All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org,
	James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de,
	jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net,
	nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
	davem@davemloft.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 06/15] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2024 09:54:49 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240223175449.GA1112@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <431a0b3a-47e5-4e61-a7fc-31cdf56f4e4c@citrix.com>

On Fri, Feb 23, 2024 at 04:42:11PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> 
> Yes, and I agree.  We're not looking to try and force this in with
> underhand tactics.
> 
> But a blind "nack to any SHA-1" is similarly damaging in the opposite
> direction.
> 

Well, reviewers have said they'd prefer that SHA-1 not be included and given
some thoughtful reasons for that.  But also they've given suggestions on how to
make the SHA-1 support more palatable, such as splitting it into a separate
patch and giving it a proper justification.

All suggestions have been ignored.

- Eric

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org,
	James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de,
	jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net,
	nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
	davem@davemloft.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 06/15] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2024 09:54:49 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240223175449.GA1112@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <431a0b3a-47e5-4e61-a7fc-31cdf56f4e4c@citrix.com>

On Fri, Feb 23, 2024 at 04:42:11PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> 
> Yes, and I agree.  We're not looking to try and force this in with
> underhand tactics.
> 
> But a blind "nack to any SHA-1" is similarly damaging in the opposite
> direction.
> 

Well, reviewers have said they'd prefer that SHA-1 not be included and given
some thoughtful reasons for that.  But also they've given suggestions on how to
make the SHA-1 support more palatable, such as splitting it into a separate
patch and giving it a proper justification.

All suggestions have been ignored.

- Eric

_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec

  reply	other threads:[~2024-02-23 17:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 116+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-14 22:18 [PATCH v8 00/15] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 01/15] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  7:56   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15  7:56     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 10:56     ` Daniel Kiper
2024-02-15 10:56       ` Daniel Kiper
2024-03-21 13:45     ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-03-21 13:45       ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-03-22 14:18       ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-03-22 14:18         ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-03-23  1:33         ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-03-23  1:33           ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 02/15] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 03/15] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  7:59   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15  7:59     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 22:20     ` ross.philipson
2024-02-15 22:20       ` ross.philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 04/15] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  8:08   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15  8:08     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22  2:03     ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-22  2:03       ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-22  2:10       ` ross.philipson
2024-02-22  2:10         ` ross.philipson
2024-02-22 17:49     ` ross.philipson
2024-02-22 17:49       ` ross.philipson
2024-03-29 22:38   ` Kim Phillips
2024-03-29 22:38     ` Kim Phillips
2024-03-29 22:38     ` Kim Phillips
2024-03-29 22:38     ` Kim Phillips
2024-03-29 22:38     ` Kim Phillips
2024-03-29 22:38     ` Kim Phillips
2024-04-01 18:25     ` ross.philipson
2024-04-01 18:25       ` ross.philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 05/15] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 06/15] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  8:17   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15  8:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22  3:04     ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-22  3:04       ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-22  9:34       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22  9:34         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22 12:30         ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-22 12:30           ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23  9:27           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-23  9:27             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-23 16:42             ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23 16:42               ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23 17:54               ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2024-02-23 17:54                 ` Eric Biggers
2024-02-23 18:20                 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23 18:20                   ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23 18:30                   ` Eric Biggers
2024-02-23 18:30                     ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-03 16:32                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-04-03 16:32                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-04-03 23:56                       ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-03 23:56                         ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-04  4:55                         ` ross.philipson
2024-04-04  4:55                           ` ross.philipson
2024-04-04 14:55                         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-04 14:55                           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 07/15] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  8:29   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15  8:29     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 22:26     ` ross.philipson
2024-02-15 22:26       ` ross.philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 08/15] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 09/15] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 10/15] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 11/15] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 12/15] tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 13/15] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the preferred locality Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 14/15] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  8:40   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15  8:40     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22 13:57     ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-02-22 13:57       ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-02-23  9:36       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-23  9:36         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-03-21 14:11         ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-03-21 14:11           ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-02-16  1:53   ` kernel test robot
2024-02-16  1:53     ` kernel test robot
2024-02-17  7:53   ` kernel test robot
2024-02-17  7:53     ` kernel test robot
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 15/15] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  9:01   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15  9:01     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-21 20:17     ` ross.philipson
2024-02-21 20:17       ` ross.philipson
2024-02-21 20:37       ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-21 20:37         ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-21 23:24         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-21 23:24           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-17  7:31   ` kernel test robot
2024-02-17  7:31     ` kernel test robot
2024-02-17 20:06   ` kernel test robot
2024-02-17 20:06     ` kernel test robot

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20240223175449.GA1112@sol.localdomain \
    --to=ebiggers@kernel.org \
    --cc=James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com \
    --cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=ardb@kernel.org \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=dpsmith@apertussolutions.com \
    --cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
    --cc=jgg@ziepe.ca \
    --cc=kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com \
    --cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@amacapital.net \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=mjg59@srcf.ucam.org \
    --cc=nivedita@alum.mit.edu \
    --cc=peterhuewe@gmx.de \
    --cc=ross.philipson@oracle.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.