From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 01/15] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:56:10 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <Zc3tykqH2SjSVtd1@tomti.i.net-space.pl> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAMj1kXH3Gvr3vDRLDdXuc0s7ZAQYE6+D7tmCRBjJWwWt2fn4-w@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 08:56:25AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > On Wed, 14 Feb 2024 at 23:31, Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> wrote: > > > > From: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu> > > > > There are use cases for storing the offset of a symbol in kernel_info. > > For example, the trenchboot series [0] needs to store the offset of the > > Measured Launch Environment header in kernel_info. > > > > Why? Is this information consumed by the bootloader? The bootloader stuffs this info, plus some offset IIRC, into special structure and finally it is consumed by SINIT ACM after GETSEC[SENTER] call. Sadly this data is Intel specific and it is even not compatible with AMD. So, if I am not mistaken, we will need additional member for the AMD in the kernel_info. > I'd like to get away from x86 specific hacks for boot code and boot > images, so I would like to explore if we can avoid kernel_info, or at > least expose it in a generic way. We might just add a 32-bit offset > somewhere in the first 64 bytes of the bootable image: this could > co-exist with EFI bootable images, and can be implemented on arm64, > RISC-V and LoongArch as well. The other architectures may or may not have need for such data due to differences in DRTM implementation. Anyway, whatever we do I want to be sure the DRTM can be used on UEFI and non-UEFI platforms. So, I am not entirely convinced the address/pointer to additional DRTM data should be part of the MS-DOS and/or PE header. Though I am not against building something generic shared among various architectures either. Daniel _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
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From: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 01/15] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 11:56:10 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <Zc3tykqH2SjSVtd1@tomti.i.net-space.pl> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAMj1kXH3Gvr3vDRLDdXuc0s7ZAQYE6+D7tmCRBjJWwWt2fn4-w@mail.gmail.com> On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 08:56:25AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > On Wed, 14 Feb 2024 at 23:31, Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> wrote: > > > > From: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu> > > > > There are use cases for storing the offset of a symbol in kernel_info. > > For example, the trenchboot series [0] needs to store the offset of the > > Measured Launch Environment header in kernel_info. > > > > Why? Is this information consumed by the bootloader? The bootloader stuffs this info, plus some offset IIRC, into special structure and finally it is consumed by SINIT ACM after GETSEC[SENTER] call. Sadly this data is Intel specific and it is even not compatible with AMD. So, if I am not mistaken, we will need additional member for the AMD in the kernel_info. > I'd like to get away from x86 specific hacks for boot code and boot > images, so I would like to explore if we can avoid kernel_info, or at > least expose it in a generic way. We might just add a 32-bit offset > somewhere in the first 64 bytes of the bootable image: this could > co-exist with EFI bootable images, and can be implemented on arm64, > RISC-V and LoongArch as well. The other architectures may or may not have need for such data due to differences in DRTM implementation. Anyway, whatever we do I want to be sure the DRTM can be used on UEFI and non-UEFI platforms. So, I am not entirely convinced the address/pointer to additional DRTM data should be part of the MS-DOS and/or PE header. Though I am not against building something generic shared among various architectures either. Daniel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-15 10:56 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 116+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2024-02-14 22:18 [PATCH v8 00/15] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 01/15] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-15 7:56 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 7:56 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 10:56 ` Daniel Kiper [this message] 2024-02-15 10:56 ` Daniel Kiper 2024-03-21 13:45 ` Daniel P. Smith 2024-03-21 13:45 ` Daniel P. Smith 2024-03-22 14:18 ` H. Peter Anvin 2024-03-22 14:18 ` H. Peter Anvin 2024-03-23 1:33 ` Daniel P. Smith 2024-03-23 1:33 ` Daniel P. Smith 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 02/15] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 03/15] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-15 7:59 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 7:59 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 22:20 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-15 22:20 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 04/15] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-15 8:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 8:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-22 2:03 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-22 2:03 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-22 2:10 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-22 2:10 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-22 17:49 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-22 17:49 ` ross.philipson 2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips 2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips 2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips 2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips 2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips 2024-03-29 22:38 ` Kim Phillips 2024-04-01 18:25 ` ross.philipson 2024-04-01 18:25 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 05/15] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 06/15] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-15 8:17 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 8:17 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-22 3:04 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-22 3:04 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-22 9:34 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-22 9:34 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-22 12:30 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-22 12:30 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-23 9:27 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-23 9:27 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-23 16:42 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-23 16:42 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-23 17:54 ` Eric Biggers 2024-02-23 17:54 ` Eric Biggers 2024-02-23 18:20 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-23 18:20 ` Andrew Cooper 2024-02-23 18:30 ` Eric Biggers 2024-02-23 18:30 ` Eric Biggers 2024-04-03 16:32 ` Andy Lutomirski 2024-04-03 16:32 ` Andy Lutomirski 2024-04-03 23:56 ` Eric Biggers 2024-04-03 23:56 ` Eric Biggers 2024-04-04 4:55 ` ross.philipson 2024-04-04 4:55 ` ross.philipson 2024-04-04 14:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2024-04-04 14:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 07/15] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-15 8:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 8:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 22:26 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-15 22:26 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 08/15] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 09/15] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 10/15] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 11/15] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 12/15] tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 13/15] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the preferred locality Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 14/15] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-15 8:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 8:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-22 13:57 ` Daniel P. Smith 2024-02-22 13:57 ` Daniel P. Smith 2024-02-23 9:36 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-23 9:36 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-03-21 14:11 ` Daniel P. Smith 2024-03-21 14:11 ` Daniel P. Smith 2024-02-16 1:53 ` kernel test robot 2024-02-16 1:53 ` kernel test robot 2024-02-17 7:53 ` kernel test robot 2024-02-17 7:53 ` kernel test robot 2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 15/15] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson 2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson 2024-02-15 9:01 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-15 9:01 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-21 20:17 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-21 20:17 ` ross.philipson 2024-02-21 20:37 ` H. Peter Anvin 2024-02-21 20:37 ` H. Peter Anvin 2024-02-21 23:24 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-21 23:24 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2024-02-17 7:31 ` kernel test robot 2024-02-17 7:31 ` kernel test robot 2024-02-17 20:06 ` kernel test robot 2024-02-17 20:06 ` kernel test robot
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