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From: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: tixxdz@gmail.com, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 4/9] procfs: make /proc/*/{stack,syscall} 0400
Date: Tue,  1 Oct 2013 21:26:13 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1380659178-28605-5-git-send-email-tixxdz@opendz.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1380659178-28605-1-git-send-email-tixxdz@opendz.org>

The /proc/*/{stack,syscall} contain sensitive information and currently
its mode is 0444. Change this to 0400 so the VFS will be able to block
unprivileged processes from getting file descriptors on arbitrary
privileged /proc/*/{stack,syscall} files.

This will also avoid doing extra unnecessary ptrace checks.

Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
---
 fs/proc/base.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 8d21316..54e926a 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2682,7 +2682,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
 #endif
 	REG("comm",      S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_set_comm_operations),
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
-	INF("syscall",    S_IRUGO, proc_pid_syscall),
+	INF("syscall",    S_IRUSR, proc_pid_syscall),
 #endif
 	INF("cmdline",    S_IRUGO, proc_pid_cmdline),
 	ONE("stat",       S_IRUGO, proc_tgid_stat),
@@ -2710,7 +2710,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
 	INF("wchan",      S_IRUGO, proc_pid_wchan),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_STACKTRACE
-	ONE("stack",      S_IRUGO, proc_pid_stack),
+	ONE("stack",      S_IRUSR, proc_pid_stack),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
 	INF("schedstat",  S_IRUGO, proc_pid_schedstat),
@@ -3018,7 +3018,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {
 #endif
 	REG("comm",      S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_set_comm_operations),
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
-	INF("syscall",   S_IRUGO, proc_pid_syscall),
+	INF("syscall",   S_IRUSR, proc_pid_syscall),
 #endif
 	INF("cmdline",   S_IRUGO, proc_pid_cmdline),
 	ONE("stat",      S_IRUGO, proc_tid_stat),
@@ -3048,7 +3048,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {
 	INF("wchan",     S_IRUGO, proc_pid_wchan),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_STACKTRACE
-	ONE("stack",      S_IRUGO, proc_pid_stack),
+	ONE("stack",      S_IRUSR, proc_pid_stack),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
 	INF("schedstat", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_schedstat),
-- 
1.7.11.7


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: tixxdz@gmail.com, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 4/9] procfs: make /proc/*/{stack,syscall} 0400
Date: Tue,  1 Oct 2013 21:26:13 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1380659178-28605-5-git-send-email-tixxdz@opendz.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1380659178-28605-1-git-send-email-tixxdz@opendz.org>

The /proc/*/{stack,syscall} contain sensitive information and currently
its mode is 0444. Change this to 0400 so the VFS will be able to block
unprivileged processes from getting file descriptors on arbitrary
privileged /proc/*/{stack,syscall} files.

This will also avoid doing extra unnecessary ptrace checks.

Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
---
 fs/proc/base.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 8d21316..54e926a 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2682,7 +2682,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
 #endif
 	REG("comm",      S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_set_comm_operations),
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
-	INF("syscall",    S_IRUGO, proc_pid_syscall),
+	INF("syscall",    S_IRUSR, proc_pid_syscall),
 #endif
 	INF("cmdline",    S_IRUGO, proc_pid_cmdline),
 	ONE("stat",       S_IRUGO, proc_tgid_stat),
@@ -2710,7 +2710,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
 	INF("wchan",      S_IRUGO, proc_pid_wchan),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_STACKTRACE
-	ONE("stack",      S_IRUGO, proc_pid_stack),
+	ONE("stack",      S_IRUSR, proc_pid_stack),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
 	INF("schedstat",  S_IRUGO, proc_pid_schedstat),
@@ -3018,7 +3018,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {
 #endif
 	REG("comm",      S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_set_comm_operations),
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
-	INF("syscall",   S_IRUGO, proc_pid_syscall),
+	INF("syscall",   S_IRUSR, proc_pid_syscall),
 #endif
 	INF("cmdline",   S_IRUGO, proc_pid_cmdline),
 	ONE("stat",      S_IRUGO, proc_tid_stat),
@@ -3048,7 +3048,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {
 	INF("wchan",     S_IRUGO, proc_pid_wchan),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_STACKTRACE
-	ONE("stack",      S_IRUGO, proc_pid_stack),
+	ONE("stack",      S_IRUSR, proc_pid_stack),
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
 	INF("schedstat", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_schedstat),
-- 
1.7.11.7

  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-10-01 20:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 179+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-10-01 20:26 [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 1/9] procfs: add proc_same_open_cred() to check if the cred have changed Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02  1:36   ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02  1:36     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 14:55     ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 14:55       ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 16:44       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 16:44         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 14:36         ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 14:36           ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 15:12           ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 15:12             ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 15:12             ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 19:29             ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 19:29               ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 19:29               ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 19:37               ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 19:37                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 19:37                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 20:13                 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 20:13                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 20:13                   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 21:09                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 21:09                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 21:09                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04  8:59                     ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04  8:59                       ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04  8:59                       ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 15:40                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 15:40                         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 15:40                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 18:23                         ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 18:23                           ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 18:23                           ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 18:34                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 18:34                             ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 18:34                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 19:11                             ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:11                               ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:11                               ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:16                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 19:16                                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 19:16                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 19:27                                 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:27                                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:27                                   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:32                                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 19:32                                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 19:32                                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 19:41                                     ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:41                                       ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 19:41                                       ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04 22:17                                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 22:17                                         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 22:17                                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 22:55                                         ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-04 22:55                                           ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-04 22:55                                           ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-04 22:59                                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 22:59                                             ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 22:59                                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 23:08                                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 23:08                                               ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-04 23:08                                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-05  0:35                                             ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-05  0:35                                               ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-05  0:35                                               ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-10-09 10:35                                               ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 10:35                                                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 10:35                                                 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-05 13:23                                         ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-05 13:23                                           ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-05 13:23                                           ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-07 21:41                                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-07 21:41                                             ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-07 21:41                                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-09 10:54                                             ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 10:54                                               ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 10:54                                               ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 11:15                                               ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 11:15                                                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 11:15                                                 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-09 17:27                                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-09 17:27                                                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-09 17:27                                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-13 10:18                                                 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-13 10:18                                                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-13 10:18                                                   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 3/9] procfs: Document the proposed solution to protect procfs entries Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` Djalal Harouni [this message]
2013-10-01 20:26   ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 4/9] procfs: make /proc/*/{stack,syscall} 0400 Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 5/9] procfs: make /proc entries that use seq files able to access file->f_cred Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 6/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/stat Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02  1:39   ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02  1:39     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 15:14     ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 15:14       ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 16:46       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 16:46         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 19:00         ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 19:00           ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 7/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/personality Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 8/9] procfs: improve permission checks on /proc/*/stack Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26 ` [PATCH v2 9/9] procfs: improve permission checks on /proc/*/syscall Djalal Harouni
2013-10-01 20:26   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02  1:40 ` [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02  1:40   ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 14:37   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 14:37     ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 16:51     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 16:51       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 17:48       ` Kees Cook
2013-10-02 17:48         ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-02 17:48         ` Kees Cook
2013-10-02 18:00         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 18:00           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 18:00           ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-02 18:07           ` Kees Cook
2013-10-02 18:07             ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-02 18:07             ` Kees Cook
2013-10-03 23:14             ` Julien Tinnes
2013-10-03 23:14               ` [kernel-hardening] " Julien Tinnes
2013-10-03 23:14               ` Julien Tinnes
2013-10-02 18:26           ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:26             ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:26             ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:41             ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:41               ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:41               ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:22         ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:22           ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:22           ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:35           ` Kees Cook
2013-10-02 18:35             ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-02 18:35             ` Kees Cook
2013-10-02 18:48             ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:48               ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:48               ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 19:43               ` Kees Cook
2013-10-02 19:43                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-10-02 19:43                 ` Kees Cook
2013-10-03  6:12               ` Ingo Molnar
2013-10-03  6:12                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-10-03  6:12                 ` Ingo Molnar
2013-10-03 12:29                 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 12:29                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 12:29                   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 15:15                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 15:15                     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 15:15                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 15:40                     ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 15:40                       ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 15:40                       ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 15:50                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 15:50                         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 15:50                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2013-10-03 18:37                         ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 18:37                           ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 18:37                           ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04  9:05                 ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04  9:05                   ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-04  9:05                   ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:12       ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-02 18:12         ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03  6:22         ` Ingo Molnar
2013-10-03  6:22           ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-10-03 12:56           ` Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 12:56             ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2013-10-03 13:39             ` Ingo Molnar
2013-10-03 13:39               ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar

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