Re: [PATCH 2/4] x86/P2M: relax guarding of MMIO entries

[Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>]

On 06.09.2021 21:53, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 01/09/2021 14:08, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> Restricting execute permissions is something unique to virt.  It doesn't
>>>>> exist in a non-virtualised system, as I and D side reads are
>>>>> indistinguishable outside of the core.
>>>>>
>>>>> Furthermore, it is inexpressible on some systems/configurations.
>>>>>
>>>>> Introspection is the only technology which should be restricting execute
>>>>> permissions in the p2m, and only when it takes responsibility for
>>>>> dealing with the fallout.
>>>> IOW are you saying that the calls to set_identity_p2m_entry()
>>>> (pre-dating XSA-378) were wrong to use p2m_access_rw?
>>> Yes.
>>>
>>>>  Because that's
>>>> what's getting the way here.
>>> On a real machine, you really can write some executable code into an
>>> E820 reserved region and jump to it.  You can also execute code from
>>> real BARs is you happen to know that they are prefetchable (or you're a
>>> glutton for UC reads...)
>>>
>>> And there is the WPBT ACPI table which exists specifically to let
>>> firmware inject drivers/applications into a windows environment, and may
>>> come out of the SPI ROM in the first place.
>>>
>>>
>>> Is it sensible to execute an E820 reserved region, or unmarked BAR? 
>>> Probably not.
>>>
>>> Should it work, because that's how real hardware behaves?  Absolutely.
>>>
>>> Any restrictions beyond that want handling by some kind of introspection
>>> agent which has a policy of what to do with legal-but-dodgy-looking actions.
>> IOW you suggest we remove p2m_access_t parameters from various functions,
>> going with just default access?
> 
> p2m_access_t was very obviously a bodge when introduced, and I doubt it
> would pass today's review standards.
> 
> It is definitely a mis-design, given its ill-specified and overlapping
> semantics with respect to the p2m type.
> 
>>  Of course, as pointed out in another
>> reply, we'll need to split p2m_mmio_direct into multiple types then, at
>> the very least to honor the potential r/o restriction of AMD IOMMU unity
>> mapped regions. (FAOD all of this isn't a short term plan anyway, at least
>> afaic.)
> 
> I don't think that will be necessary.
> 
> IVMDs are almost non-existent, and given how many other areas of the AMD
> IOMMU spec are totally unused, I wouldn't be surprised if r/o unity
> mappings were in that category too.  There's no obvious usecase for r/o,
> as anything critical enough in the platform to have an IVMD in the first
> place will also be non-trivial enough to require bidirectional
> communication somehow.
> 
> The unity mapping only says "this device requires read-only access".  It
> doesn't say "this must be mapped read-only", and it is legitimate to map
> a r/o unity mapping as r/w.

Well, imo that's extending what "Write permission. 1b=writeable, 0b=not
writeable" and "Read permission. 1b=readable, 0b=not readable" in the
spec say. "Permission" to me doesn't mean what you say.

Nevertheless I would perhaps not insist (as I've already made clear I
don't see a strong need to support w/o mappings), if ...

> If such a case actually exists, there's clearly one agent in the system
> with r/w access into the r/o range, and mapping it r/w is equivalent to
> the "IOMMU not enabled in the first place" case which is the default
> case for most software for the past decade-and-a-bit.
> 
> In other words, I don't think the r/o unit maps on their own are a good
> enough reasons to split the type.  If we gain other reasons then fine,
> but this seems like chunk of complexity with no real users.

... there wasn't already a 2nd use for this: The IO-APIC mappings (see
my respective pending patch).

Jan