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From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@kernel.org
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	luto@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 1/3] x86/entry: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments for 64bit kernels
Date: Mon, 05 Feb 2018 17:18:05 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <151787988577.7847.16733592218894189003.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151787988045.7847.11830748914544718151.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>

At entry userspace may have populated the extra registers outside the
syscall calling convention with values that could be useful in a
speculative execution attack. Clear them to minimize the kernel's attack
surface. Note, this only clears the extra registers and not the unused
registers for syscalls less than 6 arguments since those registers are
likely to be clobbered well before their values could be put to use
under speculation.

Note, Linus found that the 'xor' instructions can be executed with
minimized cost if interleaved with the 'push' instructions, and Ingo's
analysis found that r10 and r11 should be included in the register
clearing beyond the typical 'extra' syscall calling convention
registers.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S |   13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index c752abe89d80..e8c3a902333d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -235,13 +235,26 @@ GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe)
 	pushq	%r8				/* pt_regs->r8 */
 	pushq	%r9				/* pt_regs->r9 */
 	pushq	%r10				/* pt_regs->r10 */
+	/*
+	 * Sanitize extra registers of values that a speculation attack
+	 * might want to exploit. Interleave xor with pushq for better
+	 * uop scheduling.
+	 */
+	xorq	%r10, %r10			/* nospec   r10 */
 	pushq	%r11				/* pt_regs->r11 */
+	xorq	%r11, %r11			/* nospec   r11 */
 	pushq	%rbx				/* pt_regs->rbx */
+	xorl	%ebx, %ebx			/* nospec   rbx */
 	pushq	%rbp				/* pt_regs->rbp */
+	xorl	%ebp, %ebp			/* nospec   rbp */
 	pushq	%r12				/* pt_regs->r12 */
+	xorq	%r12, %r12			/* nospec   r12 */
 	pushq	%r13				/* pt_regs->r13 */
+	xorq	%r13, %r13			/* nospec   r13 */
 	pushq	%r14				/* pt_regs->r14 */
+	xorq	%r14, %r14			/* nospec   r14 */
 	pushq	%r15				/* pt_regs->r15 */
+	xorq	%r15, %r15			/* nospec   r15 */
 	UNWIND_HINT_REGS
 
 	TRACE_IRQS_OFF

  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-06  1:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-06  1:18 [PATCH v3 0/3] x86/entry: Clear registers to sanitize speculative usages Dan Williams
2018-02-06  1:18 ` Dan Williams [this message]
2018-02-06 11:52   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/entry/64: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments, to reduce speculation attack surface tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-02-06  1:18 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] x86/entry: Clear registers for 64bit exceptions/interrupts Dan Williams
2018-02-06  9:04   ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 10:48     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-06  9:17   ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 10:51     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-06 10:57       ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 21:25       ` [PATCH tip-pti 1/2] x86/entry: remove SAVE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_* macros Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 22:56         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 21:32       ` [PATCH tip-pti 2/2] x86/entry: interleave XOR register clearing with PUSH/MOV instructions Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 22:30         ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 22:48         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 23:05           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-06 23:54           ` Andi Kleen
2018-02-07  1:30             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-07 15:18               ` Andi Kleen
2018-02-07 17:05                 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-07 17:37                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 12:00   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-02-06  1:18 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] x86/entry: Clear registers for compat syscalls Dan Williams
2018-02-06  7:26   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-06  7:53     ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 12:00   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/entry/64/compat: Clear registers for compat syscalls, to reduce speculation attack surface tip-bot for Dan Williams

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