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From: ross.philipson@oracle.com
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org,
	James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de,
	jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net,
	nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
	davem@davemloft.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 04/15] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2024 18:10:43 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d250f64a-dd4b-44ca-8fb9-464bbd812c54@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <08ac69b4-4d12-4454-aa16-40db7e54816f@citrix.com>

On 2/21/24 6:03 PM, 'Andrew Cooper' via trenchboot-devel wrote:
> On 15/02/2024 8:08 am, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> On Wed, 14 Feb 2024 at 23:31, Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> wrote:
>>> +/*
>>> + * Primary SLR Table Header
> 
> I know it's just a comment, but SLR ought to be written in longhand here.

Will do, thanks. Ross.

> 
>>> + */
>>> +struct slr_table {
>>> +       u32 magic;
>>> +       u16 revision;
>>> +       u16 architecture;
>>> +       u32 size;
>>> +       u32 max_size;
>>> +       /* entries[] */
>>> +} __packed;
>> Packing this struct has no effect on the layout so better drop the
>> __packed here. If this table is part of a structure that can appear
>> misaligned in memory, better to pack the outer struct or deal with it
>> there in another way.
> 
> As you note, __packed does two things not one.
> 
> The consumer of the random integer that is expected to be a pointer to a
> struct lsr_table doesn't know whether it was invoked by a 16bit
> bootloader or a 32bit bootloader, and this really does make a difference
> for an ABI described only in C.
> 
> Then again, we're holding off on setting the spec in stone until there's
> an agreement in principle, so we could retrofit a statement about the
> expected alignment of this structure in memory.
> 
> The sane choices are either 8b alignment (there are uint64_t's in
> entires[], but I also see there are some misaligned uint64_t's too,
> which is dull), or using the good old x86 fallback or paragraph
> alignment just in case we really want to extend it with a uint128_t in
> future.
> 
> Thoughts?
> 
> ~Andrew
> 


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: ross.philipson@oracle.com
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org,
	James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de,
	jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net,
	nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
	davem@davemloft.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 04/15] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2024 18:10:43 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d250f64a-dd4b-44ca-8fb9-464bbd812c54@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <08ac69b4-4d12-4454-aa16-40db7e54816f@citrix.com>

On 2/21/24 6:03 PM, 'Andrew Cooper' via trenchboot-devel wrote:
> On 15/02/2024 8:08 am, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
>> On Wed, 14 Feb 2024 at 23:31, Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> wrote:
>>> +/*
>>> + * Primary SLR Table Header
> 
> I know it's just a comment, but SLR ought to be written in longhand here.

Will do, thanks. Ross.

> 
>>> + */
>>> +struct slr_table {
>>> +       u32 magic;
>>> +       u16 revision;
>>> +       u16 architecture;
>>> +       u32 size;
>>> +       u32 max_size;
>>> +       /* entries[] */
>>> +} __packed;
>> Packing this struct has no effect on the layout so better drop the
>> __packed here. If this table is part of a structure that can appear
>> misaligned in memory, better to pack the outer struct or deal with it
>> there in another way.
> 
> As you note, __packed does two things not one.
> 
> The consumer of the random integer that is expected to be a pointer to a
> struct lsr_table doesn't know whether it was invoked by a 16bit
> bootloader or a 32bit bootloader, and this really does make a difference
> for an ABI described only in C.
> 
> Then again, we're holding off on setting the spec in stone until there's
> an agreement in principle, so we could retrofit a statement about the
> expected alignment of this structure in memory.
> 
> The sane choices are either 8b alignment (there are uint64_t's in
> entires[], but I also see there are some misaligned uint64_t's too,
> which is dull), or using the good old x86 fallback or paragraph
> alignment just in case we really want to extend it with a uint128_t in
> future.
> 
> Thoughts?
> 
> ~Andrew
> 


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  reply	other threads:[~2024-02-22  2:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 116+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-14 22:18 [PATCH v8 00/15] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 01/15] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  7:56   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15  7:56     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 10:56     ` Daniel Kiper
2024-02-15 10:56       ` Daniel Kiper
2024-03-21 13:45     ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-03-21 13:45       ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-03-22 14:18       ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-03-22 14:18         ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-03-23  1:33         ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-03-23  1:33           ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 02/15] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 03/15] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  7:59   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15  7:59     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 22:20     ` ross.philipson
2024-02-15 22:20       ` ross.philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 04/15] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  8:08   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15  8:08     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22  2:03     ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-22  2:03       ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-22  2:10       ` ross.philipson [this message]
2024-02-22  2:10         ` ross.philipson
2024-02-22 17:49     ` ross.philipson
2024-02-22 17:49       ` ross.philipson
2024-03-29 22:38   ` Kim Phillips
2024-03-29 22:38     ` Kim Phillips
2024-03-29 22:38     ` Kim Phillips
2024-03-29 22:38     ` Kim Phillips
2024-03-29 22:38     ` Kim Phillips
2024-03-29 22:38     ` Kim Phillips
2024-04-01 18:25     ` ross.philipson
2024-04-01 18:25       ` ross.philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 05/15] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 06/15] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  8:17   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15  8:17     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22  3:04     ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-22  3:04       ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-22  9:34       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22  9:34         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22 12:30         ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-22 12:30           ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23  9:27           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-23  9:27             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-23 16:42             ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23 16:42               ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23 17:54               ` Eric Biggers
2024-02-23 17:54                 ` Eric Biggers
2024-02-23 18:20                 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23 18:20                   ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23 18:30                   ` Eric Biggers
2024-02-23 18:30                     ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-03 16:32                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-04-03 16:32                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-04-03 23:56                       ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-03 23:56                         ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-04  4:55                         ` ross.philipson
2024-04-04  4:55                           ` ross.philipson
2024-04-04 14:55                         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-04 14:55                           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 07/15] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  8:29   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15  8:29     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 22:26     ` ross.philipson
2024-02-15 22:26       ` ross.philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 08/15] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 09/15] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 10/15] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 11/15] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 12/15] tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 13/15] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the preferred locality Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 14/15] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  8:40   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15  8:40     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22 13:57     ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-02-22 13:57       ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-02-23  9:36       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-23  9:36         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-03-21 14:11         ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-03-21 14:11           ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-02-16  1:53   ` kernel test robot
2024-02-16  1:53     ` kernel test robot
2024-02-17  7:53   ` kernel test robot
2024-02-17  7:53     ` kernel test robot
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 15/15] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18   ` Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  9:01   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15  9:01     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-21 20:17     ` ross.philipson
2024-02-21 20:17       ` ross.philipson
2024-02-21 20:37       ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-21 20:37         ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-21 23:24         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-21 23:24           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-17  7:31   ` kernel test robot
2024-02-17  7:31     ` kernel test robot
2024-02-17 20:06   ` kernel test robot
2024-02-17 20:06     ` kernel test robot

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