From: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org> To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: tixxdz@gmail.com, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org> Subject: [PATCH v2 3/9] procfs: Document the proposed solution to protect procfs entries Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2013 21:26:12 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1380659178-28605-4-git-send-email-tixxdz@opendz.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1380659178-28605-1-git-send-email-tixxdz@opendz.org> Note the proposed solution to protect sensitive procfs entries as code comment. Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org> --- fs/proc/base.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index c29eeae..8d21316 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -102,6 +102,17 @@ * * The classic example of a problem is opening file descriptors * in /proc for a task before it execs a suid executable. + * + * Solution for sensitive files: + * At each system call: open(),read(),write()... Perform the + * ptrace_may_access() check. + * + * After open() and during each system call: read(),write()... + * If the cred of current have changed then perform the + * proc_allow_access() check after the ptrace_may_access() one. + * + * This way we can determine if current has gained more privileges + * by execs a suid executable. */ struct pid_entry { -- 1.7.11.7
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org> To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: tixxdz@gmail.com, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org> Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/9] procfs: Document the proposed solution to protect procfs entries Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2013 21:26:12 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1380659178-28605-4-git-send-email-tixxdz@opendz.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <1380659178-28605-1-git-send-email-tixxdz@opendz.org> Note the proposed solution to protect sensitive procfs entries as code comment. Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org> --- fs/proc/base.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index c29eeae..8d21316 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -102,6 +102,17 @@ * * The classic example of a problem is opening file descriptors * in /proc for a task before it execs a suid executable. + * + * Solution for sensitive files: + * At each system call: open(),read(),write()... Perform the + * ptrace_may_access() check. + * + * After open() and during each system call: read(),write()... + * If the cred of current have changed then perform the + * proc_allow_access() check after the ptrace_may_access() one. + * + * This way we can determine if current has gained more privileges + * by execs a suid executable. */ struct pid_entry { -- 1.7.11.7
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-10-01 20:30 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 179+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2013-10-01 20:26 [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 1/9] procfs: add proc_same_open_cred() to check if the cred have changed Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 1:36 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-02 1:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-02 14:55 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 14:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 16:44 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-02 16:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-03 14:36 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 14:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 15:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-03 15:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-03 15:12 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-03 19:29 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 19:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 19:29 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 19:37 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-03 19:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-03 19:37 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-03 20:13 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 20:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 20:13 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 21:09 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-03 21:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-03 21:09 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 8:59 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 8:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 8:59 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 15:40 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 15:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 15:40 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 18:23 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 18:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 18:23 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 18:34 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 18:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 18:34 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 19:11 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 19:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 19:11 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 19:16 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 19:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 19:16 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 19:27 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 19:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 19:27 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 19:32 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 19:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 19:32 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 19:41 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 19:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 19:41 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 22:17 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 22:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 22:17 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 22:55 ` Eric W. Biederman 2013-10-04 22:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman 2013-10-04 22:55 ` Eric W. Biederman 2013-10-04 22:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 22:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 22:59 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 23:08 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 23:08 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-04 23:08 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-05 0:35 ` Eric W. Biederman 2013-10-05 0:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman 2013-10-05 0:35 ` Eric W. Biederman 2013-10-09 10:35 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-09 10:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-09 10:35 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-05 13:23 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-05 13:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-05 13:23 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-07 21:41 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-07 21:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-07 21:41 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-09 10:54 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-09 10:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-09 10:54 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-09 11:15 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-09 11:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-09 11:15 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-09 17:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-09 17:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-09 17:27 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-13 10:18 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-13 10:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-13 10:18 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` Djalal Harouni [this message] 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 3/9] procfs: Document the proposed solution to protect procfs entries Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 4/9] procfs: make /proc/*/{stack,syscall} 0400 Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 5/9] procfs: make /proc entries that use seq files able to access file->f_cred Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 6/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/stat Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 1:39 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-02 1:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-02 15:14 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 15:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 16:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-02 16:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-02 19:00 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 19:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 7/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/personality Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 8/9] procfs: improve permission checks on /proc/*/stack Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 9/9] procfs: improve permission checks on /proc/*/syscall Djalal Harouni 2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 1:40 ` [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-02 1:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-02 14:37 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 14:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 16:51 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-02 16:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-02 17:48 ` Kees Cook 2013-10-02 17:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2013-10-02 17:48 ` Kees Cook 2013-10-02 18:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-02 18:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-02 18:00 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-02 18:07 ` Kees Cook 2013-10-02 18:07 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2013-10-02 18:07 ` Kees Cook 2013-10-03 23:14 ` Julien Tinnes 2013-10-03 23:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Julien Tinnes 2013-10-03 23:14 ` Julien Tinnes 2013-10-02 18:26 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 18:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 18:26 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 18:41 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 18:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 18:41 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 18:22 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 18:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 18:22 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 18:35 ` Kees Cook 2013-10-02 18:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2013-10-02 18:35 ` Kees Cook 2013-10-02 18:48 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 18:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 18:48 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 19:43 ` Kees Cook 2013-10-02 19:43 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2013-10-02 19:43 ` Kees Cook 2013-10-03 6:12 ` Ingo Molnar 2013-10-03 6:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar 2013-10-03 6:12 ` Ingo Molnar 2013-10-03 12:29 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 12:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 12:29 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 15:15 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-03 15:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-03 15:15 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-03 15:40 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 15:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 15:40 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 15:50 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-03 15:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-03 15:50 ` Andy Lutomirski 2013-10-03 18:37 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 18:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 18:37 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 9:05 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 9:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-04 9:05 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 18:12 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-02 18:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 6:22 ` Ingo Molnar 2013-10-03 6:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar 2013-10-03 12:56 ` Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 12:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni 2013-10-03 13:39 ` Ingo Molnar 2013-10-03 13:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
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