From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH tip-pti 2/2] x86/entry: interleave XOR register clearing with PUSH/MOV instructions
Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2018 14:30:21 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAPcyv4hCgN_Un1WxGOKtpJR8A_FK3-PStCXynkjOxQTG7ecxCQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180206213202.GB2026@light.dominikbrodowski.net>
On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 1:32 PM, Dominik Brodowski
<linux@dominikbrodowski.net> wrote:
> Same as is done for syscalls, interleave XOR with PUSH or MOV
> instructions for exceptions/interrupts, in order to minimize
> the cost of the additional instructions required for register
> clearing.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Looks good to me.
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
> index 75a237c95ff7..89a906c868d8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
> @@ -102,10 +102,21 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
> .endm
>
> .macro SAVE_C_REGS offset=0
> + /*
> + * Save registers and sanitize registers of values that a
> + * speculation attack might otherwise want to exploit. The
> + * lower registers are likely clobbered well before they
> + * could be put to use in a speculative execution gadget.
> + * Interleave XOR with MOV for better uop scheduling:
> + */
> movq %r11, 6*8+\offset(%rsp)
> + xorq %r11, %r11 /* nospec r11 */
> movq %r10, 7*8+\offset(%rsp)
> + xorq %r10, %r10 /* nospec r10 */
> movq %r9, 8*8+\offset(%rsp)
> + xorq %r9, %r9 /* nospec r9 */
> movq %r8, 9*8+\offset(%rsp)
> + xorq %r8, %r8 /* nospec r8 */
> movq %rax, 10*8+\offset(%rsp)
> movq %rcx, 11*8+\offset(%rsp)
> movq %rdx, 12*8+\offset(%rsp)
> @@ -115,34 +126,28 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
> .endm
>
> .macro SAVE_EXTRA_REGS offset=0
> + /*
> + * Save registers and sanitize registers of values that a
> + * speculation attack might otherwise want to exploit. The
> + * lower registers are likely clobbered well before they
> + * could be put to use in a speculative execution gadget.
> + * Interleave XOR with MOV for better uop scheduling:
> + */
> movq %r15, 0*8+\offset(%rsp)
> + xorq %r15, %r15 /* nospec r15 */
> movq %r14, 1*8+\offset(%rsp)
> + xorq %r14, %r14 /* nospec r14 */
> movq %r13, 2*8+\offset(%rsp)
> + xorq %r13, %r13 /* nospec r13 */
> movq %r12, 3*8+\offset(%rsp)
> + xorq %r12, %r12 /* nospec r12 */
> movq %rbp, 4*8+\offset(%rsp)
> + xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp */
> movq %rbx, 5*8+\offset(%rsp)
> + xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx */
> UNWIND_HINT_REGS offset=\offset
> .endm
>
> - /*
> - * Sanitize registers of values that a speculation attack
> - * might otherwise want to exploit. The lower registers are
> - * likely clobbered well before they could be put to use in
> - * a speculative execution gadget:
> - */
> - .macro CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
> - xorl %ebp, %ebp
> - xorl %ebx, %ebx
> - xorq %r8, %r8
> - xorq %r9, %r9
> - xorq %r10, %r10
> - xorq %r11, %r11
> - xorq %r12, %r12
> - xorq %r13, %r13
> - xorq %r14, %r14
> - xorq %r15, %r15
> - .endm
> -
> .macro POP_EXTRA_REGS
> popq %r15
> popq %r14
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> index 9e48002b953b..903d9088bdb3 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> @@ -575,7 +575,6 @@ END(irq_entries_start)
> ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
> SAVE_C_REGS
> SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
> - CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
> ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
>
> testb $3, CS(%rsp)
> @@ -1134,7 +1133,6 @@ ENTRY(xen_failsafe_callback)
> ALLOC_PT_GPREGS_ON_STACK
> SAVE_C_REGS
> SAVE_EXTRA_REGS
> - CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
> ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
> jmp error_exit
> END(xen_failsafe_callback)
> @@ -1180,7 +1178,6 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
> cld
> SAVE_C_REGS 8
> SAVE_EXTRA_REGS 8
> - CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
> ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
> movl $1, %ebx
> movl $MSR_GS_BASE, %ecx
> @@ -1233,7 +1230,6 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
> cld
> SAVE_C_REGS 8
> SAVE_EXTRA_REGS 8
> - CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
> ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
> testb $3, CS+8(%rsp)
> jz .Lerror_kernelspace
> @@ -1420,18 +1416,34 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
> pushq (%rdx) /* pt_regs->dx */
> pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->cx */
> pushq %rax /* pt_regs->ax */
> + /*
> + * Sanitize registers of values that a speculation attack
> + * might otherwise want to exploit. The lower registers are
> + * likely clobbered well before they could be put to use in
> + * a speculative execution gadget. Interleave XOR with PUSH
> + * for better uop scheduling:
> + */
> pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r8 */
> + xorq %r8, %r8 /* nospec r8 */
> pushq %r9 /* pt_regs->r9 */
> + xorq %r9, %r9 /* nospec r9 */
> pushq %r10 /* pt_regs->r10 */
> + xorq %r10, %r10 /* nospec r10 */
> pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->r11 */
> + xorq %r11, %r11 /* nospec r11*/
> pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */
> + xorl %ebx, %ebx /* nospec rbx*/
> pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */
> + xorl %ebp, %ebp /* nospec rbp*/
> pushq %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */
> + xorq %r12, %r12 /* nospec r12*/
> pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */
> + xorq %r13, %r13 /* nospec r13*/
> pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */
> + xorq %r14, %r14 /* nospec r14*/
> pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */
> + xorq %r15, %r15 /* nospec r15*/
> UNWIND_HINT_REGS
> - CLEAR_REGS_NOSPEC
> ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
>
> /*
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-06 22:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-06 1:18 [PATCH v3 0/3] x86/entry: Clear registers to sanitize speculative usages Dan Williams
2018-02-06 1:18 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] x86/entry: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments for 64bit kernels Dan Williams
2018-02-06 11:52 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/entry/64: Clear extra registers beyond syscall arguments, to reduce speculation attack surface tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-02-06 1:18 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] x86/entry: Clear registers for 64bit exceptions/interrupts Dan Williams
2018-02-06 9:04 ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 10:48 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-06 9:17 ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 10:51 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-06 10:57 ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 21:25 ` [PATCH tip-pti 1/2] x86/entry: remove SAVE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_* macros Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 22:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 21:32 ` [PATCH tip-pti 2/2] x86/entry: interleave XOR register clearing with PUSH/MOV instructions Dominik Brodowski
2018-02-06 22:30 ` Dan Williams [this message]
2018-02-06 22:48 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 23:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-06 23:54 ` Andi Kleen
2018-02-07 1:30 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-07 15:18 ` Andi Kleen
2018-02-07 17:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-07 17:37 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 12:00 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/entry/64: Clear registers for exceptions/interrupts, to reduce speculation attack surface tip-bot for Dan Williams
2018-02-06 1:18 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] x86/entry: Clear registers for compat syscalls Dan Williams
2018-02-06 7:26 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-06 7:53 ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 12:00 ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/entry/64/compat: Clear registers for compat syscalls, to reduce speculation attack surface tip-bot for Dan Williams
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