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From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@kernel.org
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	luto@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 0/3] x86/entry: Clear registers to sanitize speculative usages
Date: Mon, 05 Feb 2018 17:18:00 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <151787988045.7847.11830748914544718151.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw)

Changes since v2 [1]:
* Interleave clearing with preserving in the syscall and compat syscall
  path (Linus)

* Extend clearing protection to r10 and r11 in the sycall path and r8 +
  r9 in the compat syscall path. (Ingo)

* Drop some redundant clearing at interrupt / exception entry.

[1]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/2/4/125

---

At entry userspace may have populated callee saved registers with values
that could be useful in a speculative execution attack. Clear them to
minimize the kernel's attack surface.

Note, this is done to make it harder to find / manipulate exploitable
sequences in the kernel.

The clearing is limited to the 64-bit 'extra' registers since those are
the most likely to survive with user populated values deep into the call
chain. Normal register pressure likely clobbers values in the lower
registers and the 32-bit case.

As for cycle impact, interleaving the clearing with pushing values onto
the stack hides most the overhead.

---

Andi Kleen (2):
      x86/entry: Clear registers for 64bit exceptions/interrupts
      x86/entry: Clear registers for compat syscalls

Dan Williams (1):
      x86/entry: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments for 64bit kernels


 arch/x86/entry/calling.h         |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S        |   20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

             reply	other threads:[~2018-02-06  1:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-06  1:18 Dan Williams [this message]
2018-02-06  1:18 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] x86/entry: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments for 64bit kernels Dan Williams
2018-02-06 11:52   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/entry/64: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments, to reduce speculation attack surface tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-02-06  1:18 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] x86/entry: Clear registers for 64bit exceptions/interrupts Dan Williams
2018-02-06  9:04   ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 10:48     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-06  9:17   ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 10:51     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-06 10:57       ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 21:25       ` [PATCH tip-pti 1/2] x86/entry: remove SAVE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_* macros Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 22:56         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 21:32       ` [PATCH tip-pti 2/2] x86/entry: interleave XOR register clearing with PUSH/MOV instructions Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 22:30         ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 22:48         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 23:05           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-06 23:54           ` Andi Kleen
2018-02-07  1:30             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-07 15:18               ` Andi Kleen
2018-02-07 17:05                 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-07 17:37                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 12:00   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-02-06  1:18 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] x86/entry: Clear registers for compat syscalls Dan Williams
2018-02-06  7:26   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-06  7:53     ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 12:00   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/entry/64/compat: Clear registers for compat syscalls, to reduce speculation attack surface tip-bot for Dan Williams

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