From: Alon Ziv <alon-lkml-iOy/dmW02wpAfugRpC6u6w@public.gmane.org>
To: linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Subject: Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown
Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2014 09:54:34 +0000 (UTC) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <loom.20140227T104216-669@post.gmane.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20140226222151.78854cd8@alan.etchedpixels.co.uk
One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...> writes:
> Trusted is rather misleading. It's not trusted, it's *measured*.
>
> It's the same bits you had when you made it, and when you booted it
> before. Whether you trust them is a different and quite unrelated
> question. You may have reasons to do either.
I believe mjg's point is that the patch implement's the kernel's view
of its trust requirements, and is thus independent of whether it is
measured or not.
Frankly, from my experience, the term "trust" is one of the most
confusing ones in the security field... In general, unlike the intuitive
definition, "trust" is a _negative_ feature.
To say it differently: a "Trusted Kernel" is "a kernel that believes
someone trusts it". It does _not_ mean the kernel is actually
_trustworthy_. A "measured" kernel is one way for it to be trustworthy -
but you cannot trust the kernel to tell you if it is measured. (This is
a classic case of the Epimenides paradox: if the kernel is untrustworhy,
it will always claim to be trusted.)
-Alon
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-02-27 9:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 128+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-02-26 20:11 Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 01/12] Add support for indicating that the booted kernel is externally trusted Matthew Garrett
2014-02-27 19:02 ` Kees Cook
2014-02-27 19:02 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-31 14:49 ` Pavel Machek
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 02/12] Enforce module signatures when trusted kernel is enabled Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 03/12] PCI: Lock down BAR access when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 04/12] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 05/12] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 06/12] acpi: Limit access to custom_method if " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 07/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 08/12] kexec: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 09/12] uswsusp: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-31 14:49 ` Pavel Machek
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 10/12] x86: Restrict MSR access " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 11/12] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 12/12] Add option to automatically set trusted_kernel when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 22:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-02-26 22:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-02-26 22:47 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-02-26 22:48 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 22:48 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-02-27 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2014-02-27 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2014-02-26 21:11 ` Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Kees Cook
2014-02-26 22:21 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-02-26 22:21 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-02-27 9:54 ` Alon Ziv [this message]
2014-03-19 17:42 ` Florian Weimer
2014-03-19 17:42 ` Florian Weimer
2014-02-27 18:04 ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-27 18:04 ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-27 19:07 ` Greg KH
2014-02-27 19:11 ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-27 19:11 ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-28 12:50 ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-28 3:03 ` James Morris
2014-02-28 4:52 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-02-28 4:52 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 5:01 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 5:01 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 6:22 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-13 6:22 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-13 9:33 ` James Morris
2014-03-13 9:33 ` James Morris
2014-03-13 10:12 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 10:12 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 15:54 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-13 15:54 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-13 15:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 15:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 21:24 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:24 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:28 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-13 21:28 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-13 21:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 21:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 21:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 21:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 23:21 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 23:21 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 1:57 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 1:57 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 12:22 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 12:22 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 12:51 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 12:51 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 15:23 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 15:23 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 15:46 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 15:46 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 15:54 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 15:54 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 15:58 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 15:58 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 16:28 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 16:28 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 17:06 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 17:06 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 18:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 18:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 19:24 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 19:24 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 20:37 ` David Lang
2014-03-14 20:37 ` David Lang
2014-03-14 20:43 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 20:43 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 21:58 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 21:58 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 21:48 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 21:48 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 21:56 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 21:56 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:08 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:08 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:31 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:31 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:52 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:52 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-19 19:50 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-19 19:50 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 23:18 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-03-14 23:18 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-03-15 0:15 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-15 0:15 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-19 17:49 ` Florian Weimer
2014-03-19 17:49 ` Florian Weimer
2014-03-19 20:16 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-19 20:16 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-20 14:47 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 14:47 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 14:55 ` tytso
2014-03-20 14:55 ` tytso
2014-03-20 17:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-20 17:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-20 18:13 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 18:13 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:26 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:26 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:31 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 21:31 ` Matthew Garrett
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