From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org,
James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de,
jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net,
nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
davem@davemloft.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 03/15] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 08:59:28 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMj1kXHxvmHo-FWa8PXoZSTVyeSsgFyOaSuXP=2Bhj2YjxCALQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240214221847.2066632-4-ross.philipson@oracle.com>
On Wed, 14 Feb 2024 at 23:31, Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> wrote:
>
> Initial bits to bring in Secure Launch functionality. Add Kconfig
> options for compiling in/out the Secure Launch code.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index 5edec175b9bf..d96d75f6f1a9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -2071,6 +2071,18 @@ config EFI_RUNTIME_MAP
>
> See also Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-firmware-efi-runtime-map.
>
> +config SECURE_LAUNCH
> + bool "Secure Launch support"
> + default n
'n' is already the default, so you can drop this line.
> + depends on X86_64 && X86_X2APIC
This depends on CONFIG_TCG_TPM as well (I got build failures without it)
> + help
> + The Secure Launch feature allows a kernel to be loaded
> + directly through an Intel TXT measured launch. Intel TXT
> + establishes a Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM)
> + where the CPU measures the kernel image. This feature then
> + continues the measurement chain over kernel configuration
> + information and init images.
> +
> source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
>
> config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC
> --
> 2.39.3
>
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kexec@lists.infradead.org
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org,
James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de,
jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net,
nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
davem@davemloft.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 03/15] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 08:59:28 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMj1kXHxvmHo-FWa8PXoZSTVyeSsgFyOaSuXP=2Bhj2YjxCALQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240214221847.2066632-4-ross.philipson@oracle.com>
On Wed, 14 Feb 2024 at 23:31, Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> wrote:
>
> Initial bits to bring in Secure Launch functionality. Add Kconfig
> options for compiling in/out the Secure Launch code.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index 5edec175b9bf..d96d75f6f1a9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -2071,6 +2071,18 @@ config EFI_RUNTIME_MAP
>
> See also Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-firmware-efi-runtime-map.
>
> +config SECURE_LAUNCH
> + bool "Secure Launch support"
> + default n
'n' is already the default, so you can drop this line.
> + depends on X86_64 && X86_X2APIC
This depends on CONFIG_TCG_TPM as well (I got build failures without it)
> + help
> + The Secure Launch feature allows a kernel to be loaded
> + directly through an Intel TXT measured launch. Intel TXT
> + establishes a Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM)
> + where the CPU measures the kernel image. This feature then
> + continues the measurement chain over kernel configuration
> + information and init images.
> +
> source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
>
> config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC
> --
> 2.39.3
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-15 7:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 116+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-14 22:18 [PATCH v8 00/15] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 01/15] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15 7:56 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 7:56 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 10:56 ` Daniel Kiper
2024-02-15 10:56 ` Daniel Kiper
2024-03-21 13:45 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-03-21 13:45 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-03-22 14:18 ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-03-22 14:18 ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-03-23 1:33 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-03-23 1:33 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 02/15] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 03/15] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15 7:59 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2024-02-15 7:59 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 22:20 ` ross.philipson
2024-02-15 22:20 ` ross.philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 04/15] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15 8:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 8:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22 2:03 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-22 2:03 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-22 2:10 ` ross.philipson
2024-02-22 2:10 ` ross.philipson
2024-02-22 17:49 ` ross.philipson
2024-02-22 17:49 ` ross.philipson
2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips
2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips
2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips
2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips
2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips
2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips
2024-04-01 18:25 ` ross.philipson
2024-04-01 18:25 ` ross.philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 05/15] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 06/15] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15 8:17 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 8:17 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22 3:04 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-22 3:04 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-22 9:34 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22 9:34 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22 12:30 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-22 12:30 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23 9:27 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-23 9:27 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-23 16:42 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23 16:42 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23 17:54 ` Eric Biggers
2024-02-23 17:54 ` Eric Biggers
2024-02-23 18:20 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23 18:20 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23 18:30 ` Eric Biggers
2024-02-23 18:30 ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-03 16:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-04-03 16:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-04-03 23:56 ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-03 23:56 ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-04 4:55 ` ross.philipson
2024-04-04 4:55 ` ross.philipson
2024-04-04 14:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-04 14:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 07/15] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15 8:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 8:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 22:26 ` ross.philipson
2024-02-15 22:26 ` ross.philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 08/15] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 09/15] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 10/15] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 11/15] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 12/15] tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 13/15] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the preferred locality Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 14/15] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15 8:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 8:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22 13:57 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-02-22 13:57 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-02-23 9:36 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-23 9:36 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-03-21 14:11 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-03-21 14:11 ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-02-16 1:53 ` kernel test robot
2024-02-16 1:53 ` kernel test robot
2024-02-17 7:53 ` kernel test robot
2024-02-17 7:53 ` kernel test robot
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 15/15] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15 9:01 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 9:01 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-21 20:17 ` ross.philipson
2024-02-21 20:17 ` ross.philipson
2024-02-21 20:37 ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-21 20:37 ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-21 23:24 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-21 23:24 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-17 7:31 ` kernel test robot
2024-02-17 7:31 ` kernel test robot
2024-02-17 20:06 ` kernel test robot
2024-02-17 20:06 ` kernel test robot
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