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From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH tip-pti 2/2] x86/entry: interleave XOR register clearing with PUSH/MOV instructions
Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2018 14:30:21 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAPcyv4hCgN_Un1WxGOKtpJR8A_FK3-PStCXynkjOxQTG7ecxCQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180206213202.GB2026@light.dominikbrodowski.net>

On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 1:32 PM, Dominik Brodowski
<linux@dominikbrodowski.net> wrote:
> Same as is done for syscalls, interleave XOR with PUSH or MOV
> instructions for exceptions/interrupts, in order to minimize
> the cost of the additional instructions required for register
> clearing.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>

Looks good to me.

Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>

>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
> index 75a237c95ff7..89a906c868d8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
> @@ -102,10 +102,21 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
>         .endm
>
>         .macro SAVE_C_REGS offset=0
> +       /*
> +        * Save registers and sanitize registers of values that a
> +        * speculation attack might otherwise want to exploit. The
> +        * lower registers are likely clobbered well before they
> +        * could be put to use in a speculative execution gadget.
> +        * Interleave XOR with MOV for better uop scheduling:
> +        */
>         movq %r11, 6*8+\offset(%rsp)
> +       xorq %r11, %r11                         /* nospec r11 */
>         movq %r10, 7*8+\offset(%rsp)
> +       xorq %r10, %r10                         /* nospec r10 */
>         movq %r9,  8*8+\offset(%rsp)
> +       xorq %r9, %r9                           /* nospec r9 */
>         movq %r8,  9*8+\offset(%rsp)
> +       xorq %r8, %r8                           /* nospec r8 */
>         movq %rax, 10*8+\offset(%rsp)
>         movq %rcx, 11*8+\offset(%rsp)
>         movq %rdx, 12*8+\offset(%rsp)
> @@ -115,34 +126,28 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
>         .endm
>
>         .macro SAVE_EXTRA_REGS offset=0
> +       /*
> +        * Save registers and sanitize registers of values that a
> +        * speculation attack might otherwise want to exploit. The
> +        * lower registers are likely clobbered well before they
> +        * could be put to use in a speculative execution gadget.
> +        * Interleave XOR with MOV for better uop scheduling:
> +        */
>         movq %r15, 0*8+\offset(%rsp)
> +       xorq %r15, %r15                         /* nospec r15 */
>         movq %r14, 1*8+\offset(%rsp)
> +       xorq %r14, %r14                         /* nospec r14 */
>         movq %r13, 2*8+\offset(%rsp)
> +       xorq %r13, %r13                         /* nospec r13 */
>         movq %r12, 3*8+\offset(%rsp)
> +       xorq %r12, %r12                         /* nospec r12 */
>         movq %rbp, 4*8+\offset(%rsp)
> +       xorl %ebp, %ebp                         /* nospec rbp */
>         movq %rbx, 5*8+\offset(%rsp)
> +       xorl %ebx, %ebx                         /* nospec rbx */
>         UNWIND_HINT_REGS offset=\offset
>         .endm
>
> -       /*
> -        * Sanitize registers of values that a speculation attack
> -        * might otherwise want to exploit. The lower registers are
> -        * likely clobbered well before they could be put to use in
> -        * a speculative execution gadget:
> -        */
> -       .macro CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
> -       xorl %ebp, %ebp
> -       xorl %ebx, %ebx
> -       xorq %r8, %r8
> -       xorq %r9, %r9
> -       xorq %r10, %r10
> -       xorq %r11, %r11
> -       xorq %r12, %r12
> -       xorq %r13, %r13
> -       xorq %r14, %r14
> -       xorq %r15, %r15
> -       .endm
> -
>         .macro POP_EXTRA_REGS
>         popq %r15
>         popq %r14
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> index 9e48002b953b..903d9088bdb3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> @@ -575,7 +575,6 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
>         ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
>         SAVE_C_REGS
>         SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
> -       CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
>         ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
>
>         testb   $3, CS(%rsp)
> @@ -1134,7 +1133,6 @@ ENTRY(xen_failsafe_callback)
>         ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
>         SAVE_C_REGS
>         SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
> -       CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
>         ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
>         jmp     error_exit
>  END(xen_failsafe_callback)
> @@ -1180,7 +1178,6 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
>         cld
>         SAVE_C_REGS 8
>         SAVE_EXTRA_REGS 8
> -       CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
>         ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
>         movl    $1, %ebx
>         movl    $MSR_GS_BASE, %ecx
> @@ -1233,7 +1230,6 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
>         cld
>         SAVE_C_REGS 8
>         SAVE_EXTRA_REGS 8
> -       CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
>         ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
>         testb   $3, CS+8(%rsp)
>         jz      .Lerror_kernelspace
> @@ -1420,18 +1416,34 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
>         pushq   (%rdx)          /* pt_regs->dx */
>         pushq   %rcx            /* pt_regs->cx */
>         pushq   %rax            /* pt_regs->ax */
> +       /*
> +        * Sanitize registers of values that a speculation attack
> +        * might otherwise want to exploit. The lower registers are
> +        * likely clobbered well before they could be put to use in
> +        * a speculative execution gadget. Interleave XOR with PUSH
> +        * for better uop scheduling:
> +        */
>         pushq   %r8             /* pt_regs->r8 */
> +       xorq    %r8, %r8        /* nospec   r8 */
>         pushq   %r9             /* pt_regs->r9 */
> +       xorq    %r9, %r9        /* nospec   r9 */
>         pushq   %r10            /* pt_regs->r10 */
> +       xorq    %r10, %r10      /* nospec   r10 */
>         pushq   %r11            /* pt_regs->r11 */
> +       xorq    %r11, %r11      /* nospec   r11*/
>         pushq   %rbx            /* pt_regs->rbx */
> +       xorl    %ebx, %ebx      /* nospec   rbx*/
>         pushq   %rbp            /* pt_regs->rbp */
> +       xorl    %ebp, %ebp      /* nospec   rbp*/
>         pushq   %r12            /* pt_regs->r12 */
> +       xorq    %r12, %r12      /* nospec   r12*/
>         pushq   %r13            /* pt_regs->r13 */
> +       xorq    %r13, %r13      /* nospec   r13*/
>         pushq   %r14            /* pt_regs->r14 */
> +       xorq    %r14, %r14      /* nospec   r14*/
>         pushq   %r15            /* pt_regs->r15 */
> +       xorq    %r15, %r15      /* nospec   r15*/
>         UNWIND_HINT_REGS
> -       CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
>         ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
>
>         /*

  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-06 22:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-06  1:18 [PATCH v3 0/3] x86/entry: Clear registers to sanitize speculative usages Dan Williams
2018-02-06  1:18 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] x86/entry: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments for 64bit kernels Dan Williams
2018-02-06 11:52   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/entry/64: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments, to reduce speculation attack surface tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-02-06  1:18 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] x86/entry: Clear registers for 64bit exceptions/interrupts Dan Williams
2018-02-06  9:04   ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 10:48     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-06  9:17   ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 10:51     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-06 10:57       ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 21:25       ` [PATCH tip-pti 1/2] x86/entry: remove SAVE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_* macros Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 22:56         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 21:32       ` [PATCH tip-pti 2/2] x86/entry: interleave XOR register clearing with PUSH/MOV instructions Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 22:30         ` Dan Williams [this message]
2018-02-06 22:48         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 23:05           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-06 23:54           ` Andi Kleen
2018-02-07  1:30             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-07 15:18               ` Andi Kleen
2018-02-07 17:05                 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-07 17:37                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 12:00   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-02-06  1:18 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] x86/entry: Clear registers for compat syscalls Dan Williams
2018-02-06  7:26   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-06  7:53     ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 12:00   ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/entry/64/compat: Clear registers for compat syscalls, to reduce speculation attack surface tip-bot for Dan Williams

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