btrfs_file_extent_type(src, extent) ==
-		    BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
-			len = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(src, extent);
-			*last_extent = ALIGN(key.offset + len,
-					     fs_info->sectorsize);
-		} else {
-			len = btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(src, extent);
-			*last_extent = key.offset + len;
-		}
-	}
-fill_holes:
-	/* So we did prev_leaf, now we need to move to the next leaf, but a few
-	 * things could have happened
-	 *
-	 * 1) A merge could have happened, so we could currently be on a leaf
-	 * that holds what we were copying in the first place.
-	 * 2) A split could have happened, and now not all of the items we want
-	 * are on the same leaf.
-	 *
-	 * So we need to adjust how we search for holes, we need to drop the
-	 * path and re-search for the first extent key we found, and then walk
-	 * forward until we hit the last one we copied.
-	 */
-	if (need_find_last_extent) {
-		/* btrfs_prev_leaf could return 1 without releasing the path */
-		btrfs_release_path(src_path);
-		ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, inode->root, &first_key,
-				src_path, 0, 0);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			return ret;
-		ASSERT(ret == 0);
-		src = src_path->nodes[0];
-		i = src_path->slots[0];
-	} else {
-		i = start_slot;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Ok so here we need to go through and fill in any holes we may have
-	 * to make sure that holes are punched for those areas in case they had
-	 * extents previously.
-	 */
-	while (!done) {
-		u64 offset, len;
-		u64 extent_end;
-
-		if (i >= btrfs_header_nritems(src_path->nodes[0])) {
-			ret = btrfs_next_leaf(inode->root, src_path);
-			if (ret < 0)
-				return ret;
-			ASSERT(ret == 0);
-			src = src_path->nodes[0];
-			i = 0;
-			need_find_last_extent = true;
-		}
-
-		btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(src, &key, i);
-		if (!btrfs_comp_cpu_keys(&key, &last_key))
-			done = true;
-		if (key.objectid != btrfs_ino(inode) ||
-		    key.type != BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY) {
-			i++;
-			continue;
-		}
-		extent = btrfs_item_ptr(src, i, struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
-		if (btrfs_file_extent_type(src, extent) ==
-		    BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
-			len = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(src, extent);
-			extent_end = ALIGN(key.offset + len,
-					   fs_info->sectorsize);
-		} else {
-			len = btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(src, extent);
-			extent_end = key.offset + len;
-		}
-		i++;
-
-		if (*last_extent == key.offset) {
-			*last_extent = extent_end;
-			continue;
-		}
-		offset = *last_extent;
-		len = key.offset - *last_extent;
-		ret = btrfs_insert_file_extent(trans, log, btrfs_ino(inode),
-				offset, 0, 0, len, 0, len, 0, 0, 0);
-		if (ret)
-			break;
-		*last_extent = extent_end;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Check if there is a hole between the last extent found in our leaf
-	 * and the first extent in the next leaf. If there is one, we need to
-	 * log an explicit hole so that at replay time we can punch the hole.
-	 */
-	if (ret == 0 &&
-	    key.objectid == btrfs_ino(inode) &&
-	    key.type == BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY &&
-	    i == btrfs_header_nritems(src_path->nodes[0])) {
-		ret = btrfs_next_leaf(inode->root, src_path);
-		need_find_last_extent = true;
-		if (ret > 0) {
-			ret = 0;
-		} else if (ret == 0) {
-			btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(src_path->nodes[0], &key,
-					      src_path->slots[0]);
-			if (key.objectid == btrfs_ino(inode) &&
-			    key.type == BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY &&
-			    *last_extent < key.offset) {
-				const u64 len = key.offset - *last_extent;
-
-				ret = btrfs_insert_file_extent(trans, log,
-							       btrfs_ino(inode),
-							       *last_extent, 0,
-							       0, len, 0, len,
-							       0, 0, 0);
-				*last_extent += len;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	/*
-	 * Need to let the callers know we dropped the path so they should
-	 * re-search.
-	 */
-	if (!ret && need_find_last_extent)
-		ret = 1;
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -4338,7 +4154,7 @@ static int btrfs_log_prealloc_extents(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 	const u64 i_size = i_size_read(&inode->vfs_inode);
 	const u64 ino = btrfs_ino(inode);
 	struct btrfs_path *dst_path = NULL;
-	u64 last_extent = (u64)-1;
+	bool dropped_extents = false;
 	int ins_nr = 0;
 	int start_slot;
 	int ret;
@@ -4360,8 +4176,7 @@ static int btrfs_log_prealloc_extents(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 		if (slot >= btrfs_header_nritems(leaf)) {
 			if (ins_nr > 0) {
 				ret = copy_items(trans, inode, dst_path, path,
-						 &last_extent, start_slot,
-						 ins_nr, 1, 0);
+						 start_slot, ins_nr, 1, 0);
 				if (ret < 0)
 					goto out;
 				ins_nr = 0;
@@ -4385,8 +4200,7 @@ static int btrfs_log_prealloc_extents(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 			path->slots[0]++;
 			continue;
 		}
-		if (last_extent == (u64)-1) {
-			last_extent = key.offset;
+		if (!dropped_extents) {
 			/*
 			 * Avoid logging extent items logged in past fsync calls
 			 * and leading to duplicate keys in the log tree.
@@ -4400,6 +4214,7 @@ static int btrfs_log_prealloc_extents(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 			} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
 			if (ret)
 				goto out;
+			dropped_extents = true;
 		}
 		if (ins_nr == 0)
 			start_slot = slot;
@@ -4414,7 +4229,7 @@ static int btrfs_log_prealloc_extents(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 		}
 	}
 	if (ins_nr > 0) {
-		ret = copy_items(trans, inode, dst_path, path, &last_extent,
+		ret = copy_items(trans, inode, dst_path, path,
 				 start_slot, ins_nr, 1, 0);
 		if (ret > 0)
 			ret = 0;
@@ -4608,13 +4423,8 @@ static int btrfs_log_all_xattrs(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 
 		if (slot >= nritems) {
 			if (ins_nr > 0) {
-				u64 last_extent = 0;
-
 				ret = copy_items(trans, inode, dst_path, path,
-						 &last_extent, start_slot,
-						 ins_nr, 1, 0);
-				/* can't be 1, extent items aren't processed */
-				ASSERT(ret <= 0);
+						 start_slot, ins_nr, 1, 0);
 				if (ret < 0)
 					return ret;
 				ins_nr = 0;
@@ -4638,13 +4448,8 @@ static int btrfs_log_all_xattrs(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 		cond_resched();
 	}
 	if (ins_nr > 0) {
-		u64 last_extent = 0;
-
 		ret = copy_items(trans, inode, dst_path, path,
-				 &last_extent, start_slot,
-				 ins_nr, 1, 0);
-		/* can't be 1, extent items aren't processed */
-		ASSERT(ret <= 0);
+				 start_slot, ins_nr, 1, 0);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return ret;
 	}
@@ -4653,100 +4458,119 @@ static int btrfs_log_all_xattrs(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 }
 
 /*
- * If the no holes feature is enabled we need to make sure any hole between the
- * last extent and the i_size of our inode is explicitly marked in the log. This
- * is to make sure that doing something like:
- *
- *      1) create file with 128Kb of data
- *      2) truncate file to 64Kb
- *      3) truncate file to 256Kb
- *      4) fsync file
- *      5) <crash/power failure>
- *      6) mount fs and trigger log replay
- *
- * Will give us a file with a size of 256Kb, the first 64Kb of data match what
- * the file had in its first 64Kb of data at step 1 and the last 192Kb of the
- * file correspond to a hole. The presence of explicit holes in a log tree is
- * what guarantees that log replay will remove/adjust file extent items in the
- * fs/subvol tree.
- *
- * Here we do not need to care about holes between extents, that is already done
- * by copy_items(). We also only need to do this in the full sync path, where we
- * lookup for extents from the fs/subvol tree only. In the fast path case, we
- * lookup the list of modified extent maps and if any represents a hole, we
- * insert a corresponding extent representing a hole in the log tree.
+ * When using the NO_HOLES feature if we punched a hole that causes the
+ * deletion of entire leafs or all the extent items of the first leaf (the one
+ * that contains the inode item and references) we may end up not processing
+ * any extents, because there are no leafs with a generation matching the
+ * current transaction that have extent items for our inode. So we need to find
+ * if any holes exist and then log them. We also need to log holes after any
+ * truncate operation that changes the inode's size.
  */
-static int btrfs_log_trailing_hole(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
-				   struct btrfs_root *root,
-				   struct btrfs_inode *inode,
-				   struct btrfs_path *path)
+static int btrfs_log_holes(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
+			   struct btrfs_root *root,
+			   struct btrfs_inode *inode,
+			   struct btrfs_path *path)
 {
 	struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = root->fs_info;
-	int ret;
 	struct btrfs_key key;
-	u64 hole_start;
-	u64 hole_size;
-	struct extent_buffer *leaf;
-	struct btrfs_root *log = root->log_root;
 	const u64 ino = btrfs_ino(inode);
 	const u64 i_size = i_size_read(&inode->vfs_inode);
+	u64 prev_extent_end = 0;
+	int ret;
 
-	if (!btrfs_fs_incompat(fs_info, NO_HOLES))
+	if (!btrfs_fs_incompat(fs_info, NO_HOLES) || i_size == 0)
 		return 0;
 
 	key.objectid = ino;
 	key.type = BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY;
-	key.offset = (u64)-1;
+	key.offset = 0;
 
 	ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, root, &key, path, 0, 0);
-	ASSERT(ret != 0);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
-	ASSERT(path->slots[0] > 0);
-	path->slots[0]--;
-	leaf = path->nodes[0];
-	btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &key, path->slots[0]);
-
-	if (key.objectid != ino || key.type != BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY) {
-		/* inode does not have any extents */
-		hole_start = 0;
-		hole_size = i_size;
-	} else {
+	while (true) {
 		struct btrfs_file_extent_item *extent;
+		struct extent_buffer *leaf = path->nodes[0];
 		u64 len;
 
-		/*
-		 * If there's an extent beyond i_size, an explicit hole was
-		 * already inserted by copy_items().
-		 */
-		if (key.offset >= i_size)
-			return 0;
+		if (path->slots[0] >= btrfs_header_nritems(path->nodes[0])) {
+			ret = btrfs_next_leaf(root, path);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				return ret;
+			if (ret > 0) {
+				ret = 0;
+				break;
+			}
+			leaf = path->nodes[0];
+		}
+
+		btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &key, path->slots[0]);
+		if (key.objectid != ino || key.type != BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY)
+			break;
+
+		/* We have a hole, log it. */
+		if (prev_extent_end < key.offset) {
+			const u64 hole_len = key.offset - prev_extent_end;
+
+			/*
+			 * Release the path to avoid deadlocks with other code
+			 * paths that search the root while holding locks on
+			 * leafs from the log root.
+			 */
+			btrfs_release_path(path);
+			ret = btrfs_insert_file_extent(trans, root->log_root,
+						       ino, prev_extent_end, 0,
+						       0, hole_len, 0, hole_len,
+						       0, 0, 0);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				return ret;
+
+			/*
+			 * Search for the same key again in the root. Since it's
+			 * an extent item and we are holding the inode lock, the
+			 * key must still exist. If it doesn't just emit warning
+			 * and return an error to fall back to a transaction
+			 * commit.
+			 */
+			ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, root, &key, path, 0, 0);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				return ret;
+			if (WARN_ON(ret > 0))
+				return -ENOENT;
+			leaf = path->nodes[0];
+		}
 
 		extent = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, path->slots[0],
 					struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
-
 		if (btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, extent) ==
-		    BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE)
-			return 0;
+		    BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
+			len = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, extent);
+			prev_extent_end = ALIGN(key.offset + len,
+						fs_info->sectorsize);
+		} else {
+			len = btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, extent);
+			prev_extent_end = key.offset + len;
+		}
 
-		len = btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, extent);
-		/* Last extent goes beyond i_size, no need to log a hole. */
-		if (key.offset + len > i_size)
-			return 0;
-		hole_start = key.offset + len;
-		hole_size = i_size - hole_start;
+		path->slots[0]++;
+		cond_resched();
 	}
-	btrfs_release_path(path);
 
-	/* Last extent ends at i_size. */
-	if (hole_size == 0)
-		return 0;
+	if (prev_extent_end < i_size) {
+		u64 hole_len;
 
-	hole_size = ALIGN(hole_size, fs_info->sectorsize);
-	ret = btrfs_insert_file_extent(trans, log, ino, hole_start, 0, 0,
-				       hole_size, 0, hole_size, 0, 0, 0);
-	return ret;
+		btrfs_release_path(path);
+		hole_len = ALIGN(i_size - prev_extent_end, fs_info->sectorsize);
+		ret = btrfs_insert_file_extent(trans, root->log_root,
+					       ino, prev_extent_end, 0, 0,
+					       hole_len, 0, hole_len,
+					       0, 0, 0);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -4914,7 +4738,6 @@ static int btrfs_log_inode(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 	struct btrfs_root *log = root->log_root;
 	struct extent_buffer *src = NULL;
 	LIST_HEAD(logged_list);
-	u64 last_extent = 0;
 	int err = 0;
 	int ret;
 	int nritems;
@@ -5088,7 +4911,7 @@ static int btrfs_log_inode(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 					ins_start_slot = path->slots[0];
 				}
 				ret = copy_items(trans, inode, dst_path, path,
-						 &last_extent, ins_start_slot,
+						 ins_start_slot,
 						 ins_nr, inode_only,
 						 logged_isize);
 				if (ret < 0) {
@@ -5142,17 +4965,13 @@ static int btrfs_log_inode(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 			if (ins_nr == 0)
 				goto next_slot;
 			ret = copy_items(trans, inode, dst_path, path,
-					 &last_extent, ins_start_slot,
+					 ins_start_slot,
 					 ins_nr, inode_only, logged_isize);
 			if (ret < 0) {
 				err = ret;
 				goto out_unlock;
 			}
 			ins_nr = 0;
-			if (ret) {
-				btrfs_release_path(path);
-				continue;
-			}
 			goto next_slot;
 		}
 
@@ -5166,18 +4985,13 @@ static int btrfs_log_inode(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 			goto next_slot;
 		}
 
-		ret = copy_items(trans, inode, dst_path, path, &last_extent,
+		ret = copy_items(trans, inode, dst_path, path,
 				 ins_start_slot, ins_nr, inode_only,
 				 logged_isize);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			err = ret;
 			goto out_unlock;
 		}
-		if (ret) {
-			ins_nr = 0;
-			btrfs_release_path(path);
-			continue;
-		}
 		ins_nr = 1;
 		ins_start_slot = path->slots[0];
 next_slot:
@@ -5191,13 +5005,12 @@ static int btrfs_log_inode(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 		}
 		if (ins_nr) {
 			ret = copy_items(trans, inode, dst_path, path,
-					 &last_extent, ins_start_slot,
+					 ins_start_slot,
 					 ins_nr, inode_only, logged_isize);
 			if (ret < 0) {
 				err = ret;
 				goto out_unlock;
 			}
-			ret = 0;
 			ins_nr = 0;
 		}
 		btrfs_release_path(path);
@@ -5212,14 +5025,13 @@ static int btrfs_log_inode(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 		}
 	}
 	if (ins_nr) {
-		ret = copy_items(trans, inode, dst_path, path, &last_extent,
+		ret = copy_items(trans, inode, dst_path, path,
 				 ins_start_slot, ins_nr, inode_only,
 				 logged_isize);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			err = ret;
 			goto out_unlock;
 		}
-		ret = 0;
 		ins_nr = 0;
 	}
 
@@ -5232,7 +5044,7 @@ static int btrfs_log_inode(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 	if (max_key.type >= BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY && !fast_search) {
 		btrfs_release_path(path);
 		btrfs_release_path(dst_path);
-		err = btrfs_log_trailing_hole(trans, root, inode, path);
+		err = btrfs_log_holes(trans, root, inode, path);
 		if (err)
 			goto out_unlock;
 	}
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 122/173] btrfs: use bool argument in free_root_pointers()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (120 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 121/173] Btrfs: fix missing hole after hole punching and fsync when using NO_HOLES Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 123/173] btrfs: free block groups after freeing fs trees Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (56 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Qu Wenruo, Anand Jain, David Sterba,
	Sasha Levin

From: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 4273eaff9b8d5e141113a5bdf9628c02acf3afe5 ]

We don't need int argument bool shall do in free_root_pointers().  And
rename the argument as it confused two people.

Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
index a8ea56218d6b6..e5b0a027c213c 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
@@ -2051,7 +2051,7 @@ static void free_root_extent_buffers(struct btrfs_root *root)
 }
 
 /* helper to cleanup tree roots */
-static void free_root_pointers(struct btrfs_fs_info *info, int chunk_root)
+static void free_root_pointers(struct btrfs_fs_info *info, bool free_chunk_root)
 {
 	free_root_extent_buffers(info->tree_root);
 
@@ -2060,7 +2060,7 @@ static void free_root_pointers(struct btrfs_fs_info *info, int chunk_root)
 	free_root_extent_buffers(info->csum_root);
 	free_root_extent_buffers(info->quota_root);
 	free_root_extent_buffers(info->uuid_root);
-	if (chunk_root)
+	if (free_chunk_root)
 		free_root_extent_buffers(info->chunk_root);
 	free_root_extent_buffers(info->free_space_root);
 }
@@ -3069,7 +3069,7 @@ int open_ctree(struct super_block *sb,
 	btrfs_put_block_group_cache(fs_info);
 
 fail_tree_roots:
-	free_root_pointers(fs_info, 1);
+	free_root_pointers(fs_info, true);
 	invalidate_inode_pages2(fs_info->btree_inode->i_mapping);
 
 fail_sb_buffer:
@@ -3097,7 +3097,7 @@ int open_ctree(struct super_block *sb,
 	if (!btrfs_test_opt(fs_info, USEBACKUPROOT))
 		goto fail_tree_roots;
 
-	free_root_pointers(fs_info, 0);
+	free_root_pointers(fs_info, false);
 
 	/* don't use the log in recovery mode, it won't be valid */
 	btrfs_set_super_log_root(disk_super, 0);
@@ -3764,7 +3764,7 @@ void close_ctree(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
 	btrfs_free_block_groups(fs_info);
 
 	clear_bit(BTRFS_FS_OPEN, &fs_info->flags);
-	free_root_pointers(fs_info, 1);
+	free_root_pointers(fs_info, true);
 
 	iput(fs_info->btree_inode);
 
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 123/173] btrfs: free block groups after freeing fs trees
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (121 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 122/173] btrfs: use bool argument in free_root_pointers() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 124/173] btrfs: remove trivial locking wrappers of tree mod log Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (55 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josef Bacik, David Sterba, Sasha Levin

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

[ Upstream commit 4e19443da1941050b346f8fc4c368aa68413bc88 ]

Sometimes when running generic/475 we would trip the
WARN_ON(cache->reserved) check when free'ing the block groups on umount.
This is because sometimes we don't commit the transaction because of IO
errors and thus do not cleanup the tree logs until at umount time.

These blocks are still reserved until they are cleaned up, but they
aren't cleaned up until _after_ we do the free block groups work.  Fix
this by moving the free after free'ing the fs roots, that way all of the
tree logs are cleaned up and we have a properly cleaned fs.  A bunch of
loops of generic/475 confirmed this fixes the problem.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
index e5b0a027c213c..6c6c15fdeef71 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
@@ -3761,11 +3761,18 @@ void close_ctree(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
 	invalidate_inode_pages2(fs_info->btree_inode->i_mapping);
 	btrfs_stop_all_workers(fs_info);
 
-	btrfs_free_block_groups(fs_info);
-
 	clear_bit(BTRFS_FS_OPEN, &fs_info->flags);
 	free_root_pointers(fs_info, true);
 
+	/*
+	 * We must free the block groups after dropping the fs_roots as we could
+	 * have had an IO error and have left over tree log blocks that aren't
+	 * cleaned up until the fs roots are freed.  This makes the block group
+	 * accounting appear to be wrong because there's pending reserved bytes,
+	 * so make sure we do the block group cleanup afterwards.
+	 */
+	btrfs_free_block_groups(fs_info);
+
 	iput(fs_info->btree_inode);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_CHECK_INTEGRITY
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 124/173] btrfs: remove trivial locking wrappers of tree mod log
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (122 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 123/173] btrfs: free block groups after freeing fs trees Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 125/173] Btrfs: fix race between adding and putting tree mod seq elements and nodes Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (54 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nikolay Borisov, David Sterba, Sasha Levin

From: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

[ Upstream commit b1a09f1ec540408abf3a50d15dff5d9506932693 ]

The wrappers are trivial and do not bring any extra value on top of the
plain locking primitives.

Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/btrfs/ctree.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++--------------------------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.c b/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
index 740ef428acdd9..a7b9859449c5a 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
@@ -334,26 +334,6 @@ struct tree_mod_elem {
 	struct tree_mod_root old_root;
 };
 
-static inline void tree_mod_log_read_lock(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
-{
-	read_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
-}
-
-static inline void tree_mod_log_read_unlock(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
-{
-	read_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
-}
-
-static inline void tree_mod_log_write_lock(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
-{
-	write_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
-}
-
-static inline void tree_mod_log_write_unlock(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
-{
-	write_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
-}
-
 /*
  * Pull a new tree mod seq number for our operation.
  */
@@ -373,14 +353,14 @@ static inline u64 btrfs_inc_tree_mod_seq(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
 u64 btrfs_get_tree_mod_seq(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 			   struct seq_list *elem)
 {
-	tree_mod_log_write_lock(fs_info);
+	write_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	spin_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_seq_lock);
 	if (!elem->seq) {
 		elem->seq = btrfs_inc_tree_mod_seq(fs_info);
 		list_add_tail(&elem->list, &fs_info->tree_mod_seq_list);
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_seq_lock);
-	tree_mod_log_write_unlock(fs_info);
+	write_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 
 	return elem->seq;
 }
@@ -422,7 +402,7 @@ void btrfs_put_tree_mod_seq(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 	 * anything that's lower than the lowest existing (read: blocked)
 	 * sequence number can be removed from the tree.
 	 */
-	tree_mod_log_write_lock(fs_info);
+	write_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	tm_root = &fs_info->tree_mod_log;
 	for (node = rb_first(tm_root); node; node = next) {
 		next = rb_next(node);
@@ -432,7 +412,7 @@ void btrfs_put_tree_mod_seq(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 		rb_erase(node, tm_root);
 		kfree(tm);
 	}
-	tree_mod_log_write_unlock(fs_info);
+	write_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -443,7 +423,7 @@ void btrfs_put_tree_mod_seq(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
  * for root replace operations, or the logical address of the affected
  * block for all other operations.
  *
- * Note: must be called with write lock (tree_mod_log_write_lock).
+ * Note: must be called with write lock for fs_info::tree_mod_log_lock.
  */
 static noinline int
 __tree_mod_log_insert(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, struct tree_mod_elem *tm)
@@ -481,7 +461,7 @@ __tree_mod_log_insert(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, struct tree_mod_elem *tm)
  * Determines if logging can be omitted. Returns 1 if it can. Otherwise, it
  * returns zero with the tree_mod_log_lock acquired. The caller must hold
  * this until all tree mod log insertions are recorded in the rb tree and then
- * call tree_mod_log_write_unlock() to release.
+ * write unlock fs_info::tree_mod_log_lock.
  */
 static inline int tree_mod_dont_log(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 				    struct extent_buffer *eb) {
@@ -491,9 +471,9 @@ static inline int tree_mod_dont_log(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 	if (eb && btrfs_header_level(eb) == 0)
 		return 1;
 
-	tree_mod_log_write_lock(fs_info);
+	write_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	if (list_empty(&(fs_info)->tree_mod_seq_list)) {
-		tree_mod_log_write_unlock(fs_info);
+		write_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 		return 1;
 	}
 
@@ -557,7 +537,7 @@ tree_mod_log_insert_key(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 	}
 
 	ret = __tree_mod_log_insert(fs_info, tm);
-	tree_mod_log_write_unlock(fs_info);
+	write_unlock(&eb->fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	if (ret)
 		kfree(tm);
 
@@ -621,7 +601,7 @@ tree_mod_log_insert_move(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 	ret = __tree_mod_log_insert(fs_info, tm);
 	if (ret)
 		goto free_tms;
-	tree_mod_log_write_unlock(fs_info);
+	write_unlock(&eb->fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	kfree(tm_list);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -632,7 +612,7 @@ tree_mod_log_insert_move(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 		kfree(tm_list[i]);
 	}
 	if (locked)
-		tree_mod_log_write_unlock(fs_info);
+		write_unlock(&eb->fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	kfree(tm_list);
 	kfree(tm);
 
@@ -713,7 +693,7 @@ tree_mod_log_insert_root(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 	if (!ret)
 		ret = __tree_mod_log_insert(fs_info, tm);
 
-	tree_mod_log_write_unlock(fs_info);
+	write_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	if (ret)
 		goto free_tms;
 	kfree(tm_list);
@@ -740,7 +720,7 @@ __tree_mod_log_search(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 start, u64 min_seq,
 	struct tree_mod_elem *cur = NULL;
 	struct tree_mod_elem *found = NULL;
 
-	tree_mod_log_read_lock(fs_info);
+	read_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	tm_root = &fs_info->tree_mod_log;
 	node = tm_root->rb_node;
 	while (node) {
@@ -768,7 +748,7 @@ __tree_mod_log_search(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 start, u64 min_seq,
 			break;
 		}
 	}
-	tree_mod_log_read_unlock(fs_info);
+	read_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 
 	return found;
 }
@@ -849,7 +829,7 @@ tree_mod_log_eb_copy(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, struct extent_buffer *dst,
 			goto free_tms;
 	}
 
-	tree_mod_log_write_unlock(fs_info);
+	write_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	kfree(tm_list);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -861,7 +841,7 @@ tree_mod_log_eb_copy(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, struct extent_buffer *dst,
 		kfree(tm_list[i]);
 	}
 	if (locked)
-		tree_mod_log_write_unlock(fs_info);
+		write_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	kfree(tm_list);
 
 	return ret;
@@ -921,7 +901,7 @@ tree_mod_log_free_eb(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, struct extent_buffer *eb)
 		goto free_tms;
 
 	ret = __tree_mod_log_free_eb(fs_info, tm_list, nritems);
-	tree_mod_log_write_unlock(fs_info);
+	write_unlock(&eb->fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	if (ret)
 		goto free_tms;
 	kfree(tm_list);
@@ -1279,7 +1259,7 @@ __tree_mod_log_rewind(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, struct extent_buffer *eb,
 	unsigned long p_size = sizeof(struct btrfs_key_ptr);
 
 	n = btrfs_header_nritems(eb);
-	tree_mod_log_read_lock(fs_info);
+	read_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	while (tm && tm->seq >= time_seq) {
 		/*
 		 * all the operations are recorded with the operator used for
@@ -1334,7 +1314,7 @@ __tree_mod_log_rewind(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, struct extent_buffer *eb,
 		if (tm->logical != first_tm->logical)
 			break;
 	}
-	tree_mod_log_read_unlock(fs_info);
+	read_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	btrfs_set_header_nritems(eb, n);
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 125/173] Btrfs: fix race between adding and putting tree mod seq elements and nodes
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (123 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 124/173] btrfs: remove trivial locking wrappers of tree mod log Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 126/173] drm: atmel-hlcdc: enable clock before configuring timing engine Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (53 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Josef Bacik, Nikolay Borisov,
	Filipe Manana, David Sterba, Sasha Levin

From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>

[ Upstream commit 7227ff4de55d931bbdc156c8ef0ce4f100c78a5b ]

There is a race between adding and removing elements to the tree mod log
list and rbtree that can lead to use-after-free problems.

Consider the following example that explains how/why the problems happens:

1) Task A has mod log element with sequence number 200. It currently is
   the only element in the mod log list;

2) Task A calls btrfs_put_tree_mod_seq() because it no longer needs to
   access the tree mod log. When it enters the function, it initializes
   'min_seq' to (u64)-1. Then it acquires the lock 'tree_mod_seq_lock'
   before checking if there are other elements in the mod seq list.
   Since the list it empty, 'min_seq' remains set to (u64)-1. Then it
   unlocks the lock 'tree_mod_seq_lock';

3) Before task A acquires the lock 'tree_mod_log_lock', task B adds
   itself to the mod seq list through btrfs_get_tree_mod_seq() and gets a
   sequence number of 201;

4) Some other task, name it task C, modifies a btree and because there
   elements in the mod seq list, it adds a tree mod elem to the tree
   mod log rbtree. That node added to the mod log rbtree is assigned
   a sequence number of 202;

5) Task B, which is doing fiemap and resolving indirect back references,
   calls btrfs get_old_root(), with 'time_seq' == 201, which in turn
   calls tree_mod_log_search() - the search returns the mod log node
   from the rbtree with sequence number 202, created by task C;

6) Task A now acquires the lock 'tree_mod_log_lock', starts iterating
   the mod log rbtree and finds the node with sequence number 202. Since
   202 is less than the previously computed 'min_seq', (u64)-1, it
   removes the node and frees it;

7) Task B still has a pointer to the node with sequence number 202, and
   it dereferences the pointer itself and through the call to
   __tree_mod_log_rewind(), resulting in a use-after-free problem.

This issue can be triggered sporadically with the test case generic/561
from fstests, and it happens more frequently with a higher number of
duperemove processes. When it happens to me, it either freezes the VM or
it produces a trace like the following before crashing:

  [ 1245.321140] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
  [ 1245.321200] CPU: 1 PID: 26997 Comm: pool Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-btrfs-next-52 #1
  [ 1245.321235] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  [ 1245.321287] RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x16/0x50
  [ 1245.321307] Code: ....
  [ 1245.321372] RSP: 0018:ffffa151c4d039b0 EFLAGS: 00010202
  [ 1245.321388] RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff8ae221363c80 RCX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
  [ 1245.321409] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ae221363c80
  [ 1245.321439] RBP: ffff8ae20fcc4688 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000
  [ 1245.321475] R10: ffff8ae20b120910 R11: 00000000243f8bb1 R12: 0000000000000038
  [ 1245.321506] R13: ffff8ae221363c80 R14: 000000000000075f R15: ffff8ae223f762b8
  [ 1245.321539] FS:  00007fdee1ec7700(0000) GS:ffff8ae236c80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [ 1245.321591] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [ 1245.321614] CR2: 00007fded4030c48 CR3: 000000021da16003 CR4: 00000000003606e0
  [ 1245.321642] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  [ 1245.321668] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  [ 1245.321706] Call Trace:
  [ 1245.321798]  __tree_mod_log_rewind+0xbf/0x280 [btrfs]
  [ 1245.321841]  btrfs_search_old_slot+0x105/0xd00 [btrfs]
  [ 1245.321877]  resolve_indirect_refs+0x1eb/0xc60 [btrfs]
  [ 1245.321912]  find_parent_nodes+0x3dc/0x11b0 [btrfs]
  [ 1245.321947]  btrfs_check_shared+0x115/0x1c0 [btrfs]
  [ 1245.321980]  ? extent_fiemap+0x59d/0x6d0 [btrfs]
  [ 1245.322029]  extent_fiemap+0x59d/0x6d0 [btrfs]
  [ 1245.322066]  do_vfs_ioctl+0x45a/0x750
  [ 1245.322081]  ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80
  [ 1245.322092]  ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
  [ 1245.322113]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
  [ 1245.322126]  do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x280
  [ 1245.322139]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
  [ 1245.322155] RIP: 0033:0x7fdee3942dd7
  [ 1245.322177] Code: ....
  [ 1245.322258] RSP: 002b:00007fdee1ec6c88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
  [ 1245.322294] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fded40210d8 RCX: 00007fdee3942dd7
  [ 1245.322314] RDX: 00007fded40210d8 RSI: 00000000c020660b RDI: 0000000000000004
  [ 1245.322337] RBP: 0000562aa89e7510 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fdee1ec6d44
  [ 1245.322369] R10: 0000000000000073 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fdee1ec6d48
  [ 1245.322390] R13: 00007fdee1ec6d40 R14: 00007fded40210d0 R15: 00007fdee1ec6d50
  [ 1245.322423] Modules linked in: ....
  [ 1245.323443] ---[ end trace 01de1e9ec5dff3cd ]---

Fix this by ensuring that btrfs_put_tree_mod_seq() computes the minimum
sequence number and iterates the rbtree while holding the lock
'tree_mod_log_lock' in write mode. Also get rid of the 'tree_mod_seq_lock'
lock, since it is now redundant.

Fixes: bd989ba359f2ac ("Btrfs: add tree modification log functions")
Fixes: 097b8a7c9e48e2 ("Btrfs: join tree mod log code with the code holding back delayed refs")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/btrfs/ctree.c             | 8 ++------
 fs/btrfs/ctree.h             | 6 ++----
 fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.c       | 8 ++++----
 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c           | 1 -
 fs/btrfs/tests/btrfs-tests.c | 1 -
 5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.c b/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
index a7b9859449c5a..f5a8c0d26cf36 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.c
@@ -354,12 +354,10 @@ u64 btrfs_get_tree_mod_seq(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 			   struct seq_list *elem)
 {
 	write_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
-	spin_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_seq_lock);
 	if (!elem->seq) {
 		elem->seq = btrfs_inc_tree_mod_seq(fs_info);
 		list_add_tail(&elem->list, &fs_info->tree_mod_seq_list);
 	}
-	spin_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_seq_lock);
 	write_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 
 	return elem->seq;
@@ -379,7 +377,7 @@ void btrfs_put_tree_mod_seq(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 	if (!seq_putting)
 		return;
 
-	spin_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_seq_lock);
+	write_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	list_del(&elem->list);
 	elem->seq = 0;
 
@@ -390,19 +388,17 @@ void btrfs_put_tree_mod_seq(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 				 * blocker with lower sequence number exists, we
 				 * cannot remove anything from the log
 				 */
-				spin_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_seq_lock);
+				write_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 				return;
 			}
 			min_seq = cur_elem->seq;
 		}
 	}
-	spin_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_seq_lock);
 
 	/*
 	 * anything that's lower than the lowest existing (read: blocked)
 	 * sequence number can be removed from the tree.
 	 */
-	write_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	tm_root = &fs_info->tree_mod_log;
 	for (node = rb_first(tm_root); node; node = next) {
 		next = rb_next(node);
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h
index 664710848e6f1..5412b12491cb8 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h
@@ -869,14 +869,12 @@ struct btrfs_fs_info {
 	struct list_head delayed_iputs;
 	struct mutex cleaner_delayed_iput_mutex;
 
-	/* this protects tree_mod_seq_list */
-	spinlock_t tree_mod_seq_lock;
 	atomic64_t tree_mod_seq;
-	struct list_head tree_mod_seq_list;
 
-	/* this protects tree_mod_log */
+	/* this protects tree_mod_log and tree_mod_seq_list */
 	rwlock_t tree_mod_log_lock;
 	struct rb_root tree_mod_log;
+	struct list_head tree_mod_seq_list;
 
 	atomic_t nr_async_submits;
 	atomic_t async_submit_draining;
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.c b/fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.c
index d56bd36254681..45714f1c43a31 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/delayed-ref.c
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ void btrfs_merge_delayed_refs(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 	if (head->is_data)
 		return;
 
-	spin_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_seq_lock);
+	read_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	if (!list_empty(&fs_info->tree_mod_seq_list)) {
 		struct seq_list *elem;
 
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ void btrfs_merge_delayed_refs(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 					struct seq_list, list);
 		seq = elem->seq;
 	}
-	spin_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_seq_lock);
+	read_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 
 	ref = list_first_entry(&head->ref_list, struct btrfs_delayed_ref_node,
 			       list);
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ int btrfs_check_delayed_seq(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 	struct seq_list *elem;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	spin_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_seq_lock);
+	read_lock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	if (!list_empty(&fs_info->tree_mod_seq_list)) {
 		elem = list_first_entry(&fs_info->tree_mod_seq_list,
 					struct seq_list, list);
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ int btrfs_check_delayed_seq(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 		}
 	}
 
-	spin_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_seq_lock);
+	read_unlock(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
index 6c6c15fdeef71..44b15617c7b9f 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
@@ -2455,7 +2455,6 @@ int open_ctree(struct super_block *sb,
 	spin_lock_init(&fs_info->fs_roots_radix_lock);
 	spin_lock_init(&fs_info->delayed_iput_lock);
 	spin_lock_init(&fs_info->defrag_inodes_lock);
-	spin_lock_init(&fs_info->tree_mod_seq_lock);
 	spin_lock_init(&fs_info->super_lock);
 	spin_lock_init(&fs_info->qgroup_op_lock);
 	spin_lock_init(&fs_info->buffer_lock);
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/tests/btrfs-tests.c b/fs/btrfs/tests/btrfs-tests.c
index d3f25376a0f86..6c92101e80928 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/tests/btrfs-tests.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/tests/btrfs-tests.c
@@ -115,7 +115,6 @@ struct btrfs_fs_info *btrfs_alloc_dummy_fs_info(u32 nodesize, u32 sectorsize)
 	spin_lock_init(&fs_info->qgroup_op_lock);
 	spin_lock_init(&fs_info->super_lock);
 	spin_lock_init(&fs_info->fs_roots_radix_lock);
-	spin_lock_init(&fs_info->tree_mod_seq_lock);
 	mutex_init(&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock);
 	mutex_init(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock);
 	rwlock_init(&fs_info->tree_mod_log_lock);
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 126/173] drm: atmel-hlcdc: enable clock before configuring timing engine
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (124 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 125/173] Btrfs: fix race between adding and putting tree mod seq elements and nodes Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 127/173] drm/dp_mst: Remove VCPI while disabling topology mgr Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (52 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Claudiu Beznea, Sam Ravnborg,
	Boris Brezillon, Sasha Levin

From: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@microchip.com>

[ Upstream commit 2c1fb9d86f6820abbfaa38a6836157c76ccb4e7b ]

Changing pixel clock source without having this clock source enabled
will block the timing engine and the next operations after (in this case
setting ATMEL_HLCDC_CFG(5) settings in atmel_hlcdc_crtc_mode_set_nofb()
will fail). It is recomended (although in datasheet this is not present)
to actually enabled pixel clock source before doing any changes on timing
enginge (only SAM9X60 datasheet specifies that the peripheral clock and
pixel clock must be enabled before using LCD controller).

Fixes: 1a396789f65a ("drm: add Atmel HLCDC Display Controller support")
Signed-off-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Cc: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.0+
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1576672109-22707-3-git-send-email-claudiu.beznea@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/atmel-hlcdc/atmel_hlcdc_crtc.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/atmel-hlcdc/atmel_hlcdc_crtc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/atmel-hlcdc/atmel_hlcdc_crtc.c
index d73281095faca..976109c20d493 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/atmel-hlcdc/atmel_hlcdc_crtc.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/atmel-hlcdc/atmel_hlcdc_crtc.c
@@ -79,7 +79,11 @@ static void atmel_hlcdc_crtc_mode_set_nofb(struct drm_crtc *c)
 	struct videomode vm;
 	unsigned long prate;
 	unsigned int cfg;
-	int div;
+	int div, ret;
+
+	ret = clk_prepare_enable(crtc->dc->hlcdc->sys_clk);
+	if (ret)
+		return;
 
 	vm.vfront_porch = adj->crtc_vsync_start - adj->crtc_vdisplay;
 	vm.vback_porch = adj->crtc_vtotal - adj->crtc_vsync_end;
@@ -138,6 +142,8 @@ static void atmel_hlcdc_crtc_mode_set_nofb(struct drm_crtc *c)
 			   ATMEL_HLCDC_VSPSU | ATMEL_HLCDC_VSPHO |
 			   ATMEL_HLCDC_GUARDTIME_MASK | ATMEL_HLCDC_MODE_MASK,
 			   cfg);
+
+	clk_disable_unprepare(crtc->dc->hlcdc->sys_clk);
 }
 
 static enum drm_mode_status
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 127/173] drm/dp_mst: Remove VCPI while disabling topology mgr
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (125 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 126/173] drm: atmel-hlcdc: enable clock before configuring timing engine Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 128/173] KVM: x86: Protect pmu_intel.c from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (51 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Wayne Lin, Lyude Paul, Sasha Levin

From: Wayne Lin <Wayne.Lin@amd.com>

[ Upstream commit 64e62bdf04ab8529f45ed0a85122c703035dec3a ]

[Why]

This patch is trying to address the issue observed when hotplug DP
daisy chain monitors.

e.g.
src-mstb-mstb-sst -> src (unplug) mstb-mstb-sst -> src-mstb-mstb-sst
(plug in again)

Once unplug a DP MST capable device, driver will call
drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst() to disable MST. In this function,
it cleans data of topology manager while disabling mst_state. However,
it doesn't clean up the proposed_vcpis of topology manager.
If proposed_vcpi is not reset, once plug in MST daisy chain monitors
later, code will fail at checking port validation while trying to
allocate payloads.

When MST capable device is plugged in again and try to allocate
payloads by calling drm_dp_update_payload_part1(), this
function will iterate over all proposed virtual channels to see if
any proposed VCPI's num_slots is greater than 0. If any proposed
VCPI's num_slots is greater than 0 and the port which the
specific virtual channel directed to is not in the topology, code then
fails at the port validation. Since there are stale VCPI allocations
from the previous topology enablement in proposed_vcpi[], code will fail
at port validation and reurn EINVAL.

[How]

Clean up the data of stale proposed_vcpi[] and reset mgr->proposed_vcpis
to NULL while disabling mst in drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst().

Changes since v1:
*Add on more details in commit message to describe the issue which the
patch is trying to fix

Signed-off-by: Wayne Lin <Wayne.Lin@amd.com>
[added cc to stable]
Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20191205090043.7580-1-Wayne.Lin@amd.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.17+
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_mst_topology.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_mst_topology.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_mst_topology.c
index 9d94c306c8ca1..f427a5dc66685 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_mst_topology.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_mst_topology.c
@@ -2046,6 +2046,7 @@ static bool drm_dp_get_vc_payload_bw(int dp_link_bw,
 int drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst(struct drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr *mgr, bool mst_state)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
+	int i = 0;
 	struct drm_dp_mst_branch *mstb = NULL;
 
 	mutex_lock(&mgr->lock);
@@ -2106,10 +2107,21 @@ int drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst(struct drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr *mgr, bool ms
 		/* this can fail if the device is gone */
 		drm_dp_dpcd_writeb(mgr->aux, DP_MSTM_CTRL, 0);
 		ret = 0;
+		mutex_lock(&mgr->payload_lock);
 		memset(mgr->payloads, 0, mgr->max_payloads * sizeof(struct drm_dp_payload));
 		mgr->payload_mask = 0;
 		set_bit(0, &mgr->payload_mask);
+		for (i = 0; i < mgr->max_payloads; i++) {
+			struct drm_dp_vcpi *vcpi = mgr->proposed_vcpis[i];
+
+			if (vcpi) {
+				vcpi->vcpi = 0;
+				vcpi->num_slots = 0;
+			}
+			mgr->proposed_vcpis[i] = NULL;
+		}
 		mgr->vcpi_mask = 0;
+		mutex_unlock(&mgr->payload_lock);
 	}
 
 out_unlock:
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 128/173] KVM: x86: Protect pmu_intel.c from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (126 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 127/173] drm/dp_mst: Remove VCPI while disabling topology mgr Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 129/173] btrfs: flush write bio if we loop in extent_write_cache_pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (50 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nick Finco, Marios Pomonis,
	Andrew Honig, Jim Mattson, Paolo Bonzini, Sasha Levin

From: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 66061740f1a487f4ed54fde75e724709f805da53 ]

This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in intel_find_fixed_event()
and intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc().
kvm_rdpmc() (ancestor of intel_find_fixed_event()) and
reprogram_fixed_counter() (ancestor of intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc()) are
exported symbols so KVM should treat them conservatively from a security
perspective.

Fixes: 25462f7f5295 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Define kvm_pmu_ops to support vPMU function dispatch")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/pmu_intel.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu_intel.c b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu_intel.c
index 2729131fe9bfc..84ae4dd261caf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu_intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu_intel.c
@@ -87,10 +87,14 @@ static unsigned intel_find_arch_event(struct kvm_pmu *pmu,
 
 static unsigned intel_find_fixed_event(int idx)
 {
-	if (idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(fixed_pmc_events))
+	u32 event;
+	size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(fixed_pmc_events);
+
+	if (idx >= size)
 		return PERF_COUNT_HW_MAX;
 
-	return intel_arch_events[fixed_pmc_events[idx]].event_type;
+	event = fixed_pmc_events[array_index_nospec(idx, size)];
+	return intel_arch_events[event].event_type;
 }
 
 /* check if a PMC is enabled by comparing it with globl_ctrl bits. */
@@ -131,15 +135,19 @@ static struct kvm_pmc *intel_msr_idx_to_pmc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	struct kvm_pmu *pmu = vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu);
 	bool fixed = idx & (1u << 30);
 	struct kvm_pmc *counters;
+	unsigned int num_counters;
 
 	idx &= ~(3u << 30);
-	if (!fixed && idx >= pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters)
-		return NULL;
-	if (fixed && idx >= pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters)
+	if (fixed) {
+		counters = pmu->fixed_counters;
+		num_counters = pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters;
+	} else {
+		counters = pmu->gp_counters;
+		num_counters = pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters;
+	}
+	if (idx >= num_counters)
 		return NULL;
-	counters = fixed ? pmu->fixed_counters : pmu->gp_counters;
-
-	return &counters[idx];
+	return &counters[array_index_nospec(idx, num_counters)];
 }
 
 static bool intel_is_valid_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 129/173] btrfs: flush write bio if we loop in extent_write_cache_pages
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (127 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 128/173] KVM: x86: Protect pmu_intel.c from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 21:02   ` David Sterba
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 130/173] KVM: x86: Fix potential put_fpu() w/o load_fpu() on MPX platform Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (49 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 1 reply; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Filipe Manana, Josef Bacik,
	David Sterba, Sasha Levin

From: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

[ Upstream commit 96bf313ecb33567af4cb53928b0c951254a02759 ]

There exists a deadlock with range_cyclic that has existed forever.  If
we loop around with a bio already built we could deadlock with a writer
who has the page locked that we're attempting to write but is waiting on
a page in our bio to be written out.  The task traces are as follows

  PID: 1329874  TASK: ffff889ebcdf3800  CPU: 33  COMMAND: "kworker/u113:5"
   #0 [ffffc900297bb658] __schedule at ffffffff81a4c33f
   #1 [ffffc900297bb6e0] schedule at ffffffff81a4c6e3
   #2 [ffffc900297bb6f8] io_schedule at ffffffff81a4ca42
   #3 [ffffc900297bb708] __lock_page at ffffffff811f145b
   #4 [ffffc900297bb798] __process_pages_contig at ffffffff814bc502
   #5 [ffffc900297bb8c8] lock_delalloc_pages at ffffffff814bc684
   #6 [ffffc900297bb900] find_lock_delalloc_range at ffffffff814be9ff
   #7 [ffffc900297bb9a0] writepage_delalloc at ffffffff814bebd0
   #8 [ffffc900297bba18] __extent_writepage at ffffffff814bfbf2
   #9 [ffffc900297bba98] extent_write_cache_pages at ffffffff814bffbd

  PID: 2167901  TASK: ffff889dc6a59c00  CPU: 14  COMMAND:
  "aio-dio-invalid"
   #0 [ffffc9003b50bb18] __schedule at ffffffff81a4c33f
   #1 [ffffc9003b50bba0] schedule at ffffffff81a4c6e3
   #2 [ffffc9003b50bbb8] io_schedule at ffffffff81a4ca42
   #3 [ffffc9003b50bbc8] wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff811f24d6
   #4 [ffffc9003b50bc60] prepare_pages at ffffffff814b05a7
   #5 [ffffc9003b50bcd8] btrfs_buffered_write at ffffffff814b1359
   #6 [ffffc9003b50bdb0] btrfs_file_write_iter at ffffffff814b5933
   #7 [ffffc9003b50be38] new_sync_write at ffffffff8128f6a8
   #8 [ffffc9003b50bec8] vfs_write at ffffffff81292b9d
   #9 [ffffc9003b50bf00] ksys_pwrite64 at ffffffff81293032

I used drgn to find the respective pages we were stuck on

page_entry.page 0xffffea00fbfc7500 index 8148 bit 15 pid 2167901
page_entry.page 0xffffea00f9bb7400 index 7680 bit 0 pid 1329874

As you can see the kworker is waiting for bit 0 (PG_locked) on index
7680, and aio-dio-invalid is waiting for bit 15 (PG_writeback) on index
8148.  aio-dio-invalid has 7680, and the kworker epd looks like the
following

  crash> struct extent_page_data ffffc900297bbbb0
  struct extent_page_data {
    bio = 0xffff889f747ed830,
    tree = 0xffff889eed6ba448,
    extent_locked = 0,
    sync_io = 0
  }

Probably worth mentioning as well that it waits for writeback of the
page to complete while holding a lock on it (at prepare_pages()).

Using drgn I walked the bio pages looking for page
0xffffea00fbfc7500 which is the one we're waiting for writeback on

  bio = Object(prog, 'struct bio', address=0xffff889f747ed830)
  for i in range(0, bio.bi_vcnt.value_()):
      bv = bio.bi_io_vec[i]
      if bv.bv_page.value_() == 0xffffea00fbfc7500:
	  print("FOUND IT")

which validated what I suspected.

The fix for this is simple, flush the epd before we loop back around to
the beginning of the file during writeout.

Fixes: b293f02e1423 ("Btrfs: Add writepages support")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
index fced434bbddcc..a8be9478ca3e2 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
@@ -4048,6 +4048,14 @@ static int extent_write_cache_pages(struct address_space *mapping,
 		 */
 		scanned = 1;
 		index = 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * If we're looping we could run into a page that is locked by a
+		 * writer and that writer could be waiting on writeback for a
+		 * page in our current bio, and thus deadlock, so flush the
+		 * write bio here.
+		 */
+		flush_write_bio(data);
 		goto retry;
 	}
 
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 130/173] KVM: x86: Fix potential put_fpu() w/o load_fpu() on MPX platform
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (128 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 129/173] btrfs: flush write bio if we loop in extent_write_cache_pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 131/173] KVM: x86/mmu: Apply max PA check for MMIO sptes to 32-bit KVM Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (48 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini,
	Sasha Levin

From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit f958bd2314d117f8c29f4821401bc1925bc2e5ef ]

Unlike most state managed by XSAVE, MPX is initialized to zero on INIT.
Because INITs are usually recognized in the context of a VCPU_RUN call,
kvm_vcpu_reset() puts the guest's FPU so that the FPU state is resident
in memory, zeros the MPX state, and reloads FPU state to hardware.  But,
in the unlikely event that an INIT is recognized during
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate() via kvm_apic_accept_events(),
kvm_vcpu_reset() will call kvm_put_guest_fpu() without a preceding
kvm_load_guest_fpu() and corrupt the guest's FPU state (and possibly
userspace's FPU state as well).

Given that MPX is being removed from the kernel[*], fix the bug with the
simple-but-ugly approach of loading the guest's FPU during
KVM_GET_MP_STATE.

[*] See commit f240652b6032b ("x86/mpx: Remove MPX APIs").

Fixes: f775b13eedee2 ("x86,kvm: move qemu/guest FPU switching out to vcpu_run")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index b6d80c0190563..d915ea0e69cfd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -7677,6 +7677,9 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_sregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				    struct kvm_mp_state *mp_state)
 {
+	if (kvm_mpx_supported())
+		kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
+
 	kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu);
 	if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED &&
 					vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted)
@@ -7684,6 +7687,8 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	else
 		mp_state->mp_state = vcpu->arch.mp_state;
 
+	if (kvm_mpx_supported())
+		kvm_put_guest_fpu(vcpu);
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 131/173] KVM: x86/mmu: Apply max PA check for MMIO sptes to 32-bit KVM
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (129 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 130/173] KVM: x86: Fix potential put_fpu() w/o load_fpu() on MPX platform Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 132/173] KVM: VMX: Add non-canonical check on writes to RTIT address MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (47 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini,
	Sasha Levin

From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit e30a7d623dccdb3f880fbcad980b0cb589a1da45 ]

Remove the bogus 64-bit only condition from the check that disables MMIO
spte optimization when the system supports the max PA, i.e. doesn't have
any reserved PA bits.  32-bit KVM always uses PAE paging for the shadow
MMU, and per Intel's SDM:

  PAE paging translates 32-bit linear addresses to 52-bit physical
  addresses.

The kernel's restrictions on max physical addresses are limits on how
much memory the kernel can reasonably use, not what physical addresses
are supported by hardware.

Fixes: ce88decffd17 ("KVM: MMU: mmio page fault support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index d915ea0e69cfd..d6851636edab3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -6314,7 +6314,7 @@ static void kvm_set_mmio_spte_mask(void)
 	 * If reserved bit is not supported, clear the present bit to disable
 	 * mmio page fault.
 	 */
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && maxphyaddr == 52)
+	if (maxphyaddr == 52)
 		mask &= ~1ull;
 
 	kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(mask, mask);
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 132/173] KVM: VMX: Add non-canonical check on writes to RTIT address MSRs
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (130 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 131/173] KVM: x86/mmu: Apply max PA check for MMIO sptes to 32-bit KVM Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 133/173] KVM: nVMX: vmread should not set rflags to specify success in case of #PF Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (46 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini,
	Sasha Levin

From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit fe6ed369fca98e99df55c932b85782a5687526b5 ]

Reject writes to RTIT address MSRs if the data being written is a
non-canonical address as the MSRs are subject to canonical checks, e.g.
KVM will trigger an unchecked #GP when loading the values to hardware
during pt_guest_enter().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 8033 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 8033 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..3791ce8d269e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,8033 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
+ *
+ * This module enables machines with Intel VT-x extensions to run virtual
+ * machines without emulation or binary translation.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *   Avi Kivity   <avi@qumranet.com>
+ *   Yaniv Kamay  <yaniv@qumranet.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/frame.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/hrtimer.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/tboot.h>
+#include <linux/trace_events.h>
+
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/desc.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
+#include <asm/io.h>
+#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
+#include <asm/kexec.h>
+#include <asm/perf_event.h>
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+#include <asm/virtext.h>
+#include <asm/vmx.h>
+
+#include "capabilities.h"
+#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "evmcs.h"
+#include "irq.h"
+#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "lapic.h"
+#include "mmu.h"
+#include "nested.h"
+#include "ops.h"
+#include "pmu.h"
+#include "trace.h"
+#include "vmcs.h"
+#include "vmcs12.h"
+#include "vmx.h"
+#include "x86.h"
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Qumranet");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id vmx_cpu_id[] = {
+	X86_FEATURE_MATCH(X86_FEATURE_VMX),
+	{}
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, vmx_cpu_id);
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_vpid = 1;
+module_param_named(vpid, enable_vpid, bool, 0444);
+
+static bool __read_mostly enable_vnmi = 1;
+module_param_named(vnmi, enable_vnmi, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly flexpriority_enabled = 1;
+module_param_named(flexpriority, flexpriority_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_ept = 1;
+module_param_named(ept, enable_ept, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_unrestricted_guest = 1;
+module_param_named(unrestricted_guest,
+			enable_unrestricted_guest, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_ept_ad_bits = 1;
+module_param_named(eptad, enable_ept_ad_bits, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+static bool __read_mostly emulate_invalid_guest_state = true;
+module_param(emulate_invalid_guest_state, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+static bool __read_mostly fasteoi = 1;
+module_param(fasteoi, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+static bool __read_mostly enable_apicv = 1;
+module_param(enable_apicv, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+/*
+ * If nested=1, nested virtualization is supported, i.e., guests may use
+ * VMX and be a hypervisor for its own guests. If nested=0, guests may not
+ * use VMX instructions.
+ */
+static bool __read_mostly nested = 1;
+module_param(nested, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+bool __read_mostly enable_pml = 1;
+module_param_named(pml, enable_pml, bool, S_IRUGO);
+
+static bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcs = 0;
+module_param(dump_invalid_vmcs, bool, 0644);
+
+#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC		1
+#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV	2
+
+#define KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX     0xffffffffffffffffULL
+
+/* Guest_tsc -> host_tsc conversion requires 64-bit division.  */
+static int __read_mostly cpu_preemption_timer_multi;
+static bool __read_mostly enable_preemption_timer = 1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+module_param_named(preemption_timer, enable_preemption_timer, bool, S_IRUGO);
+#endif
+
+#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_OFF (X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD)
+#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST X86_CR0_NE
+#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON				\
+	(KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST | 	\
+	 X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE)
+#define KVM_CR4_GUEST_OWNED_BITS				      \
+	(X86_CR4_PVI | X86_CR4_DE | X86_CR4_PCE | X86_CR4_OSFXSR      \
+	 | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_LA57 | X86_CR4_TSD)
+
+#define KVM_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST X86_CR4_VMXE
+#define KVM_PMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON (X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_VMXE)
+#define KVM_RMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON (X86_CR4_VME | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_VMXE)
+
+#define RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS (~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM))
+
+#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS_MASK (~(RTIT_STATUS_FILTEREN | \
+	RTIT_STATUS_CONTEXTEN | RTIT_STATUS_TRIGGEREN | \
+	RTIT_STATUS_ERROR | RTIT_STATUS_STOPPED | \
+	RTIT_STATUS_BYTECNT))
+
+#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE_MASK \
+	(~((1UL << cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(vcpu)) - 1) | 0x7f)
+
+/*
+ * These 2 parameters are used to config the controls for Pause-Loop Exiting:
+ * ple_gap:    upper bound on the amount of time between two successive
+ *             executions of PAUSE in a loop. Also indicate if ple enabled.
+ *             According to test, this time is usually smaller than 128 cycles.
+ * ple_window: upper bound on the amount of time a guest is allowed to execute
+ *             in a PAUSE loop. Tests indicate that most spinlocks are held for
+ *             less than 2^12 cycles
+ * Time is measured based on a counter that runs at the same rate as the TSC,
+ * refer SDM volume 3b section 21.6.13 & 22.1.3.
+ */
+static unsigned int ple_gap = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_GAP;
+module_param(ple_gap, uint, 0444);
+
+static unsigned int ple_window = KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW;
+module_param(ple_window, uint, 0444);
+
+/* Default doubles per-vcpu window every exit. */
+static unsigned int ple_window_grow = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_GROW;
+module_param(ple_window_grow, uint, 0444);
+
+/* Default resets per-vcpu window every exit to ple_window. */
+static unsigned int ple_window_shrink = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_SHRINK;
+module_param(ple_window_shrink, uint, 0444);
+
+/* Default is to compute the maximum so we can never overflow. */
+static unsigned int ple_window_max        = KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_MAX;
+module_param(ple_window_max, uint, 0444);
+
+/* Default is SYSTEM mode, 1 for host-guest mode */
+int __read_mostly pt_mode = PT_MODE_SYSTEM;
+module_param(pt_mode, int, S_IRUGO);
+
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(vmx_l1d_should_flush);
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
+
+/* Storage for pre module init parameter parsing */
+static enum vmx_l1d_flush_state __read_mostly vmentry_l1d_flush_param = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
+
+static const struct {
+	const char *option;
+	bool for_parse;
+} vmentry_l1d_param[] = {
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO]	 = {"auto", true},
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER]	 = {"never", true},
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND]	 = {"cond", true},
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS]	 = {"always", true},
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED] = {"EPT disabled", false},
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED] = {"not required", false},
+};
+
+#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4
+static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;
+
+static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF)) {
+		l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!enable_ept) {
+		l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) {
+		u64 msr;
+
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, msr);
+		if (msr & ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH) {
+			l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* If set to auto use the default l1tf mitigation method */
+	if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO) {
+		switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER;
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND;
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
+			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS;
+			break;
+		}
+	} else if (l1tf_mitigation == L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE) {
+		l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS;
+	}
+
+	if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER && !vmx_l1d_flush_pages &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
+		/*
+		 * This allocation for vmx_l1d_flush_pages is not tied to a VM
+		 * lifetime and so should not be charged to a memcg.
+		 */
+		page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
+		if (!page)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		vmx_l1d_flush_pages = page_address(page);
+
+		/*
+		 * Initialize each page with a different pattern in
+		 * order to protect against KSM in the nested
+		 * virtualization case.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < 1u << L1D_CACHE_ORDER; ++i) {
+			memset(vmx_l1d_flush_pages + i * PAGE_SIZE, i + 1,
+			       PAGE_SIZE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	l1tf_vmx_mitigation = l1tf;
+
+	if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
+		static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
+	else
+		static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
+
+	if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND)
+		static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
+	else
+		static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmentry_l1d_flush_parse(const char *s)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (s) {
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmentry_l1d_param); i++) {
+			if (vmentry_l1d_param[i].for_parse &&
+			    sysfs_streq(s, vmentry_l1d_param[i].option))
+				return i;
+		}
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int vmentry_l1d_flush_set(const char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	int l1tf, ret;
+
+	l1tf = vmentry_l1d_flush_parse(s);
+	if (l1tf < 0)
+		return l1tf;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Has vmx_init() run already? If not then this is the pre init
+	 * parameter parsing. In that case just store the value and let
+	 * vmx_init() do the proper setup after enable_ept has been
+	 * established.
+	 */
+	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO) {
+		vmentry_l1d_flush_param = l1tf;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
+	ret = vmx_setup_l1d_flush(l1tf);
+	mutex_unlock(&vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int vmentry_l1d_flush_get(char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(l1tf_vmx_mitigation >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmentry_l1d_param)))
+		return sprintf(s, "???\n");
+
+	return sprintf(s, "%s\n", vmentry_l1d_param[l1tf_vmx_mitigation].option);
+}
+
+static const struct kernel_param_ops vmentry_l1d_flush_ops = {
+	.set = vmentry_l1d_flush_set,
+	.get = vmentry_l1d_flush_get,
+};
+module_param_cb(vmentry_l1d_flush, &vmentry_l1d_flush_ops, NULL, 0644);
+
+static bool guest_state_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+static u32 vmx_segment_access_rights(struct kvm_segment *var);
+static __always_inline void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
+							  u32 msr, int type);
+
+void vmx_vmexit(void);
+
+#define vmx_insn_failed(fmt...)		\
+do {					\
+	WARN_ONCE(1, fmt);		\
+	pr_warn_ratelimited(fmt);	\
+} while (0)
+
+asmlinkage void vmread_error(unsigned long field, bool fault)
+{
+	if (fault)
+		kvm_spurious_fault();
+	else
+		vmx_insn_failed("kvm: vmread failed: field=%lx\n", field);
+}
+
+noinline void vmwrite_error(unsigned long field, unsigned long value)
+{
+	vmx_insn_failed("kvm: vmwrite failed: field=%lx val=%lx err=%d\n",
+			field, value, vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
+}
+
+noinline void vmclear_error(struct vmcs *vmcs, u64 phys_addr)
+{
+	vmx_insn_failed("kvm: vmclear failed: %p/%llx\n", vmcs, phys_addr);
+}
+
+noinline void vmptrld_error(struct vmcs *vmcs, u64 phys_addr)
+{
+	vmx_insn_failed("kvm: vmptrld failed: %p/%llx\n", vmcs, phys_addr);
+}
+
+noinline void invvpid_error(unsigned long ext, u16 vpid, gva_t gva)
+{
+	vmx_insn_failed("kvm: invvpid failed: ext=0x%lx vpid=%u gva=0x%lx\n",
+			ext, vpid, gva);
+}
+
+noinline void invept_error(unsigned long ext, u64 eptp, gpa_t gpa)
+{
+	vmx_insn_failed("kvm: invept failed: ext=0x%lx eptp=%llx gpa=0x%llx\n",
+			ext, eptp, gpa);
+}
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea);
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs);
+/*
+ * We maintain a per-CPU linked-list of VMCS loaded on that CPU. This is needed
+ * when a CPU is brought down, and we need to VMCLEAR all VMCSs loaded on it.
+ */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, loaded_vmcss_on_cpu);
+
+/*
+ * We maintian a per-CPU linked-list of vCPU, so in wakeup_handler() we
+ * can find which vCPU should be waken up.
+ */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, blocked_vcpu_on_cpu);
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(spinlock_t, blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock);
+
+static DECLARE_BITMAP(vmx_vpid_bitmap, VMX_NR_VPIDS);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(vmx_vpid_lock);
+
+struct vmcs_config vmcs_config;
+struct vmx_capability vmx_capability;
+
+#define VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(seg)					\
+	[VCPU_SREG_##seg] = {                                   \
+		.selector = GUEST_##seg##_SELECTOR,		\
+		.base = GUEST_##seg##_BASE,		   	\
+		.limit = GUEST_##seg##_LIMIT,		   	\
+		.ar_bytes = GUEST_##seg##_AR_BYTES,	   	\
+	}
+
+static const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field {
+	unsigned selector;
+	unsigned base;
+	unsigned limit;
+	unsigned ar_bytes;
+} kvm_vmx_segment_fields[] = {
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(CS),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(DS),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(ES),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(FS),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(GS),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(SS),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(TR),
+	VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(LDTR),
+};
+
+u64 host_efer;
+static unsigned long host_idt_base;
+
+/*
+ * Though SYSCALL is only supported in 64-bit mode on Intel CPUs, kvm
+ * will emulate SYSCALL in legacy mode if the vendor string in guest
+ * CPUID.0:{EBX,ECX,EDX} is "AuthenticAMD" or "AMDisbetter!" To
+ * support this emulation, IA32_STAR must always be included in
+ * vmx_msr_index[], even in i386 builds.
+ */
+const u32 vmx_msr_index[] = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, MSR_LSTAR, MSR_CSTAR,
+#endif
+	MSR_EFER, MSR_TSC_AUX, MSR_STAR,
+	MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL,
+};
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+static bool __read_mostly enlightened_vmcs = true;
+module_param(enlightened_vmcs, bool, 0444);
+
+/* check_ept_pointer() should be under protection of ept_pointer_lock. */
+static void check_ept_pointer_match(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	u64 tmp_eptp = INVALID_PAGE;
+	int i;
+
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+		if (!VALID_PAGE(tmp_eptp)) {
+			tmp_eptp = to_vmx(vcpu)->ept_pointer;
+		} else if (tmp_eptp != to_vmx(vcpu)->ept_pointer) {
+			to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointers_match
+				= EPT_POINTERS_MISMATCH;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+
+	to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointers_match = EPT_POINTERS_MATCH;
+}
+
+static int kvm_fill_hv_flush_list_func(struct hv_guest_mapping_flush_list *flush,
+		void *data)
+{
+	struct kvm_tlb_range *range = data;
+
+	return hyperv_fill_flush_guest_mapping_list(flush, range->start_gfn,
+			range->pages);
+}
+
+static inline int __hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range(struct kvm *kvm,
+		struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_tlb_range *range)
+{
+	u64 ept_pointer = to_vmx(vcpu)->ept_pointer;
+
+	/*
+	 * FLUSH_GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_SPACE hypercall needs address
+	 * of the base of EPT PML4 table, strip off EPT configuration
+	 * information.
+	 */
+	if (range)
+		return hyperv_flush_guest_mapping_range(ept_pointer & PAGE_MASK,
+				kvm_fill_hv_flush_list_func, (void *)range);
+	else
+		return hyperv_flush_guest_mapping(ept_pointer & PAGE_MASK);
+}
+
+static int hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range(struct kvm *kvm,
+		struct kvm_tlb_range *range)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	int ret = 0, i;
+
+	spin_lock(&to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointer_lock);
+
+	if (to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointers_match == EPT_POINTERS_CHECK)
+		check_ept_pointer_match(kvm);
+
+	if (to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointers_match != EPT_POINTERS_MATCH) {
+		kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
+			/* If ept_pointer is invalid pointer, bypass flush request. */
+			if (VALID_PAGE(to_vmx(vcpu)->ept_pointer))
+				ret |= __hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range(
+					kvm, vcpu, range);
+		}
+	} else {
+		ret = __hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range(kvm,
+				kvm_get_vcpu(kvm, 0), range);
+	}
+
+	spin_unlock(&to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointer_lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+static int hv_remote_flush_tlb(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range(kvm, NULL);
+}
+
+static int hv_enable_direct_tlbflush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs;
+	struct hv_partition_assist_pg **p_hv_pa_pg =
+			&vcpu->kvm->arch.hyperv.hv_pa_pg;
+	/*
+	 * Synthetic VM-Exit is not enabled in current code and so All
+	 * evmcs in singe VM shares same assist page.
+	 */
+	if (!*p_hv_pa_pg)
+		*p_hv_pa_pg = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (!*p_hv_pa_pg)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	evmcs = (struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *)to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
+
+	evmcs->partition_assist_page =
+		__pa(*p_hv_pa_pg);
+	evmcs->hv_vm_id = (unsigned long)vcpu->kvm;
+	evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.nested_flush_hypercall = 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) */
+
+/*
+ * Comment's format: document - errata name - stepping - processor name.
+ * Refer from
+ * https://www.virtualbox.org/svn/vbox/trunk/src/VBox/VMM/VMMR0/HMR0.cpp
+ */
+static u32 vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms[] = {
+/* 323344.pdf - BA86   - D0 - Xeon 7500 Series */
+0x000206E6,
+/* 323056.pdf - AAX65  - C2 - Xeon L3406 */
+/* 322814.pdf - AAT59  - C2 - i7-600, i5-500, i5-400 and i3-300 Mobile */
+/* 322911.pdf - AAU65  - C2 - i5-600, i3-500 Desktop and Pentium G6950 */
+0x00020652,
+/* 322911.pdf - AAU65  - K0 - i5-600, i3-500 Desktop and Pentium G6950 */
+0x00020655,
+/* 322373.pdf - AAO95  - B1 - Xeon 3400 Series */
+/* 322166.pdf - AAN92  - B1 - i7-800 and i5-700 Desktop */
+/*
+ * 320767.pdf - AAP86  - B1 -
+ * i7-900 Mobile Extreme, i7-800 and i7-700 Mobile
+ */
+0x000106E5,
+/* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - C0 - Xeon 3500 */
+0x000106A0,
+/* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - C1 - Xeon 3500 */
+0x000106A1,
+/* 320836.pdf - AAJ124 - C0 - i7-900 Desktop Extreme and i7-900 Desktop */
+0x000106A4,
+ /* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - D0 - Xeon 3500 */
+ /* 321324.pdf - AAK139 - D0 - Xeon 5500 */
+ /* 320836.pdf - AAJ124 - D0 - i7-900 Extreme and i7-900 Desktop */
+0x000106A5,
+ /* Xeon E3-1220 V2 */
+0x000306A8,
+};
+
+static inline bool cpu_has_broken_vmx_preemption_timer(void)
+{
+	u32 eax = cpuid_eax(0x00000001), i;
+
+	/* Clear the reserved bits */
+	eax &= ~(0x3U << 14 | 0xfU << 28);
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms); i++)
+		if (eax == vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms[i])
+			return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline bool cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return flexpriority_enabled && lapic_in_kernel(vcpu);
+}
+
+static inline bool report_flexpriority(void)
+{
+	return flexpriority_enabled;
+}
+
+static inline int __find_msr_index(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < vmx->nmsrs; ++i)
+		if (vmx_msr_index[vmx->guest_msrs[i].index] == msr)
+			return i;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+struct shared_msr_entry *find_msr_entry(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	i = __find_msr_index(vmx, msr);
+	if (i >= 0)
+		return &vmx->guest_msrs[i];
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int vmx_set_guest_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct shared_msr_entry *msr, u64 data)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	u64 old_msr_data = msr->data;
+	msr->data = data;
+	if (msr - vmx->guest_msrs < vmx->save_nmsrs) {
+		preempt_disable();
+		ret = kvm_set_shared_msr(msr->index, msr->data,
+					 msr->mask);
+		preempt_enable();
+		if (ret)
+			msr->data = old_msr_data;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void loaded_vmcs_init(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
+{
+	vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+	if (loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs && loaded_vmcs->launched)
+		vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs);
+	loaded_vmcs->cpu = -1;
+	loaded_vmcs->launched = 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
+/*
+ * This bitmap is used to indicate whether the vmclear
+ * operation is enabled on all cpus. All disabled by
+ * default.
+ */
+static cpumask_t crash_vmclear_enabled_bitmap = CPU_MASK_NONE;
+
+static inline void crash_enable_local_vmclear(int cpu)
+{
+	cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &crash_vmclear_enabled_bitmap);
+}
+
+static inline void crash_disable_local_vmclear(int cpu)
+{
+	cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, &crash_vmclear_enabled_bitmap);
+}
+
+static inline int crash_local_vmclear_enabled(int cpu)
+{
+	return cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, &crash_vmclear_enabled_bitmap);
+}
+
+static void crash_vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss(void)
+{
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+	struct loaded_vmcs *v;
+
+	if (!crash_local_vmclear_enabled(cpu))
+		return;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(v, &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu),
+			    loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link)
+		vmcs_clear(v->vmcs);
+}
+#else
+static inline void crash_enable_local_vmclear(int cpu) { }
+static inline void crash_disable_local_vmclear(int cpu) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE */
+
+static void __loaded_vmcs_clear(void *arg)
+{
+	struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs = arg;
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+
+	if (loaded_vmcs->cpu != cpu)
+		return; /* vcpu migration can race with cpu offline */
+	if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) == loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
+		per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = NULL;
+	crash_disable_local_vmclear(cpu);
+	list_del(&loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link);
+
+	/*
+	 * we should ensure updating loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link
+	 * is before setting loaded_vmcs->vcpu to -1 which is done in
+	 * loaded_vmcs_init. Otherwise, other cpu can see vcpu = -1 fist
+	 * then adds the vmcs into percpu list before it is deleted.
+	 */
+	smp_wmb();
+
+	loaded_vmcs_init(loaded_vmcs);
+	crash_enable_local_vmclear(cpu);
+}
+
+void loaded_vmcs_clear(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
+{
+	int cpu = loaded_vmcs->cpu;
+
+	if (cpu != -1)
+		smp_call_function_single(cpu,
+			 __loaded_vmcs_clear, loaded_vmcs, 1);
+}
+
+static bool vmx_segment_cache_test_set(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg,
+				       unsigned field)
+{
+	bool ret;
+	u32 mask = 1 << (seg * SEG_FIELD_NR + field);
+
+	if (!kvm_register_is_available(&vmx->vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS)) {
+		kvm_register_mark_available(&vmx->vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS);
+		vmx->segment_cache.bitmask = 0;
+	}
+	ret = vmx->segment_cache.bitmask & mask;
+	vmx->segment_cache.bitmask |= mask;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static u16 vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
+{
+	u16 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].selector;
+
+	if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_SEL))
+		*p = vmcs_read16(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].selector);
+	return *p;
+}
+
+static ulong vmx_read_guest_seg_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
+{
+	ulong *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].base;
+
+	if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_BASE))
+		*p = vmcs_readl(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].base);
+	return *p;
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_read_guest_seg_limit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
+{
+	u32 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].limit;
+
+	if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_LIMIT))
+		*p = vmcs_read32(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].limit);
+	return *p;
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
+{
+	u32 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].ar;
+
+	if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_AR))
+		*p = vmcs_read32(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].ar_bytes);
+	return *p;
+}
+
+void update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 eb;
+
+	eb = (1u << PF_VECTOR) | (1u << UD_VECTOR) | (1u << MC_VECTOR) |
+	     (1u << DB_VECTOR) | (1u << AC_VECTOR);
+	/*
+	 * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
+	 * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
+	 * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
+	 * as VMware does.
+	 */
+	if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
+		eb |= (1u << GP_VECTOR);
+	if ((vcpu->guest_debug &
+	     (KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)) ==
+	    (KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP))
+		eb |= 1u << BP_VECTOR;
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active)
+		eb = ~0;
+	if (enable_ept)
+		eb &= ~(1u << PF_VECTOR); /* bypass_guest_pf = 0 */
+
+	/* When we are running a nested L2 guest and L1 specified for it a
+	 * certain exception bitmap, we must trap the same exceptions and pass
+	 * them to L1. When running L2, we will only handle the exceptions
+	 * specified above if L1 did not want them.
+	 */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		eb |= get_vmcs12(vcpu)->exception_bitmap;
+
+	vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if MSR is intercepted for currently loaded MSR bitmap.
+ */
+static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
+{
+	unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
+	int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+		return true;
+
+	msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap;
+
+	if (msr <= 0x1fff) {
+		return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
+	} else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) {
+		msr &= 0x1fff;
+		return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f);
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+		unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit)
+{
+	vm_entry_controls_clearbit(vmx, entry);
+	vm_exit_controls_clearbit(vmx, exit);
+}
+
+int vmx_find_msr_index(struct vmx_msrs *m, u32 msr)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < m->nr; ++i) {
+		if (m->val[i].index == msr)
+			return i;
+	}
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
+static void clear_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_EFER:
+		if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer()) {
+			clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
+					VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER,
+					VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER);
+			return;
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL:
+		if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl()) {
+			clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
+					VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
+					VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL);
+			return;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	i = vmx_find_msr_index(&m->guest, msr);
+	if (i < 0)
+		goto skip_guest;
+	--m->guest.nr;
+	m->guest.val[i] = m->guest.val[m->guest.nr];
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->guest.nr);
+
+skip_guest:
+	i = vmx_find_msr_index(&m->host, msr);
+	if (i < 0)
+		return;
+
+	--m->host.nr;
+	m->host.val[i] = m->host.val[m->host.nr];
+	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->host.nr);
+}
+
+static void add_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+		unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit,
+		unsigned long guest_val_vmcs, unsigned long host_val_vmcs,
+		u64 guest_val, u64 host_val)
+{
+	vmcs_write64(guest_val_vmcs, guest_val);
+	if (host_val_vmcs != HOST_IA32_EFER)
+		vmcs_write64(host_val_vmcs, host_val);
+	vm_entry_controls_setbit(vmx, entry);
+	vm_exit_controls_setbit(vmx, exit);
+}
+
+static void add_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
+				  u64 guest_val, u64 host_val, bool entry_only)
+{
+	int i, j = 0;
+	struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload;
+
+	switch (msr) {
+	case MSR_EFER:
+		if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer()) {
+			add_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
+					VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER,
+					VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER,
+					GUEST_IA32_EFER,
+					HOST_IA32_EFER,
+					guest_val, host_val);
+			return;
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL:
+		if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl()) {
+			add_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
+					VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
+					VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
+					GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
+					HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
+					guest_val, host_val);
+			return;
+		}
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE:
+		/* PEBS needs a quiescent period after being disabled (to write
+		 * a record).  Disabling PEBS through VMX MSR swapping doesn't
+		 * provide that period, so a CPU could write host's record into
+		 * guest's memory.
+		 */
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE, 0);
+	}
+
+	i = vmx_find_msr_index(&m->guest, msr);
+	if (!entry_only)
+		j = vmx_find_msr_index(&m->host, msr);
+
+	if ((i < 0 && m->guest.nr == NR_LOADSTORE_MSRS) ||
+		(j < 0 &&  m->host.nr == NR_LOADSTORE_MSRS)) {
+		printk_once(KERN_WARNING "Not enough msr switch entries. "
+				"Can't add msr %x\n", msr);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (i < 0) {
+		i = m->guest.nr++;
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->guest.nr);
+	}
+	m->guest.val[i].index = msr;
+	m->guest.val[i].value = guest_val;
+
+	if (entry_only)
+		return;
+
+	if (j < 0) {
+		j = m->host.nr++;
+		vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->host.nr);
+	}
+	m->host.val[j].index = msr;
+	m->host.val[j].value = host_val;
+}
+
+static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int efer_offset)
+{
+	u64 guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
+	u64 ignore_bits = 0;
+
+	/* Shadow paging assumes NX to be available.  */
+	if (!enable_ept)
+		guest_efer |= EFER_NX;
+
+	/*
+	 * LMA and LME handled by hardware; SCE meaningless outside long mode.
+	 */
+	ignore_bits |= EFER_SCE;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	ignore_bits |= EFER_LMA | EFER_LME;
+	/* SCE is meaningful only in long mode on Intel */
+	if (guest_efer & EFER_LMA)
+		ignore_bits &= ~(u64)EFER_SCE;
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * On EPT, we can't emulate NX, so we must switch EFER atomically.
+	 * On CPUs that support "load IA32_EFER", always switch EFER
+	 * atomically, since it's faster than switching it manually.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer() ||
+	    (enable_ept && ((vmx->vcpu.arch.efer ^ host_efer) & EFER_NX))) {
+		if (!(guest_efer & EFER_LMA))
+			guest_efer &= ~EFER_LME;
+		if (guest_efer != host_efer)
+			add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER,
+					      guest_efer, host_efer, false);
+		else
+			clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER);
+		return false;
+	} else {
+		clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER);
+
+		guest_efer &= ~ignore_bits;
+		guest_efer |= host_efer & ignore_bits;
+
+		vmx->guest_msrs[efer_offset].data = guest_efer;
+		vmx->guest_msrs[efer_offset].mask = ~ignore_bits;
+
+		return true;
+	}
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+/*
+ * On 32-bit kernels, VM exits still load the FS and GS bases from the
+ * VMCS rather than the segment table.  KVM uses this helper to figure
+ * out the current bases to poke them into the VMCS before entry.
+ */
+static unsigned long segment_base(u16 selector)
+{
+	struct desc_struct *table;
+	unsigned long v;
+
+	if (!(selector & ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK))
+		return 0;
+
+	table = get_current_gdt_ro();
+
+	if ((selector & SEGMENT_TI_MASK) == SEGMENT_LDT) {
+		u16 ldt_selector = kvm_read_ldt();
+
+		if (!(ldt_selector & ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK))
+			return 0;
+
+		table = (struct desc_struct *)segment_base(ldt_selector);
+	}
+	v = get_desc_base(&table[selector >> 3]);
+	return v;
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline void pt_load_msr(struct pt_ctx *ctx, u32 addr_range)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, ctx->status);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, ctx->output_base);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, ctx->output_mask);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, ctx->cr3_match);
+	for (i = 0; i < addr_range; i++) {
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, ctx->addr_a[i]);
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, ctx->addr_b[i]);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void pt_save_msr(struct pt_ctx *ctx, u32 addr_range)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, ctx->status);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, ctx->output_base);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, ctx->output_mask);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, ctx->cr3_match);
+	for (i = 0; i < addr_range; i++) {
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, ctx->addr_a[i]);
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, ctx->addr_b[i]);
+	}
+}
+
+static void pt_guest_enter(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_SYSTEM)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL is already set in the VMCS.
+	 * Save host state before VM entry.
+	 */
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl);
+	if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
+		pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx->pt_desc.addr_range);
+		pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx->pt_desc.addr_range);
+	}
+}
+
+static void pt_guest_exit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_SYSTEM)
+		return;
+
+	if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
+		pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx->pt_desc.addr_range);
+		pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx->pt_desc.addr_range);
+	}
+
+	/* Reload host state (IA32_RTIT_CTL will be cleared on VM exit). */
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl);
+}
+
+void vmx_set_host_fs_gs(struct vmcs_host_state *host, u16 fs_sel, u16 gs_sel,
+			unsigned long fs_base, unsigned long gs_base)
+{
+	if (unlikely(fs_sel != host->fs_sel)) {
+		if (!(fs_sel & 7))
+			vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, fs_sel);
+		else
+			vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, 0);
+		host->fs_sel = fs_sel;
+	}
+	if (unlikely(gs_sel != host->gs_sel)) {
+		if (!(gs_sel & 7))
+			vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, gs_sel);
+		else
+			vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, 0);
+		host->gs_sel = gs_sel;
+	}
+	if (unlikely(fs_base != host->fs_base)) {
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, fs_base);
+		host->fs_base = fs_base;
+	}
+	if (unlikely(gs_base != host->gs_base)) {
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, gs_base);
+		host->gs_base = gs_base;
+	}
+}
+
+void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct vmcs_host_state *host_state;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+#endif
+	unsigned long fs_base, gs_base;
+	u16 fs_sel, gs_sel;
+	int i;
+
+	vmx->req_immediate_exit = false;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note that guest MSRs to be saved/restored can also be changed
+	 * when guest state is loaded. This happens when guest transitions
+	 * to/from long-mode by setting MSR_EFER.LMA.
+	 */
+	if (!vmx->guest_msrs_ready) {
+		vmx->guest_msrs_ready = true;
+		for (i = 0; i < vmx->save_nmsrs; ++i)
+			kvm_set_shared_msr(vmx->guest_msrs[i].index,
+					   vmx->guest_msrs[i].data,
+					   vmx->guest_msrs[i].mask);
+
+	}
+	if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+		return;
+
+	host_state = &vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set host fs and gs selectors.  Unfortunately, 22.2.3 does not
+	 * allow segment selectors with cpl > 0 or ti == 1.
+	 */
+	host_state->ldt_sel = kvm_read_ldt();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	savesegment(ds, host_state->ds_sel);
+	savesegment(es, host_state->es_sel);
+
+	gs_base = cpu_kernelmode_gs_base(cpu);
+	if (likely(is_64bit_mm(current->mm))) {
+		save_fsgs_for_kvm();
+		fs_sel = current->thread.fsindex;
+		gs_sel = current->thread.gsindex;
+		fs_base = current->thread.fsbase;
+		vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = current->thread.gsbase;
+	} else {
+		savesegment(fs, fs_sel);
+		savesegment(gs, gs_sel);
+		fs_base = read_msr(MSR_FS_BASE);
+		vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = read_msr(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE);
+	}
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
+#else
+	savesegment(fs, fs_sel);
+	savesegment(gs, gs_sel);
+	fs_base = segment_base(fs_sel);
+	gs_base = segment_base(gs_sel);
+#endif
+
+	vmx_set_host_fs_gs(host_state, fs_sel, gs_sel, fs_base, gs_base);
+	vmx->guest_state_loaded = true;
+}
+
+static void vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	struct vmcs_host_state *host_state;
+
+	if (!vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+		return;
+
+	host_state = &vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state;
+
+	++vmx->vcpu.stat.host_state_reload;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
+#endif
+	if (host_state->ldt_sel || (host_state->gs_sel & 7)) {
+		kvm_load_ldt(host_state->ldt_sel);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		load_gs_index(host_state->gs_sel);
+#else
+		loadsegment(gs, host_state->gs_sel);
+#endif
+	}
+	if (host_state->fs_sel & 7)
+		loadsegment(fs, host_state->fs_sel);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (unlikely(host_state->ds_sel | host_state->es_sel)) {
+		loadsegment(ds, host_state->ds_sel);
+		loadsegment(es, host_state->es_sel);
+	}
+#endif
+	invalidate_tss_limit();
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base);
+#endif
+	load_fixmap_gdt(raw_smp_processor_id());
+	vmx->guest_state_loaded = false;
+	vmx->guest_msrs_ready = false;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static u64 vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	preempt_disable();
+	if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+		rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
+	preempt_enable();
+	return vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
+}
+
+static void vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
+{
+	preempt_disable();
+	if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, data);
+	preempt_enable();
+	vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base = data;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+	struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
+	struct pi_desc old, new;
+	unsigned int dest;
+
+	/*
+	 * In case of hot-plug or hot-unplug, we may have to undo
+	 * vmx_vcpu_pi_put even if there is no assigned device.  And we
+	 * always keep PI.NDST up to date for simplicity: it makes the
+	 * code easier, and CPU migration is not a fast path.
+	 */
+	if (!pi_test_sn(pi_desc) && vcpu->cpu == cpu)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the 'nv' field is POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR, do not change
+	 * PI.NDST: pi_post_block is the one expected to change PID.NDST and the
+	 * wakeup handler expects the vCPU to be on the blocked_vcpu_list that
+	 * matches PI.NDST. Otherwise, a vcpu may not be able to be woken up
+	 * correctly.
+	 */
+	if (pi_desc->nv == POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR || vcpu->cpu == cpu) {
+		pi_clear_sn(pi_desc);
+		goto after_clear_sn;
+	}
+
+	/* The full case.  */
+	do {
+		old.control = new.control = pi_desc->control;
+
+		dest = cpu_physical_id(cpu);
+
+		if (x2apic_enabled())
+			new.ndst = dest;
+		else
+			new.ndst = (dest << 8) & 0xFF00;
+
+		new.sn = 0;
+	} while (cmpxchg64(&pi_desc->control, old.control,
+			   new.control) != old.control);
+
+after_clear_sn:
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear SN before reading the bitmap.  The VT-d firmware
+	 * writes the bitmap and reads SN atomically (5.2.3 in the
+	 * spec), so it doesn't really have a memory barrier that
+	 * pairs with this, but we cannot do that and we need one.
+	 */
+	smp_mb__after_atomic();
+
+	if (!pi_is_pir_empty(pi_desc))
+		pi_set_on(pi_desc);
+}
+
+void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	bool already_loaded = vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu == cpu;
+
+	if (!already_loaded) {
+		loaded_vmcs_clear(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
+		local_irq_disable();
+		crash_disable_local_vmclear(cpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * Read loaded_vmcs->cpu should be before fetching
+		 * loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link.
+		 * See the comments in __loaded_vmcs_clear().
+		 */
+		smp_rmb();
+
+		list_add(&vmx->loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link,
+			 &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
+		crash_enable_local_vmclear(cpu);
+		local_irq_enable();
+	}
+
+	if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
+		per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
+		vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+		indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+	}
+
+	if (!already_loaded) {
+		void *gdt = get_current_gdt_ro();
+		unsigned long sysenter_esp;
+
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
+
+		/*
+		 * Linux uses per-cpu TSS and GDT, so set these when switching
+		 * processors.  See 22.2.4.
+		 */
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_TR_BASE,
+			    (unsigned long)&get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->tss.x86_tss);
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_GDTR_BASE, (unsigned long)gdt);   /* 22.2.4 */
+
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, sysenter_esp);
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, sysenter_esp); /* 22.2.3 */
+
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu = cpu;
+	}
+
+	/* Setup TSC multiplier */
+	if (kvm_has_tsc_control &&
+	    vmx->current_tsc_ratio != vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio)
+		decache_tsc_multiplier(vmx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Switches to specified vcpu, until a matching vcpu_put(), but assumes
+ * vcpu mutex is already taken.
+ */
+void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu);
+
+	vmx_vcpu_pi_load(vcpu, cpu);
+
+	vmx->host_pkru = read_pkru();
+	vmx->host_debugctlmsr = get_debugctlmsr();
+}
+
+static void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
+
+	if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm) ||
+		!irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP)  ||
+		!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	/* Set SN when the vCPU is preempted */
+	if (vcpu->preempted)
+		pi_set_sn(pi_desc);
+}
+
+static void vmx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vmx_vcpu_pi_put(vcpu);
+
+	vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(to_vmx(vcpu));
+}
+
+static bool emulation_required(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return emulate_invalid_guest_state && !guest_state_valid(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_decache_cr0_guest_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+unsigned long vmx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long rflags, save_rflags;
+
+	if (!kvm_register_is_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS)) {
+		kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS);
+		rflags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
+		if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
+			rflags &= RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
+			save_rflags = vmx->rmode.save_rflags;
+			rflags |= save_rflags & ~RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
+		}
+		vmx->rflags = rflags;
+	}
+	return vmx->rflags;
+}
+
+void vmx_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long old_rflags;
+
+	if (enable_unrestricted_guest) {
+		kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS);
+		vmx->rflags = rflags;
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, rflags);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	old_rflags = vmx_get_rflags(vcpu);
+	vmx->rflags = rflags;
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
+		vmx->rmode.save_rflags = rflags;
+		rflags |= X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM;
+	}
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, rflags);
+
+	if ((old_rflags ^ vmx->rflags) & X86_EFLAGS_VM)
+		vmx->emulation_required = emulation_required(vcpu);
+}
+
+u32 vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 interruptibility = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO);
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (interruptibility & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI)
+		ret |= KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI;
+	if (interruptibility & GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS)
+		ret |= KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask)
+{
+	u32 interruptibility_old = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO);
+	u32 interruptibility = interruptibility_old;
+
+	interruptibility &= ~(GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS);
+
+	if (mask & KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS)
+		interruptibility |= GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS;
+	else if (mask & KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI)
+		interruptibility |= GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI;
+
+	if ((interruptibility != interruptibility_old))
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, interruptibility);
+}
+
+static int vmx_rtit_ctl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long value;
+
+	/*
+	 * Any MSR write that attempts to change bits marked reserved will
+	 * case a #GP fault.
+	 */
+	if (data & vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask)
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Any attempt to modify IA32_RTIT_CTL while TraceEn is set will
+	 * result in a #GP unless the same write also clears TraceEn.
+	 */
+	if ((vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) &&
+		((vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl ^ data) & ~RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * WRMSR to IA32_RTIT_CTL that sets TraceEn but clears this bit
+	 * and FabricEn would cause #GP, if
+	 * CPUID.(EAX=14H, ECX=0):ECX.SNGLRGNOUT[bit 2] = 0
+	 */
+	if ((data & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) && !(data & RTIT_CTL_TOPA) &&
+		!(data & RTIT_CTL_FABRIC_EN) &&
+		!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_single_range_output))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * MTCFreq, CycThresh and PSBFreq encodings check, any MSR write that
+	 * utilize encodings marked reserved will casue a #GP fault.
+	 */
+	value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_mtc_periods);
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_mtc) &&
+			!test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE) >>
+			RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE_OFFSET, &value))
+		return 1;
+	value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+						PT_CAP_cycle_thresholds);
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_cyc) &&
+			!test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH) >>
+			RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH_OFFSET, &value))
+		return 1;
+	value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_periods);
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_cyc) &&
+			!test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ) >>
+			RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ_OFFSET, &value))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * If ADDRx_CFG is reserved or the encodings is >2 will
+	 * cause a #GP fault.
+	 */
+	value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR0) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR0_OFFSET;
+	if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.addr_range < 1)) || (value > 2))
+		return 1;
+	value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR1) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR1_OFFSET;
+	if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.addr_range < 2)) || (value > 2))
+		return 1;
+	value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR2) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR2_OFFSET;
+	if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.addr_range < 3)) || (value > 2))
+		return 1;
+	value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR3) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR3_OFFSET;
+	if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.addr_range < 4)) || (value > 2))
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long rip;
+
+	/*
+	 * Using VMCS.VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN on EPT misconfig depends on
+	 * undefined behavior: Intel's SDM doesn't mandate the VMCS field be
+	 * set when EPT misconfig occurs.  In practice, real hardware updates
+	 * VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN on EPT misconfig, but other hypervisors
+	 * (namely Hyper-V) don't set it due to it being undefined behavior,
+	 * i.e. we end up advancing IP with some random value.
+	 */
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) ||
+	    to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
+		rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+		rip += vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
+		kvm_rip_write(vcpu, rip);
+	} else {
+		if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP))
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* skipping an emulated instruction also counts */
+	vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void vmx_clear_hlt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that we clear the HLT state in the VMCS.  We don't need to
+	 * explicitly skip the instruction because if the HLT state is set,
+	 * then the instruction is already executing and RIP has already been
+	 * advanced.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm) &&
+			vmcs_read32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE) == GUEST_ACTIVITY_HLT)
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE);
+}
+
+static void vmx_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned nr = vcpu->arch.exception.nr;
+	bool has_error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code;
+	u32 error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.error_code;
+	u32 intr_info = nr | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
+
+	kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu);
+
+	if (has_error_code) {
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE, error_code);
+		intr_info |= INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
+		int inc_eip = 0;
+		if (kvm_exception_is_soft(nr))
+			inc_eip = vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len;
+		kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, nr, inc_eip);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->emulation_required);
+
+	if (kvm_exception_is_soft(nr)) {
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
+			     vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len);
+		intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION;
+	} else
+		intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION;
+
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intr_info);
+
+	vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
+}
+
+static bool vmx_rdtscp_supported(void)
+{
+	return cpu_has_vmx_rdtscp();
+}
+
+static bool vmx_invpcid_supported(void)
+{
+	return cpu_has_vmx_invpcid();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Swap MSR entry in host/guest MSR entry array.
+ */
+static void move_msr_up(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int from, int to)
+{
+	struct shared_msr_entry tmp;
+
+	tmp = vmx->guest_msrs[to];
+	vmx->guest_msrs[to] = vmx->guest_msrs[from];
+	vmx->guest_msrs[from] = tmp;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set up the vmcs to automatically save and restore system
+ * msrs.  Don't touch the 64-bit msrs if the guest is in legacy
+ * mode, as fiddling with msrs is very expensive.
+ */
+static void setup_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	int save_nmsrs, index;
+
+	save_nmsrs = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/*
+	 * The SYSCALL MSRs are only needed on long mode guests, and only
+	 * when EFER.SCE is set.
+	 */
+	if (is_long_mode(&vmx->vcpu) && (vmx->vcpu.arch.efer & EFER_SCE)) {
+		index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_STAR);
+		if (index >= 0)
+			move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
+		index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_LSTAR);
+		if (index >= 0)
+			move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
+		index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK);
+		if (index >= 0)
+			move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
+	}
+#endif
+	index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_EFER);
+	if (index >= 0 && update_transition_efer(vmx, index))
+		move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
+	index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_TSC_AUX);
+	if (index >= 0 && guest_cpuid_has(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
+		move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
+	index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL);
+	if (index >= 0)
+		move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
+
+	vmx->save_nmsrs = save_nmsrs;
+	vmx->guest_msrs_ready = false;
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+		vmx_update_msr_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu);
+}
+
+static u64 vmx_read_l1_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+	    (vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control & CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING))
+		return vcpu->arch.tsc_offset - vmcs12->tsc_offset;
+
+	return vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
+}
+
+static u64 vmx_write_l1_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	u64 g_tsc_offset = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * We're here if L1 chose not to trap WRMSR to TSC. According
+	 * to the spec, this should set L1's TSC; The offset that L1
+	 * set for L2 remains unchanged, and still needs to be added
+	 * to the newly set TSC to get L2's TSC.
+	 */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+	    (vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control & CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING))
+		g_tsc_offset = vmcs12->tsc_offset;
+
+	trace_kvm_write_tsc_offset(vcpu->vcpu_id,
+				   vcpu->arch.tsc_offset - g_tsc_offset,
+				   offset);
+	vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, offset + g_tsc_offset);
+	return offset + g_tsc_offset;
+}
+
+/*
+ * nested_vmx_allowed() checks whether a guest should be allowed to use VMX
+ * instructions and MSRs (i.e., nested VMX). Nested VMX is disabled for
+ * all guests if the "nested" module option is off, and can also be disabled
+ * for a single guest by disabling its VMX cpuid bit.
+ */
+bool nested_vmx_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return nested && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
+}
+
+static inline bool vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						 uint64_t val)
+{
+	uint64_t valid_bits = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits;
+
+	return !(val & ~valid_bits);
+}
+
+static int vmx_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
+{
+	switch (msr->index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
+		if (!nested)
+			return 1;
+		return vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmcs_config.nested, msr->index, &msr->data);
+	default:
+		return 1;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads an msr value (of 'msr_index') into 'pdata'.
+ * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
+ * Assumes vcpu_load() was already called.
+ */
+static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct shared_msr_entry *msr;
+	u32 index;
+
+	switch (msr_info->index) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	case MSR_FS_BASE:
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_FS_BASE);
+		break;
+	case MSR_GS_BASE:
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GS_BASE);
+		break;
+	case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
+		msr_info->data = vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(vmx);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case MSR_EFER:
+		return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+	case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !(vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+			return 1;
+		goto find_shared_msr;
+	case MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !vmx_has_waitpkg(vmx))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+			return 1;
+
+		msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
+		if (!kvm_mpx_supported() ||
+		    (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		     !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX)))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !(vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control &
+		      FEATURE_CONTROL_LMCE))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL:
+		msr_info->data = vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
+		if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+		return vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmx->nested.msrs, msr_info->index,
+				       &msr_info->data);
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
+		if (pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST)
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
+		if (pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST)
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.status;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH:
+		if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
+			!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+						PT_CAP_cr3_filtering))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.cr3_match;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE:
+		if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
+			(!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
+			 !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_single_range_output)))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_base;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK:
+		if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
+			(!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
+			 !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_single_range_output)))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B:
+		index = msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A;
+		if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
+			(index >= 2 * intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_num_address_ranges)))
+			return 1;
+		if (is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu))
+			return 1;
+		if (index % 2)
+			msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_b[index / 2];
+		else
+			msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2];
+		break;
+	case MSR_TSC_AUX:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
+			return 1;
+		goto find_shared_msr;
+	default:
+	find_shared_msr:
+		msr = find_msr_entry(vmx, msr_info->index);
+		if (msr) {
+			msr_info->data = msr->data;
+			break;
+		}
+		return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Writes msr value into the appropriate "register".
+ * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
+ * Assumes vcpu_load() was already called.
+ */
+static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct shared_msr_entry *msr;
+	int ret = 0;
+	u32 msr_index = msr_info->index;
+	u64 data = msr_info->data;
+	u32 index;
+
+	switch (msr_index) {
+	case MSR_EFER:
+		ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	case MSR_FS_BASE:
+		vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_FS_BASE, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_GS_BASE:
+		vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_GS_BASE, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
+		vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(vmx, data);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+			get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_cs = data;
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+			get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_eip = data;
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+			get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_esp = data;
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vm_exit_controls &
+						VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS)
+			get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_ia32_debugctl = data;
+
+		ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+		break;
+
+	case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
+		if (!kvm_mpx_supported() ||
+		    (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		     !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX)))
+			return 1;
+		if (is_noncanonical_address(data & PAGE_MASK, vcpu) ||
+		    (data & MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD))
+			return 1;
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, data);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !vmx_has_waitpkg(vmx))
+			return 1;
+
+		/* The reserved bit 1 and non-32 bit [63:32] should be zero */
+		if (data & (BIT_ULL(1) | GENMASK_ULL(63, 32)))
+			return 1;
+
+		vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+			return 1;
+
+		/* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
+		if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
+			return 1;
+
+		vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
+
+		if (!data)
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * For non-nested:
+		 * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
+		 * it through.
+		 *
+		 * For nested:
+		 * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
+		 * nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the
+		 * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten
+		 * in the merging. We update the vmcs01 here for L1 as well
+		 * since it will end up touching the MSR anyway now.
+		 */
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap,
+					      MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
+					      MSR_TYPE_RW);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !(vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+			return 1;
+		if (data & ~(TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE | TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR))
+			return 1;
+		goto find_shared_msr;
+	case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB)
+			return 1;
+
+		if (!data)
+			break;
+
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
+
+		/*
+		 * For non-nested:
+		 * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
+		 * it through.
+		 *
+		 * For nested:
+		 * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
+		 * nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the
+		 * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten
+		 * in the merging.
+		 */
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,
+					      MSR_TYPE_W);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
+		if (!kvm_pat_valid(data))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+		    get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT)
+			get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_ia32_pat = data;
+
+		if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
+			vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, data);
+			vcpu->arch.pat = data;
+			break;
+		}
+		ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
+		ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
+		if ((!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		     !(to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control &
+		       FEATURE_CONTROL_LMCE)) ||
+		    (data & ~MCG_EXT_CTL_LMCE_EN))
+			return 1;
+		vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL:
+		if (!vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(vcpu, data) ||
+		    (to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control &
+		     FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED && !msr_info->host_initiated))
+			return 1;
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control = data;
+		if (msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0)
+			vmx_leave_nested(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
+			return 1; /* they are read-only */
+		if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+		return vmx_set_vmx_msr(vcpu, msr_index, data);
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
+		if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
+			vmx_rtit_ctl_check(vcpu, data) ||
+			vmx->nested.vmxon)
+			return 1;
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL, data);
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl = data;
+		pt_update_intercept_for_msr(vmx);
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
+		if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
+			(vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) ||
+			(data & MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS_MASK))
+			return 1;
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.status = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH:
+		if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
+			(vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) ||
+			!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+						PT_CAP_cr3_filtering))
+			return 1;
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.cr3_match = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE:
+		if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
+			(vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) ||
+			(!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
+			 !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_single_range_output)) ||
+			(data & MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE_MASK))
+			return 1;
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_base = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK:
+		if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
+			(vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) ||
+			(!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
+			 !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_single_range_output)))
+			return 1;
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B:
+		index = msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A;
+		if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
+			(vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) ||
+			(index >= 2 * intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+					PT_CAP_num_address_ranges)))
+			return 1;
+		if (is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu))
+			return 1;
+		if (index % 2)
+			vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_b[index / 2] = data;
+		else
+			vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2] = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_TSC_AUX:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
+			return 1;
+		/* Check reserved bit, higher 32 bits should be zero */
+		if ((data >> 32) != 0)
+			return 1;
+		goto find_shared_msr;
+
+	default:
+	find_shared_msr:
+		msr = find_msr_entry(vmx, msr_index);
+		if (msr)
+			ret = vmx_set_guest_msr(vmx, msr, data);
+		else
+			ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg)
+{
+	kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, reg);
+
+	switch (reg) {
+	case VCPU_REGS_RSP:
+		vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP] = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RSP);
+		break;
+	case VCPU_REGS_RIP:
+		vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP] = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RIP);
+		break;
+	case VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR:
+		if (enable_ept)
+			ept_save_pdptrs(vcpu);
+		break;
+	case VCPU_EXREG_CR3:
+		if (enable_unrestricted_guest || (enable_ept && is_paging(vcpu)))
+			vcpu->arch.cr3 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3);
+		break;
+	default:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static __init int cpu_has_kvm_support(void)
+{
+	return cpu_has_vmx();
+}
+
+static __init int vmx_disabled_by_bios(void)
+{
+	u64 msr;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, msr);
+	if (msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED) {
+		/* launched w/ TXT and VMX disabled */
+		if (!(msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX)
+			&& tboot_enabled())
+			return 1;
+		/* launched w/o TXT and VMX only enabled w/ TXT */
+		if (!(msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX)
+			&& (msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX)
+			&& !tboot_enabled()) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "kvm: disable TXT in the BIOS or "
+				"activate TXT before enabling KVM\n");
+			return 1;
+		}
+		/* launched w/o TXT and VMX disabled */
+		if (!(msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX)
+			&& !tboot_enabled())
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void kvm_cpu_vmxon(u64 addr)
+{
+	cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
+	intel_pt_handle_vmx(1);
+
+	asm volatile ("vmxon %0" : : "m"(addr));
+}
+
+static int hardware_enable(void)
+{
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+	u64 phys_addr = __pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu));
+	u64 old, test_bits;
+
+	if (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_VMXE)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	/*
+	 * This can happen if we hot-added a CPU but failed to allocate
+	 * VP assist page for it.
+	 */
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs) &&
+	    !hv_get_vp_assist_page(cpu))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu, cpu));
+	spin_lock_init(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, cpu));
+
+	/*
+	 * Now we can enable the vmclear operation in kdump
+	 * since the loaded_vmcss_on_cpu list on this cpu
+	 * has been initialized.
+	 *
+	 * Though the cpu is not in VMX operation now, there
+	 * is no problem to enable the vmclear operation
+	 * for the loaded_vmcss_on_cpu list is empty!
+	 */
+	crash_enable_local_vmclear(cpu);
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, old);
+
+	test_bits = FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED;
+	test_bits |= FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
+	if (tboot_enabled())
+		test_bits |= FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX;
+
+	if ((old & test_bits) != test_bits) {
+		/* enable and lock */
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, old | test_bits);
+	}
+	kvm_cpu_vmxon(phys_addr);
+	if (enable_ept)
+		ept_sync_global();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss(void)
+{
+	int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+	struct loaded_vmcs *v, *n;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(v, n, &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu),
+				 loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link)
+		__loaded_vmcs_clear(v);
+}
+
+
+/* Just like cpu_vmxoff(), but with the __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot()
+ * tricks.
+ */
+static void kvm_cpu_vmxoff(void)
+{
+	asm volatile (__ex("vmxoff"));
+
+	intel_pt_handle_vmx(0);
+	cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
+}
+
+static void hardware_disable(void)
+{
+	vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss();
+	kvm_cpu_vmxoff();
+}
+
+static __init int adjust_vmx_controls(u32 ctl_min, u32 ctl_opt,
+				      u32 msr, u32 *result)
+{
+	u32 vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high;
+	u32 ctl = ctl_min | ctl_opt;
+
+	rdmsr(msr, vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high);
+
+	ctl &= vmx_msr_high; /* bit == 0 in high word ==> must be zero */
+	ctl |= vmx_msr_low;  /* bit == 1 in low word  ==> must be one  */
+
+	/* Ensure minimum (required) set of control bits are supported. */
+	if (ctl_min & ~ctl)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	*result = ctl;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
+				    struct vmx_capability *vmx_cap)
+{
+	u32 vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high;
+	u32 min, opt, min2, opt2;
+	u32 _pin_based_exec_control = 0;
+	u32 _cpu_based_exec_control = 0;
+	u32 _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control = 0;
+	u32 _vmexit_control = 0;
+	u32 _vmentry_control = 0;
+
+	memset(vmcs_conf, 0, sizeof(*vmcs_conf));
+	min = CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING |
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	      CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING |
+	      CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING |
+#endif
+	      CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
+	      CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |
+	      CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING |
+	      CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING |
+	      CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING |
+	      CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING |
+	      CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING |
+	      CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING |
+	      CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING;
+
+	opt = CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW |
+	      CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS |
+	      CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS;
+	if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS,
+				&_cpu_based_exec_control) < 0)
+		return -EIO;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if ((_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
+		_cpu_based_exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING &
+					   ~CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING;
+#endif
+	if (_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS) {
+		min2 = 0;
+		opt2 = SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_USE_GPA |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC |
+			SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING;
+		if (adjust_vmx_controls(min2, opt2,
+					MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
+					&_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control) < 0)
+			return -EIO;
+	}
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES))
+		_cpu_based_exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
+#endif
+
+	if (!(_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
+		_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~(
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
+
+	rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP,
+		&vmx_cap->ept, &vmx_cap->vpid);
+
+	if (_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT) {
+		/* CR3 accesses and invlpg don't need to cause VM Exits when EPT
+		   enabled */
+		_cpu_based_exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
+					     CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |
+					     CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING);
+	} else if (vmx_cap->ept) {
+		vmx_cap->ept = 0;
+		pr_warn_once("EPT CAP should not exist if not support "
+				"1-setting enable EPT VM-execution control\n");
+	}
+	if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID) &&
+		vmx_cap->vpid) {
+		vmx_cap->vpid = 0;
+		pr_warn_once("VPID CAP should not exist if not support "
+				"1-setting enable VPID VM-execution control\n");
+	}
+
+	min = VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS | VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	min |= VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE;
+#endif
+	opt = VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL |
+	      VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT |
+	      VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER |
+	      VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS |
+	      VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP |
+	      VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL;
+	if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS,
+				&_vmexit_control) < 0)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	min = PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK | PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING;
+	opt = PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS | PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR |
+		 PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
+	if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS,
+				&_pin_based_exec_control) < 0)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (cpu_has_broken_vmx_preemption_timer())
+		_pin_based_exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
+	if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY))
+		_pin_based_exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
+
+	min = VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS;
+	opt = VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL |
+	      VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT |
+	      VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER |
+	      VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS |
+	      VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP |
+	      VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL;
+	if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS,
+				&_vmentry_control) < 0)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	/*
+	 * Some cpus support VM_{ENTRY,EXIT}_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL but they
+	 * can't be used due to an errata where VM Exit may incorrectly clear
+	 * IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL[34:32].  Workaround the errata by using the
+	 * MSR load mechanism to switch IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x6) {
+		switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
+		case 26: /* AAK155 */
+		case 30: /* AAP115 */
+		case 37: /* AAT100 */
+		case 44: /* BC86,AAY89,BD102 */
+		case 46: /* BA97 */
+			_vmentry_control &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
+			_vmexit_control &= ~VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
+			pr_warn_once("kvm: VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL "
+					"does not work properly. Using workaround\n");
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+
+	rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC, vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high);
+
+	/* IA-32 SDM Vol 3B: VMCS size is never greater than 4kB. */
+	if ((vmx_msr_high & 0x1fff) > PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -EIO;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/* IA-32 SDM Vol 3B: 64-bit CPUs always have VMX_BASIC_MSR[48]==0. */
+	if (vmx_msr_high & (1u<<16))
+		return -EIO;
+#endif
+
+	/* Require Write-Back (WB) memory type for VMCS accesses. */
+	if (((vmx_msr_high >> 18) & 15) != 6)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	vmcs_conf->size = vmx_msr_high & 0x1fff;
+	vmcs_conf->order = get_order(vmcs_conf->size);
+	vmcs_conf->basic_cap = vmx_msr_high & ~0x1fff;
+
+	vmcs_conf->revision_id = vmx_msr_low;
+
+	vmcs_conf->pin_based_exec_ctrl = _pin_based_exec_control;
+	vmcs_conf->cpu_based_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_exec_control;
+	vmcs_conf->cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control;
+	vmcs_conf->vmexit_ctrl         = _vmexit_control;
+	vmcs_conf->vmentry_ctrl        = _vmentry_control;
+
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
+		evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls(vmcs_conf);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs_cpu(bool shadow, int cpu, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	int node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
+	struct page *pages;
+	struct vmcs *vmcs;
+
+	pages = __alloc_pages_node(node, flags, vmcs_config.order);
+	if (!pages)
+		return NULL;
+	vmcs = page_address(pages);
+	memset(vmcs, 0, vmcs_config.size);
+
+	/* KVM supports Enlightened VMCS v1 only */
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
+		vmcs->hdr.revision_id = KVM_EVMCS_VERSION;
+	else
+		vmcs->hdr.revision_id = vmcs_config.revision_id;
+
+	if (shadow)
+		vmcs->hdr.shadow_vmcs = 1;
+	return vmcs;
+}
+
+void free_vmcs(struct vmcs *vmcs)
+{
+	free_pages((unsigned long)vmcs, vmcs_config.order);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free a VMCS, but before that VMCLEAR it on the CPU where it was last loaded
+ */
+void free_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
+{
+	if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
+		return;
+	loaded_vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs);
+	free_vmcs(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+	loaded_vmcs->vmcs = NULL;
+	if (loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap)
+		free_page((unsigned long)loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap);
+	WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs != NULL);
+}
+
+int alloc_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
+{
+	loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs(false);
+	if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL;
+	loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = false;
+	loaded_vmcs_init(loaded_vmcs);
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) {
+		loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap = (unsigned long *)
+				__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		if (!loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap)
+			goto out_vmcs;
+		memset(loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) &&
+		    static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs) &&
+		    (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_MSR_BITMAP)) {
+			struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs =
+				(struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *)loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
+
+			evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.msr_bitmap = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	memset(&loaded_vmcs->host_state, 0, sizeof(struct vmcs_host_state));
+	memset(&loaded_vmcs->controls_shadow, 0,
+		sizeof(struct vmcs_controls_shadow));
+
+	return 0;
+
+out_vmcs:
+	free_loaded_vmcs(loaded_vmcs);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static void free_kvm_area(void)
+{
+	int cpu;
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		free_vmcs(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu));
+		per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu) = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static __init int alloc_kvm_area(void)
+{
+	int cpu;
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		struct vmcs *vmcs;
+
+		vmcs = alloc_vmcs_cpu(false, cpu, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!vmcs) {
+			free_kvm_area();
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * When eVMCS is enabled, alloc_vmcs_cpu() sets
+		 * vmcs->revision_id to KVM_EVMCS_VERSION instead of
+		 * revision_id reported by MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC.
+		 *
+		 * However, even though not explicitly documented by
+		 * TLFS, VMXArea passed as VMXON argument should
+		 * still be marked with revision_id reported by
+		 * physical CPU.
+		 */
+		if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
+			vmcs->hdr.revision_id = vmcs_config.revision_id;
+
+		per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu) = vmcs;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void fix_pmode_seg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg,
+		struct kvm_segment *save)
+{
+	if (!emulate_invalid_guest_state) {
+		/*
+		 * CS and SS RPL should be equal during guest entry according
+		 * to VMX spec, but in reality it is not always so. Since vcpu
+		 * is in the middle of the transition from real mode to
+		 * protected mode it is safe to assume that RPL 0 is a good
+		 * default value.
+		 */
+		if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS || seg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
+			save->selector &= ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+		save->dpl = save->selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+		save->s = 1;
+	}
+	vmx_set_segment(vcpu, save, seg);
+}
+
+static void enter_pmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Update real mode segment cache. It may be not up-to-date if sement
+	 * register was written while vcpu was in a guest mode.
+	 */
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES], VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS], VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS], VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS], VCPU_SREG_GS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS], VCPU_SREG_SS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS], VCPU_SREG_CS);
+
+	vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
+
+	vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
+
+	vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_TR], VCPU_SREG_TR);
+
+	flags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
+	flags &= RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
+	flags |= vmx->rmode.save_rflags & ~RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, flags);
+
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, (vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) & ~X86_CR4_VME) |
+			(vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW) & X86_CR4_VME));
+
+	update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
+
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_CS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS]);
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_SS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS]);
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_ES, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES]);
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_DS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS]);
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_FS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS]);
+	fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_GS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS]);
+}
+
+static void fix_rmode_seg(int seg, struct kvm_segment *save)
+{
+	const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg];
+	struct kvm_segment var = *save;
+
+	var.dpl = 0x3;
+	if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS)
+		var.type = 0x3;
+
+	if (!emulate_invalid_guest_state) {
+		var.selector = var.base >> 4;
+		var.base = var.base & 0xffff0;
+		var.limit = 0xffff;
+		var.g = 0;
+		var.db = 0;
+		var.present = 1;
+		var.s = 1;
+		var.l = 0;
+		var.unusable = 0;
+		var.type = 0x3;
+		var.avl = 0;
+		if (save->base & 0xf)
+			printk_once(KERN_WARNING "kvm: segment base is not "
+					"paragraph aligned when entering "
+					"protected mode (seg=%d)", seg);
+	}
+
+	vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var.selector);
+	vmcs_writel(sf->base, var.base);
+	vmcs_write32(sf->limit, var.limit);
+	vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, vmx_segment_access_rights(&var));
+}
+
+static void enter_rmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(vcpu->kvm);
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_TR], VCPU_SREG_TR);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES], VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS], VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS], VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS], VCPU_SREG_GS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS], VCPU_SREG_SS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS], VCPU_SREG_CS);
+
+	vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Very old userspace does not call KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR before entering
+	 * vcpu. Warn the user that an update is overdue.
+	 */
+	if (!kvm_vmx->tss_addr)
+		printk_once(KERN_WARNING "kvm: KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR need to be "
+			     "called before entering vcpu\n");
+
+	vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
+
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, kvm_vmx->tss_addr);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, RMODE_TSS_SIZE - 1);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, 0x008b);
+
+	flags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
+	vmx->rmode.save_rflags = flags;
+
+	flags |= X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM;
+
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, flags);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) | X86_CR4_VME);
+	update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
+
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_SS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS]);
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_CS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS]);
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_ES, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES]);
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_DS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS]);
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_GS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS]);
+	fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_FS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS]);
+
+	kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
+}
+
+void vmx_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct shared_msr_entry *msr = find_msr_entry(vmx, MSR_EFER);
+
+	if (!msr)
+		return;
+
+	vcpu->arch.efer = efer;
+	if (efer & EFER_LMA) {
+		vm_entry_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
+		msr->data = efer;
+	} else {
+		vm_entry_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
+
+		msr->data = efer & ~EFER_LME;
+	}
+	setup_msrs(vmx);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+
+static void enter_lmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 guest_tr_ar;
+
+	vmx_segment_cache_clear(to_vmx(vcpu));
+
+	guest_tr_ar = vmcs_read32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES);
+	if ((guest_tr_ar & VMX_AR_TYPE_MASK) != VMX_AR_TYPE_BUSY_64_TSS) {
+		pr_debug_ratelimited("%s: tss fixup for long mode. \n",
+				     __func__);
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES,
+			     (guest_tr_ar & ~VMX_AR_TYPE_MASK)
+			     | VMX_AR_TYPE_BUSY_64_TSS);
+	}
+	vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer | EFER_LMA);
+}
+
+static void exit_lmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vm_entry_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
+	vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer & ~EFER_LMA);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static void vmx_flush_tlb_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr)
+{
+	int vpid = to_vmx(vcpu)->vpid;
+
+	if (!vpid_sync_vcpu_addr(vpid, addr))
+		vpid_sync_context(vpid);
+
+	/*
+	 * If VPIDs are not supported or enabled, then the above is a no-op.
+	 * But we don't really need a TLB flush in that case anyway, because
+	 * each VM entry/exit includes an implicit flush when VPID is 0.
+	 */
+}
+
+static void vmx_decache_cr0_guest_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	ulong cr0_guest_owned_bits = vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits;
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr0 &= ~cr0_guest_owned_bits;
+	vcpu->arch.cr0 |= vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR0) & cr0_guest_owned_bits;
+}
+
+static void vmx_decache_cr4_guest_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	ulong cr4_guest_owned_bits = vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits;
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr4 &= ~cr4_guest_owned_bits;
+	vcpu->arch.cr4 |= vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) & cr4_guest_owned_bits;
+}
+
+static void ept_load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
+
+	if (!kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR))
+		return;
+
+	if (is_pae_paging(vcpu)) {
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR0, mmu->pdptrs[0]);
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR1, mmu->pdptrs[1]);
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR2, mmu->pdptrs[2]);
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR3, mmu->pdptrs[3]);
+	}
+}
+
+void ept_save_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
+
+	if (is_pae_paging(vcpu)) {
+		mmu->pdptrs[0] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR0);
+		mmu->pdptrs[1] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR1);
+		mmu->pdptrs[2] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR2);
+		mmu->pdptrs[3] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3);
+	}
+
+	kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR);
+}
+
+static void ept_update_paging_mode_cr0(unsigned long *hw_cr0,
+					unsigned long cr0,
+					struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (!kvm_register_is_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3))
+		vmx_cache_reg(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
+	if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
+		/* From paging/starting to nonpaging */
+		exec_controls_setbit(vmx, CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
+					  CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING);
+		vcpu->arch.cr0 = cr0;
+		vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu));
+	} else if (!is_paging(vcpu)) {
+		/* From nonpaging to paging */
+		exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
+					    CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING);
+		vcpu->arch.cr0 = cr0;
+		vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu));
+	}
+
+	if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_WP))
+		*hw_cr0 &= ~X86_CR0_WP;
+}
+
+void vmx_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long hw_cr0;
+
+	hw_cr0 = (cr0 & ~KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_OFF);
+	if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
+		hw_cr0 |= KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
+	else {
+		hw_cr0 |= KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON;
+
+		if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PE))
+			enter_pmode(vcpu);
+
+		if (!vmx->rmode.vm86_active && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PE))
+			enter_rmode(vcpu);
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	if (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME) {
+		if (!is_paging(vcpu) && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG))
+			enter_lmode(vcpu);
+		if (is_paging(vcpu) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG))
+			exit_lmode(vcpu);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (enable_ept && !enable_unrestricted_guest)
+		ept_update_paging_mode_cr0(&hw_cr0, cr0, vcpu);
+
+	vmcs_writel(CR0_READ_SHADOW, cr0);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR0, hw_cr0);
+	vcpu->arch.cr0 = cr0;
+
+	/* depends on vcpu->arch.cr0 to be set to a new value */
+	vmx->emulation_required = emulation_required(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int get_ept_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels() && (cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu) > 48))
+		return 5;
+	return 4;
+}
+
+u64 construct_eptp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long root_hpa)
+{
+	u64 eptp = VMX_EPTP_MT_WB;
+
+	eptp |= (get_ept_level(vcpu) == 5) ? VMX_EPTP_PWL_5 : VMX_EPTP_PWL_4;
+
+	if (enable_ept_ad_bits &&
+	    (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) || nested_ept_ad_enabled(vcpu)))
+		eptp |= VMX_EPTP_AD_ENABLE_BIT;
+	eptp |= (root_hpa & PAGE_MASK);
+
+	return eptp;
+}
+
+void vmx_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
+{
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	bool update_guest_cr3 = true;
+	unsigned long guest_cr3;
+	u64 eptp;
+
+	guest_cr3 = cr3;
+	if (enable_ept) {
+		eptp = construct_eptp(vcpu, cr3);
+		vmcs_write64(EPT_POINTER, eptp);
+
+		if (kvm_x86_ops->tlb_remote_flush) {
+			spin_lock(&to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointer_lock);
+			to_vmx(vcpu)->ept_pointer = eptp;
+			to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointers_match
+				= EPT_POINTERS_CHECK;
+			spin_unlock(&to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointer_lock);
+		}
+
+		/* Loading vmcs02.GUEST_CR3 is handled by nested VM-Enter. */
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+			update_guest_cr3 = false;
+		else if (!enable_unrestricted_guest && !is_paging(vcpu))
+			guest_cr3 = to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_identity_map_addr;
+		else if (test_bit(VCPU_EXREG_CR3, (ulong *)&vcpu->arch.regs_avail))
+			guest_cr3 = vcpu->arch.cr3;
+		else /* vmcs01.GUEST_CR3 is already up-to-date. */
+			update_guest_cr3 = false;
+		ept_load_pdptrs(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	if (update_guest_cr3)
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR3, guest_cr3);
+}
+
+int vmx_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	/*
+	 * Pass through host's Machine Check Enable value to hw_cr4, which
+	 * is in force while we are in guest mode.  Do not let guests control
+	 * this bit, even if host CR4.MCE == 0.
+	 */
+	unsigned long hw_cr4;
+
+	hw_cr4 = (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_MCE) | (cr4 & ~X86_CR4_MCE);
+	if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
+		hw_cr4 |= KVM_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
+	else if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active)
+		hw_cr4 |= KVM_RMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON;
+	else
+		hw_cr4 |= KVM_PMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_UMIP) && vmx_umip_emulated()) {
+		if (cr4 & X86_CR4_UMIP) {
+			secondary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
+			hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_UMIP;
+		} else if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) ||
+			!nested_cpu_has2(get_vmcs12(vcpu), SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC)) {
+			secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (cr4 & X86_CR4_VMXE) {
+		/*
+		 * To use VMXON (and later other VMX instructions), a guest
+		 * must first be able to turn on cr4.VMXE (see handle_vmon()).
+		 * So basically the check on whether to allow nested VMX
+		 * is here.  We operate under the default treatment of SMM,
+		 * so VMX cannot be enabled under SMM.
+		 */
+		if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu) || is_smm(vcpu))
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->nested.vmxon && !nested_cr4_valid(vcpu, cr4))
+		return 1;
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr4 = cr4;
+
+	if (!enable_unrestricted_guest) {
+		if (enable_ept) {
+			if (!is_paging(vcpu)) {
+				hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_PAE;
+				hw_cr4 |= X86_CR4_PSE;
+			} else if (!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)) {
+				hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_PAE;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * SMEP/SMAP/PKU is disabled if CPU is in non-paging mode in
+		 * hardware.  To emulate this behavior, SMEP/SMAP/PKU needs
+		 * to be manually disabled when guest switches to non-paging
+		 * mode.
+		 *
+		 * If !enable_unrestricted_guest, the CPU is always running
+		 * with CR0.PG=1 and CR4 needs to be modified.
+		 * If enable_unrestricted_guest, the CPU automatically
+		 * disables SMEP/SMAP/PKU when the guest sets CR0.PG=0.
+		 */
+		if (!is_paging(vcpu))
+			hw_cr4 &= ~(X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE);
+	}
+
+	vmcs_writel(CR4_READ_SHADOW, cr4);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, hw_cr4);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void vmx_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u32 ar;
+
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && seg != VCPU_SREG_LDTR) {
+		*var = vmx->rmode.segs[seg];
+		if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR
+		    || var->selector == vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(vmx, seg))
+			return;
+		var->base = vmx_read_guest_seg_base(vmx, seg);
+		var->selector = vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(vmx, seg);
+		return;
+	}
+	var->base = vmx_read_guest_seg_base(vmx, seg);
+	var->limit = vmx_read_guest_seg_limit(vmx, seg);
+	var->selector = vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(vmx, seg);
+	ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(vmx, seg);
+	var->unusable = (ar >> 16) & 1;
+	var->type = ar & 15;
+	var->s = (ar >> 4) & 1;
+	var->dpl = (ar >> 5) & 3;
+	/*
+	 * Some userspaces do not preserve unusable property. Since usable
+	 * segment has to be present according to VMX spec we can use present
+	 * property to amend userspace bug by making unusable segment always
+	 * nonpresent. vmx_segment_access_rights() already marks nonpresent
+	 * segment as unusable.
+	 */
+	var->present = !var->unusable;
+	var->avl = (ar >> 12) & 1;
+	var->l = (ar >> 13) & 1;
+	var->db = (ar >> 14) & 1;
+	var->g = (ar >> 15) & 1;
+}
+
+static u64 vmx_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment s;
+
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active) {
+		vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &s, seg);
+		return s.base;
+	}
+	return vmx_read_guest_seg_base(to_vmx(vcpu), seg);
+}
+
+int vmx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (unlikely(vmx->rmode.vm86_active))
+		return 0;
+	else {
+		int ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(vmx, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+		return VMX_AR_DPL(ar);
+	}
+}
+
+static u32 vmx_segment_access_rights(struct kvm_segment *var)
+{
+	u32 ar;
+
+	if (var->unusable || !var->present)
+		ar = 1 << 16;
+	else {
+		ar = var->type & 15;
+		ar |= (var->s & 1) << 4;
+		ar |= (var->dpl & 3) << 5;
+		ar |= (var->present & 1) << 7;
+		ar |= (var->avl & 1) << 12;
+		ar |= (var->l & 1) << 13;
+		ar |= (var->db & 1) << 14;
+		ar |= (var->g & 1) << 15;
+	}
+
+	return ar;
+}
+
+void vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg];
+
+	vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
+
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && seg != VCPU_SREG_LDTR) {
+		vmx->rmode.segs[seg] = *var;
+		if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR)
+			vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var->selector);
+		else if (var->s)
+			fix_rmode_seg(seg, &vmx->rmode.segs[seg]);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	vmcs_writel(sf->base, var->base);
+	vmcs_write32(sf->limit, var->limit);
+	vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var->selector);
+
+	/*
+	 *   Fix the "Accessed" bit in AR field of segment registers for older
+	 * qemu binaries.
+	 *   IA32 arch specifies that at the time of processor reset the
+	 * "Accessed" bit in the AR field of segment registers is 1. And qemu
+	 * is setting it to 0 in the userland code. This causes invalid guest
+	 * state vmexit when "unrestricted guest" mode is turned on.
+	 *    Fix for this setup issue in cpu_reset is being pushed in the qemu
+	 * tree. Newer qemu binaries with that qemu fix would not need this
+	 * kvm hack.
+	 */
+	if (enable_unrestricted_guest && (seg != VCPU_SREG_LDTR))
+		var->type |= 0x1; /* Accessed */
+
+	vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, vmx_segment_access_rights(var));
+
+out:
+	vmx->emulation_required = emulation_required(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l)
+{
+	u32 ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(to_vmx(vcpu), VCPU_SREG_CS);
+
+	*db = (ar >> 14) & 1;
+	*l = (ar >> 13) & 1;
+}
+
+static void vmx_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	dt->size = vmcs_read32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
+	dt->address = vmcs_readl(GUEST_IDTR_BASE);
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, dt->size);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, dt->address);
+}
+
+static void vmx_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	dt->size = vmcs_read32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT);
+	dt->address = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GDTR_BASE);
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
+{
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, dt->size);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, dt->address);
+}
+
+static bool rmode_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment var;
+	u32 ar;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &var, seg);
+	var.dpl = 0x3;
+	if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS)
+		var.type = 0x3;
+	ar = vmx_segment_access_rights(&var);
+
+	if (var.base != (var.selector << 4))
+		return false;
+	if (var.limit != 0xffff)
+		return false;
+	if (ar != 0xf3)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool code_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment cs;
+	unsigned int cs_rpl;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	cs_rpl = cs.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+
+	if (cs.unusable)
+		return false;
+	if (~cs.type & (VMX_AR_TYPE_CODE_MASK|VMX_AR_TYPE_ACCESSES_MASK))
+		return false;
+	if (!cs.s)
+		return false;
+	if (cs.type & VMX_AR_TYPE_WRITEABLE_MASK) {
+		if (cs.dpl > cs_rpl)
+			return false;
+	} else {
+		if (cs.dpl != cs_rpl)
+			return false;
+	}
+	if (!cs.present)
+		return false;
+
+	/* TODO: Add Reserved field check, this'll require a new member in the kvm_segment_field structure */
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool stack_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment ss;
+	unsigned int ss_rpl;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+	ss_rpl = ss.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+
+	if (ss.unusable)
+		return true;
+	if (ss.type != 3 && ss.type != 7)
+		return false;
+	if (!ss.s)
+		return false;
+	if (ss.dpl != ss_rpl) /* DPL != RPL */
+		return false;
+	if (!ss.present)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool data_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment var;
+	unsigned int rpl;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &var, seg);
+	rpl = var.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
+
+	if (var.unusable)
+		return true;
+	if (!var.s)
+		return false;
+	if (!var.present)
+		return false;
+	if (~var.type & (VMX_AR_TYPE_CODE_MASK|VMX_AR_TYPE_WRITEABLE_MASK)) {
+		if (var.dpl < rpl) /* DPL < RPL */
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	/* TODO: Add other members to kvm_segment_field to allow checking for other access
+	 * rights flags
+	 */
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool tr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment tr;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &tr, VCPU_SREG_TR);
+
+	if (tr.unusable)
+		return false;
+	if (tr.selector & SEGMENT_TI_MASK)	/* TI = 1 */
+		return false;
+	if (tr.type != 3 && tr.type != 11) /* TODO: Check if guest is in IA32e mode */
+		return false;
+	if (!tr.present)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool ldtr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment ldtr;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &ldtr, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
+
+	if (ldtr.unusable)
+		return true;
+	if (ldtr.selector & SEGMENT_TI_MASK)	/* TI = 1 */
+		return false;
+	if (ldtr.type != 2)
+		return false;
+	if (!ldtr.present)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool cs_ss_rpl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct kvm_segment cs, ss;
+
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
+
+	return ((cs.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK) ==
+		 (ss.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if guest state is valid. Returns true if valid, false if
+ * not.
+ * We assume that registers are always usable
+ */
+static bool guest_state_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
+		return true;
+
+	/* real mode guest state checks */
+	if (!is_protmode(vcpu) || (vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_VM)) {
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_CS))
+			return false;
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_SS))
+			return false;
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_DS))
+			return false;
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_ES))
+			return false;
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_FS))
+			return false;
+		if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_GS))
+			return false;
+	} else {
+	/* protected mode guest state checks */
+		if (!cs_ss_rpl_check(vcpu))
+			return false;
+		if (!code_segment_valid(vcpu))
+			return false;
+		if (!stack_segment_valid(vcpu))
+			return false;
+		if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_DS))
+			return false;
+		if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_ES))
+			return false;
+		if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_FS))
+			return false;
+		if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_GS))
+			return false;
+		if (!tr_valid(vcpu))
+			return false;
+		if (!ldtr_valid(vcpu))
+			return false;
+	}
+	/* TODO:
+	 * - Add checks on RIP
+	 * - Add checks on RFLAGS
+	 */
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int init_rmode_tss(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	gfn_t fn;
+	u16 data = 0;
+	int idx, r;
+
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+	fn = to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->tss_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	r = kvm_clear_guest_page(kvm, fn, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+	data = TSS_BASE_SIZE + TSS_REDIRECTION_SIZE;
+	r = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, fn++, &data,
+			TSS_IOPB_BASE_OFFSET, sizeof(u16));
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+	r = kvm_clear_guest_page(kvm, fn++, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+	r = kvm_clear_guest_page(kvm, fn, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+	data = ~0;
+	r = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, fn, &data,
+				 RMODE_TSS_SIZE - 2 * PAGE_SIZE - 1,
+				 sizeof(u8));
+out:
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int init_rmode_identity_map(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(kvm);
+	int i, idx, r = 0;
+	kvm_pfn_t identity_map_pfn;
+	u32 tmp;
+
+	/* Protect kvm_vmx->ept_identity_pagetable_done. */
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+	if (likely(kvm_vmx->ept_identity_pagetable_done))
+		goto out2;
+
+	if (!kvm_vmx->ept_identity_map_addr)
+		kvm_vmx->ept_identity_map_addr = VMX_EPT_IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_ADDR;
+	identity_map_pfn = kvm_vmx->ept_identity_map_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	r = __x86_set_memory_region(kvm, IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT,
+				    kvm_vmx->ept_identity_map_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out2;
+
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+	r = kvm_clear_guest_page(kvm, identity_map_pfn, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (r < 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* Set up identity-mapping pagetable for EPT in real mode */
+	for (i = 0; i < PT32_ENT_PER_PAGE; i++) {
+		tmp = (i << 22) + (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER |
+			_PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE);
+		r = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, identity_map_pfn,
+				&tmp, i * sizeof(tmp), sizeof(tmp));
+		if (r < 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	kvm_vmx->ept_identity_pagetable_done = true;
+
+out:
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
+
+out2:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void seg_setup(int seg)
+{
+	const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg];
+	unsigned int ar;
+
+	vmcs_write16(sf->selector, 0);
+	vmcs_writel(sf->base, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(sf->limit, 0xffff);
+	ar = 0x93;
+	if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS)
+		ar |= 0x08; /* code segment */
+
+	vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, ar);
+}
+
+static int alloc_apic_access_page(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	if (kvm->arch.apic_access_page_done)
+		goto out;
+	r = __x86_set_memory_region(kvm, APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT,
+				    APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (r)
+		goto out;
+
+	page = gfn_to_page(kvm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	if (is_error_page(page)) {
+		r = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not pin the page in memory, so that memory hot-unplug
+	 * is able to migrate it.
+	 */
+	put_page(page);
+	kvm->arch.apic_access_page_done = true;
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int allocate_vpid(void)
+{
+	int vpid;
+
+	if (!enable_vpid)
+		return 0;
+	spin_lock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
+	vpid = find_first_zero_bit(vmx_vpid_bitmap, VMX_NR_VPIDS);
+	if (vpid < VMX_NR_VPIDS)
+		__set_bit(vpid, vmx_vpid_bitmap);
+	else
+		vpid = 0;
+	spin_unlock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
+	return vpid;
+}
+
+void free_vpid(int vpid)
+{
+	if (!enable_vpid || vpid == 0)
+		return;
+	spin_lock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
+	__clear_bit(vpid, vmx_vpid_bitmap);
+	spin_unlock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
+							  u32 msr, int type)
+{
+	int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+		return;
+
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
+		evmcs_touch_msr_bitmap();
+
+	/*
+	 * See Intel PRM Vol. 3, 20.6.9 (MSR-Bitmap Address). Early manuals
+	 * have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets the wrong way round.
+	 * We can control MSRs 0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff.
+	 */
+	if (msr <= 0x1fff) {
+		if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+			/* read-low */
+			__clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000 / f);
+
+		if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+			/* write-low */
+			__clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
+
+	} else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) {
+		msr &= 0x1fff;
+		if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+			/* read-high */
+			__clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400 / f);
+
+		if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+			/* write-high */
+			__clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f);
+
+	}
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
+							 u32 msr, int type)
+{
+	int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+		return;
+
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
+		evmcs_touch_msr_bitmap();
+
+	/*
+	 * See Intel PRM Vol. 3, 20.6.9 (MSR-Bitmap Address). Early manuals
+	 * have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets the wrong way round.
+	 * We can control MSRs 0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff.
+	 */
+	if (msr <= 0x1fff) {
+		if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+			/* read-low */
+			__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000 / f);
+
+		if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+			/* write-low */
+			__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
+
+	} else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) {
+		msr &= 0x1fff;
+		if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
+			/* read-high */
+			__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400 / f);
+
+		if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
+			/* write-high */
+			__set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f);
+
+	}
+}
+
+static __always_inline void vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
+			     			      u32 msr, int type, bool value)
+{
+	if (value)
+		vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, msr, type);
+	else
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, msr, type);
+}
+
+static u8 vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u8 mode = 0;
+
+	if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() &&
+	    (secondary_exec_controls_get(to_vmx(vcpu)) &
+	     SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)) {
+		mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC;
+		if (enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+			mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV;
+	}
+
+	return mode;
+}
+
+static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
+					 u8 mode)
+{
+	int msr;
+
+	for (msr = 0x800; msr <= 0x8ff; msr += BITS_PER_LONG) {
+		unsigned word = msr / BITS_PER_LONG;
+		msr_bitmap[word] = (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) ? 0 : ~0;
+		msr_bitmap[word + (0x800 / sizeof(long))] = ~0;
+	}
+
+	if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC) {
+		/*
+		 * TPR reads and writes can be virtualized even if virtual interrupt
+		 * delivery is not in use.
+		 */
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI), MSR_TYPE_RW);
+		if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) {
+			vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), MSR_TYPE_R);
+			vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), MSR_TYPE_W);
+			vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SELF_IPI), MSR_TYPE_W);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
+	u8 mode = vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(vcpu);
+	u8 changed = mode ^ vmx->msr_bitmap_mode;
+
+	if (!changed)
+		return;
+
+	if (changed & (MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC | MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV))
+		vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(msr_bitmap, mode);
+
+	vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = mode;
+}
+
+void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
+	bool flag = !(vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN);
+	u32 i;
+
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS,
+							MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE,
+							MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK,
+							MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH,
+							MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	for (i = 0; i < vmx->pt_desc.addr_range; i++) {
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap,
+			MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+		vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap,
+			MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
+	}
+}
+
+static bool vmx_get_enable_apicv(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return enable_apicv;
+}
+
+static bool vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	void *vapic_page;
+	u32 vppr;
+	int rvi;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_guest_mode(vcpu)) ||
+		!nested_cpu_has_vid(get_vmcs12(vcpu)) ||
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!vmx->nested.virtual_apic_map.gfn))
+		return false;
+
+	rvi = vmx_get_rvi();
+
+	vapic_page = vmx->nested.virtual_apic_map.hva;
+	vppr = *((u32 *)(vapic_page + APIC_PROCPRI));
+
+	return ((rvi & 0xf0) > (vppr & 0xf0));
+}
+
+static inline bool kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						     bool nested)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+	int pi_vec = nested ? POSTED_INTR_NESTED_VECTOR : POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
+
+	if (vcpu->mode == IN_GUEST_MODE) {
+		/*
+		 * The vector of interrupt to be delivered to vcpu had
+		 * been set in PIR before this function.
+		 *
+		 * Following cases will be reached in this block, and
+		 * we always send a notification event in all cases as
+		 * explained below.
+		 *
+		 * Case 1: vcpu keeps in non-root mode. Sending a
+		 * notification event posts the interrupt to vcpu.
+		 *
+		 * Case 2: vcpu exits to root mode and is still
+		 * runnable. PIR will be synced to vIRR before the
+		 * next vcpu entry. Sending a notification event in
+		 * this case has no effect, as vcpu is not in root
+		 * mode.
+		 *
+		 * Case 3: vcpu exits to root mode and is blocked.
+		 * vcpu_block() has already synced PIR to vIRR and
+		 * never blocks vcpu if vIRR is not cleared. Therefore,
+		 * a blocked vcpu here does not wait for any requested
+		 * interrupts in PIR, and sending a notification event
+		 * which has no effect is safe here.
+		 */
+
+		apic->send_IPI_mask(get_cpu_mask(vcpu->cpu), pi_vec);
+		return true;
+	}
+#endif
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+						int vector)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+	    vector == vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv) {
+		/*
+		 * If a posted intr is not recognized by hardware,
+		 * we will accomplish it in the next vmentry.
+		 */
+		vmx->nested.pi_pending = true;
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+		/* the PIR and ON have been set by L1. */
+		if (!kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, true))
+			kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+/*
+ * Send interrupt to vcpu via posted interrupt way.
+ * 1. If target vcpu is running(non-root mode), send posted interrupt
+ * notification to vcpu and hardware will sync PIR to vIRR atomically.
+ * 2. If target vcpu isn't running(root mode), kick it to pick up the
+ * interrupt from PIR in next vmentry.
+ */
+static void vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	int r;
+
+	r = vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(vcpu, vector);
+	if (!r)
+		return;
+
+	if (pi_test_and_set_pir(vector, &vmx->pi_desc))
+		return;
+
+	/* If a previous notification has sent the IPI, nothing to do.  */
+	if (pi_test_and_set_on(&vmx->pi_desc))
+		return;
+
+	if (!kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, false))
+		kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set up the vmcs's constant host-state fields, i.e., host-state fields that
+ * will not change in the lifetime of the guest.
+ * Note that host-state that does change is set elsewhere. E.g., host-state
+ * that is set differently for each CPU is set in vmx_vcpu_load(), not here.
+ */
+void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u32 low32, high32;
+	unsigned long tmpl;
+	unsigned long cr0, cr3, cr4;
+
+	cr0 = read_cr0();
+	WARN_ON(cr0 & X86_CR0_TS);
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_CR0, cr0);  /* 22.2.3 */
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the most likely value for this task's CR3 in the VMCS.
+	 * We can't use __get_current_cr3_fast() because we're not atomic.
+	 */
+	cr3 = __read_cr3();
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, cr3);		/* 22.2.3  FIXME: shadow tables */
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3 = cr3;
+
+	/* Save the most likely value for this task's CR4 in the VMCS. */
+	cr4 = cr4_read_shadow();
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4);			/* 22.2.3, 22.2.5 */
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4;
+
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_CS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_CS);  /* 22.2.4 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/*
+	 * Load null selectors, so we can avoid reloading them in
+	 * vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(), in case userspace uses
+	 * the null selectors too (the expected case).
+	 */
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, 0);
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, 0);
+#else
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS);  /* 22.2.4 */
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS);  /* 22.2.4 */
+#endif
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS);  /* 22.2.4 */
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_TR_SELECTOR, GDT_ENTRY_TSS*8);  /* 22.2.4 */
+
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_IDTR_BASE, host_idt_base);   /* 22.2.4 */
+
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_RIP, (unsigned long)vmx_vmexit); /* 22.2.5 */
+
+	rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32, high32);
+	vmcs_write32(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl);
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl);   /* 22.2.3 */
+
+	if (vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
+		rdmsr(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, low32, high32);
+		vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_PAT, low32 | ((u64) high32 << 32));
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer())
+		vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, host_efer);
+}
+
+void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = KVM_CR4_GUEST_OWNED_BITS;
+	if (enable_ept)
+		vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits |= X86_CR4_PGE;
+	if (is_guest_mode(&vmx->vcpu))
+		vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits &=
+			~get_vmcs12(&vmx->vcpu)->cr4_guest_host_mask;
+	vmcs_writel(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits);
+}
+
+u32 vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u32 pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl;
+
+	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu))
+		pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
+
+	if (!enable_vnmi)
+		pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS;
+
+	if (!enable_preemption_timer)
+		pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
+
+	return pin_based_exec_ctrl;
+}
+
+static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	pin_controls_set(vmx, vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(vmx));
+	if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
+		if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+			secondary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx,
+				      SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
+				      SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
+		else
+			secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx,
+					SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
+					SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+		vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu);
+}
+
+u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u32 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_exec_ctrl;
+
+	if (vmx->vcpu.arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)
+		exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING;
+
+	if (!cpu_need_tpr_shadow(&vmx->vcpu)) {
+		exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		exec_control |= CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING |
+				CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING;
+#endif
+	}
+	if (!enable_ept)
+		exec_control |= CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |
+				CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING  |
+				CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING;
+	if (kvm_mwait_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
+		exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING |
+				CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING);
+	if (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
+		exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING;
+	return exec_control;
+}
+
+
+static void vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &vmx->vcpu;
+
+	u32 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl;
+
+	if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_SYSTEM)
+		exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_USE_GPA | SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX);
+	if (!cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(vcpu))
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
+	if (vmx->vpid == 0)
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
+	if (!enable_ept) {
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
+		enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
+	}
+	if (!enable_unrestricted_guest)
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
+	if (kvm_pause_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING;
+	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
+				  SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
+	exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
+
+	/* SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC is enabled/disabled on writes to CR4.UMIP,
+	 * in vmx_set_cr4.  */
+	exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC;
+
+	/* SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS is enabled when L1 executes VMPTRLD
+	   (handle_vmptrld).
+	   We can NOT enable shadow_vmcs here because we don't have yet
+	   a current VMCS12
+	*/
+	exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS;
+
+	if (!enable_pml)
+		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
+
+	if (vmx_xsaves_supported()) {
+		/* Exposing XSAVES only when XSAVE is exposed */
+		bool xsaves_enabled =
+			guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
+			guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
+
+		vcpu->arch.xsaves_enabled = xsaves_enabled;
+
+		if (!xsaves_enabled)
+			exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES;
+
+		if (nested) {
+			if (xsaves_enabled)
+				vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
+					SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES;
+			else
+				vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
+					~SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (vmx_rdtscp_supported()) {
+		bool rdtscp_enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP);
+		if (!rdtscp_enabled)
+			exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
+
+		if (nested) {
+			if (rdtscp_enabled)
+				vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
+					SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
+			else
+				vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
+					~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (vmx_invpcid_supported()) {
+		/* Exposing INVPCID only when PCID is exposed */
+		bool invpcid_enabled =
+			guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID) &&
+			guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PCID);
+
+		if (!invpcid_enabled) {
+			exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
+			guest_cpuid_clear(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
+		}
+
+		if (nested) {
+			if (invpcid_enabled)
+				vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
+					SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
+			else
+				vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
+					~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (vmx_rdrand_supported()) {
+		bool rdrand_enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND);
+		if (rdrand_enabled)
+			exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING;
+
+		if (nested) {
+			if (rdrand_enabled)
+				vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
+					SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING;
+			else
+				vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
+					~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (vmx_rdseed_supported()) {
+		bool rdseed_enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED);
+		if (rdseed_enabled)
+			exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING;
+
+		if (nested) {
+			if (rdseed_enabled)
+				vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
+					SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING;
+			else
+				vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
+					~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (vmx_waitpkg_supported()) {
+		bool waitpkg_enabled =
+			guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG);
+
+		if (!waitpkg_enabled)
+			exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE;
+
+		if (nested) {
+			if (waitpkg_enabled)
+				vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
+					SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE;
+			else
+				vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
+					~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	vmx->secondary_exec_control = exec_control;
+}
+
+static void ept_set_mmio_spte_mask(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * EPT Misconfigurations can be generated if the value of bits 2:0
+	 * of an EPT paging-structure entry is 110b (write/execute).
+	 */
+	kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK,
+				   VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE, 0);
+}
+
+#define VMX_XSS_EXIT_BITMAP 0
+
+/*
+ * Noting that the initialization of Guest-state Area of VMCS is in
+ * vmx_vcpu_reset().
+ */
+static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	if (nested)
+		nested_vmx_set_vmcs_shadowing_bitmap();
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+		vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap));
+
+	vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, -1ull); /* 22.3.1.5 */
+
+	/* Control */
+	pin_controls_set(vmx, vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(vmx));
+
+	exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_exec_control(vmx));
+
+	if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
+		vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(vmx);
+		secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx->secondary_exec_control);
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu)) {
+		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, 0);
+		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, 0);
+		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, 0);
+		vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, 0);
+
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, 0);
+
+		vmcs_write16(POSTED_INTR_NV, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
+		vmcs_write64(POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR, __pa((&vmx->pi_desc)));
+	}
+
+	if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm)) {
+		vmcs_write32(PLE_GAP, ple_gap);
+		vmx->ple_window = ple_window;
+		vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
+	}
+
+	vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(CR3_TARGET_COUNT, 0);           /* 22.2.1 */
+
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, 0);            /* 22.2.4 */
+	vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, 0);            /* 22.2.4 */
+	vmx_set_constant_host_state(vmx);
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
+	vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc())
+		vmcs_write64(VM_FUNCTION_CONTROL, 0);
+
+	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
+	vmcs_write64(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.host.val));
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
+	vmcs_write64(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.guest.val));
+
+	if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmx->vcpu.arch.pat);
+
+	vm_exit_controls_set(vmx, vmx_vmexit_ctrl());
+
+	/* 22.2.1, 20.8.1 */
+	vm_entry_controls_set(vmx, vmx_vmentry_ctrl());
+
+	vmx->vcpu.arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = X86_CR0_TS;
+	vmcs_writel(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~X86_CR0_TS);
+
+	set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
+
+	if (vmx->vpid != 0)
+		vmcs_write16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, vmx->vpid);
+
+	if (vmx_xsaves_supported())
+		vmcs_write64(XSS_EXIT_BITMAP, VMX_XSS_EXIT_BITMAP);
+
+	if (enable_pml) {
+		vmcs_write64(PML_ADDRESS, page_to_phys(vmx->pml_pg));
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit())
+		vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, -1ull);
+
+	if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) {
+		memset(&vmx->pt_desc, 0, sizeof(vmx->pt_desc));
+		/* Bit[6~0] are forced to 1, writes are ignored. */
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask = 0x7F;
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct msr_data apic_base_msr;
+	u64 cr0;
+
+	vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
+	vmx->spec_ctrl = 0;
+
+	vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control = 0;
+
+	vcpu->arch.microcode_version = 0x100000000ULL;
+	vmx->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = get_rdx_init_val();
+	vmx->hv_deadline_tsc = -1;
+	kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, 0);
+
+	if (!init_event) {
+		apic_base_msr.data = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE |
+				     MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE;
+		if (kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(vcpu))
+			apic_base_msr.data |= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP;
+		apic_base_msr.host_initiated = true;
+		kvm_set_apic_base(vcpu, &apic_base_msr);
+	}
+
+	vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
+
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_CS);
+	vmcs_write16(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR, 0xf000);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CS_BASE, 0xffff0000ul);
+
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_DS);
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_ES);
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_FS);
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_GS);
+	seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_SS);
+
+	vmcs_write16(GUEST_TR_SELECTOR, 0);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, 0x008b);
+
+	vmcs_write16(GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR, 0);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_LDTR_BASE, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_AR_BYTES, 0x00082);
+
+	if (!init_event) {
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, 0);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, 0);
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, 0);
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, 0);
+	}
+
+	kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, X86_EFLAGS_FIXED);
+	kvm_rip_write(vcpu, 0xfff0);
+
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
+
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, 0);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
+
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE);
+	vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, 0);
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS, 0);
+	if (kvm_mpx_supported())
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, 0);
+
+	setup_msrs(vmx);
+
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, 0);  /* 22.2.1 */
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow() && !init_event) {
+		vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR, 0);
+		if (cpu_need_tpr_shadow(vcpu))
+			vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR,
+				     __pa(vcpu->arch.apic->regs));
+		vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, 0);
+	}
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD, vcpu);
+
+	cr0 = X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_ET;
+	vmx->vcpu.arch.cr0 = cr0;
+	vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, cr0); /* enter rmode */
+	vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, 0);
+	vmx_set_efer(vcpu, 0);
+
+	update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
+
+	vpid_sync_context(vmx->vpid);
+	if (init_event)
+		vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	exec_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING);
+}
+
+static void enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!enable_vnmi ||
+	    vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI) {
+		enable_irq_window(vcpu);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	exec_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING);
+}
+
+static void vmx_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	uint32_t intr;
+	int irq = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
+
+	trace_kvm_inj_virq(irq);
+
+	++vcpu->stat.irq_injections;
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
+		int inc_eip = 0;
+		if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft)
+			inc_eip = vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len;
+		kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, irq, inc_eip);
+		return;
+	}
+	intr = irq | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
+	if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft) {
+		intr |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR;
+		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
+			     vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len);
+	} else
+		intr |= INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR;
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intr);
+
+	vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (!enable_vnmi) {
+		/*
+		 * Tracking the NMI-blocked state in software is built upon
+		 * finding the next open IRQ window. This, in turn, depends on
+		 * well-behaving guests: They have to keep IRQs disabled at
+		 * least as long as the NMI handler runs. Otherwise we may
+		 * cause NMI nesting, maybe breaking the guest. But as this is
+		 * highly unlikely, we can live with the residual risk.
+		 */
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 1;
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time = 0;
+	}
+
+	++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = false;
+
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
+		kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, NMI_VECTOR, 0);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD,
+			INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | NMI_VECTOR);
+
+	vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
+}
+
+bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	bool masked;
+
+	if (!enable_vnmi)
+		return vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked;
+	if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
+		return false;
+	masked = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI;
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
+	return masked;
+}
+
+void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (!enable_vnmi) {
+		if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked != masked) {
+			vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = masked;
+			vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time = 0;
+		}
+	} else {
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
+		if (masked)
+			vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+				      GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+		else
+			vmcs_clear_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+					GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+	}
+}
+
+static int vmx_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!enable_vnmi &&
+	    to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked)
+		return 0;
+
+	return	!(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
+		  (GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS | GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI
+		   | GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI));
+}
+
+static int vmx_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return (!to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending &&
+		vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS) & X86_EFLAGS_IF) &&
+		!(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
+			(GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS));
+}
+
+static int vmx_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int addr)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = x86_set_memory_region(kvm, TSS_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT, addr,
+				    PAGE_SIZE * 3);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->tss_addr = addr;
+	return init_rmode_tss(kvm);
+}
+
+static int vmx_set_identity_map_addr(struct kvm *kvm, u64 ident_addr)
+{
+	to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_identity_map_addr = ident_addr;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool rmode_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vec)
+{
+	switch (vec) {
+	case BP_VECTOR:
+		/*
+		 * Update instruction length as we may reinject the exception
+		 * from user space while in guest debugging mode.
+		 */
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len =
+			vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
+		if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
+			return false;
+		/* fall through */
+	case DB_VECTOR:
+		if (vcpu->guest_debug &
+			(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))
+			return false;
+		/* fall through */
+	case DE_VECTOR:
+	case OF_VECTOR:
+	case BR_VECTOR:
+	case UD_VECTOR:
+	case DF_VECTOR:
+	case SS_VECTOR:
+	case GP_VECTOR:
+	case MF_VECTOR:
+		return true;
+	break;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int handle_rmode_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				  int vec, u32 err_code)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Instruction with address size override prefix opcode 0x67
+	 * Cause the #SS fault with 0 error code in VM86 mode.
+	 */
+	if (((vec == GP_VECTOR) || (vec == SS_VECTOR)) && err_code == 0) {
+		if (kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0)) {
+			if (vcpu->arch.halt_request) {
+				vcpu->arch.halt_request = 0;
+				return kvm_vcpu_halt(vcpu);
+			}
+			return 1;
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Forward all other exceptions that are valid in real mode.
+	 * FIXME: Breaks guest debugging in real mode, needs to be fixed with
+	 *        the required debugging infrastructure rework.
+	 */
+	kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, vec);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Trigger machine check on the host. We assume all the MSRs are already set up
+ * by the CPU and that we still run on the same CPU as the MCE occurred on.
+ * We pass a fake environment to the machine check handler because we want
+ * the guest to be always treated like user space, no matter what context
+ * it used internally.
+ */
+static void kvm_machine_check(void)
+{
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_MCE) && defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
+	struct pt_regs regs = {
+		.cs = 3, /* Fake ring 3 no matter what the guest ran on */
+		.flags = X86_EFLAGS_IF,
+	};
+
+	do_machine_check(&regs, 0);
+#endif
+}
+
+static int handle_machine_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* handled by vmx_vcpu_run() */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
+	u32 intr_info, ex_no, error_code;
+	unsigned long cr2, rip, dr6;
+	u32 vect_info;
+
+	vect_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
+	intr_info = vmx->exit_intr_info;
+
+	if (is_machine_check(intr_info) || is_nmi(intr_info))
+		return 1; /* handled by handle_exception_nmi_irqoff() */
+
+	if (is_invalid_opcode(intr_info))
+		return handle_ud(vcpu);
+
+	error_code = 0;
+	if (intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
+		error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
+
+	if (!vmx->rmode.vm86_active && is_gp_fault(intr_info)) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_vmware_backdoor);
+
+		/*
+		 * VMware backdoor emulation on #GP interception only handles
+		 * IN{S}, OUT{S}, and RDPMC, none of which generate a non-zero
+		 * error code on #GP.
+		 */
+		if (error_code) {
+			kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The #PF with PFEC.RSVD = 1 indicates the guest is accessing
+	 * MMIO, it is better to report an internal error.
+	 * See the comments in vmx_handle_exit.
+	 */
+	if ((vect_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+	    !(is_page_fault(intr_info) && !(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK))) {
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_SIMUL_EX;
+		vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 3;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vect_info;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = intr_info;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = error_code;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (is_page_fault(intr_info)) {
+		cr2 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+		/* EPT won't cause page fault directly */
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_reason && enable_ept);
+		return kvm_handle_page_fault(vcpu, error_code, cr2, NULL, 0);
+	}
+
+	ex_no = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+
+	if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no))
+		return handle_rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no, error_code);
+
+	switch (ex_no) {
+	case AC_VECTOR:
+		kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, error_code);
+		return 1;
+	case DB_VECTOR:
+		dr6 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+		if (!(vcpu->guest_debug &
+		      (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))) {
+			vcpu->arch.dr6 &= ~DR_TRAP_BITS;
+			vcpu->arch.dr6 |= dr6 | DR6_RTM;
+			if (is_icebp(intr_info))
+				WARN_ON(!skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu));
+
+			kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.dr6 = dr6 | DR6_FIXED_1;
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
+		/* fall through */
+	case BP_VECTOR:
+		/*
+		 * Update instruction length as we may reinject #BP from
+		 * user space while in guest debugging mode. Reading it for
+		 * #DB as well causes no harm, it is not used in that case.
+		 */
+		vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len =
+			vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
+		kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
+		rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CS_BASE) + rip;
+		kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = ex_no;
+		break;
+	default:
+		kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_EXCEPTION;
+		kvm_run->ex.exception = ex_no;
+		kvm_run->ex.error_code = error_code;
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __always_inline int handle_external_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	++vcpu->stat.irq_exits;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_triple_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
+	vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int handle_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+	int size, in, string;
+	unsigned port;
+
+	exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+	string = (exit_qualification & 16) != 0;
+
+	++vcpu->stat.io_exits;
+
+	if (string)
+		return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+
+	port = exit_qualification >> 16;
+	size = (exit_qualification & 7) + 1;
+	in = (exit_qualification & 8) != 0;
+
+	return kvm_fast_pio(vcpu, size, port, in);
+}
+
+static void
+vmx_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned char *hypercall)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Patch in the VMCALL instruction:
+	 */
+	hypercall[0] = 0x0f;
+	hypercall[1] = 0x01;
+	hypercall[2] = 0xc1;
+}
+
+/* called to set cr0 as appropriate for a mov-to-cr0 exit. */
+static int handle_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+		unsigned long orig_val = val;
+
+		/*
+		 * We get here when L2 changed cr0 in a way that did not change
+		 * any of L1's shadowed bits (see nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr),
+		 * but did change L0 shadowed bits. So we first calculate the
+		 * effective cr0 value that L1 would like to write into the
+		 * hardware. It consists of the L2-owned bits from the new
+		 * value combined with the L1-owned bits from L1's guest_cr0.
+		 */
+		val = (val & ~vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask) |
+			(vmcs12->guest_cr0 & vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask);
+
+		if (!nested_guest_cr0_valid(vcpu, val))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, val))
+			return 1;
+		vmcs_writel(CR0_READ_SHADOW, orig_val);
+		return 0;
+	} else {
+		if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon &&
+		    !nested_host_cr0_valid(vcpu, val))
+			return 1;
+
+		return kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, val);
+	}
+}
+
+static int handle_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+		unsigned long orig_val = val;
+
+		/* analogously to handle_set_cr0 */
+		val = (val & ~vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask) |
+			(vmcs12->guest_cr4 & vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask);
+		if (kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, val))
+			return 1;
+		vmcs_writel(CR4_READ_SHADOW, orig_val);
+		return 0;
+	} else
+		return kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, val);
+}
+
+static int handle_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	WARN_ON(!(vcpu->arch.cr4 & X86_CR4_UMIP));
+	return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+}
+
+static int handle_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification, val;
+	int cr;
+	int reg;
+	int err;
+	int ret;
+
+	exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+	cr = exit_qualification & 15;
+	reg = (exit_qualification >> 8) & 15;
+	switch ((exit_qualification >> 4) & 3) {
+	case 0: /* mov to cr */
+		val = kvm_register_readl(vcpu, reg);
+		trace_kvm_cr_write(cr, val);
+		switch (cr) {
+		case 0:
+			err = handle_set_cr0(vcpu, val);
+			return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+		case 3:
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(enable_unrestricted_guest);
+			err = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, val);
+			return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+		case 4:
+			err = handle_set_cr4(vcpu, val);
+			return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+		case 8: {
+				u8 cr8_prev = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
+				u8 cr8 = (u8)val;
+				err = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, cr8);
+				ret = kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+				if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+					return ret;
+				if (cr8_prev <= cr8)
+					return ret;
+				/*
+				 * TODO: we might be squashing a
+				 * KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP-triggered
+				 * KVM_EXIT_DEBUG here.
+				 */
+				vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SET_TPR;
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	case 2: /* clts */
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "Guest should always own CR0.TS");
+		vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, ~X86_CR0_TS));
+		trace_kvm_cr_write(0, kvm_read_cr0(vcpu));
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	case 1: /*mov from cr*/
+		switch (cr) {
+		case 3:
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(enable_unrestricted_guest);
+			val = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
+			kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
+			trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
+			return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+		case 8:
+			val = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
+			kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
+			trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
+			return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+		}
+		break;
+	case 3: /* lmsw */
+		val = (exit_qualification >> LMSW_SOURCE_DATA_SHIFT) & 0x0f;
+		trace_kvm_cr_write(0, (kvm_read_cr0(vcpu) & ~0xful) | val);
+		kvm_lmsw(vcpu, val);
+
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	vcpu->run->exit_reason = 0;
+	vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unhandled control register: op %d cr %d\n",
+	       (int)(exit_qualification >> 4) & 3, cr);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int handle_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+	int dr, dr7, reg;
+
+	exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+	dr = exit_qualification & DEBUG_REG_ACCESS_NUM;
+
+	/* First, if DR does not exist, trigger UD */
+	if (!kvm_require_dr(vcpu, dr))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Do not handle if the CPL > 0, will trigger GP on re-entry */
+	if (!kvm_require_cpl(vcpu, 0))
+		return 1;
+	dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
+	if (dr7 & DR7_GD) {
+		/*
+		 * As the vm-exit takes precedence over the debug trap, we
+		 * need to emulate the latter, either for the host or the
+		 * guest debugging itself.
+		 */
+		if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP) {
+			vcpu->run->debug.arch.dr6 = vcpu->arch.dr6;
+			vcpu->run->debug.arch.dr7 = dr7;
+			vcpu->run->debug.arch.pc = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
+			vcpu->run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
+			vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
+			return 0;
+		} else {
+			vcpu->arch.dr6 &= ~DR_TRAP_BITS;
+			vcpu->arch.dr6 |= DR6_BD | DR6_RTM;
+			kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (vcpu->guest_debug == 0) {
+		exec_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
+
+		/*
+		 * No more DR vmexits; force a reload of the debug registers
+		 * and reenter on this instruction.  The next vmexit will
+		 * retrieve the full state of the debug registers.
+		 */
+		vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs |= KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	reg = DEBUG_REG_ACCESS_REG(exit_qualification);
+	if (exit_qualification & TYPE_MOV_FROM_DR) {
+		unsigned long val;
+
+		if (kvm_get_dr(vcpu, dr, &val))
+			return 1;
+		kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
+	} else
+		if (kvm_set_dr(vcpu, dr, kvm_register_readl(vcpu, reg)))
+			return 1;
+
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static u64 vmx_get_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return vcpu->arch.dr6;
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+}
+
+static void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[0], 0);
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[1], 1);
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[2], 2);
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[3], 3);
+	get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
+	vcpu->arch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
+
+	vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs &= ~KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
+	exec_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
+{
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, val);
+}
+
+static int handle_tpr_below_threshold(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_apic_update_ppr(vcpu);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_interrupt_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	exec_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING);
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	++vcpu->stat.irq_window_exits;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_vmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_emulate_hypercall(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int handle_invd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+}
+
+static int handle_invlpg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+
+	kvm_mmu_invlpg(vcpu, exit_qualification);
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int handle_rdpmc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = kvm_rdpmc(vcpu);
+	return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
+}
+
+static int handle_wbinvd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_emulate_wbinvd(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int handle_xsetbv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u64 new_bv = kvm_read_edx_eax(vcpu);
+	u32 index = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
+
+	if (kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, index, new_bv) == 0)
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_apic_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (likely(fasteoi)) {
+		unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+		int access_type, offset;
+
+		access_type = exit_qualification & APIC_ACCESS_TYPE;
+		offset = exit_qualification & APIC_ACCESS_OFFSET;
+		/*
+		 * Sane guest uses MOV to write EOI, with written value
+		 * not cared. So make a short-circuit here by avoiding
+		 * heavy instruction emulation.
+		 */
+		if ((access_type == TYPE_LINEAR_APIC_INST_WRITE) &&
+		    (offset == APIC_EOI)) {
+			kvm_lapic_set_eoi(vcpu);
+			return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+		}
+	}
+	return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
+}
+
+static int handle_apic_eoi_induced(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+	int vector = exit_qualification & 0xff;
+
+	/* EOI-induced VM exit is trap-like and thus no need to adjust IP */
+	kvm_apic_set_eoi_accelerated(vcpu, vector);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_apic_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+	u32 offset = exit_qualification & 0xfff;
+
+	/* APIC-write VM exit is trap-like and thus no need to adjust IP */
+	kvm_apic_write_nodecode(vcpu, offset);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+	bool has_error_code = false;
+	u32 error_code = 0;
+	u16 tss_selector;
+	int reason, type, idt_v, idt_index;
+
+	idt_v = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK);
+	idt_index = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK);
+	type = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK);
+
+	exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+
+	reason = (u32)exit_qualification >> 30;
+	if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE && idt_v) {
+		switch (type) {
+		case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR:
+			vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
+			vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, true);
+			break;
+		case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
+		case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
+			kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
+			break;
+		case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION:
+			if (vmx->idt_vectoring_info &
+			    VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) {
+				has_error_code = true;
+				error_code =
+					vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE);
+			}
+			/* fall through */
+		case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
+			kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	tss_selector = exit_qualification;
+
+	if (!idt_v || (type != INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION &&
+		       type != INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR &&
+		       type != INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR))
+		WARN_ON(!skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu));
+
+	/*
+	 * TODO: What about debug traps on tss switch?
+	 *       Are we supposed to inject them and update dr6?
+	 */
+	return kvm_task_switch(vcpu, tss_selector,
+			       type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR ? idt_index : -1,
+			       reason, has_error_code, error_code);
+}
+
+static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+	gpa_t gpa;
+	u64 error_code;
+
+	exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+
+	/*
+	 * EPT violation happened while executing iret from NMI,
+	 * "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
+	 * There are errata that may cause this bit to not be set:
+	 * AAK134, BY25.
+	 */
+	if (!(to_vmx(vcpu)->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+			enable_vnmi &&
+			(exit_qualification & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
+		vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+
+	gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
+	trace_kvm_page_fault(gpa, exit_qualification);
+
+	/* Is it a read fault? */
+	error_code = (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ)
+		     ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
+	/* Is it a write fault? */
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE)
+		      ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0;
+	/* Is it a fetch fault? */
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR)
+		      ? PFERR_FETCH_MASK : 0;
+	/* ept page table entry is present? */
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification &
+		       (EPT_VIOLATION_READABLE | EPT_VIOLATION_WRITABLE |
+			EPT_VIOLATION_EXECUTABLE))
+		      ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
+
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification & 0x100) != 0 ?
+	       PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK : PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
+
+	vcpu->arch.exit_qualification = exit_qualification;
+	return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, error_code, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	gpa_t gpa;
+
+	/*
+	 * A nested guest cannot optimize MMIO vmexits, because we have an
+	 * nGPA here instead of the required GPA.
+	 */
+	gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+	    !kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_FAST_MMIO_BUS, gpa, 0, NULL)) {
+		trace_kvm_fast_mmio(gpa);
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, PFERR_RSVD_MASK, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int handle_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_vnmi);
+	exec_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING);
+	++vcpu->stat.nmi_window_exits;
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_invalid_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	bool intr_window_requested;
+	unsigned count = 130;
+
+	/*
+	 * We should never reach the point where we are emulating L2
+	 * due to invalid guest state as that means we incorrectly
+	 * allowed a nested VMEntry with an invalid vmcs12.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->emulation_required && vmx->nested.nested_run_pending);
+
+	intr_window_requested = exec_controls_get(vmx) &
+				CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING;
+
+	while (vmx->emulation_required && count-- != 0) {
+		if (intr_window_requested && vmx_interrupt_allowed(vcpu))
+			return handle_interrupt_window(&vmx->vcpu);
+
+		if (kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0))
+			return 0;
+
+		if (vmx->emulation_required && !vmx->rmode.vm86_active &&
+		    vcpu->arch.exception.pending) {
+			vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			vcpu->run->internal.suberror =
+						KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
+			vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		if (vcpu->arch.halt_request) {
+			vcpu->arch.halt_request = 0;
+			return kvm_vcpu_halt(vcpu);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Note, return 1 and not 0, vcpu_run() is responsible for
+		 * morphing the pending signal into the proper return code.
+		 */
+		if (signal_pending(current))
+			return 1;
+
+		if (need_resched())
+			schedule();
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void grow_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned int old = vmx->ple_window;
+
+	vmx->ple_window = __grow_ple_window(old, ple_window,
+					    ple_window_grow,
+					    ple_window_max);
+
+	if (vmx->ple_window != old) {
+		vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
+		trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
+					    vmx->ple_window, old);
+	}
+}
+
+static void shrink_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned int old = vmx->ple_window;
+
+	vmx->ple_window = __shrink_ple_window(old, ple_window,
+					      ple_window_shrink,
+					      ple_window);
+
+	if (vmx->ple_window != old) {
+		vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
+		trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
+					    vmx->ple_window, old);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handler for POSTED_INTERRUPT_WAKEUP_VECTOR.
+ */
+static void wakeup_handler(void)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+
+	spin_lock(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, cpu));
+	list_for_each_entry(vcpu, &per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu, cpu),
+			blocked_vcpu_list) {
+		struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
+
+		if (pi_test_on(pi_desc) == 1)
+			kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, cpu));
+}
+
+static void vmx_enable_tdp(void)
+{
+	kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK,
+		enable_ept_ad_bits ? VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT : 0ull,
+		enable_ept_ad_bits ? VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT : 0ull,
+		0ull, VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK,
+		cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only() ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK,
+		VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK, 0ull);
+
+	ept_set_mmio_spte_mask();
+	kvm_enable_tdp();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Indicate a busy-waiting vcpu in spinlock. We do not enable the PAUSE
+ * exiting, so only get here on cpu with PAUSE-Loop-Exiting.
+ */
+static int handle_pause(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		grow_ple_window(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Intel sdm vol3 ch-25.1.3 says: The "PAUSE-loop exiting"
+	 * VM-execution control is ignored if CPL > 0. OTOH, KVM
+	 * never set PAUSE_EXITING and just set PLE if supported,
+	 * so the vcpu must be CPL=0 if it gets a PAUSE exit.
+	 */
+	kvm_vcpu_on_spin(vcpu, true);
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int handle_nop(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int handle_mwait(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	printk_once(KERN_WARNING "kvm: MWAIT instruction emulated as NOP!\n");
+	return handle_nop(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int handle_invalid_op(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_monitor_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_monitor(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	printk_once(KERN_WARNING "kvm: MONITOR instruction emulated as NOP!\n");
+	return handle_nop(vcpu);
+}
+
+static int handle_invpcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	u32 vmx_instruction_info;
+	unsigned long type;
+	bool pcid_enabled;
+	gva_t gva;
+	struct x86_exception e;
+	unsigned i;
+	unsigned long roots_to_free = 0;
+	struct {
+		u64 pcid;
+		u64 gla;
+	} operand;
+
+	if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID)) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
+	type = kvm_register_readl(vcpu, (vmx_instruction_info >> 28) & 0xf);
+
+	if (type > 3) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* According to the Intel instruction reference, the memory operand
+	 * is read even if it isn't needed (e.g., for type==all)
+	 */
+	if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION),
+				vmx_instruction_info, false,
+				sizeof(operand), &gva))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, gva, &operand, sizeof(operand), &e)) {
+		kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &e);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (operand.pcid >> 12 != 0) {
+		kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	pcid_enabled = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PCIDE);
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case INVPCID_TYPE_INDIV_ADDR:
+		if ((!pcid_enabled && (operand.pcid != 0)) ||
+		    is_noncanonical_address(operand.gla, vcpu)) {
+			kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		kvm_mmu_invpcid_gva(vcpu, operand.gla, operand.pcid);
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+
+	case INVPCID_TYPE_SINGLE_CTXT:
+		if (!pcid_enabled && (operand.pcid != 0)) {
+			kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		if (kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu) == operand.pcid) {
+			kvm_mmu_sync_roots(vcpu);
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++)
+			if (kvm_get_pcid(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmu->prev_roots[i].cr3)
+			    == operand.pcid)
+				roots_to_free |= KVM_MMU_ROOT_PREVIOUS(i);
+
+		kvm_mmu_free_roots(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmu, roots_to_free);
+		/*
+		 * If neither the current cr3 nor any of the prev_roots use the
+		 * given PCID, then nothing needs to be done here because a
+		 * resync will happen anyway before switching to any other CR3.
+		 */
+
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+
+	case INVPCID_TYPE_ALL_NON_GLOBAL:
+		/*
+		 * Currently, KVM doesn't mark global entries in the shadow
+		 * page tables, so a non-global flush just degenerates to a
+		 * global flush. If needed, we could optimize this later by
+		 * keeping track of global entries in shadow page tables.
+		 */
+
+		/* fall-through */
+	case INVPCID_TYPE_ALL_INCL_GLOBAL:
+		kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
+		return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+
+	default:
+		BUG(); /* We have already checked above that type <= 3 */
+	}
+}
+
+static int handle_pml_full(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long exit_qualification;
+
+	trace_kvm_pml_full(vcpu->vcpu_id);
+
+	exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+
+	/*
+	 * PML buffer FULL happened while executing iret from NMI,
+	 * "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
+	 */
+	if (!(to_vmx(vcpu)->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+			enable_vnmi &&
+			(exit_qualification & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
+		vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+				GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+
+	/*
+	 * PML buffer already flushed at beginning of VMEXIT. Nothing to do
+	 * here.., and there's no userspace involvement needed for PML.
+	 */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_preemption_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (!vmx->req_immediate_exit &&
+	    !unlikely(vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled))
+		kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer(vcpu);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * When nested=0, all VMX instruction VM Exits filter here.  The handlers
+ * are overwritten by nested_vmx_setup() when nested=1.
+ */
+static int handle_vmx_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/*
+	 * SGX virtualization is not yet supported.  There is no software
+	 * enable bit for SGX, so we have to trap ENCLS and inject a #UD
+	 * to prevent the guest from executing ENCLS.
+	 */
+	kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The exit handlers return 1 if the exit was handled fully and guest execution
+ * may resume.  Otherwise they set the kvm_run parameter to indicate what needs
+ * to be done to userspace and return 0.
+ */
+static int (*kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
+	[EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI]           = handle_exception_nmi,
+	[EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT]      = handle_external_interrupt,
+	[EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT]            = handle_triple_fault,
+	[EXIT_REASON_NMI_WINDOW]	      = handle_nmi_window,
+	[EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION]          = handle_io,
+	[EXIT_REASON_CR_ACCESS]               = handle_cr,
+	[EXIT_REASON_DR_ACCESS]               = handle_dr,
+	[EXIT_REASON_CPUID]                   = kvm_emulate_cpuid,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ]                = kvm_emulate_rdmsr,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE]               = kvm_emulate_wrmsr,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW]        = handle_interrupt_window,
+	[EXIT_REASON_HLT]                     = kvm_emulate_halt,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INVD]		      = handle_invd,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INVLPG]		      = handle_invlpg,
+	[EXIT_REASON_RDPMC]                   = handle_rdpmc,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMCALL]                  = handle_vmcall,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMREAD]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMOFF]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMON]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD]     = handle_tpr_below_threshold,
+	[EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS]             = handle_apic_access,
+	[EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE]              = handle_apic_write,
+	[EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED]             = handle_apic_eoi_induced,
+	[EXIT_REASON_WBINVD]                  = handle_wbinvd,
+	[EXIT_REASON_XSETBV]                  = handle_xsetbv,
+	[EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH]             = handle_task_switch,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY]      = handle_machine_check,
+	[EXIT_REASON_GDTR_IDTR]		      = handle_desc,
+	[EXIT_REASON_LDTR_TR]		      = handle_desc,
+	[EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION]	      = handle_ept_violation,
+	[EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG]           = handle_ept_misconfig,
+	[EXIT_REASON_PAUSE_INSTRUCTION]       = handle_pause,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MWAIT_INSTRUCTION]	      = handle_mwait,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG]       = handle_monitor_trap,
+	[EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_INSTRUCTION]     = handle_monitor,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INVEPT]                  = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INVVPID]                 = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_RDRAND]                  = handle_invalid_op,
+	[EXIT_REASON_RDSEED]                  = handle_invalid_op,
+	[EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL]		      = handle_pml_full,
+	[EXIT_REASON_INVPCID]                 = handle_invpcid,
+	[EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC]		      = handle_vmx_instruction,
+	[EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER]	      = handle_preemption_timer,
+	[EXIT_REASON_ENCLS]		      = handle_encls,
+};
+
+static const int kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers =
+	ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_vmx_exit_handlers);
+
+static void vmx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *info1, u64 *info2)
+{
+	*info1 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+	*info2 = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
+}
+
+static void vmx_destroy_pml_buffer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	if (vmx->pml_pg) {
+		__free_page(vmx->pml_pg);
+		vmx->pml_pg = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_flush_pml_buffer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u64 *pml_buf;
+	u16 pml_idx;
+
+	pml_idx = vmcs_read16(GUEST_PML_INDEX);
+
+	/* Do nothing if PML buffer is empty */
+	if (pml_idx == (PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1))
+		return;
+
+	/* PML index always points to next available PML buffer entity */
+	if (pml_idx >= PML_ENTITY_NUM)
+		pml_idx = 0;
+	else
+		pml_idx++;
+
+	pml_buf = page_address(vmx->pml_pg);
+	for (; pml_idx < PML_ENTITY_NUM; pml_idx++) {
+		u64 gpa;
+
+		gpa = pml_buf[pml_idx];
+		WARN_ON(gpa & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
+		kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	}
+
+	/* reset PML index */
+	vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Flush all vcpus' PML buffer and update logged GPAs to dirty_bitmap.
+ * Called before reporting dirty_bitmap to userspace.
+ */
+static void kvm_flush_pml_buffers(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	/*
+	 * We only need to kick vcpu out of guest mode here, as PML buffer
+	 * is flushed at beginning of all VMEXITs, and it's obvious that only
+	 * vcpus running in guest are possible to have unflushed GPAs in PML
+	 * buffer.
+	 */
+	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
+		kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_dump_sel(char *name, uint32_t sel)
+{
+	pr_err("%s sel=0x%04x, attr=0x%05x, limit=0x%08x, base=0x%016lx\n",
+	       name, vmcs_read16(sel),
+	       vmcs_read32(sel + GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR),
+	       vmcs_read32(sel + GUEST_ES_LIMIT - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR),
+	       vmcs_readl(sel + GUEST_ES_BASE - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR));
+}
+
+static void vmx_dump_dtsel(char *name, uint32_t limit)
+{
+	pr_err("%s                           limit=0x%08x, base=0x%016lx\n",
+	       name, vmcs_read32(limit),
+	       vmcs_readl(limit + GUEST_GDTR_BASE - GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT));
+}
+
+void dump_vmcs(void)
+{
+	u32 vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl;
+	u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl, pin_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control;
+	unsigned long cr4;
+	u64 efer;
+	int i, n;
+
+	if (!dump_invalid_vmcs) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("set kvm_intel.dump_invalid_vmcs=1 to dump internal KVM state.\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	vmentry_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS);
+	vmexit_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS);
+	cpu_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
+	pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
+	cr4 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4);
+	efer = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_EFER);
+	secondary_exec_control = 0;
+	if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())
+		secondary_exec_control = vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
+
+	pr_err("*** Guest State ***\n");
+	pr_err("CR0: actual=0x%016lx, shadow=0x%016lx, gh_mask=%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR0), vmcs_readl(CR0_READ_SHADOW),
+	       vmcs_readl(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK));
+	pr_err("CR4: actual=0x%016lx, shadow=0x%016lx, gh_mask=%016lx\n",
+	       cr4, vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW), vmcs_readl(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK));
+	pr_err("CR3 = 0x%016lx\n", vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3));
+	if ((secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT) &&
+	    (cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE) && !(efer & EFER_LMA))
+	{
+		pr_err("PDPTR0 = 0x%016llx  PDPTR1 = 0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR0), vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR1));
+		pr_err("PDPTR2 = 0x%016llx  PDPTR3 = 0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR2), vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3));
+	}
+	pr_err("RSP = 0x%016lx  RIP = 0x%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(GUEST_RSP), vmcs_readl(GUEST_RIP));
+	pr_err("RFLAGS=0x%08lx         DR7 = 0x%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS), vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7));
+	pr_err("Sysenter RSP=%016lx CS:RIP=%04x:%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP),
+	       vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS), vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP));
+	vmx_dump_sel("CS:  ", GUEST_CS_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_sel("DS:  ", GUEST_DS_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_sel("SS:  ", GUEST_SS_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_sel("ES:  ", GUEST_ES_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_sel("FS:  ", GUEST_FS_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_sel("GS:  ", GUEST_GS_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_dtsel("GDTR:", GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT);
+	vmx_dump_sel("LDTR:", GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR);
+	vmx_dump_dtsel("IDTR:", GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
+	vmx_dump_sel("TR:  ", GUEST_TR_SELECTOR);
+	if ((vmexit_ctl & (VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT | VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_EFER)) ||
+	    (vmentry_ctl & (VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT | VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)))
+		pr_err("EFER =     0x%016llx  PAT = 0x%016llx\n",
+		       efer, vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_PAT));
+	pr_err("DebugCtl = 0x%016llx  DebugExceptions = 0x%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL),
+	       vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS));
+	if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl() &&
+	    vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)
+		pr_err("PerfGlobCtl = 0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL));
+	if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS)
+		pr_err("BndCfgS = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS));
+	pr_err("Interruptibility = %08x  ActivityState = %08x\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO),
+	       vmcs_read32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE));
+	if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY)
+		pr_err("InterruptStatus = %04x\n",
+		       vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS));
+
+	pr_err("*** Host State ***\n");
+	pr_err("RIP = 0x%016lx  RSP = 0x%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_RIP), vmcs_readl(HOST_RSP));
+	pr_err("CS=%04x SS=%04x DS=%04x ES=%04x FS=%04x GS=%04x TR=%04x\n",
+	       vmcs_read16(HOST_CS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_SS_SELECTOR),
+	       vmcs_read16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR),
+	       vmcs_read16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR),
+	       vmcs_read16(HOST_TR_SELECTOR));
+	pr_err("FSBase=%016lx GSBase=%016lx TRBase=%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_FS_BASE), vmcs_readl(HOST_GS_BASE),
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_TR_BASE));
+	pr_err("GDTBase=%016lx IDTBase=%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_GDTR_BASE), vmcs_readl(HOST_IDTR_BASE));
+	pr_err("CR0=%016lx CR3=%016lx CR4=%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_CR0), vmcs_readl(HOST_CR3),
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_CR4));
+	pr_err("Sysenter RSP=%016lx CS:RIP=%04x:%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP),
+	       vmcs_read32(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS),
+	       vmcs_readl(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP));
+	if (vmexit_ctl & (VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT | VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER))
+		pr_err("EFER = 0x%016llx  PAT = 0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_EFER),
+		       vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_PAT));
+	if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl() &&
+	    vmexit_ctl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)
+		pr_err("PerfGlobCtl = 0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL));
+
+	pr_err("*** Control State ***\n");
+	pr_err("PinBased=%08x CPUBased=%08x SecondaryExec=%08x\n",
+	       pin_based_exec_ctrl, cpu_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control);
+	pr_err("EntryControls=%08x ExitControls=%08x\n", vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl);
+	pr_err("ExceptionBitmap=%08x PFECmask=%08x PFECmatch=%08x\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP),
+	       vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK),
+	       vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH));
+	pr_err("VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE),
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
+	pr_err("VMExit: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO),
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
+	pr_err("        reason=%08x qualification=%016lx\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON), vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION));
+	pr_err("IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x\n",
+	       vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD),
+	       vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE));
+	pr_err("TSC Offset = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(TSC_OFFSET));
+	if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING)
+		pr_err("TSC Multiplier = 0x%016llx\n",
+		       vmcs_read64(TSC_MULTIPLIER));
+	if (cpu_based_exec_ctrl & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) {
+		if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY) {
+			u16 status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
+			pr_err("SVI|RVI = %02x|%02x ", status >> 8, status & 0xff);
+		}
+		pr_cont("TPR Threshold = 0x%02x\n", vmcs_read32(TPR_THRESHOLD));
+		if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)
+			pr_err("APIC-access addr = 0x%016llx ", vmcs_read64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR));
+		pr_cont("virt-APIC addr = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR));
+	}
+	if (pin_based_exec_ctrl & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR)
+		pr_err("PostedIntrVec = 0x%02x\n", vmcs_read16(POSTED_INTR_NV));
+	if ((secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT))
+		pr_err("EPT pointer = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(EPT_POINTER));
+	n = vmcs_read32(CR3_TARGET_COUNT);
+	for (i = 0; i + 1 < n; i += 4)
+		pr_err("CR3 target%u=%016lx target%u=%016lx\n",
+		       i, vmcs_readl(CR3_TARGET_VALUE0 + i * 2),
+		       i + 1, vmcs_readl(CR3_TARGET_VALUE0 + i * 2 + 2));
+	if (i < n)
+		pr_err("CR3 target%u=%016lx\n",
+		       i, vmcs_readl(CR3_TARGET_VALUE0 + i * 2));
+	if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING)
+		pr_err("PLE Gap=%08x Window=%08x\n",
+		       vmcs_read32(PLE_GAP), vmcs_read32(PLE_WINDOW));
+	if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID)
+		pr_err("Virtual processor ID = 0x%04x\n",
+		       vmcs_read16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID));
+}
+
+/*
+ * The guest has exited.  See if we can fix it or if we need userspace
+ * assistance.
+ */
+static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+	enum exit_fastpath_completion exit_fastpath)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
+	u32 vectoring_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
+
+	trace_kvm_exit(exit_reason, vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
+
+	/*
+	 * Flush logged GPAs PML buffer, this will make dirty_bitmap more
+	 * updated. Another good is, in kvm_vm_ioctl_get_dirty_log, before
+	 * querying dirty_bitmap, we only need to kick all vcpus out of guest
+	 * mode as if vcpus is in root mode, the PML buffer must has been
+	 * flushed already.
+	 */
+	if (enable_pml)
+		vmx_flush_pml_buffer(vcpu);
+
+	/* If guest state is invalid, start emulating */
+	if (vmx->emulation_required)
+		return handle_invalid_guest_state(vcpu);
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_vmx_exit_reflected(vcpu, exit_reason))
+		return nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(vcpu, exit_reason);
+
+	if (exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY) {
+		dump_vmcs();
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
+		vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
+			= exit_reason;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
+		dump_vmcs();
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
+		vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
+			= vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Note:
+	 * Do not try to fix EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG if it caused by
+	 * delivery event since it indicates guest is accessing MMIO.
+	 * The vm-exit can be triggered again after return to guest that
+	 * will cause infinite loop.
+	 */
+	if ((vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+			(exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI &&
+			exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION &&
+			exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL &&
+			exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH)) {
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_DELIVERY_EV;
+		vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 3;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vectoring_info;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = exit_reason;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = vcpu->arch.exit_qualification;
+		if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
+			vcpu->run->internal.ndata++;
+			vcpu->run->internal.data[3] =
+				vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (unlikely(!enable_vnmi &&
+		     vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked)) {
+		if (vmx_interrupt_allowed(vcpu)) {
+			vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
+		} else if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time > 1000000000LL &&
+			   vcpu->arch.nmi_pending) {
+			/*
+			 * This CPU don't support us in finding the end of an
+			 * NMI-blocked window if the guest runs with IRQs
+			 * disabled. So we pull the trigger after 1 s of
+			 * futile waiting, but inform the user about this.
+			 */
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Breaking out of NMI-blocked "
+			       "state on VCPU %d after 1 s timeout\n",
+			       __func__, vcpu->vcpu_id);
+			vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (exit_fastpath == EXIT_FASTPATH_SKIP_EMUL_INS) {
+		kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+		return 1;
+	} else if (exit_reason < kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers
+	    && kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason]) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+		if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
+			return kvm_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
+		else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
+			return handle_preemption_timer(vcpu);
+		else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW)
+			return handle_interrupt_window(vcpu);
+		else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
+			return handle_external_interrupt(vcpu);
+		else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_HLT)
+			return kvm_emulate_halt(vcpu);
+		else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG)
+			return handle_ept_misconfig(vcpu);
+#endif
+		return kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason](vcpu);
+	} else {
+		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmx: unexpected exit reason 0x%x\n",
+				exit_reason);
+		dump_vmcs();
+		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		vcpu->run->internal.suberror =
+			KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXIT_REASON;
+		vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 1;
+		vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = exit_reason;
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Software based L1D cache flush which is used when microcode providing
+ * the cache control MSR is not loaded.
+ *
+ * The L1D cache is 32 KiB on Nehalem and later microarchitectures, but to
+ * flush it is required to read in 64 KiB because the replacement algorithm
+ * is not exactly LRU. This could be sized at runtime via topology
+ * information but as all relevant affected CPUs have 32KiB L1D cache size
+ * there is no point in doing so.
+ */
+static void vmx_l1d_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	int size = PAGE_SIZE << L1D_CACHE_ORDER;
+
+	/*
+	 * This code is only executed when the the flush mode is 'cond' or
+	 * 'always'
+	 */
+	if (static_branch_likely(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond)) {
+		bool flush_l1d;
+
+		/*
+		 * Clear the per-vcpu flush bit, it gets set again
+		 * either from vcpu_run() or from one of the unsafe
+		 * VMEXIT handlers.
+		 */
+		flush_l1d = vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d;
+		vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = false;
+
+		/*
+		 * Clear the per-cpu flush bit, it gets set again from
+		 * the interrupt handlers.
+		 */
+		flush_l1d |= kvm_get_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
+		kvm_clear_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
+
+		if (!flush_l1d)
+			return;
+	}
+
+	vcpu->stat.l1d_flush++;
+
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, L1D_FLUSH);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	asm volatile(
+		/* First ensure the pages are in the TLB */
+		"xorl	%%eax, %%eax\n"
+		".Lpopulate_tlb:\n\t"
+		"movzbl	(%[flush_pages], %%" _ASM_AX "), %%ecx\n\t"
+		"addl	$4096, %%eax\n\t"
+		"cmpl	%%eax, %[size]\n\t"
+		"jne	.Lpopulate_tlb\n\t"
+		"xorl	%%eax, %%eax\n\t"
+		"cpuid\n\t"
+		/* Now fill the cache */
+		"xorl	%%eax, %%eax\n"
+		".Lfill_cache:\n"
+		"movzbl	(%[flush_pages], %%" _ASM_AX "), %%ecx\n\t"
+		"addl	$64, %%eax\n\t"
+		"cmpl	%%eax, %[size]\n\t"
+		"jne	.Lfill_cache\n\t"
+		"lfence\n"
+		:: [flush_pages] "r" (vmx_l1d_flush_pages),
+		    [size] "r" (size)
+		: "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx");
+}
+
+static void update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	int tpr_threshold;
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+		nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
+		return;
+
+	tpr_threshold = (irr == -1 || tpr < irr) ? 0 : irr;
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.l1_tpr_threshold = tpr_threshold;
+	else
+		vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, tpr_threshold);
+}
+
+void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u32 sec_exec_control;
+
+	if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	if (!flexpriority_enabled &&
+	    !cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode())
+		return;
+
+	/* Postpone execution until vmcs01 is the current VMCS. */
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		vmx->nested.change_vmcs01_virtual_apic_mode = true;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	sec_exec_control = secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx);
+	sec_exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
+			      SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE);
+
+	switch (kvm_get_apic_mode(vcpu)) {
+	case LAPIC_MODE_INVALID:
+		WARN_ONCE(true, "Invalid local APIC state");
+	case LAPIC_MODE_DISABLED:
+		break;
+	case LAPIC_MODE_XAPIC:
+		if (flexpriority_enabled) {
+			sec_exec_control |=
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
+			vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
+		}
+		break;
+	case LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC:
+		if (cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode())
+			sec_exec_control |=
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
+		break;
+	}
+	secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, sec_exec_control);
+
+	vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t hpa)
+{
+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		vmcs_write64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR, hpa);
+		vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_hwapic_isr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_isr)
+{
+	u16 status;
+	u8 old;
+
+	if (max_isr == -1)
+		max_isr = 0;
+
+	status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
+	old = status >> 8;
+	if (max_isr != old) {
+		status &= 0xff;
+		status |= max_isr << 8;
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_rvi(int vector)
+{
+	u16 status;
+	u8 old;
+
+	if (vector == -1)
+		vector = 0;
+
+	status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
+	old = (u8)status & 0xff;
+	if ((u8)vector != old) {
+		status &= ~0xff;
+		status |= (u8)vector;
+		vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_hwapic_irr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_irr)
+{
+	/*
+	 * When running L2, updating RVI is only relevant when
+	 * vmcs12 virtual-interrupt-delivery enabled.
+	 * However, it can be enabled only when L1 also
+	 * intercepts external-interrupts and in that case
+	 * we should not update vmcs02 RVI but instead intercept
+	 * interrupt. Therefore, do nothing when running L2.
+	 */
+	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
+		vmx_set_rvi(max_irr);
+}
+
+static int vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	int max_irr;
+	bool max_irr_updated;
+
+	WARN_ON(!vcpu->arch.apicv_active);
+	if (pi_test_on(&vmx->pi_desc)) {
+		pi_clear_on(&vmx->pi_desc);
+		/*
+		 * IOMMU can write to PID.ON, so the barrier matters even on UP.
+		 * But on x86 this is just a compiler barrier anyway.
+		 */
+		smp_mb__after_atomic();
+		max_irr_updated =
+			kvm_apic_update_irr(vcpu, vmx->pi_desc.pir, &max_irr);
+
+		/*
+		 * If we are running L2 and L1 has a new pending interrupt
+		 * which can be injected, we should re-evaluate
+		 * what should be done with this new L1 interrupt.
+		 * If L1 intercepts external-interrupts, we should
+		 * exit from L2 to L1. Otherwise, interrupt should be
+		 * delivered directly to L2.
+		 */
+		if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && max_irr_updated) {
+			if (nested_exit_on_intr(vcpu))
+				kvm_vcpu_exiting_guest_mode(vcpu);
+			else
+				kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+		}
+	} else {
+		max_irr = kvm_lapic_find_highest_irr(vcpu);
+	}
+	vmx_hwapic_irr_update(vcpu, max_irr);
+	return max_irr;
+}
+
+static bool vmx_dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
+
+	return pi_test_on(pi_desc) ||
+		(pi_test_sn(pi_desc) && !pi_is_pir_empty(pi_desc));
+}
+
+static void vmx_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap)
+{
+	if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		return;
+
+	vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, eoi_exit_bitmap[0]);
+	vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, eoi_exit_bitmap[1]);
+	vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, eoi_exit_bitmap[2]);
+	vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, eoi_exit_bitmap[3]);
+}
+
+static void vmx_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	pi_clear_on(&vmx->pi_desc);
+	memset(vmx->pi_desc.pir, 0, sizeof(vmx->pi_desc.pir));
+}
+
+static void handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	vmx->exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
+
+	/* if exit due to PF check for async PF */
+	if (is_page_fault(vmx->exit_intr_info))
+		vmx->vcpu.arch.apf.host_apf_reason = kvm_read_and_reset_pf_reason();
+
+	/* Handle machine checks before interrupts are enabled */
+	if (is_machine_check(vmx->exit_intr_info))
+		kvm_machine_check();
+
+	/* We need to handle NMIs before interrupts are enabled */
+	if (is_nmi(vmx->exit_intr_info)) {
+		kvm_before_interrupt(&vmx->vcpu);
+		asm("int $2");
+		kvm_after_interrupt(&vmx->vcpu);
+	}
+}
+
+static void handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned int vector;
+	unsigned long entry;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	unsigned long tmp;
+#endif
+	gate_desc *desc;
+	u32 intr_info;
+
+	intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
+	if (WARN_ONCE(!is_external_intr(intr_info),
+	    "KVM: unexpected VM-Exit interrupt info: 0x%x", intr_info))
+		return;
+
+	vector = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+	desc = (gate_desc *)host_idt_base + vector;
+	entry = gate_offset(desc);
+
+	kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu);
+
+	asm volatile(
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		"mov %%" _ASM_SP ", %[sp]\n\t"
+		"and $0xfffffffffffffff0, %%" _ASM_SP "\n\t"
+		"push $%c[ss]\n\t"
+		"push %[sp]\n\t"
+#endif
+		"pushf\n\t"
+		__ASM_SIZE(push) " $%c[cs]\n\t"
+		CALL_NOSPEC
+		:
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+		[sp]"=&r"(tmp),
+#endif
+		ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
+		:
+		THUNK_TARGET(entry),
+		[ss]"i"(__KERNEL_DS),
+		[cs]"i"(__KERNEL_CS)
+	);
+
+	kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
+}
+STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(handle_external_interrupt_irqoff);
+
+static void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+	enum exit_fastpath_completion *exit_fastpath)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
+		handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(vcpu);
+	else if (vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)
+		handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(vmx);
+	else if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
+		vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
+		*exit_fastpath = handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(vcpu);
+}
+
+static bool vmx_has_emulated_msr(int index)
+{
+	switch (index) {
+	case MSR_IA32_SMBASE:
+		/*
+		 * We cannot do SMM unless we can run the guest in big
+		 * real mode.
+		 */
+		return enable_unrestricted_guest || emulate_invalid_guest_state;
+	case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
+		return nested;
+	case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
+		/* This is AMD only.  */
+		return false;
+	default:
+		return true;
+	}
+}
+
+static bool vmx_pt_supported(void)
+{
+	return pt_mode == PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST;
+}
+
+static void vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u32 exit_intr_info;
+	bool unblock_nmi;
+	u8 vector;
+	bool idtv_info_valid;
+
+	idtv_info_valid = vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
+
+	if (enable_vnmi) {
+		if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
+			return;
+		/*
+		 * Can't use vmx->exit_intr_info since we're not sure what
+		 * the exit reason is.
+		 */
+		exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
+		unblock_nmi = (exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI) != 0;
+		vector = exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+		/*
+		 * SDM 3: 27.7.1.2 (September 2008)
+		 * Re-set bit "block by NMI" before VM entry if vmexit caused by
+		 * a guest IRET fault.
+		 * SDM 3: 23.2.2 (September 2008)
+		 * Bit 12 is undefined in any of the following cases:
+		 *  If the VM exit sets the valid bit in the IDT-vectoring
+		 *   information field.
+		 *  If the VM exit is due to a double fault.
+		 */
+		if ((exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) && unblock_nmi &&
+		    vector != DF_VECTOR && !idtv_info_valid)
+			vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
+				      GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+		else
+			vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked =
+				!(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO)
+				  & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
+	} else if (unlikely(vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked))
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time +=
+			ktime_to_ns(ktime_sub(ktime_get(),
+					      vmx->loaded_vmcs->entry_time));
+}
+
+static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				      u32 idt_vectoring_info,
+				      int instr_len_field,
+				      int error_code_field)
+{
+	u8 vector;
+	int type;
+	bool idtv_info_valid;
+
+	idtv_info_valid = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
+
+	vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
+	kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
+	kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
+
+	if (!idtv_info_valid)
+		return;
+
+	kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
+
+	vector = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
+	type = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR:
+		vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = true;
+		/*
+		 * SDM 3: 27.7.1.2 (September 2008)
+		 * Clear bit "block by NMI" before VM entry if a NMI
+		 * delivery faulted.
+		 */
+		vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, false);
+		break;
+	case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
+		vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
+		/* fall through */
+	case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION:
+		if (idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) {
+			u32 err = vmcs_read32(error_code_field);
+			kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, err);
+		} else
+			kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector);
+		break;
+	case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
+		vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
+		/* fall through */
+	case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
+		kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, vector, type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	__vmx_complete_interrupts(&vmx->vcpu, vmx->idt_vectoring_info,
+				  VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
+				  IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE);
+}
+
+static void vmx_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	__vmx_complete_interrupts(vcpu,
+				  vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),
+				  VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
+				  VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE);
+
+	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, 0);
+}
+
+static void atomic_switch_perf_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	int i, nr_msrs;
+	struct perf_guest_switch_msr *msrs;
+
+	msrs = perf_guest_get_msrs(&nr_msrs);
+
+	if (!msrs)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nr_msrs; i++)
+		if (msrs[i].host == msrs[i].guest)
+			clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, msrs[i].msr);
+		else
+			add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, msrs[i].msr, msrs[i].guest,
+					msrs[i].host, false);
+}
+
+static void atomic_switch_umwait_control_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	u32 host_umwait_control;
+
+	if (!vmx_has_waitpkg(vmx))
+		return;
+
+	host_umwait_control = get_umwait_control_msr();
+
+	if (vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control != host_umwait_control)
+		add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL,
+			vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control,
+			host_umwait_control, false);
+	else
+		clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL);
+}
+
+static void vmx_update_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u64 tscl;
+	u32 delta_tsc;
+
+	if (vmx->req_immediate_exit) {
+		vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, 0);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = false;
+	} else if (vmx->hv_deadline_tsc != -1) {
+		tscl = rdtsc();
+		if (vmx->hv_deadline_tsc > tscl)
+			/* set_hv_timer ensures the delta fits in 32-bits */
+			delta_tsc = (u32)((vmx->hv_deadline_tsc - tscl) >>
+				cpu_preemption_timer_multi);
+		else
+			delta_tsc = 0;
+
+		vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, delta_tsc);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = false;
+	} else if (!vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled) {
+		vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, -1);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = true;
+	}
+}
+
+void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp)
+{
+	if (unlikely(host_rsp != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.rsp)) {
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.rsp = host_rsp;
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_RSP, host_rsp);
+	}
+}
+
+bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, bool launched);
+
+static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	unsigned long cr3, cr4;
+
+	/* Record the guest's net vcpu time for enforced NMI injections. */
+	if (unlikely(!enable_vnmi &&
+		     vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked))
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->entry_time = ktime_get();
+
+	/* Don't enter VMX if guest state is invalid, let the exit handler
+	   start emulation until we arrive back to a valid state */
+	if (vmx->emulation_required)
+		return;
+
+	if (vmx->ple_window_dirty) {
+		vmx->ple_window_dirty = false;
+		vmcs_write32(PLE_WINDOW, vmx->ple_window);
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync)
+		nested_sync_vmcs12_to_shadow(vcpu);
+
+	if (kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP))
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_RSP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP]);
+	if (kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RIP))
+		vmcs_writel(GUEST_RIP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP]);
+
+	cr3 = __get_current_cr3_fast();
+	if (unlikely(cr3 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3)) {
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, cr3);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3 = cr3;
+	}
+
+	cr4 = cr4_read_shadow();
+	if (unlikely(cr4 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4)) {
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4);
+		vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4;
+	}
+
+	/* When single-stepping over STI and MOV SS, we must clear the
+	 * corresponding interruptibility bits in the guest state. Otherwise
+	 * vmentry fails as it then expects bit 14 (BS) in pending debug
+	 * exceptions being set, but that's not correct for the guest debugging
+	 * case. */
+	if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)
+		vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
+
+	kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
+
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
+	    kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE) &&
+	    vcpu->arch.pkru != vmx->host_pkru)
+		__write_pkru(vcpu->arch.pkru);
+
+	pt_guest_enter(vmx);
+
+	atomic_switch_perf_msrs(vmx);
+	atomic_switch_umwait_control_msr(vmx);
+
+	if (enable_preemption_timer)
+		vmx_update_hv_timer(vcpu);
+
+	if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) &&
+		vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer.timer_advance_ns)
+		kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
+	 * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there
+	 * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
+	 * being speculatively taken.
+	 */
+	x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
+
+	/* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
+		vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
+	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
+		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
+	if (vcpu->arch.cr2 != read_cr2())
+		write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2);
+
+	vmx->fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs,
+				   vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched);
+
+	vcpu->arch.cr2 = read_cr2();
+
+	/*
+	 * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
+	 * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and
+	 * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding
+	 * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former
+	 * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM.
+	 *
+	 * For non-nested case:
+	 * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
+	 * save it.
+	 *
+	 * For nested case:
+	 * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
+	 * save it.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
+		vmx->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
+
+	x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
+
+	/* All fields are clean at this point */
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
+		current_evmcs->hv_clean_fields |=
+			HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_ALL;
+
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
+		current_evmcs->hv_vp_id = vcpu->arch.hyperv.vp_index;
+
+	/* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */
+	if (vmx->host_debugctlmsr)
+		update_debugctlmsr(vmx->host_debugctlmsr);
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/*
+	 * The sysexit path does not restore ds/es, so we must set them to
+	 * a reasonable value ourselves.
+	 *
+	 * We can't defer this to vmx_prepare_switch_to_host() since that
+	 * function may be executed in interrupt context, which saves and
+	 * restore segments around it, nullifying its effect.
+	 */
+	loadsegment(ds, __USER_DS);
+	loadsegment(es, __USER_DS);
+#endif
+
+	vcpu->arch.regs_avail = ~((1 << VCPU_REGS_RIP) | (1 << VCPU_REGS_RSP)
+				  | (1 << VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS)
+				  | (1 << VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR)
+				  | (1 << VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS)
+				  | (1 << VCPU_EXREG_CR3));
+	vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = 0;
+
+	pt_guest_exit(vmx);
+
+	/*
+	 * eager fpu is enabled if PKEY is supported and CR4 is switched
+	 * back on host, so it is safe to read guest PKRU from current
+	 * XSAVE.
+	 */
+	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
+	    kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE)) {
+		vcpu->arch.pkru = rdpkru();
+		if (vcpu->arch.pkru != vmx->host_pkru)
+			__write_pkru(vmx->host_pkru);
+	}
+
+	kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
+
+	vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
+	vmx->idt_vectoring_info = 0;
+
+	vmx->exit_reason = vmx->fail ? 0xdead : vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON);
+	if ((u16)vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY)
+		kvm_machine_check();
+
+	if (vmx->fail || (vmx->exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY))
+		return;
+
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched = 1;
+	vmx->idt_vectoring_info = vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD);
+
+	vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(vmx);
+	vmx_complete_interrupts(vmx);
+}
+
+static struct kvm *vmx_vm_alloc(void)
+{
+	struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = __vmalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
+					    GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO,
+					    PAGE_KERNEL);
+	return &kvm_vmx->kvm;
+}
+
+static void vmx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	kfree(kvm->arch.hyperv.hv_pa_pg);
+	vfree(to_kvm_vmx(kvm));
+}
+
+static void vmx_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (enable_pml)
+		vmx_destroy_pml_buffer(vmx);
+	free_vpid(vmx->vpid);
+	nested_vmx_free_vcpu(vcpu);
+	free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
+	kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
+	kmem_cache_free(x86_fpu_cache, vmx->vcpu.arch.user_fpu);
+	kmem_cache_free(x86_fpu_cache, vmx->vcpu.arch.guest_fpu);
+	kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, vmx);
+}
+
+static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx;
+	unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
+	int i, cpu;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu) != 0,
+		"struct kvm_vcpu must be at offset 0 for arch usercopy region");
+
+	vmx = kmem_cache_zalloc(kvm_vcpu_cache, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!vmx)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	vmx->vcpu.arch.user_fpu = kmem_cache_zalloc(x86_fpu_cache,
+			GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!vmx->vcpu.arch.user_fpu) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: failed to allocate kvm userspace's fpu\n");
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto free_partial_vcpu;
+	}
+
+	vmx->vcpu.arch.guest_fpu = kmem_cache_zalloc(x86_fpu_cache,
+			GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!vmx->vcpu.arch.guest_fpu) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: failed to allocate vcpu's fpu\n");
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto free_user_fpu;
+	}
+
+	vmx->vpid = allocate_vpid();
+
+	err = kvm_vcpu_init(&vmx->vcpu, kvm, id);
+	if (err)
+		goto free_vcpu;
+
+	err = -ENOMEM;
+
+	/*
+	 * If PML is turned on, failure on enabling PML just results in failure
+	 * of creating the vcpu, therefore we can simplify PML logic (by
+	 * avoiding dealing with cases, such as enabling PML partially on vcpus
+	 * for the guest), etc.
+	 */
+	if (enable_pml) {
+		vmx->pml_pg = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
+		if (!vmx->pml_pg)
+			goto uninit_vcpu;
+	}
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_msr_index) != NR_SHARED_MSRS);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_msr_index); ++i) {
+		u32 index = vmx_msr_index[i];
+		u32 data_low, data_high;
+		int j = vmx->nmsrs;
+
+		if (rdmsr_safe(index, &data_low, &data_high) < 0)
+			continue;
+		if (wrmsr_safe(index, data_low, data_high) < 0)
+			continue;
+
+		vmx->guest_msrs[j].index = i;
+		vmx->guest_msrs[j].data = 0;
+		switch (index) {
+		case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
+			/*
+			 * No need to pass TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR through, so
+			 * let's avoid changing CPUID bits under the host
+			 * kernel's feet.
+			 */
+			vmx->guest_msrs[j].mask = ~(u64)TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
+			break;
+		default:
+			vmx->guest_msrs[j].mask = -1ull;
+			break;
+		}
+		++vmx->nmsrs;
+	}
+
+	err = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->vmcs01);
+	if (err < 0)
+		goto free_pml;
+
+	msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_TYPE_R);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
+	if (kvm_cstate_in_guest(kvm)) {
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_CORE_C1_RES, MSR_TYPE_R);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_CORE_C3_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_CORE_C6_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_CORE_C7_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
+	}
+	vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = 0;
+
+	vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01;
+	cpu = get_cpu();
+	vmx_vcpu_load(&vmx->vcpu, cpu);
+	vmx->vcpu.cpu = cpu;
+	init_vmcs(vmx);
+	vmx_vcpu_put(&vmx->vcpu);
+	put_cpu();
+	if (cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(&vmx->vcpu)) {
+		err = alloc_apic_access_page(kvm);
+		if (err)
+			goto free_vmcs;
+	}
+
+	if (enable_ept && !enable_unrestricted_guest) {
+		err = init_rmode_identity_map(kvm);
+		if (err)
+			goto free_vmcs;
+	}
+
+	if (nested)
+		nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmx->nested.msrs,
+					   vmx_capability.ept,
+					   kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu));
+	else
+		memset(&vmx->nested.msrs, 0, sizeof(vmx->nested.msrs));
+
+	vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1;
+	vmx->nested.current_vmptr = -1ull;
+
+	vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits = FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED;
+
+	/*
+	 * Enforce invariant: pi_desc.nv is always either POSTED_INTR_VECTOR
+	 * or POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR.
+	 */
+	vmx->pi_desc.nv = POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
+	vmx->pi_desc.sn = 1;
+
+	vmx->ept_pointer = INVALID_PAGE;
+
+	return &vmx->vcpu;
+
+free_vmcs:
+	free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
+free_pml:
+	vmx_destroy_pml_buffer(vmx);
+uninit_vcpu:
+	kvm_vcpu_uninit(&vmx->vcpu);
+free_vcpu:
+	free_vpid(vmx->vpid);
+	kmem_cache_free(x86_fpu_cache, vmx->vcpu.arch.guest_fpu);
+free_user_fpu:
+	kmem_cache_free(x86_fpu_cache, vmx->vcpu.arch.user_fpu);
+free_partial_vcpu:
+	kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, vmx);
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
+#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
+
+static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	spin_lock_init(&to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointer_lock);
+
+	if (!ple_gap)
+		kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_L1TF) && enable_ept) {
+		switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
+			/* 'I explicitly don't care' is set */
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+			/*
+			 * Warn upon starting the first VM in a potentially
+			 * insecure environment.
+			 */
+			if (sched_smt_active())
+				pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_SMT);
+			if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
+				pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_L1D);
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
+			/* Flush is enforced */
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init vmx_check_processor_compat(void)
+{
+	struct vmcs_config vmcs_conf;
+	struct vmx_capability vmx_cap;
+
+	if (setup_vmcs_config(&vmcs_conf, &vmx_cap) < 0)
+		return -EIO;
+	if (nested)
+		nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmcs_conf.nested, vmx_cap.ept,
+					   enable_apicv);
+	if (memcmp(&vmcs_config, &vmcs_conf, sizeof(struct vmcs_config)) != 0) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: CPU %d feature inconsistency!\n",
+				smp_processor_id());
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u64 vmx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
+{
+	u8 cache;
+	u64 ipat = 0;
+
+	/* For VT-d and EPT combination
+	 * 1. MMIO: always map as UC
+	 * 2. EPT with VT-d:
+	 *   a. VT-d without snooping control feature: can't guarantee the
+	 *	result, try to trust guest.
+	 *   b. VT-d with snooping control feature: snooping control feature of
+	 *	VT-d engine can guarantee the cache correctness. Just set it
+	 *	to WB to keep consistent with host. So the same as item 3.
+	 * 3. EPT without VT-d: always map as WB and set IPAT=1 to keep
+	 *    consistent with host MTRR
+	 */
+	if (is_mmio) {
+		cache = MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
+		goto exit;
+	}
+
+	if (!kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		ipat = VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
+		cache = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
+		goto exit;
+	}
+
+	if (kvm_read_cr0(vcpu) & X86_CR0_CD) {
+		ipat = VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
+		if (kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED))
+			cache = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
+		else
+			cache = MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
+		goto exit;
+	}
+
+	cache = kvm_mtrr_get_guest_memory_type(vcpu, gfn);
+
+exit:
+	return (cache << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT) | ipat;
+}
+
+static int vmx_get_lpage_level(void)
+{
+	if (enable_ept && !cpu_has_vmx_ept_1g_page())
+		return PT_DIRECTORY_LEVEL;
+	else
+		/* For shadow and EPT supported 1GB page */
+		return PT_PDPE_LEVEL;
+}
+
+static void vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	/*
+	 * These bits in the secondary execution controls field
+	 * are dynamic, the others are mostly based on the hypervisor
+	 * architecture and the guest's CPUID.  Do not touch the
+	 * dynamic bits.
+	 */
+	u32 mask =
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
+		SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC;
+
+	u32 new_ctl = vmx->secondary_exec_control;
+	u32 cur_ctl = secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx);
+
+	secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, (new_ctl & ~mask) | (cur_ctl & mask));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate MSR_IA32_VMX_CR{0,4}_FIXED1 according to CPUID. Only set bits
+ * (indicating "allowed-1") if they are supported in the guest's CPUID.
+ */
+static void nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
+
+	vmx->nested.msrs.cr0_fixed1 = 0xffffffff;
+	vmx->nested.msrs.cr4_fixed1 = X86_CR4_PCE;
+
+#define cr4_fixed1_update(_cr4_mask, _reg, _cpuid_mask) do {		\
+	if (entry && (entry->_reg & (_cpuid_mask)))			\
+		vmx->nested.msrs.cr4_fixed1 |= (_cr4_mask);	\
+} while (0)
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x1, 0);
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_VME,        edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_VME));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PVI,        edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_VME));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_TSD,        edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_TSC));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_DE,         edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_DE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PSE,        edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_PSE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PAE,        edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_PAE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_MCE,        edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_MCE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PGE,        edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_PGE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_OSFXSR,     edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_FXSR));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT, edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_XMM));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_VMXE,       ecx, bit(X86_FEATURE_VMX));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_SMXE,       ecx, bit(X86_FEATURE_SMX));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PCIDE,      ecx, bit(X86_FEATURE_PCID));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE,    ecx, bit(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE));
+
+	entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x7, 0);
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE,   ebx, bit(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_SMEP,       ebx, bit(X86_FEATURE_SMEP));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_SMAP,       ebx, bit(X86_FEATURE_SMAP));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PKE,        ecx, bit(X86_FEATURE_PKU));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_UMIP,       ecx, bit(X86_FEATURE_UMIP));
+	cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_LA57,       ecx, bit(X86_FEATURE_LA57));
+
+#undef cr4_fixed1_update
+}
+
+static void nested_vmx_entry_exit_ctls_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	if (kvm_mpx_supported()) {
+		bool mpx_enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX);
+
+		if (mpx_enabled) {
+			vmx->nested.msrs.entry_ctls_high |= VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
+			vmx->nested.msrs.exit_ctls_high |= VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS;
+		} else {
+			vmx->nested.msrs.entry_ctls_high &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
+			vmx->nested.msrs.exit_ctls_high &= ~VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void update_intel_pt_cfg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best = NULL;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PT_CPUID_LEAVES; i++) {
+		best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x14, i);
+		if (!best)
+			return;
+		vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_EAX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->eax;
+		vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_EBX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->ebx;
+		vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_ECX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->ecx;
+		vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_EDX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->edx;
+	}
+
+	/* Get the number of configurable Address Ranges for filtering */
+	vmx->pt_desc.addr_range = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
+						PT_CAP_num_address_ranges);
+
+	/* Initialize and clear the no dependency bits */
+	vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask = ~(RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN | RTIT_CTL_OS |
+			RTIT_CTL_USR | RTIT_CTL_TSC_EN | RTIT_CTL_DISRETC);
+
+	/*
+	 * If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[0]=1 CR3Filter can be set otherwise
+	 * will inject an #GP
+	 */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_cr3_filtering))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_CR3EN;
+
+	/*
+	 * If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[1]=1 CYCEn, CycThresh and
+	 * PSBFreq can be set
+	 */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_cyc))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(RTIT_CTL_CYCLEACC |
+				RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH | RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ);
+
+	/*
+	 * If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[3]=1 MTCEn BranchEn and
+	 * MTCFreq can be set
+	 */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_mtc))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(RTIT_CTL_MTC_EN |
+				RTIT_CTL_BRANCH_EN | RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE);
+
+	/* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[4]=1 FUPonPTW and PTWEn can be set */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_ptwrite))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(RTIT_CTL_FUP_ON_PTW |
+							RTIT_CTL_PTW_EN);
+
+	/* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[5]=1 PwrEvEn can be set */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_power_event_trace))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_PWR_EVT_EN;
+
+	/* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):ECX[0]=1 ToPA can be set */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_topa_output))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_TOPA;
+
+	/* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):ECX[3]=1 FabircEn can be set */
+	if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_output_subsys))
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_FABRIC_EN;
+
+	/* unmask address range configure area */
+	for (i = 0; i < vmx->pt_desc.addr_range; i++)
+		vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(0xfULL << (32 + i * 4));
+}
+
+static void vmx_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	/* xsaves_enabled is recomputed in vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(). */
+	vcpu->arch.xsaves_enabled = false;
+
+	if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
+		vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(vmx);
+		vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(vmx);
+	}
+
+	if (nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
+			FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
+			FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
+	else
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &=
+			~(FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
+			  FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX);
+
+	if (nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu)) {
+		nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(vcpu);
+		nested_vmx_entry_exit_ctls_update(vcpu);
+	}
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) &&
+			guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT))
+		update_intel_pt_cfg(vcpu);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
+		struct shared_msr_entry *msr;
+		msr = find_msr_entry(vmx, MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL);
+		if (msr) {
+			bool enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+			vmx_set_guest_msr(vmx, msr, enabled ? 0 : TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void vmx_set_supported_cpuid(u32 func, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry)
+{
+	if (func == 1 && nested)
+		entry->ecx |= bit(X86_FEATURE_VMX);
+}
+
+static void vmx_request_immediate_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	to_vmx(vcpu)->req_immediate_exit = true;
+}
+
+static int vmx_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+			       struct x86_instruction_info *info,
+			       enum x86_intercept_stage stage)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+	struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = &vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+
+	/*
+	 * RDPID causes #UD if disabled through secondary execution controls.
+	 * Because it is marked as EmulateOnUD, we need to intercept it here.
+	 */
+	if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_rdtscp &&
+	    !nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP)) {
+		ctxt->exception.vector = UD_VECTOR;
+		ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = false;
+		return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
+	}
+
+	/* TODO: check more intercepts... */
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+/* (a << shift) / divisor, return 1 if overflow otherwise 0 */
+static inline int u64_shl_div_u64(u64 a, unsigned int shift,
+				  u64 divisor, u64 *result)
+{
+	u64 low = a << shift, high = a >> (64 - shift);
+
+	/* To avoid the overflow on divq */
+	if (high >= divisor)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Low hold the result, high hold rem which is discarded */
+	asm("divq %2\n\t" : "=a" (low), "=d" (high) :
+	    "rm" (divisor), "0" (low), "1" (high));
+	*result = low;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmx_set_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_deadline_tsc,
+			    bool *expired)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx;
+	u64 tscl, guest_tscl, delta_tsc, lapic_timer_advance_cycles;
+	struct kvm_timer *ktimer = &vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer;
+
+	if (kvm_mwait_in_guest(vcpu->kvm) ||
+		kvm_can_post_timer_interrupt(vcpu))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	tscl = rdtsc();
+	guest_tscl = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, tscl);
+	delta_tsc = max(guest_deadline_tsc, guest_tscl) - guest_tscl;
+	lapic_timer_advance_cycles = nsec_to_cycles(vcpu,
+						    ktimer->timer_advance_ns);
+
+	if (delta_tsc > lapic_timer_advance_cycles)
+		delta_tsc -= lapic_timer_advance_cycles;
+	else
+		delta_tsc = 0;
+
+	/* Convert to host delta tsc if tsc scaling is enabled */
+	if (vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio != kvm_default_tsc_scaling_ratio &&
+	    delta_tsc && u64_shl_div_u64(delta_tsc,
+				kvm_tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits,
+				vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio, &delta_tsc))
+		return -ERANGE;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the delta tsc can't fit in the 32 bit after the multi shift,
+	 * we can't use the preemption timer.
+	 * It's possible that it fits on later vmentries, but checking
+	 * on every vmentry is costly so we just use an hrtimer.
+	 */
+	if (delta_tsc >> (cpu_preemption_timer_multi + 32))
+		return -ERANGE;
+
+	vmx->hv_deadline_tsc = tscl + delta_tsc;
+	*expired = !delta_tsc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void vmx_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	to_vmx(vcpu)->hv_deadline_tsc = -1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void vmx_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
+{
+	if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+		shrink_ple_window(vcpu);
+}
+
+static void vmx_slot_enable_log_dirty(struct kvm *kvm,
+				     struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	kvm_mmu_slot_leaf_clear_dirty(kvm, slot);
+	kvm_mmu_slot_largepage_remove_write_access(kvm, slot);
+}
+
+static void vmx_slot_disable_log_dirty(struct kvm *kvm,
+				       struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	kvm_mmu_slot_set_dirty(kvm, slot);
+}
+
+static void vmx_flush_log_dirty(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	kvm_flush_pml_buffers(kvm);
+}
+
+static int vmx_write_pml_buffer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	gpa_t gpa, dst;
+
+	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->nested.pml_full);
+
+		/*
+		 * Check if PML is enabled for the nested guest.
+		 * Whether eptp bit 6 is set is already checked
+		 * as part of A/D emulation.
+		 */
+		vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+		if (!nested_cpu_has_pml(vmcs12))
+			return 0;
+
+		if (vmcs12->guest_pml_index >= PML_ENTITY_NUM) {
+			vmx->nested.pml_full = true;
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) & ~0xFFFull;
+		dst = vmcs12->pml_address + sizeof(u64) * vmcs12->guest_pml_index;
+
+		if (kvm_write_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(dst), &gpa,
+					 offset_in_page(dst), sizeof(gpa)))
+			return 0;
+
+		vmcs12->guest_pml_index--;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void vmx_enable_log_dirty_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm,
+					   struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
+					   gfn_t offset, unsigned long mask)
+{
+	kvm_mmu_clear_dirty_pt_masked(kvm, memslot, offset, mask);
+}
+
+static void __pi_post_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
+	struct pi_desc old, new;
+	unsigned int dest;
+
+	do {
+		old.control = new.control = pi_desc->control;
+		WARN(old.nv != POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR,
+		     "Wakeup handler not enabled while the VCPU is blocked\n");
+
+		dest = cpu_physical_id(vcpu->cpu);
+
+		if (x2apic_enabled())
+			new.ndst = dest;
+		else
+			new.ndst = (dest << 8) & 0xFF00;
+
+		/* set 'NV' to 'notification vector' */
+		new.nv = POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
+	} while (cmpxchg64(&pi_desc->control, old.control,
+			   new.control) != old.control);
+
+	if (!WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->pre_pcpu == -1)) {
+		spin_lock(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->pre_pcpu));
+		list_del(&vcpu->blocked_vcpu_list);
+		spin_unlock(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->pre_pcpu));
+		vcpu->pre_pcpu = -1;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * This routine does the following things for vCPU which is going
+ * to be blocked if VT-d PI is enabled.
+ * - Store the vCPU to the wakeup list, so when interrupts happen
+ *   we can find the right vCPU to wake up.
+ * - Change the Posted-interrupt descriptor as below:
+ *      'NDST' <-- vcpu->pre_pcpu
+ *      'NV' <-- POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR
+ * - If 'ON' is set during this process, which means at least one
+ *   interrupt is posted for this vCPU, we cannot block it, in
+ *   this case, return 1, otherwise, return 0.
+ *
+ */
+static int pi_pre_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned int dest;
+	struct pi_desc old, new;
+	struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
+
+	if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm) ||
+		!irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP)  ||
+		!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
+		return 0;
+
+	WARN_ON(irqs_disabled());
+	local_irq_disable();
+	if (!WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->pre_pcpu != -1)) {
+		vcpu->pre_pcpu = vcpu->cpu;
+		spin_lock(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->pre_pcpu));
+		list_add_tail(&vcpu->blocked_vcpu_list,
+			      &per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu,
+				       vcpu->pre_pcpu));
+		spin_unlock(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->pre_pcpu));
+	}
+
+	do {
+		old.control = new.control = pi_desc->control;
+
+		WARN((pi_desc->sn == 1),
+		     "Warning: SN field of posted-interrupts "
+		     "is set before blocking\n");
+
+		/*
+		 * Since vCPU can be preempted during this process,
+		 * vcpu->cpu could be different with pre_pcpu, we
+		 * need to set pre_pcpu as the destination of wakeup
+		 * notification event, then we can find the right vCPU
+		 * to wakeup in wakeup handler if interrupts happen
+		 * when the vCPU is in blocked state.
+		 */
+		dest = cpu_physical_id(vcpu->pre_pcpu);
+
+		if (x2apic_enabled())
+			new.ndst = dest;
+		else
+			new.ndst = (dest << 8) & 0xFF00;
+
+		/* set 'NV' to 'wakeup vector' */
+		new.nv = POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR;
+	} while (cmpxchg64(&pi_desc->control, old.control,
+			   new.control) != old.control);
+
+	/* We should not block the vCPU if an interrupt is posted for it.  */
+	if (pi_test_on(pi_desc) == 1)
+		__pi_post_block(vcpu);
+
+	local_irq_enable();
+	return (vcpu->pre_pcpu == -1);
+}
+
+static int vmx_pre_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (pi_pre_block(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	if (kvm_lapic_hv_timer_in_use(vcpu))
+		kvm_lapic_switch_to_sw_timer(vcpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void pi_post_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (vcpu->pre_pcpu == -1)
+		return;
+
+	WARN_ON(irqs_disabled());
+	local_irq_disable();
+	__pi_post_block(vcpu);
+	local_irq_enable();
+}
+
+static void vmx_post_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (kvm_x86_ops->set_hv_timer)
+		kvm_lapic_switch_to_hv_timer(vcpu);
+
+	pi_post_block(vcpu);
+}
+
+/*
+ * vmx_update_pi_irte - set IRTE for Posted-Interrupts
+ *
+ * @kvm: kvm
+ * @host_irq: host irq of the interrupt
+ * @guest_irq: gsi of the interrupt
+ * @set: set or unset PI
+ * returns 0 on success, < 0 on failure
+ */
+static int vmx_update_pi_irte(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int host_irq,
+			      uint32_t guest_irq, bool set)
+{
+	struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e;
+	struct kvm_irq_routing_table *irq_rt;
+	struct kvm_lapic_irq irq;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
+	struct vcpu_data vcpu_info;
+	int idx, ret = 0;
+
+	if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(kvm) ||
+		!irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP) ||
+		!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(kvm->vcpus[0]))
+		return 0;
+
+	idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->irq_srcu);
+	irq_rt = srcu_dereference(kvm->irq_routing, &kvm->irq_srcu);
+	if (guest_irq >= irq_rt->nr_rt_entries ||
+	    hlist_empty(&irq_rt->map[guest_irq])) {
+		pr_warn_once("no route for guest_irq %u/%u (broken user space?)\n",
+			     guest_irq, irq_rt->nr_rt_entries);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(e, &irq_rt->map[guest_irq], link) {
+		if (e->type != KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI)
+			continue;
+		/*
+		 * VT-d PI cannot support posting multicast/broadcast
+		 * interrupts to a vCPU, we still use interrupt remapping
+		 * for these kind of interrupts.
+		 *
+		 * For lowest-priority interrupts, we only support
+		 * those with single CPU as the destination, e.g. user
+		 * configures the interrupts via /proc/irq or uses
+		 * irqbalance to make the interrupts single-CPU.
+		 *
+		 * We will support full lowest-priority interrupt later.
+		 *
+		 * In addition, we can only inject generic interrupts using
+		 * the PI mechanism, refuse to route others through it.
+		 */
+
+		kvm_set_msi_irq(kvm, e, &irq);
+		if (!kvm_intr_is_single_vcpu(kvm, &irq, &vcpu) ||
+		    !kvm_irq_is_postable(&irq)) {
+			/*
+			 * Make sure the IRTE is in remapped mode if
+			 * we don't handle it in posted mode.
+			 */
+			ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, NULL);
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				printk(KERN_INFO
+				   "failed to back to remapped mode, irq: %u\n",
+				   host_irq);
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		vcpu_info.pi_desc_addr = __pa(vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu));
+		vcpu_info.vector = irq.vector;
+
+		trace_kvm_pi_irte_update(host_irq, vcpu->vcpu_id, e->gsi,
+				vcpu_info.vector, vcpu_info.pi_desc_addr, set);
+
+		if (set)
+			ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, &vcpu_info);
+		else
+			ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, NULL);
+
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			printk(KERN_INFO "%s: failed to update PI IRTE\n",
+					__func__);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+out:
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->irq_srcu, idx);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	if (vcpu->arch.mcg_cap & MCG_LMCE_P)
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
+			FEATURE_CONTROL_LMCE;
+	else
+		to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &=
+			~FEATURE_CONTROL_LMCE;
+}
+
+static int vmx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	/* we need a nested vmexit to enter SMM, postpone if run is pending */
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int vmx_pre_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode = is_guest_mode(vcpu);
+	if (vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode)
+		nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, -1, 0, 0);
+
+	vmx->nested.smm.vmxon = vmx->nested.vmxon;
+	vmx->nested.vmxon = false;
+	vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmx_pre_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	int ret;
+
+	if (vmx->nested.smm.vmxon) {
+		vmx->nested.vmxon = true;
+		vmx->nested.smm.vmxon = false;
+	}
+
+	if (vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode) {
+		ret = nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(vcpu, false);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+
+		vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode = false;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool vmx_need_emulation_on_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon;
+}
+
+static __init int hardware_setup(void)
+{
+	unsigned long host_bndcfgs;
+	struct desc_ptr dt;
+	int r, i;
+
+	rdmsrl_safe(MSR_EFER, &host_efer);
+
+	store_idt(&dt);
+	host_idt_base = dt.address;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_msr_index); ++i)
+		kvm_define_shared_msr(i, vmx_msr_index[i]);
+
+	if (setup_vmcs_config(&vmcs_config, &vmx_capability) < 0)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX))
+		kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_NX);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MPX)) {
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, host_bndcfgs);
+		WARN_ONCE(host_bndcfgs, "KVM: BNDCFGS in host will be lost");
+	}
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_vpid() || !cpu_has_vmx_invvpid() ||
+	    !(cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_single() || cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_global()))
+		enable_vpid = 0;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_ept() ||
+	    !cpu_has_vmx_ept_4levels() ||
+	    !cpu_has_vmx_ept_mt_wb() ||
+	    !cpu_has_vmx_invept_global())
+		enable_ept = 0;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_ept_ad_bits() || !enable_ept)
+		enable_ept_ad_bits = 0;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_unrestricted_guest() || !enable_ept)
+		enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_flexpriority())
+		flexpriority_enabled = 0;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_virtual_nmis())
+		enable_vnmi = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * set_apic_access_page_addr() is used to reload apic access
+	 * page upon invalidation.  No need to do anything if not
+	 * using the APIC_ACCESS_ADDR VMCS field.
+	 */
+	if (!flexpriority_enabled)
+		kvm_x86_ops->set_apic_access_page_addr = NULL;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow())
+		kvm_x86_ops->update_cr8_intercept = NULL;
+
+	if (enable_ept && !cpu_has_vmx_ept_2m_page())
+		kvm_disable_largepages();
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+	if (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_GUEST_MAPPING_FLUSH
+	    && enable_ept) {
+		kvm_x86_ops->tlb_remote_flush = hv_remote_flush_tlb;
+		kvm_x86_ops->tlb_remote_flush_with_range =
+				hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_ple()) {
+		ple_gap = 0;
+		ple_window = 0;
+		ple_window_grow = 0;
+		ple_window_max = 0;
+		ple_window_shrink = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_apicv()) {
+		enable_apicv = 0;
+		kvm_x86_ops->sync_pir_to_irr = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling()) {
+		kvm_has_tsc_control = true;
+		kvm_max_tsc_scaling_ratio = KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX;
+		kvm_tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits = 48;
+	}
+
+	set_bit(0, vmx_vpid_bitmap); /* 0 is reserved for host */
+
+	if (enable_ept)
+		vmx_enable_tdp();
+	else
+		kvm_disable_tdp();
+
+	/*
+	 * Only enable PML when hardware supports PML feature, and both EPT
+	 * and EPT A/D bit features are enabled -- PML depends on them to work.
+	 */
+	if (!enable_ept || !enable_ept_ad_bits || !cpu_has_vmx_pml())
+		enable_pml = 0;
+
+	if (!enable_pml) {
+		kvm_x86_ops->slot_enable_log_dirty = NULL;
+		kvm_x86_ops->slot_disable_log_dirty = NULL;
+		kvm_x86_ops->flush_log_dirty = NULL;
+		kvm_x86_ops->enable_log_dirty_pt_masked = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_preemption_timer())
+		enable_preemption_timer = false;
+
+	if (enable_preemption_timer) {
+		u64 use_timer_freq = 5000ULL * 1000 * 1000;
+		u64 vmx_msr;
+
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC, vmx_msr);
+		cpu_preemption_timer_multi =
+			vmx_msr & VMX_MISC_PREEMPTION_TIMER_RATE_MASK;
+
+		if (tsc_khz)
+			use_timer_freq = (u64)tsc_khz * 1000;
+		use_timer_freq >>= cpu_preemption_timer_multi;
+
+		/*
+		 * KVM "disables" the preemption timer by setting it to its max
+		 * value.  Don't use the timer if it might cause spurious exits
+		 * at a rate faster than 0.1 Hz (of uninterrupted guest time).
+		 */
+		if (use_timer_freq > 0xffffffffu / 10)
+			enable_preemption_timer = false;
+	}
+
+	if (!enable_preemption_timer) {
+		kvm_x86_ops->set_hv_timer = NULL;
+		kvm_x86_ops->cancel_hv_timer = NULL;
+		kvm_x86_ops->request_immediate_exit = __kvm_request_immediate_exit;
+	}
+
+	kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler(wakeup_handler);
+
+	kvm_mce_cap_supported |= MCG_LMCE_P;
+
+	if (pt_mode != PT_MODE_SYSTEM && pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!enable_ept || !cpu_has_vmx_intel_pt())
+		pt_mode = PT_MODE_SYSTEM;
+
+	if (nested) {
+		nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmcs_config.nested,
+					   vmx_capability.ept, enable_apicv);
+
+		r = nested_vmx_hardware_setup(kvm_vmx_exit_handlers);
+		if (r)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	r = alloc_kvm_area();
+	if (r)
+		nested_vmx_hardware_unsetup();
+	return r;
+}
+
+static __exit void hardware_unsetup(void)
+{
+	if (nested)
+		nested_vmx_hardware_unsetup();
+
+	free_kvm_area();
+}
+
+static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
+	.cpu_has_kvm_support = cpu_has_kvm_support,
+	.disabled_by_bios = vmx_disabled_by_bios,
+	.hardware_setup = hardware_setup,
+	.hardware_unsetup = hardware_unsetup,
+	.check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compat,
+	.hardware_enable = hardware_enable,
+	.hardware_disable = hardware_disable,
+	.cpu_has_accelerated_tpr = report_flexpriority,
+	.has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
+
+	.vm_init = vmx_vm_init,
+	.vm_alloc = vmx_vm_alloc,
+	.vm_free = vmx_vm_free,
+
+	.vcpu_create = vmx_create_vcpu,
+	.vcpu_free = vmx_free_vcpu,
+	.vcpu_reset = vmx_vcpu_reset,
+
+	.prepare_guest_switch = vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest,
+	.vcpu_load = vmx_vcpu_load,
+	.vcpu_put = vmx_vcpu_put,
+
+	.update_bp_intercept = update_exception_bitmap,
+	.get_msr_feature = vmx_get_msr_feature,
+	.get_msr = vmx_get_msr,
+	.set_msr = vmx_set_msr,
+	.get_segment_base = vmx_get_segment_base,
+	.get_segment = vmx_get_segment,
+	.set_segment = vmx_set_segment,
+	.get_cpl = vmx_get_cpl,
+	.get_cs_db_l_bits = vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits,
+	.decache_cr0_guest_bits = vmx_decache_cr0_guest_bits,
+	.decache_cr4_guest_bits = vmx_decache_cr4_guest_bits,
+	.set_cr0 = vmx_set_cr0,
+	.set_cr3 = vmx_set_cr3,
+	.set_cr4 = vmx_set_cr4,
+	.set_efer = vmx_set_efer,
+	.get_idt = vmx_get_idt,
+	.set_idt = vmx_set_idt,
+	.get_gdt = vmx_get_gdt,
+	.set_gdt = vmx_set_gdt,
+	.get_dr6 = vmx_get_dr6,
+	.set_dr6 = vmx_set_dr6,
+	.set_dr7 = vmx_set_dr7,
+	.sync_dirty_debug_regs = vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
+	.cache_reg = vmx_cache_reg,
+	.get_rflags = vmx_get_rflags,
+	.set_rflags = vmx_set_rflags,
+
+	.tlb_flush = vmx_flush_tlb,
+	.tlb_flush_gva = vmx_flush_tlb_gva,
+
+	.run = vmx_vcpu_run,
+	.handle_exit = vmx_handle_exit,
+	.skip_emulated_instruction = skip_emulated_instruction,
+	.set_interrupt_shadow = vmx_set_interrupt_shadow,
+	.get_interrupt_shadow = vmx_get_interrupt_shadow,
+	.patch_hypercall = vmx_patch_hypercall,
+	.set_irq = vmx_inject_irq,
+	.set_nmi = vmx_inject_nmi,
+	.queue_exception = vmx_queue_exception,
+	.cancel_injection = vmx_cancel_injection,
+	.interrupt_allowed = vmx_interrupt_allowed,
+	.nmi_allowed = vmx_nmi_allowed,
+	.get_nmi_mask = vmx_get_nmi_mask,
+	.set_nmi_mask = vmx_set_nmi_mask,
+	.enable_nmi_window = enable_nmi_window,
+	.enable_irq_window = enable_irq_window,
+	.update_cr8_intercept = update_cr8_intercept,
+	.set_virtual_apic_mode = vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode,
+	.set_apic_access_page_addr = vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr,
+	.get_enable_apicv = vmx_get_enable_apicv,
+	.refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl,
+	.load_eoi_exitmap = vmx_load_eoi_exitmap,
+	.apicv_post_state_restore = vmx_apicv_post_state_restore,
+	.hwapic_irr_update = vmx_hwapic_irr_update,
+	.hwapic_isr_update = vmx_hwapic_isr_update,
+	.guest_apic_has_interrupt = vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt,
+	.sync_pir_to_irr = vmx_sync_pir_to_irr,
+	.deliver_posted_interrupt = vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt,
+	.dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt = vmx_dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt,
+
+	.set_tss_addr = vmx_set_tss_addr,
+	.set_identity_map_addr = vmx_set_identity_map_addr,
+	.get_tdp_level = get_ept_level,
+	.get_mt_mask = vmx_get_mt_mask,
+
+	.get_exit_info = vmx_get_exit_info,
+
+	.get_lpage_level = vmx_get_lpage_level,
+
+	.cpuid_update = vmx_cpuid_update,
+
+	.rdtscp_supported = vmx_rdtscp_supported,
+	.invpcid_supported = vmx_invpcid_supported,
+
+	.set_supported_cpuid = vmx_set_supported_cpuid,
+
+	.has_wbinvd_exit = cpu_has_vmx_wbinvd_exit,
+
+	.read_l1_tsc_offset = vmx_read_l1_tsc_offset,
+	.write_l1_tsc_offset = vmx_write_l1_tsc_offset,
+
+	.set_tdp_cr3 = vmx_set_cr3,
+
+	.check_intercept = vmx_check_intercept,
+	.handle_exit_irqoff = vmx_handle_exit_irqoff,
+	.mpx_supported = vmx_mpx_supported,
+	.xsaves_supported = vmx_xsaves_supported,
+	.umip_emulated = vmx_umip_emulated,
+	.pt_supported = vmx_pt_supported,
+
+	.request_immediate_exit = vmx_request_immediate_exit,
+
+	.sched_in = vmx_sched_in,
+
+	.slot_enable_log_dirty = vmx_slot_enable_log_dirty,
+	.slot_disable_log_dirty = vmx_slot_disable_log_dirty,
+	.flush_log_dirty = vmx_flush_log_dirty,
+	.enable_log_dirty_pt_masked = vmx_enable_log_dirty_pt_masked,
+	.write_log_dirty = vmx_write_pml_buffer,
+
+	.pre_block = vmx_pre_block,
+	.post_block = vmx_post_block,
+
+	.pmu_ops = &intel_pmu_ops,
+
+	.update_pi_irte = vmx_update_pi_irte,
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	.set_hv_timer = vmx_set_hv_timer,
+	.cancel_hv_timer = vmx_cancel_hv_timer,
+#endif
+
+	.setup_mce = vmx_setup_mce,
+
+	.smi_allowed = vmx_smi_allowed,
+	.pre_enter_smm = vmx_pre_enter_smm,
+	.pre_leave_smm = vmx_pre_leave_smm,
+	.enable_smi_window = enable_smi_window,
+
+	.check_nested_events = NULL,
+	.get_nested_state = NULL,
+	.set_nested_state = NULL,
+	.get_vmcs12_pages = NULL,
+	.nested_enable_evmcs = NULL,
+	.nested_get_evmcs_version = NULL,
+	.need_emulation_on_page_fault = vmx_need_emulation_on_page_fault,
+	.apic_init_signal_blocked = vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked,
+};
+
+static void vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush(void)
+{
+	if (vmx_l1d_flush_pages) {
+		free_pages((unsigned long)vmx_l1d_flush_pages, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
+		vmx_l1d_flush_pages = NULL;
+	}
+	/* Restore state so sysfs ignores VMX */
+	l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
+}
+
+static void vmx_exit(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
+	RCU_INIT_POINTER(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss, NULL);
+	synchronize_rcu();
+#endif
+
+	kvm_exit();
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs)) {
+		int cpu;
+		struct hv_vp_assist_page *vp_ap;
+		/*
+		 * Reset everything to support using non-enlightened VMCS
+		 * access later (e.g. when we reload the module with
+		 * enlightened_vmcs=0)
+		 */
+		for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+			vp_ap =	hv_get_vp_assist_page(cpu);
+
+			if (!vp_ap)
+				continue;
+
+			vp_ap->nested_control.features.directhypercall = 0;
+			vp_ap->current_nested_vmcs = 0;
+			vp_ap->enlighten_vmentry = 0;
+		}
+
+		static_branch_disable(&enable_evmcs);
+	}
+#endif
+	vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush();
+}
+module_exit(vmx_exit);
+
+static int __init vmx_init(void)
+{
+	int r;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+	/*
+	 * Enlightened VMCS usage should be recommended and the host needs
+	 * to support eVMCS v1 or above. We can also disable eVMCS support
+	 * with module parameter.
+	 */
+	if (enlightened_vmcs &&
+	    ms_hyperv.hints & HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_RECOMMENDED &&
+	    (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_VERSION) >=
+	    KVM_EVMCS_VERSION) {
+		int cpu;
+
+		/* Check that we have assist pages on all online CPUs */
+		for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+			if (!hv_get_vp_assist_page(cpu)) {
+				enlightened_vmcs = false;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (enlightened_vmcs) {
+			pr_info("KVM: vmx: using Hyper-V Enlightened VMCS\n");
+			static_branch_enable(&enable_evmcs);
+		}
+
+		if (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_DIRECT_FLUSH)
+			vmx_x86_ops.enable_direct_tlbflush
+				= hv_enable_direct_tlbflush;
+
+	} else {
+		enlightened_vmcs = false;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	r = kvm_init(&vmx_x86_ops, sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx),
+		     __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx), THIS_MODULE);
+	if (r)
+		return r;
+
+	/*
+	 * Must be called after kvm_init() so enable_ept is properly set
+	 * up. Hand the parameter mitigation value in which was stored in
+	 * the pre module init parser. If no parameter was given, it will
+	 * contain 'auto' which will be turned into the default 'cond'
+	 * mitigation mode.
+	 */
+	r = vmx_setup_l1d_flush(vmentry_l1d_flush_param);
+	if (r) {
+		vmx_exit();
+		return r;
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
+	rcu_assign_pointer(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss,
+			   crash_vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss);
+#endif
+	vmx_check_vmcs12_offsets();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+module_init(vmx_init);
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 133/173] KVM: nVMX: vmread should not set rflags to specify success in case of #PF
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (131 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 132/173] KVM: VMX: Add non-canonical check on writes to RTIT address MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 134/173] KVM: Use vcpu-specific gva->hva translation when querying host page size Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (45 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Liran Alon, Miaohe Lin,
	Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini, Sasha Levin

From: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>

[ Upstream commit a4d956b9390418623ae5d07933e2679c68b6f83c ]

In case writing to vmread destination operand result in a #PF, vmread
should not call nested_vmx_succeed() to set rflags to specify success.
Similar to as done in VMPTRST (See handle_vmptrst()).

Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index c579cda1721e1..809d1b031fd9e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -8014,8 +8014,10 @@ static int handle_vmread(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		/* _system ok, nested_vmx_check_permission has verified cpl=0 */
 		if (kvm_write_guest_virt_system(vcpu, gva, &field_value,
 						(is_long_mode(vcpu) ? 8 : 4),
-						&e))
+						&e)) {
 			kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &e);
+			return 1;
+		}
 	}
 
 	nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 134/173] KVM: Use vcpu-specific gva->hva translation when querying host page size
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (132 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 133/173] KVM: nVMX: vmread should not set rflags to specify success in case of #PF Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 135/173] KVM: Play nice with read-only memslots " Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (44 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini,
	Sasha Levin

From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit f9b84e19221efc5f493156ee0329df3142085f28 ]

Use kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva() when retrieving the host page size so that the
correct set of memslots is used when handling x86 page faults in SMM.

Fixes: 54bf36aac520 ("KVM: x86: use vcpu-specific functions to read/write/translate GFNs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c       | 6 +++---
 include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +-
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c      | 4 ++--
 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index c0b0135ef07f0..e5af08b581320 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -1165,12 +1165,12 @@ static bool mmu_gfn_lpage_is_disallowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn,
 	return __mmu_gfn_lpage_is_disallowed(gfn, level, slot);
 }
 
-static int host_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
+static int host_mapping_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
 {
 	unsigned long page_size;
 	int i, ret = 0;
 
-	page_size = kvm_host_page_size(kvm, gfn);
+	page_size = kvm_host_page_size(vcpu, gfn);
 
 	for (i = PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL; i <= PT_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL; ++i) {
 		if (page_size >= KVM_HPAGE_SIZE(i))
@@ -1220,7 +1220,7 @@ static int mapping_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t large_gfn,
 	if (unlikely(*force_pt_level))
 		return PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL;
 
-	host_level = host_mapping_level(vcpu->kvm, large_gfn);
+	host_level = host_mapping_level(vcpu, large_gfn);
 
 	if (host_level == PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL)
 		return host_level;
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 7668c68ddb5b3..30376715a6070 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ int kvm_clear_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, int offset, int len);
 int kvm_clear_guest(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, unsigned long len);
 struct kvm_memory_slot *gfn_to_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn);
 bool kvm_is_visible_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn);
-unsigned long kvm_host_page_size(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn);
+unsigned long kvm_host_page_size(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn);
 void mark_page_dirty(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn);
 
 struct kvm_memslots *kvm_vcpu_memslots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index deff4b3eb9722..609903481e39b 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -1277,14 +1277,14 @@ bool kvm_is_visible_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_is_visible_gfn);
 
-unsigned long kvm_host_page_size(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
+unsigned long kvm_host_page_size(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
 {
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 	unsigned long addr, size;
 
 	size = PAGE_SIZE;
 
-	addr = gfn_to_hva(kvm, gfn);
+	addr = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva(vcpu, gfn);
 	if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
 		return PAGE_SIZE;
 
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 135/173] KVM: Play nice with read-only memslots when querying host page size
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (133 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 134/173] KVM: Use vcpu-specific gva->hva translation when querying host page size Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` " Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 136/173] KVM: s390: do not clobber registers during guest reset/store status Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (43 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini,
	Sasha Levin

From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 42cde48b2d39772dba47e680781a32a6c4b7dc33 ]

Avoid the "writable" check in __gfn_to_hva_many(), which will always fail
on read-only memslots due to gfn_to_hva() assuming writes.  Functionally,
this allows x86 to create large mappings for read-only memslots that
are backed by HugeTLB mappings.

Note, the changelog for commit 05da45583de9 ("KVM: MMU: large page
support") states "If the largepage contains write-protected pages, a
large pte is not used.", but "write-protected" refers to pages that are
temporarily read-only, e.g. read-only memslots didn't even exist at the
time.

Fixes: 4d8b81abc47b ("KVM: introduce readonly memslot")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
[Redone using kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot_prot. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index 609903481e39b..745ee09083dd5 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -1284,7 +1284,7 @@ unsigned long kvm_host_page_size(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
 
 	size = PAGE_SIZE;
 
-	addr = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva(vcpu, gfn);
+	addr = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot(vcpu, gfn, NULL);
 	if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
 		return PAGE_SIZE;
 
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 136/173] KVM: s390: do not clobber registers during guest reset/store status
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (134 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 135/173] KVM: Play nice with read-only memslots " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 137/173] cifs: fail i/o on soft mounts if sessionsetup errors out Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (42 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, stable, Christian Borntraeger,
	David Hildenbrand, Cornelia Huck, Janosch Frank, Sasha Levin

From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

[ Upstream commit 55680890ea78be0df5e1384989f1be835043c084 ]

The initial CPU reset clobbers the userspace fpc and the store status
ioctl clobbers the guest acrs + fpr.  As these calls are only done via
ioctl (and not via vcpu_run), no CPU context is loaded, so we can (and
must) act directly on the sync regs, not on the thread context.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: e1788bb995be ("KVM: s390: handle floating point registers in the run ioctl not in vcpu_put/load")
Fixes: 31d8b8d41a7e ("KVM: s390: handle access registers in the run ioctl not in vcpu_put/load")
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200131100205.74720-2-frankja@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c
index 91c24e87fe10a..46fee3f4dedda 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c
@@ -2384,9 +2384,7 @@ static void kvm_s390_vcpu_initial_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	memset(vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr, 0, 16 * sizeof(__u64));
 	vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[0]  = 0xE0UL;
 	vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[14] = 0xC2000000UL;
-	/* make sure the new fpc will be lazily loaded */
-	save_fpu_regs();
-	current->thread.fpu.fpc = 0;
+	vcpu->run->s.regs.fpc = 0;
 	vcpu->arch.sie_block->gbea = 1;
 	vcpu->arch.sie_block->pp = 0;
 	vcpu->arch.sie_block->fpf &= ~FPF_BPBC;
@@ -3753,7 +3751,7 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 	}
 	case KVM_S390_STORE_STATUS:
 		idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
-		r = kvm_s390_vcpu_store_status(vcpu, arg);
+		r = kvm_s390_store_status_unloaded(vcpu, arg);
 		srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
 		break;
 	case KVM_S390_SET_INITIAL_PSW: {
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 137/173] cifs: fail i/o on soft mounts if sessionsetup errors out
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (135 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 136/173] KVM: s390: do not clobber registers during guest reset/store status Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 138/173] clocksource: Prevent double add_timer_on() for watchdog_timer Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (41 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ronnie Sahlberg, Steve French

From: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>

commit b0dd940e582b6a60296b9847a54012a4b080dc72 upstream.

RHBZ: 1579050

If we have a soft mount we should fail commands for session-setup
failures (such as the password having changed/ account being deleted/ ...)
and return an error back to the application.

Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c |   10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
@@ -257,9 +257,14 @@ smb2_reconnect(__le16 smb2_command, stru
 	}
 
 	rc = cifs_negotiate_protocol(0, tcon->ses);
-	if (!rc && tcon->ses->need_reconnect)
+	if (!rc && tcon->ses->need_reconnect) {
 		rc = cifs_setup_session(0, tcon->ses, nls_codepage);
-
+		if ((rc == -EACCES) && !tcon->retry) {
+			rc = -EHOSTDOWN;
+			mutex_unlock(&tcon->ses->session_mutex);
+			goto failed;
+		}
+	}
 	if (rc || !tcon->need_reconnect) {
 		mutex_unlock(&tcon->ses->session_mutex);
 		goto out;
@@ -301,6 +306,7 @@ out:
 	case SMB2_SET_INFO:
 		rc = -EAGAIN;
 	}
+failed:
 	unload_nls(nls_codepage);
 	return rc;
 }



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 138/173] clocksource: Prevent double add_timer_on() for watchdog_timer
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (136 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 137/173] cifs: fail i/o on soft mounts if sessionsetup errors out Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 139/173] perf/core: Fix mlock accounting in perf_mmap() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (40 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Konstantin Khlebnikov, Thomas Gleixner

From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>

commit febac332a819f0e764aa4da62757ba21d18c182b upstream.

Kernel crashes inside QEMU/KVM are observed:

  kernel BUG at kernel/time/timer.c:1154!
  BUG_ON(timer_pending(timer) || !timer->function) in add_timer_on().

At the same time another cpu got:

  general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI of poinson pointer 0xdead000000000200 in:

  __hlist_del at include/linux/list.h:681
  (inlined by) detach_timer at kernel/time/timer.c:818
  (inlined by) expire_timers at kernel/time/timer.c:1355
  (inlined by) __run_timers at kernel/time/timer.c:1686
  (inlined by) run_timer_softirq at kernel/time/timer.c:1699

Unfortunately kernel logs are badly scrambled, stacktraces are lost.

Printing the timer->function before the BUG_ON() pointed to
clocksource_watchdog().

The execution of clocksource_watchdog() can race with a sequence of
clocksource_stop_watchdog() .. clocksource_start_watchdog():

expire_timers()
 detach_timer(timer, true);
  timer->entry.pprev = NULL;
 raw_spin_unlock_irq(&base->lock);
 call_timer_fn
  clocksource_watchdog()

					clocksource_watchdog_kthread() or
					clocksource_unbind()

					spin_lock_irqsave(&watchdog_lock, flags);
					clocksource_stop_watchdog();
					 del_timer(&watchdog_timer);
					 watchdog_running = 0;
					spin_unlock_irqrestore(&watchdog_lock, flags);

					spin_lock_irqsave(&watchdog_lock, flags);
					clocksource_start_watchdog();
					 add_timer_on(&watchdog_timer, ...);
					 watchdog_running = 1;
					spin_unlock_irqrestore(&watchdog_lock, flags);

  spin_lock(&watchdog_lock);
  add_timer_on(&watchdog_timer, ...);
   BUG_ON(timer_pending(timer) || !timer->function);
    timer_pending() -> true
    BUG()

I.e. inside clocksource_watchdog() watchdog_timer could be already armed.

Check timer_pending() before calling add_timer_on(). This is sufficient as
all operations are synchronized by watchdog_lock.

Fixes: 75c5158f70c0 ("timekeeping: Update clocksource with stop_machine")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/158048693917.4378.13823603769948933793.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/time/clocksource.c |   11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/time/clocksource.c
+++ b/kernel/time/clocksource.c
@@ -280,8 +280,15 @@ static void clocksource_watchdog(unsigne
 	next_cpu = cpumask_next(raw_smp_processor_id(), cpu_online_mask);
 	if (next_cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
 		next_cpu = cpumask_first(cpu_online_mask);
-	watchdog_timer.expires += WATCHDOG_INTERVAL;
-	add_timer_on(&watchdog_timer, next_cpu);
+
+	/*
+	 * Arm timer if not already pending: could race with concurrent
+	 * pair clocksource_stop_watchdog() clocksource_start_watchdog().
+	 */
+	if (!timer_pending(&watchdog_timer)) {
+		watchdog_timer.expires += WATCHDOG_INTERVAL;
+		add_timer_on(&watchdog_timer, next_cpu);
+	}
 out:
 	spin_unlock(&watchdog_lock);
 }



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 139/173] perf/core: Fix mlock accounting in perf_mmap()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (137 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 138/173] clocksource: Prevent double add_timer_on() for watchdog_timer Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 140/173] rxrpc: Fix service call disconnection Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (39 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Alexander Shishkin, Song Liu,
	Peter Zijlstra (Intel),
	Ingo Molnar

From: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>

commit 003461559ef7a9bd0239bae35a22ad8924d6e9ad upstream.

Decreasing sysctl_perf_event_mlock between two consecutive perf_mmap()s of
a perf ring buffer may lead to an integer underflow in locked memory
accounting. This may lead to the undesired behaviors, such as failures in
BPF map creation.

Address this by adjusting the accounting logic to take into account the
possibility that the amount of already locked memory may exceed the
current limit.

Fixes: c4b75479741c ("perf/core: Make the mlock accounting simple again")
Suggested-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200123181146.2238074-1-songliubraving@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/events/core.c |   10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -5441,7 +5441,15 @@ accounting:
 	 */
 	user_lock_limit *= num_online_cpus();
 
-	user_locked = atomic_long_read(&user->locked_vm) + user_extra;
+	user_locked = atomic_long_read(&user->locked_vm);
+
+	/*
+	 * sysctl_perf_event_mlock may have changed, so that
+	 *     user->locked_vm > user_lock_limit
+	 */
+	if (user_locked > user_lock_limit)
+		user_locked = user_lock_limit;
+	user_locked += user_extra;
 
 	if (user_locked > user_lock_limit)
 		extra = user_locked - user_lock_limit;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 140/173] rxrpc: Fix service call disconnection
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (138 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 139/173] perf/core: Fix mlock accounting in perf_mmap() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 141/173] ASoC: pcm: update FE/BE trigger order based on the command Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (38 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, David Howells, David S. Miller, Sasha Levin

From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit b39a934ec72fa2b5a74123891f25273a38378b90 ]

The recent patch that substituted a flag on an rxrpc_call for the
connection pointer being NULL as an indication that a call was disconnected
puts the set_bit in the wrong place for service calls.  This is only a
problem if a call is implicitly terminated by a new call coming in on the
same connection channel instead of a terminating ACK packet.

In such a case, rxrpc_input_implicit_end_call() calls
__rxrpc_disconnect_call(), which is now (incorrectly) setting the
disconnection bit, meaning that when rxrpc_release_call() is later called,
it doesn't call rxrpc_disconnect_call() and so the call isn't removed from
the peer's error distribution list and the list gets corrupted.

KASAN finds the issue as an access after release on a call, but the
position at which it occurs is confusing as it appears to be related to a
different call (the call site is where the latter call is being removed
from the error distribution list and either the next or pprev pointer
points to a previously released call).

Fix this by moving the setting of the flag from __rxrpc_disconnect_call()
to rxrpc_disconnect_call() in the same place that the connection pointer
was being cleared.

Fixes: 5273a191dca6 ("rxrpc: Fix NULL pointer deref due to call->conn being cleared on disconnect")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/rxrpc/conn_object.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c b/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c
index 13b29e491de91..af02328205979 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c
@@ -163,8 +163,6 @@ void __rxrpc_disconnect_call(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
 
 	_enter("%d,%x", conn->debug_id, call->cid);
 
-	set_bit(RXRPC_CALL_DISCONNECTED, &call->flags);
-
 	if (rcu_access_pointer(chan->call) == call) {
 		/* Save the result of the call so that we can repeat it if necessary
 		 * through the channel, whilst disposing of the actual call record.
@@ -209,6 +207,7 @@ void rxrpc_disconnect_call(struct rxrpc_call *call)
 	__rxrpc_disconnect_call(conn, call);
 	spin_unlock(&conn->channel_lock);
 
+	set_bit(RXRPC_CALL_DISCONNECTED, &call->flags);
 	conn->idle_timestamp = jiffies;
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 141/173] ASoC: pcm: update FE/BE trigger order based on the command
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (139 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 140/173] rxrpc: Fix service call disconnection Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 142/173] hv_sock: Remove the accept port restriction Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (37 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ranjani Sridharan,
	Pierre-Louis Bossart, Mark Brown, Sasha Levin

From: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>

[ Upstream commit acbf27746ecfa96b290b54cc7f05273482ea128a ]

Currently, the trigger orders SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_PRE/POST
determine the order in which FE DAI and BE DAI are triggered.
In the case of SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_PRE, the FE DAI is
triggered before the BE DAI and in the case of
SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_POST, the BE DAI is triggered before
the FE DAI. And this order remains the same irrespective of the
trigger command.

In the case of the SOF driver, during playback, the FW
expects the BE DAI to be triggered before the FE DAI during
the START trigger. The BE DAI trigger handles the starting of
Link DMA and so it must be started before the FE DAI is started
to prevent xruns during pause/release. This can be addressed
by setting the trigger order for the FE dai link to
SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_POST. But during the STOP trigger,
the FW expects the FE DAI to be triggered before the BE DAI.
Retaining the same order during the START and STOP commands,
results in FW error as the DAI component in the FW is still
active.

The issue can be fixed by mirroring the trigger order of
FE and BE DAI's during the START and STOP trigger. So, with the
trigger order set to SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_PRE, the FE DAI will be
trigger first during SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START/STOP/RESUME
and the BE DAI will be triggered first during the
STOP/SUSPEND/PAUSE commands. Conversely, with the trigger order
set to SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_POST, the BE DAI will be triggered
first during the SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START/STOP/RESUME commands
and the FE DAI will be triggered first during the
SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_STOP/SUSPEND/PAUSE commands.

Signed-off-by: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191104224812.3393-2-ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 sound/soc/soc-pcm.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sound/soc/soc-pcm.c b/sound/soc/soc-pcm.c
index 70e1a60a2e980..89f772ed47053 100644
--- a/sound/soc/soc-pcm.c
+++ b/sound/soc/soc-pcm.c
@@ -2123,42 +2123,81 @@ int dpcm_be_dai_trigger(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe, int stream,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dpcm_be_dai_trigger);
 
+static int dpcm_dai_trigger_fe_be(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
+				  int cmd, bool fe_first)
+{
+	struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe = substream->private_data;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* call trigger on the frontend before the backend. */
+	if (fe_first) {
+		dev_dbg(fe->dev, "ASoC: pre trigger FE %s cmd %d\n",
+			fe->dai_link->name, cmd);
+
+		ret = soc_pcm_trigger(substream, cmd);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			return ret;
+
+		ret = dpcm_be_dai_trigger(fe, substream->stream, cmd);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	/* call trigger on the frontend after the backend. */
+	ret = dpcm_be_dai_trigger(fe, substream->stream, cmd);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	dev_dbg(fe->dev, "ASoC: post trigger FE %s cmd %d\n",
+		fe->dai_link->name, cmd);
+
+	ret = soc_pcm_trigger(substream, cmd);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int dpcm_fe_dai_do_trigger(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, int cmd)
 {
 	struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *fe = substream->private_data;
-	int stream = substream->stream, ret;
+	int stream = substream->stream;
+	int ret = 0;
 	enum snd_soc_dpcm_trigger trigger = fe->dai_link->trigger[stream];
 
 	fe->dpcm[stream].runtime_update = SND_SOC_DPCM_UPDATE_FE;
 
 	switch (trigger) {
 	case SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_PRE:
-		/* call trigger on the frontend before the backend. */
-
-		dev_dbg(fe->dev, "ASoC: pre trigger FE %s cmd %d\n",
-				fe->dai_link->name, cmd);
-
-		ret = soc_pcm_trigger(substream, cmd);
-		if (ret < 0) {
-			dev_err(fe->dev,"ASoC: trigger FE failed %d\n", ret);
-			goto out;
+		switch (cmd) {
+		case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START:
+		case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_RESUME:
+		case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_PAUSE_RELEASE:
+			ret = dpcm_dai_trigger_fe_be(substream, cmd, true);
+			break;
+		case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_STOP:
+		case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_SUSPEND:
+		case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_PAUSE_PUSH:
+			ret = dpcm_dai_trigger_fe_be(substream, cmd, false);
+			break;
+		default:
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			break;
 		}
-
-		ret = dpcm_be_dai_trigger(fe, substream->stream, cmd);
 		break;
 	case SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_POST:
-		/* call trigger on the frontend after the backend. */
-
-		ret = dpcm_be_dai_trigger(fe, substream->stream, cmd);
-		if (ret < 0) {
-			dev_err(fe->dev,"ASoC: trigger FE failed %d\n", ret);
-			goto out;
+		switch (cmd) {
+		case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START:
+		case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_RESUME:
+		case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_PAUSE_RELEASE:
+			ret = dpcm_dai_trigger_fe_be(substream, cmd, false);
+			break;
+		case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_STOP:
+		case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_SUSPEND:
+		case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_PAUSE_PUSH:
+			ret = dpcm_dai_trigger_fe_be(substream, cmd, true);
+			break;
+		default:
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			break;
 		}
-
-		dev_dbg(fe->dev, "ASoC: post trigger FE %s cmd %d\n",
-				fe->dai_link->name, cmd);
-
-		ret = soc_pcm_trigger(substream, cmd);
 		break;
 	case SND_SOC_DPCM_TRIGGER_BESPOKE:
 		/* bespoke trigger() - handles both FE and BEs */
@@ -2167,10 +2206,6 @@ static int dpcm_fe_dai_do_trigger(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, int cmd)
 				fe->dai_link->name, cmd);
 
 		ret = soc_pcm_bespoke_trigger(substream, cmd);
-		if (ret < 0) {
-			dev_err(fe->dev,"ASoC: trigger FE failed %d\n", ret);
-			goto out;
-		}
 		break;
 	default:
 		dev_err(fe->dev, "ASoC: invalid trigger cmd %d for %s\n", cmd,
@@ -2179,6 +2214,12 @@ static int dpcm_fe_dai_do_trigger(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, int cmd)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		dev_err(fe->dev, "ASoC: trigger FE cmd: %d failed: %d\n",
+			cmd, ret);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_START:
 	case SNDRV_PCM_TRIGGER_RESUME:
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 142/173] hv_sock: Remove the accept port restriction
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (140 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 141/173] ASoC: pcm: update FE/BE trigger order based on the command Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 143/173] RDMA/netlink: Do not always generate an ACK for some netlink operations Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (36 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sunil Muthuswamy, David S. Miller,
	Sasha Levin

From: Sunil Muthuswamy <sunilmut@microsoft.com>

[ Upstream commit c742c59e1fbd022b64d91aa9a0092b3a699d653c ]

Currently, hv_sock restricts the port the guest socket can accept
connections on. hv_sock divides the socket port namespace into two parts
for server side (listening socket), 0-0x7FFFFFFF & 0x80000000-0xFFFFFFFF
(there are no restrictions on client port namespace). The first part
(0-0x7FFFFFFF) is reserved for sockets where connections can be accepted.
The second part (0x80000000-0xFFFFFFFF) is reserved for allocating ports
for the peer (host) socket, once a connection is accepted.
This reservation of the port namespace is specific to hv_sock and not
known by the generic vsock library (ex: af_vsock). This is problematic
because auto-binds/ephemeral ports are handled by the generic vsock
library and it has no knowledge of this port reservation and could
allocate a port that is not compatible with hv_sock (and legitimately so).
The issue hasn't surfaced so far because the auto-bind code of vsock
(__vsock_bind_stream) prior to the change 'VSOCK: bind to random port for
VMADDR_PORT_ANY' would start walking up from LAST_RESERVED_PORT (1023) and
start assigning ports. That will take a large number of iterations to hit
0x7FFFFFFF. But, after the above change to randomize port selection, the
issue has started coming up more frequently.
There has really been no good reason to have this port reservation logic
in hv_sock from the get go. Reserving a local port for peer ports is not
how things are handled generally. Peer ports should reflect the peer port.
This fixes the issue by lifting the port reservation, and also returns the
right peer port. Since the code converts the GUID to the peer port (by
using the first 4 bytes), there is a possibility of conflicts, but that
seems like a reasonable risk to take, given this is limited to vsock and
that only applies to all local sockets.

Signed-off-by: Sunil Muthuswamy <sunilmut@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c | 68 +++++---------------------------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c b/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c
index 6614512f81800..736b76ec8cf01 100644
--- a/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c
+++ b/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c
@@ -144,28 +144,15 @@ struct hvsock {
  ****************************************************************************
  * The only valid Service GUIDs, from the perspectives of both the host and *
  * Linux VM, that can be connected by the other end, must conform to this   *
- * format: <port>-facb-11e6-bd58-64006a7986d3, and the "port" must be in    *
- * this range [0, 0x7FFFFFFF].                                              *
+ * format: <port>-facb-11e6-bd58-64006a7986d3.                              *
  ****************************************************************************
  *
  * When we write apps on the host to connect(), the GUID ServiceID is used.
  * When we write apps in Linux VM to connect(), we only need to specify the
  * port and the driver will form the GUID and use that to request the host.
  *
- * From the perspective of Linux VM:
- * 1. the local ephemeral port (i.e. the local auto-bound port when we call
- * connect() without explicit bind()) is generated by __vsock_bind_stream(),
- * and the range is [1024, 0xFFFFFFFF).
- * 2. the remote ephemeral port (i.e. the auto-generated remote port for
- * a connect request initiated by the host's connect()) is generated by
- * hvs_remote_addr_init() and the range is [0x80000000, 0xFFFFFFFF).
  */
 
-#define MAX_LISTEN_PORT			((u32)0x7FFFFFFF)
-#define MAX_VM_LISTEN_PORT		MAX_LISTEN_PORT
-#define MAX_HOST_LISTEN_PORT		MAX_LISTEN_PORT
-#define MIN_HOST_EPHEMERAL_PORT		(MAX_HOST_LISTEN_PORT + 1)
-
 /* 00000000-facb-11e6-bd58-64006a7986d3 */
 static const uuid_le srv_id_template =
 	UUID_LE(0x00000000, 0xfacb, 0x11e6, 0xbd, 0x58,
@@ -188,33 +175,6 @@ static void hvs_addr_init(struct sockaddr_vm *addr, const uuid_le *svr_id)
 	vsock_addr_init(addr, VMADDR_CID_ANY, port);
 }
 
-static void hvs_remote_addr_init(struct sockaddr_vm *remote,
-				 struct sockaddr_vm *local)
-{
-	static u32 host_ephemeral_port = MIN_HOST_EPHEMERAL_PORT;
-	struct sock *sk;
-
-	vsock_addr_init(remote, VMADDR_CID_ANY, VMADDR_PORT_ANY);
-
-	while (1) {
-		/* Wrap around ? */
-		if (host_ephemeral_port < MIN_HOST_EPHEMERAL_PORT ||
-		    host_ephemeral_port == VMADDR_PORT_ANY)
-			host_ephemeral_port = MIN_HOST_EPHEMERAL_PORT;
-
-		remote->svm_port = host_ephemeral_port++;
-
-		sk = vsock_find_connected_socket(remote, local);
-		if (!sk) {
-			/* Found an available ephemeral port */
-			return;
-		}
-
-		/* Release refcnt got in vsock_find_connected_socket */
-		sock_put(sk);
-	}
-}
-
 static void hvs_set_channel_pending_send_size(struct vmbus_channel *chan)
 {
 	set_channel_pending_send_size(chan,
@@ -342,12 +302,7 @@ static void hvs_open_connection(struct vmbus_channel *chan)
 	if_type = &chan->offermsg.offer.if_type;
 	if_instance = &chan->offermsg.offer.if_instance;
 	conn_from_host = chan->offermsg.offer.u.pipe.user_def[0];
-
-	/* The host or the VM should only listen on a port in
-	 * [0, MAX_LISTEN_PORT]
-	 */
-	if (!is_valid_srv_id(if_type) ||
-	    get_port_by_srv_id(if_type) > MAX_LISTEN_PORT)
+	if (!is_valid_srv_id(if_type))
 		return;
 
 	hvs_addr_init(&addr, conn_from_host ? if_type : if_instance);
@@ -372,6 +327,13 @@ static void hvs_open_connection(struct vmbus_channel *chan)
 
 		new->sk_state = TCP_SYN_SENT;
 		vnew = vsock_sk(new);
+
+		hvs_addr_init(&vnew->local_addr, if_type);
+
+		/* Remote peer is always the host */
+		vsock_addr_init(&vnew->remote_addr,
+				VMADDR_CID_HOST, VMADDR_PORT_ANY);
+		vnew->remote_addr.svm_port = get_port_by_srv_id(if_instance);
 		hvs_new = vnew->trans;
 		hvs_new->chan = chan;
 	} else {
@@ -411,8 +373,6 @@ static void hvs_open_connection(struct vmbus_channel *chan)
 		sk->sk_ack_backlog++;
 
 		hvs_addr_init(&vnew->local_addr, if_type);
-		hvs_remote_addr_init(&vnew->remote_addr, &vnew->local_addr);
-
 		hvs_new->vm_srv_id = *if_type;
 		hvs_new->host_srv_id = *if_instance;
 
@@ -717,16 +677,6 @@ static bool hvs_stream_is_active(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
 
 static bool hvs_stream_allow(u32 cid, u32 port)
 {
-	/* The host's port range [MIN_HOST_EPHEMERAL_PORT, 0xFFFFFFFF) is
-	 * reserved as ephemeral ports, which are used as the host's ports
-	 * when the host initiates connections.
-	 *
-	 * Perform this check in the guest so an immediate error is produced
-	 * instead of a timeout.
-	 */
-	if (port > MAX_HOST_LISTEN_PORT)
-		return false;
-
 	if (cid == VMADDR_CID_HOST)
 		return true;
 
-- 
2.20.1




^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 143/173] RDMA/netlink: Do not always generate an ACK for some netlink operations
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (141 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 142/173] hv_sock: Remove the accept port restriction Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 144/173] scsi: ufs: Fix ufshcd_probe_hba() reture value in case ufshcd_scsi_add_wlus() fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (35 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Mark Haywood, Håkon Bugge,
	Leon Romanovsky, Jason Gunthorpe

From: Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com>

commit a242c36951ecd24bc16086940dbe6b522205c461 upstream.

In rdma_nl_rcv_skb(), the local variable err is assigned the return value
of the supplied callback function, which could be one of
ib_nl_handle_resolve_resp(), ib_nl_handle_set_timeout(), or
ib_nl_handle_ip_res_resp(). These three functions all return skb->len on
success.

rdma_nl_rcv_skb() is merely a copy of netlink_rcv_skb(). The callback
functions used by the latter have the convention: "Returns 0 on success or
a negative error code".

In particular, the statement (equal for both functions):

   if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_ACK || err)

implies that rdma_nl_rcv_skb() always will ack a message, independent of
the NLM_F_ACK being set in nlmsg_flags or not.

The fix could be to change the above statement, but it is better to keep
the two *_rcv_skb() functions equal in this respect and instead change the
three callback functions in the rdma subsystem to the correct convention.

Fixes: 2ca546b92a02 ("IB/sa: Route SA pathrecord query through netlink")
Fixes: ae43f8286730 ("IB/core: Add IP to GID netlink offload")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216120436.3204814-1-haakon.bugge@oracle.com
Suggested-by: Mark Haywood <mark.haywood@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Mark Haywood <mark.haywood@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c     |    2 +-
 drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c |    4 ++--
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int ib_nl_handle_ip_res_resp(struct sk_b
 	if (ib_nl_is_good_ip_resp(nlh))
 		ib_nl_process_good_ip_rsep(nlh);
 
-	return skb->len;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int ib_nl_ip_send_msg(struct rdma_dev_addr *dev_addr,
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c
@@ -1078,7 +1078,7 @@ int ib_nl_handle_set_timeout(struct sk_b
 	}
 
 settimeout_out:
-	return skb->len;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int ib_nl_is_good_resolve_resp(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
@@ -1149,7 +1149,7 @@ int ib_nl_handle_resolve_resp(struct sk_
 	}
 
 resp_out:
-	return skb->len;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void free_sm_ah(struct kref *kref)



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 144/173] scsi: ufs: Fix ufshcd_probe_hba() reture value in case ufshcd_scsi_add_wlus() fails
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (142 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 143/173] RDMA/netlink: Do not always generate an ACK for some netlink operations Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 145/173] PCI/switchtec: Fix vep_vector_number ioread width Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (34 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Asutosh Das, Alim Akhtar,
	Stanley Chu, Bean Huo, Martin K. Petersen

From: Bean Huo <beanhuo@micron.com>

commit b9fc5320212efdfb4e08b825aaa007815fd11d16 upstream.

A non-zero error value likely being returned by ufshcd_scsi_add_wlus() in
case of failure of adding the WLs, but ufshcd_probe_hba() doesn't use this
value, and doesn't report this failure to upper caller.  This patch is to
fix this issue.

Fixes: 2a8fa600445c ("ufs: manually add well known logical units")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200120130820.1737-2-huobean@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Asutosh Das <asutoshd@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Alim Akhtar <alim.akhtar@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Stanley Chu <stanley.chu@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Bean Huo <beanhuo@micron.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c
@@ -6415,7 +6415,8 @@ static int ufshcd_probe_hba(struct ufs_h
 			ufshcd_init_icc_levels(hba);
 
 		/* Add required well known logical units to scsi mid layer */
-		if (ufshcd_scsi_add_wlus(hba))
+		ret = ufshcd_scsi_add_wlus(hba);
+		if (ret)
 			goto out;
 
 		/* Initialize devfreq after UFS device is detected */



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 145/173] PCI/switchtec: Fix vep_vector_number ioread width
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (143 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 144/173] scsi: ufs: Fix ufshcd_probe_hba() reture value in case ufshcd_scsi_add_wlus() fails Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 146/173] PCI: Dont disable bridge BARs when assigning bus resources Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (33 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Doug Meyer, Logan Gunthorpe, Bjorn Helgaas

From: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>

commit 9375646b4cf03aee81bc6c305aa18cc80b682796 upstream.

vep_vector_number is actually a 16 bit register which should be read with
ioread16() instead of ioread32().

Fixes: 080b47def5e5 ("MicroSemi Switchtec management interface driver")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200106190337.2428-3-logang@deltatee.com
Reported-by: Doug Meyer <dmeyer@gigaio.com>
Signed-off-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c
@@ -1399,7 +1399,7 @@ static int switchtec_init_isr(struct swi
 	if (nvecs < 0)
 		return nvecs;
 
-	event_irq = ioread32(&stdev->mmio_part_cfg->vep_vector_number);
+	event_irq = ioread16(&stdev->mmio_part_cfg->vep_vector_number);
 	if (event_irq < 0 || event_irq >= nvecs)
 		return -EFAULT;
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 146/173] PCI: Dont disable bridge BARs when assigning bus resources
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (144 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 145/173] PCI/switchtec: Fix vep_vector_number ioread width Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 147/173] nfs: NFS_SWAP should depend on SWAP Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (32 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kit Chow, Logan Gunthorpe, Bjorn Helgaas

From: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>

commit 9db8dc6d0785225c42a37be7b44d1b07b31b8957 upstream.

Some PCI bridges implement BARs in addition to bridge windows.  For
example, here's a PLX switch:

  04:00.0 PCI bridge: PLX Technology, Inc. PEX 8724 24-Lane, 6-Port PCI
            Express Gen 3 (8 GT/s) Switch, 19 x 19mm FCBGA (rev ca)
	    (prog-if 00 [Normal decode])
      Flags: bus master, fast devsel, latency 0, IRQ 30, NUMA node 0
      Memory at 90a00000 (32-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=256K]
      Bus: primary=04, secondary=05, subordinate=0a, sec-latency=0
      I/O behind bridge: 00002000-00003fff
      Memory behind bridge: 90000000-909fffff
      Prefetchable memory behind bridge: 0000380000800000-0000380000bfffff

Previously, when the kernel assigned resource addresses (with the
pci=realloc command line parameter, for example) it could clear the struct
resource corresponding to the BAR.  When this happened, lspci would report
this BAR as "ignored":

   Region 0: Memory at <ignored> (32-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=256K]

This is because the kernel reports a zero start address and zero flags
in the corresponding sysfs resource file and in /proc/bus/pci/devices.
Investigation with 'lspci -x', however, shows the BIOS-assigned address
will still be programmed in the device's BAR registers.

It's clearly a bug that the kernel lost track of the BAR value, but in most
cases, this still won't result in a visible issue because nothing uses the
memory, so nothing is affected.  However, when an IOMMU is in use, it will
not reserve this space in the IOVA because the kernel no longer thinks the
range is valid.  (See dmar_init_reserved_ranges() for the Intel
implementation of this.)

Without the proper reserved range, a DMA mapping may allocate an IOVA that
matches a bridge BAR, which results in DMA accesses going to the BAR
instead of the intended RAM.

The problem was in pci_assign_unassigned_root_bus_resources().  When any
resource from a bridge device fails to get assigned, the code set the
resource's flags to zero.  This makes sense for bridge windows, as they
will be re-enabled later, but for regular BARs, it makes the kernel
permanently lose track of the fact that they decode address space.

Change pci_assign_unassigned_root_bus_resources() and
pci_assign_unassigned_bridge_resources() so they only clear "res->flags"
for bridge *windows*, not bridge BARs.

Fixes: da7822e5ad71 ("PCI: update bridge resources to get more big ranges when allocating space (again)")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200108213208.4612-1-logang@deltatee.com
[bhelgaas: commit log, check for pci_is_bridge()]
Reported-by: Kit Chow <kchow@gigaio.com>
Signed-off-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/pci/setup-bus.c |   20 ++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/pci/setup-bus.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/setup-bus.c
@@ -1824,12 +1824,18 @@ again:
 	/* restore size and flags */
 	list_for_each_entry(fail_res, &fail_head, list) {
 		struct resource *res = fail_res->res;
+		int idx;
 
 		res->start = fail_res->start;
 		res->end = fail_res->end;
 		res->flags = fail_res->flags;
-		if (fail_res->dev->subordinate)
-			res->flags = 0;
+
+		if (pci_is_bridge(fail_res->dev)) {
+			idx = res - &fail_res->dev->resource[0];
+			if (idx >= PCI_BRIDGE_RESOURCES &&
+			    idx <= PCI_BRIDGE_RESOURCE_END)
+				res->flags = 0;
+		}
 	}
 	free_list(&fail_head);
 
@@ -1895,12 +1901,18 @@ again:
 	/* restore size and flags */
 	list_for_each_entry(fail_res, &fail_head, list) {
 		struct resource *res = fail_res->res;
+		int idx;
 
 		res->start = fail_res->start;
 		res->end = fail_res->end;
 		res->flags = fail_res->flags;
-		if (fail_res->dev->subordinate)
-			res->flags = 0;
+
+		if (pci_is_bridge(fail_res->dev)) {
+			idx = res - &fail_res->dev->resource[0];
+			if (idx >= PCI_BRIDGE_RESOURCES &&
+			    idx <= PCI_BRIDGE_RESOURCE_END)
+				res->flags = 0;
+		}
 	}
 	free_list(&fail_head);
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 147/173] nfs: NFS_SWAP should depend on SWAP
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (145 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 146/173] PCI: Dont disable bridge BARs when assigning bus resources Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 148/173] NFS/pnfs: Fix pnfs_generic_prepare_to_resend_writes() Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (31 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Geert Uytterhoeven, Anna Schumaker

From: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>

commit 474c4f306eefbb21b67ebd1de802d005c7d7ecdc upstream.

If CONFIG_SWAP=n, it does not make much sense to offer the user the
option to enable support for swapping over NFS, as that will still fail
at run time:

    # swapon /swap
    swapon: /swap: swapon failed: Function not implemented

Fix this by adding a dependency on CONFIG_SWAP.

Fixes: a564b8f0398636ba ("nfs: enable swap on NFS")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/nfs/Kconfig |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/nfs/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/nfs/Kconfig
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ config NFS_V4
 config NFS_SWAP
 	bool "Provide swap over NFS support"
 	default n
-	depends on NFS_FS
+	depends on NFS_FS && SWAP
 	select SUNRPC_SWAP
 	help
 	  This option enables swapon to work on files located on NFS mounts.



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 148/173] NFS/pnfs: Fix pnfs_generic_prepare_to_resend_writes()
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (146 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 147/173] nfs: NFS_SWAP should depend on SWAP Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 149/173] NFSv4: try lease recovery on NFS4ERR_EXPIRED Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (30 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Trond Myklebust, Anna Schumaker

From: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@gmail.com>

commit 221203ce6406273cf00e5c6397257d986c003ee6 upstream.

Instead of making assumptions about the commit verifier contents, change
the commit code to ensure we always check that the verifier was set
by the XDR code.

Fixes: f54bcf2ecee9 ("pnfs: Prepare for flexfiles by pulling out common code")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/nfs/direct.c   |    4 ++--
 fs/nfs/nfs3xdr.c  |    5 ++++-
 fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c  |    5 ++++-
 fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c |    7 +++----
 fs/nfs/write.c    |    4 +++-
 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/nfs/direct.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/direct.c
@@ -261,10 +261,10 @@ static int nfs_direct_cmp_commit_data_ve
 					 data->ds_commit_index);
 
 	/* verifier not set so always fail */
-	if (verfp->committed < 0)
+	if (verfp->committed < 0 || data->res.verf->committed <= NFS_UNSTABLE)
 		return 1;
 
-	return nfs_direct_cmp_verf(verfp, &data->verf);
+	return nfs_direct_cmp_verf(verfp, data->res.verf);
 }
 
 /**
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs3xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs3xdr.c
@@ -2373,6 +2373,7 @@ static int nfs3_xdr_dec_commit3res(struc
 				   void *data)
 {
 	struct nfs_commitres *result = data;
+	struct nfs_writeverf *verf = result->verf;
 	enum nfs_stat status;
 	int error;
 
@@ -2385,7 +2386,9 @@ static int nfs3_xdr_dec_commit3res(struc
 	result->op_status = status;
 	if (status != NFS3_OK)
 		goto out_status;
-	error = decode_writeverf3(xdr, &result->verf->verifier);
+	error = decode_writeverf3(xdr, &verf->verifier);
+	if (!error)
+		verf->committed = NFS_FILE_SYNC;
 out:
 	return error;
 out_status:
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -4409,11 +4409,14 @@ static int decode_write_verifier(struct
 
 static int decode_commit(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nfs_commitres *res)
 {
+	struct nfs_writeverf *verf = res->verf;
 	int status;
 
 	status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_COMMIT);
 	if (!status)
-		status = decode_write_verifier(xdr, &res->verf->verifier);
+		status = decode_write_verifier(xdr, &verf->verifier);
+	if (!status)
+		verf->committed = NFS_FILE_SYNC;
 	return status;
 }
 
--- a/fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c
@@ -30,12 +30,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pnfs_generic_rw_releas
 /* Fake up some data that will cause nfs_commit_release to retry the writes. */
 void pnfs_generic_prepare_to_resend_writes(struct nfs_commit_data *data)
 {
-	struct nfs_page *first = nfs_list_entry(data->pages.next);
+	struct nfs_writeverf *verf = data->res.verf;
 
 	data->task.tk_status = 0;
-	memcpy(&data->verf.verifier, &first->wb_verf,
-	       sizeof(data->verf.verifier));
-	data->verf.verifier.data[0]++; /* ensure verifier mismatch */
+	memset(&verf->verifier, 0, sizeof(verf->verifier));
+	verf->committed = NFS_UNSTABLE;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pnfs_generic_prepare_to_resend_writes);
 
--- a/fs/nfs/write.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/write.c
@@ -1807,6 +1807,7 @@ static void nfs_commit_done(struct rpc_t
 
 static void nfs_commit_release_pages(struct nfs_commit_data *data)
 {
+	const struct nfs_writeverf *verf = data->res.verf;
 	struct nfs_page	*req;
 	int status = data->task.tk_status;
 	struct nfs_commit_info cinfo;
@@ -1833,7 +1834,8 @@ static void nfs_commit_release_pages(str
 
 		/* Okay, COMMIT succeeded, apparently. Check the verifier
 		 * returned by the server against all stored verfs. */
-		if (!nfs_write_verifier_cmp(&req->wb_verf, &data->verf.verifier)) {
+		if (verf->committed > NFS_UNSTABLE &&
+		    !nfs_write_verifier_cmp(&req->wb_verf, &verf->verifier)) {
 			/* We have a match */
 			if (req->wb_page)
 				nfs_inode_remove_request(req);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 149/173] NFSv4: try lease recovery on NFS4ERR_EXPIRED
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (147 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 148/173] NFS/pnfs: Fix pnfs_generic_prepare_to_resend_writes() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 150/173] serial: uartps: Add a timeout to the tx empty wait Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (29 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Robert Milkowski, Trond Myklebust,
	Anna Schumaker

From: Robert Milkowski <rmilkowski@gmail.com>

commit 924491f2e476f7234d722b24171a4daff61bbe13 upstream.

Currently, if an nfs server returns NFS4ERR_EXPIRED to open(),
we return EIO to applications without even trying to recover.

Fixes: 272289a3df72 ("NFSv4: nfs4_do_handle_exception() handle revoke/expiry of a single stateid")
Signed-off-by: Robert Milkowski <rmilkowski@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -2923,6 +2923,11 @@ static struct nfs4_state *nfs4_do_open(s
 			exception.retry = 1;
 			continue;
 		}
+		if (status == -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED) {
+			nfs4_schedule_lease_recovery(server->nfs_client);
+			exception.retry = 1;
+			continue;
+		}
 		if (status == -EAGAIN) {
 			/* We must have found a delegation */
 			exception.retry = 1;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 150/173] serial: uartps: Add a timeout to the tx empty wait
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (148 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 149/173] NFSv4: try lease recovery on NFS4ERR_EXPIRED Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 151/173] rtc: hym8563: Return -EINVAL if the time is known to be invalid Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (28 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jean-Francois Dagenais,
	Shubhrajyoti Datta, Sasha Levin

From: Shubhrajyoti Datta <shubhrajyoti.datta@xilinx.com>

[ Upstream commit 277375b864e8147975b064b513f491e2a910e66a ]

In case the cable is not connected then the target gets into
an infinite wait for tx empty.
Add a timeout to the tx empty wait.

Reported-by: Jean-Francois Dagenais <jeff.dagenais@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Shubhrajyoti Datta <shubhrajyoti.datta@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/tty/serial/xilinx_uartps.c |   14 ++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/tty/serial/xilinx_uartps.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/xilinx_uartps.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/of.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/pm_runtime.h>
+#include <linux/iopoll.h>
 
 #define CDNS_UART_TTY_NAME	"ttyPS"
 #define CDNS_UART_NAME		"xuartps"
@@ -39,6 +40,7 @@
 #define CDNS_UART_NR_PORTS	2
 #define CDNS_UART_FIFO_SIZE	64	/* FIFO size */
 #define CDNS_UART_REGISTER_SPACE	0x1000
+#define TX_TIMEOUT		500000
 
 /* Rx Trigger level */
 static int rx_trigger_level = 56;
@@ -685,16 +687,20 @@ static void cdns_uart_set_termios(struct
 	unsigned int cval = 0;
 	unsigned int baud, minbaud, maxbaud;
 	unsigned long flags;
-	unsigned int ctrl_reg, mode_reg;
+	unsigned int ctrl_reg, mode_reg, val;
+	int err;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&port->lock, flags);
 
 	/* Wait for the transmit FIFO to empty before making changes */
 	if (!(readl(port->membase + CDNS_UART_CR) &
 				CDNS_UART_CR_TX_DIS)) {
-		while (!(readl(port->membase + CDNS_UART_SR) &
-				CDNS_UART_SR_TXEMPTY)) {
-			cpu_relax();
+		err = readl_poll_timeout(port->membase + CDNS_UART_SR,
+					 val, (val & CDNS_UART_SR_TXEMPTY),
+					 1000, TX_TIMEOUT);
+		if (err) {
+			dev_err(port->dev, "timed out waiting for tx empty");
+			return;
 		}
 	}
 



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 151/173] rtc: hym8563: Return -EINVAL if the time is known to be invalid
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (149 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 150/173] serial: uartps: Add a timeout to the tx empty wait Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 152/173] rtc: cmos: Stop using shared IRQ Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (27 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Paul Kocialkowski, Alexandre Belloni

From: Paul Kocialkowski <paul.kocialkowski@bootlin.com>

commit f236a2a2ebabad0848ad0995af7ad1dc7029e895 upstream.

The current code returns -EPERM when the voltage loss bit is set.
Since the bit indicates that the time value is not valid, return
-EINVAL instead, which is the appropriate error code for this
situation.

Fixes: dcaf03849352 ("rtc: add hym8563 rtc-driver")
Signed-off-by: Paul Kocialkowski <paul.kocialkowski@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191212153111.966923-1-paul.kocialkowski@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/rtc/rtc-hym8563.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/rtc/rtc-hym8563.c
+++ b/drivers/rtc/rtc-hym8563.c
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static int hym8563_rtc_read_time(struct
 
 	if (!hym8563->valid) {
 		dev_warn(&client->dev, "no valid clock/calendar values available\n");
-		return -EPERM;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	ret = i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data(client, HYM8563_SEC, 7, buf);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 152/173] rtc: cmos: Stop using shared IRQ
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (150 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 151/173] rtc: hym8563: Return -EINVAL if the time is known to be invalid Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 153/173] ARC: [plat-axs10x]: Add missing multicast filter number to GMAC node Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (26 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Guilherme G. Piccoli, Hans de Goede,
	Andy Shevchenko, Alexandre Belloni

From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>

commit b6da197a2e9670df6f07e6698629e9ce95ab614e upstream.

As reported by Guilherme G. Piccoli:

---8<---8<---8<---

The rtc-cmos interrupt setting was changed in the commit 079062b28fb4
("rtc: cmos: prevent kernel warning on IRQ flags mismatch") in order
to allow shared interrupts; according to that commit's description,
some machine got kernel warnings due to the interrupt line being shared
between rtc-cmos and other hardware, and rtc-cmos didn't allow IRQ sharing
that time.

After the aforementioned commit though it was observed a huge increase
in lost HPET interrupts in some systems, observed through the following
kernel message:

[...] hpet1: lost 35 rtc interrupts

After investigation, it was narrowed down to the shared interrupts
usage when having the kernel option "irqpoll" enabled. In this case,
all IRQ handlers are called for non-timer interrupts, if such handlers
are setup in shared IRQ lines. The rtc-cmos IRQ handler could be set to
hpet_rtc_interrupt(), which will produce the kernel "lost interrupts"
message after doing work - lots of readl/writel to HPET registers, which
are known to be slow.

Although "irqpoll" is not a default kernel option, it's used in some contexts,
one being the kdump kernel (which is an already "impaired" kernel usually
running with 1 CPU available), so the performance burden could be considerable.
Also, the same issue would happen (in a shorter extent though) when using
"irqfixup" kernel option.

In a quick experiment, a virtual machine with uptime of 2 minutes produced
>300 calls to hpet_rtc_interrupt() when "irqpoll" was set, whereas without
sharing interrupts this number reduced to 1 interrupt. Machines with more
hardware than a VM should generate even more unnecessary HPET interrupts
in this scenario.

---8<---8<---8<---

After looking into the rtc-cmos driver history and DSDT table from
the Microsoft Surface 3, we may notice that Hans de Goede submitted
a correct fix (see dependency below). Thus, we simply revert
the culprit commit.

Fixes: 079062b28fb4 ("rtc: cmos: prevent kernel warning on IRQ flags mismatch")
Depends-on: a1e23a42f1bd ("rtc: cmos: Do not assume irq 8 for rtc when there are no legacy irqs")
Reported-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@canonical.com>
Cc: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200123131437.28157-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/rtc/rtc-cmos.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/rtc/rtc-cmos.c
+++ b/drivers/rtc/rtc-cmos.c
@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ cmos_do_probe(struct device *dev, struct
 			rtc_cmos_int_handler = cmos_interrupt;
 
 		retval = request_irq(rtc_irq, rtc_cmos_int_handler,
-				IRQF_SHARED, dev_name(&cmos_rtc.rtc->dev),
+				0, dev_name(&cmos_rtc.rtc->dev),
 				cmos_rtc.rtc);
 		if (retval < 0) {
 			dev_dbg(dev, "IRQ %d is already in use\n", rtc_irq);



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 153/173] ARC: [plat-axs10x]: Add missing multicast filter number to GMAC node
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (151 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 152/173] rtc: cmos: Stop using shared IRQ Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 154/173] platform/x86: intel_mid_powerbtn: Take a copy of ddata Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (25 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Alexey Brodkin, Jose Abreu, Vineet Gupta

From: Jose Abreu <Jose.Abreu@synopsys.com>

commit 7980dff398f86a618f502378fa27cf7e77449afa upstream.

Add a missing property to GMAC node so that multicast filtering works
correctly.

Fixes: 556cc1c5f528 ("ARC: [axs101] Add support for AXS101 SDP (software development platform)")
Acked-by: Alexey Brodkin <abrodkin@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Jose Abreu <Jose.Abreu@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arc/boot/dts/axs10x_mb.dtsi |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/arc/boot/dts/axs10x_mb.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arc/boot/dts/axs10x_mb.dtsi
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
 			interrupt-names = "macirq";
 			phy-mode = "rgmii";
 			snps,pbl = < 32 >;
+			snps,multicast-filter-bins = <256>;
 			clocks = <&apbclk>;
 			clock-names = "stmmaceth";
 			max-speed = <100>;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 154/173] platform/x86: intel_mid_powerbtn: Take a copy of ddata
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (152 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 153/173] ARC: [plat-axs10x]: Add missing multicast filter number to GMAC node Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 155/173] ARM: dts: at91: sama5d3: fix maximum peripheral clock rates Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (24 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Mika Westerberg, Andy Shevchenko

From: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>

commit 5e0c94d3aeeecc68c573033f08d9678fecf253bd upstream.

The driver gets driver_data from memory that is marked as const (which
is probably put to read-only memory) and it then modifies it. This
likely causes some sort of fault to happen.

Fix this by taking a copy of the structure.

Fixes: c94a8ff14de3 ("platform/x86: intel_mid_powerbtn: make mid_pb_ddata const")
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/platform/x86/intel_mid_powerbtn.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/platform/x86/intel_mid_powerbtn.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel_mid_powerbtn.c
@@ -158,9 +158,10 @@ static int mid_pb_probe(struct platform_
 
 	input_set_capability(input, EV_KEY, KEY_POWER);
 
-	ddata = (struct mid_pb_ddata *)id->driver_data;
+	ddata = devm_kmemdup(&pdev->dev, (void *)id->driver_data,
+			     sizeof(*ddata), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ddata)
-		return -ENODATA;
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	ddata->dev = &pdev->dev;
 	ddata->irq = irq;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 155/173] ARM: dts: at91: sama5d3: fix maximum peripheral clock rates
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (153 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 154/173] platform/x86: intel_mid_powerbtn: Take a copy of ddata Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 156/173] ARM: dts: at91: sama5d3: define clock rate range for tcb1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (23 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Karl Rudbæk Olsen, Alexandre Belloni

From: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>

commit ee0aa926ddb0bd8ba59e33e3803b3b5804e3f5da upstream.

Currently the maximum rate for peripheral clock is calculated based on a
typical 133MHz MCK. The maximum frequency is defined in the datasheet as a
ratio to MCK. Some sama5d3 platforms are using a 166MHz MCK. Update the
device trees to match the maximum rate based on 166MHz.

Reported-by: Karl Rudbæk Olsen <karl@micro-technic.com>
Fixes: d2e8190b7916 ("ARM: at91/dt: define sama5d3 clocks")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200110172007.1253659-1-alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3.dtsi      |   28 ++++++++++++++--------------
 arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_can.dtsi  |    4 ++--
 arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_uart.dtsi |    4 ++--
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3.dtsi
@@ -1185,49 +1185,49 @@
 					usart0_clk: usart0_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <12>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>;
 					};
 
 					usart1_clk: usart1_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <13>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>;
 					};
 
 					usart2_clk: usart2_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <14>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>;
 					};
 
 					usart3_clk: usart3_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <15>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>;
 					};
 
 					uart0_clk: uart0_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <16>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>;
 					};
 
 					twi0_clk: twi0_clk {
 						reg = <18>;
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 16625000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 41500000>;
 					};
 
 					twi1_clk: twi1_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <19>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 16625000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 41500000>;
 					};
 
 					twi2_clk: twi2_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <20>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 16625000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 41500000>;
 					};
 
 					mci0_clk: mci0_clk {
@@ -1243,19 +1243,19 @@
 					spi0_clk: spi0_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <24>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 133000000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 166000000>;
 					};
 
 					spi1_clk: spi1_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <25>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 133000000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 166000000>;
 					};
 
 					tcb0_clk: tcb0_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <26>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 133000000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 166000000>;
 					};
 
 					pwm_clk: pwm_clk {
@@ -1266,7 +1266,7 @@
 					adc_clk: adc_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <29>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>;
 					};
 
 					dma0_clk: dma0_clk {
@@ -1297,13 +1297,13 @@
 					ssc0_clk: ssc0_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <38>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>;
 					};
 
 					ssc1_clk: ssc1_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <39>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>;
 					};
 
 					sha_clk: sha_clk {
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_can.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_can.dtsi
@@ -37,13 +37,13 @@
 					can0_clk: can0_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <40>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>;
 					};
 
 					can1_clk: can1_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <41>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>;
 					};
 				};
 			};
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_uart.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_uart.dtsi
@@ -42,13 +42,13 @@
 					uart0_clk: uart0_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <16>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>;
 					};
 
 					uart1_clk: uart1_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <17>;
-						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 66000000>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 83000000>;
 					};
 				};
 			};



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 156/173] ARM: dts: at91: sama5d3: define clock rate range for tcb1
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (154 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 155/173] ARM: dts: at91: sama5d3: fix maximum peripheral clock rates Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:21 ` [PATCH 4.14 157/173] tools/power/acpi: fix compilation error Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (22 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Karl Rudbæk Olsen, Alexandre Belloni

From: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>

commit a7e0f3fc01df4b1b7077df777c37feae8c9e8b6d upstream.

The clock rate range for the TCB1 clock is missing. define it in the device
tree.

Reported-by: Karl Rudbæk Olsen <karl@micro-technic.com>
Fixes: d2e8190b7916 ("ARM: at91/dt: define sama5d3 clocks")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200110172007.1253659-2-alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_tcb1.dtsi |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_tcb1.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d3_tcb1.dtsi
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 					tcb1_clk: tcb1_clk {
 						#clock-cells = <0>;
 						reg = <27>;
+						atmel,clk-output-range = <0 166000000>;
 					};
 				};
 			};



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 185+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 4.14 157/173] tools/power/acpi: fix compilation error
  2020-02-13 15:18 [PATCH 4.14 000/173] 4.14.171-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (155 preceding siblings ...)
  2020-02-13 15:20 ` [PATCH 4.14 156/173] ARM: dts: at91: sama5d3: define clock rate range for tcb1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-13 15:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
  2020-02-13 15:21 ` [PATCH 4.14 158/173] powerpc/pseries/vio: Fix iommu_table use-after-free refcount warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
                   ` (21 subsequent siblings)
  178 siblings, 0 replies; 185+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-13 15:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Zhengyuan Liu, Rafael J. Wysocki

From: Zhengyuan Liu <liuzhengyuan@kylinos.cn>

commit 1985f8c7f9a42a651a9750d6fcadc74336d182df upstream.

If we compile tools/acpi target in the top source directory, we'd get a
compilation error showing as bellow:

	# make tools/acpi
	  DESCEND  power/acpi
	  DESCEND  tools/acpidbg
	  CC       tools/acpidbg/acpidbg.o
	Assembler messages:
	Fatal error: can't create /home/lzy/kernel-upstream/power/acpi/\
			tools/acpidbg/acpidbg.o: No such file or directory
	../../Makefile.rules:26: recipe for target '/home/lzy/kernel-upstream/\
			power/acpi/tools/acpidbg/acpidbg.o' failed
	make[3]: *** [/home/lzy/ke