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From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>, Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>,
	"xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/4] x86/P2M: relax guarding of MMIO entries
Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 16:05:56 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <9682f7a9-7c67-a9c3-0345-11c110193f52@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YS+EqCZUAsT/WTBX@Air-de-Roger>

On 01.09.2021 15:48, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 01, 2021 at 11:53:03AM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> The issue isn't just with execution, though, and as a result I may
>> need to change the logic here to also include at least W. As of
>> one of the XSA-378 changes we may now pass just p2m_access_r to
>> iommu_identity_mapping(), if the ACPI tables on an AMD system were
>> saying so. (We may also pass p2m_access_w, but I sincerely hope no
>> firmware would specify write but no read access.)
>>
>> Similarly in "IOMMU/x86: restrict IO-APIC mappings for PV Dom0" I
>> now pass p2m_access_r to set_identity_p2m_entry().
> 
> Not really I think, as PVH dom0 is the only user of the
> set_identity_p2m_entry call in arch_iommu_hwdom_init, and we should
> never identity map the IO-APIC range in that case because a set of
> emulated IO-APIC replacements are provided and those require ranges to
> be unmapped so that accesses can be trapped.

Correct, this would be only a latent issue for now. The code passes
that value, but that path is not going to be taken (until, perhaps,
a future change).

>> I suppose an underlying issue is the mixed purpose of using
>> p2m_access_*, which possibly has been against the intentions in the
>> first place. We cannot, for example, express r/o access to an MMIO
>> page without using p2m_access_r (or p2m_access_rx), as there's no
>> suitable p2m type to express this via type alone. We may need to
>> split p2m_mmio_direct into multiple types (up to 7), I guess, if
>> we wanted to remove this (ab)use of p2m_access_*.
> 
> My main complaint is mostly with the fact that some MMIO ranges are
> mapped without execute permissions when mapped by
> set_identity_p2m_entry vs map_mmio_regions that will map them with the
> default permissions and that has execution set.

Right - as said in a reply to Andrew, we may need to drop some
p2m_access_t parameters in favor of using default permissions. But
at least for AMD's IOMMU-unity-mapped ranges we will need to have
a way to express at least r/o.

Jan



  reply	other threads:[~2021-09-01 14:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-30 13:01 [PATCH 0/4] x86/PVH: Dom0 building adjustments Jan Beulich
2021-08-30 13:02 ` [PATCH 1/4] x86/PVH: de-duplicate mappings for first Mb of Dom0 memory Jan Beulich
2021-08-31 13:02   ` Andrew Cooper
2021-08-31 13:14     ` Jan Beulich
2021-08-31 13:19       ` Jan Beulich
2021-08-31 13:27         ` Andrew Cooper
2021-08-31 13:36           ` Jan Beulich
2021-09-01 11:49             ` Andrew Cooper
2021-09-01  8:41       ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-08-30 13:02 ` [PATCH 2/4] x86/P2M: relax guarding of MMIO entries Jan Beulich
2021-08-31 13:16   ` Jan Beulich
2021-08-31 13:16   ` Andrew Cooper
2021-08-31 13:26     ` Jan Beulich
2021-08-31 15:25       ` Andrew Cooper
2021-08-31 15:38         ` Jan Beulich
2021-09-01  8:08           ` Jan Beulich
2021-09-01  8:50           ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-09-01  9:53             ` Jan Beulich
2021-09-01 13:48               ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-09-01 14:05                 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2021-09-01 12:47           ` Andrew Cooper
2021-09-01 13:08             ` Jan Beulich
2021-09-06 19:53               ` Andrew Cooper
2021-09-07  6:27                 ` Jan Beulich
2021-08-30 13:03 ` [PATCH 3/4] x86/PVH: improve Dom0 memory size calculation Jan Beulich
2021-08-31 14:07   ` Andrew Cooper
2021-08-31 15:30     ` Jan Beulich
2021-08-30 13:03 ` [PATCH 4/4] x86/PV: properly set shadow allocation for Dom0 Jan Beulich
2021-08-31 13:47   ` Andrew Cooper
2021-08-31 14:25     ` Jan Beulich
2021-08-31 21:08   ` Tim Deegan
2021-08-31  8:53 ` [PATCH 0/4] x86/PVH: Dom0 building adjustments Jan Beulich
2021-09-01 13:56   ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-09-01 14:19     ` Jan Beulich
2021-09-01 14:25       ` Jan Beulich
2021-09-01 16:13       ` Roger Pau Monné
2021-09-02  6:30         ` Jan Beulich
2021-09-01 15:06 ` Jan Beulich
2021-09-01 15:24   ` Juergen Gross
2021-09-01 15:51     ` Jan Beulich

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