From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com Subject: [PATCH v8 10/15] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 14:18:42 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20240214221847.2066632-11-ross.philipson@oracle.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20240214221847.2066632-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com> Prior to running the next kernel via kexec, the Secure Launch code closes down private SMX resources and does an SEXIT. This allows the next kernel to start normally without any issues starting the APs etc. Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/kexec_core.c | 4 +++ 2 files changed, 77 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c index 1fae323e8d1b..429e6d39e73b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c @@ -523,3 +523,76 @@ void __init slaunch_setup_txt(void) pr_info("Intel TXT setup complete\n"); } + +static inline void smx_getsec_sexit(void) +{ + asm volatile ("getsec\n" + : : "a" (SMX_X86_GETSEC_SEXIT)); +} + +/* + * Used during kexec and on reboot paths to finalize the TXT state + * and do an SEXIT exiting the DRTM and disabling SMX mode. + */ +void slaunch_finalize(int do_sexit) +{ + u64 one = TXT_REGVALUE_ONE, val; + void __iomem *config; + + if ((slaunch_get_flags() & (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE | SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT)) != + (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE | SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT)) + return; + + config = ioremap(TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE, TXT_NR_CONFIG_PAGES * + PAGE_SIZE); + if (!config) { + pr_emerg("Error SEXIT failed to ioremap TXT private reqs\n"); + return; + } + + /* Clear secrets bit for SEXIT */ + memcpy_toio(config + TXT_CR_CMD_NO_SECRETS, &one, sizeof(one)); + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(val)); + + /* Unlock memory configurations */ + memcpy_toio(config + TXT_CR_CMD_UNLOCK_MEM_CONFIG, &one, sizeof(one)); + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(val)); + + /* Close the TXT private register space */ + memcpy_toio(config + TXT_CR_CMD_CLOSE_PRIVATE, &one, sizeof(one)); + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(val)); + + /* + * Calls to iounmap are not being done because of the state of the + * system this late in the kexec process. Local IRQs are disabled and + * iounmap causes a TLB flush which in turn causes a warning. Leaving + * thse mappings is not an issue since the next kernel is going to + * completely re-setup memory management. + */ + + /* Map public registers and do a final read fence */ + config = ioremap(TXT_PUB_CONFIG_REGS_BASE, TXT_NR_CONFIG_PAGES * + PAGE_SIZE); + if (!config) { + pr_emerg("Error SEXIT failed to ioremap TXT public reqs\n"); + return; + } + + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(val)); + + pr_emerg("TXT clear secrets bit and unlock memory complete.\n"); + + if (!do_sexit) + return; + + if (smp_processor_id() != 0) + panic("Error TXT SEXIT must be called on CPU 0\n"); + + /* In case SMX mode was disabled, enable it for SEXIT */ + cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_SMXE); + + /* Do the SEXIT SMX operation */ + smx_getsec_sexit(); + + pr_info("TXT SEXIT complete.\n"); +} diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c index d08fc7b5db97..8036a731b1bb 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_core.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ #include <linux/hugetlb.h> #include <linux/objtool.h> #include <linux/kmsg_dump.h> +#include <linux/slaunch.h> #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/sections.h> @@ -1268,6 +1269,9 @@ int kernel_kexec(void) cpu_hotplug_enable(); pr_notice("Starting new kernel\n"); machine_shutdown(); + + /* Finalize TXT registers and do SEXIT */ + slaunch_finalize(1); } kmsg_dump(KMSG_DUMP_SHUTDOWN); -- 2.39.3
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com Subject: [PATCH v8 10/15] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 14:18:42 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20240214221847.2066632-11-ross.philipson@oracle.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20240214221847.2066632-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com> Prior to running the next kernel via kexec, the Secure Launch code closes down private SMX resources and does an SEXIT. This allows the next kernel to start normally without any issues starting the APs etc. Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/kexec_core.c | 4 +++ 2 files changed, 77 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c index 1fae323e8d1b..429e6d39e73b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/slaunch.c @@ -523,3 +523,76 @@ void __init slaunch_setup_txt(void) pr_info("Intel TXT setup complete\n"); } + +static inline void smx_getsec_sexit(void) +{ + asm volatile ("getsec\n" + : : "a" (SMX_X86_GETSEC_SEXIT)); +} + +/* + * Used during kexec and on reboot paths to finalize the TXT state + * and do an SEXIT exiting the DRTM and disabling SMX mode. + */ +void slaunch_finalize(int do_sexit) +{ + u64 one = TXT_REGVALUE_ONE, val; + void __iomem *config; + + if ((slaunch_get_flags() & (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE | SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT)) != + (SL_FLAG_ACTIVE | SL_FLAG_ARCH_TXT)) + return; + + config = ioremap(TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE, TXT_NR_CONFIG_PAGES * + PAGE_SIZE); + if (!config) { + pr_emerg("Error SEXIT failed to ioremap TXT private reqs\n"); + return; + } + + /* Clear secrets bit for SEXIT */ + memcpy_toio(config + TXT_CR_CMD_NO_SECRETS, &one, sizeof(one)); + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(val)); + + /* Unlock memory configurations */ + memcpy_toio(config + TXT_CR_CMD_UNLOCK_MEM_CONFIG, &one, sizeof(one)); + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(val)); + + /* Close the TXT private register space */ + memcpy_toio(config + TXT_CR_CMD_CLOSE_PRIVATE, &one, sizeof(one)); + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(val)); + + /* + * Calls to iounmap are not being done because of the state of the + * system this late in the kexec process. Local IRQs are disabled and + * iounmap causes a TLB flush which in turn causes a warning. Leaving + * thse mappings is not an issue since the next kernel is going to + * completely re-setup memory management. + */ + + /* Map public registers and do a final read fence */ + config = ioremap(TXT_PUB_CONFIG_REGS_BASE, TXT_NR_CONFIG_PAGES * + PAGE_SIZE); + if (!config) { + pr_emerg("Error SEXIT failed to ioremap TXT public reqs\n"); + return; + } + + memcpy_fromio(&val, config + TXT_CR_E2STS, sizeof(val)); + + pr_emerg("TXT clear secrets bit and unlock memory complete.\n"); + + if (!do_sexit) + return; + + if (smp_processor_id() != 0) + panic("Error TXT SEXIT must be called on CPU 0\n"); + + /* In case SMX mode was disabled, enable it for SEXIT */ + cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_SMXE); + + /* Do the SEXIT SMX operation */ + smx_getsec_sexit(); + + pr_info("TXT SEXIT complete.\n"); +} diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c index d08fc7b5db97..8036a731b1bb 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_core.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ #include <linux/hugetlb.h> #include <linux/objtool.h> #include <linux/kmsg_dump.h> +#include <linux/slaunch.h> #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/sections.h> @@ -1268,6 +1269,9 @@ int kernel_kexec(void) cpu_hotplug_enable(); pr_notice("Starting new kernel\n"); machine_shutdown(); + + /* Finalize TXT registers and do SEXIT */ + slaunch_finalize(1); } kmsg_dump(KMSG_DUMP_SHUTDOWN); -- 2.39.3 _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-14 22:36 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 116+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2024-02-14 22:18 [PATCH v8 00/15] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 01/15] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-15 7:56 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 7:56 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 10:56 ` Daniel Kiper 2024-02-15 10:56 ` Daniel Kiper 2024-03-21 13:45 ` Daniel P. Smith 2024-03-21 13:45 ` Daniel P. Smith 2024-03-22 14:18 ` H. Peter Anvin 2024-03-22 14:18 ` H. Peter Anvin 2024-03-23 1:33 ` Daniel P. Smith 2024-03-23 1:33 ` Daniel P. Smith 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 02/15] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 03/15] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-15 7:59 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 7:59 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 22:20 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-15 22:20 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 04/15] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-15 8:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 8:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-22 2:03 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-22 2:03 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-22 2:10 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-22 2:10 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-22 17:49 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-22 17:49 ` ross.philipson 2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips 2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips 2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips 2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips 2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips 2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips 2024-04-01 18:25 ` ross.philipson 2024-04-01 18:25 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 05/15] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 06/15] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-15 8:17 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 8:17 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-22 3:04 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-22 3:04 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-22 9:34 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-22 9:34 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-22 12:30 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-22 12:30 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-23 9:27 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-23 9:27 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-23 16:42 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-23 16:42 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-23 17:54 ` Eric Biggers 2024-02-23 17:54 ` Eric Biggers 2024-02-23 18:20 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-23 18:20 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-23 18:30 ` Eric Biggers 2024-02-23 18:30 ` Eric Biggers 2024-04-03 16:32 ` Andy Lutomirski 2024-04-03 16:32 ` Andy Lutomirski 2024-04-03 23:56 ` Eric Biggers 2024-04-03 23:56 ` Eric Biggers 2024-04-04 4:55 ` ross.philipson 2024-04-04 4:55 ` ross.philipson 2024-04-04 14:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2024-04-04 14:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 07/15] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-15 8:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 8:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 22:26 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-15 22:26 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 08/15] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 09/15] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson [this message] 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 10/15] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 11/15] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 12/15] tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 13/15] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the preferred locality Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 14/15] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-15 8:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 8:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-22 13:57 ` Daniel P. Smith 2024-02-22 13:57 ` Daniel P. Smith 2024-02-23 9:36 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-23 9:36 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-03-21 14:11 ` Daniel P. Smith 2024-03-21 14:11 ` Daniel P. Smith 2024-02-16 1:53 ` kernel test robot 2024-02-16 1:53 ` kernel test robot 2024-02-17 7:53 ` kernel test robot 2024-02-17 7:53 ` kernel test robot 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 15/15] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-15 9:01 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 9:01 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-21 20:17 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-21 20:17 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-21 20:37 ` H. Peter Anvin 2024-02-21 20:37 ` H. Peter Anvin 2024-02-21 23:24 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-21 23:24 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-17 7:31 ` kernel test robot 2024-02-17 7:31 ` kernel test robot 2024-02-17 20:06 ` kernel test robot 2024-02-17 20:06 ` kernel test robot
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