From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> To: "gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk" <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "jmorris@namei.org" <jmorris@namei.org>, "keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>, "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, "akpm@linux-foundation.org" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, "hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>, "jwboyer@fedoraproject.org" <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>, "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>, "gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Subject: Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 21:30:48 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1394746248.27846.3.camel@x230> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20140313212450.67f1de8e@alan.etchedpixels.co.uk> [-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --] [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8", Size: 666 bytes --] On Thu, 2014-03-13 at 21:24 +0000, One Thousand Gnomes wrote: > If I have CAP_SYS_RAWIO I can make arbitary ring 0 calls from userspace, > trivially and in a fashion well known and documented. How? > You've missed a few others too - mem= (especially with exactmap) for > example. /dev/mem access is restricted, so what would this buy you? The potential to have the kernel hand over a region belonging to hardware in response to a userspace allocation? -- Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> ÿôèº{.nÇ+·®+%Ëÿ±éݶ\x17¥wÿº{.nÇ+·¥{±þG«éÿ{ayº\x1dÊÚë,j\a¢f£¢·hïêÿêçz_è®\x03(éÝ¢j"ú\x1a¶^[m§ÿÿ¾\a«þG«éÿ¢¸?¨èÚ&£ø§~á¶iOæ¬z·vØ^\x14\x04\x1a¶^[m§ÿÿÃ\fÿ¶ìÿ¢¸?I¥
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> To: "gnomes-qBU/x9rampVanCEyBjwyrvXRex20P6io@public.gmane.org" <gnomes-qBU/x9rampVanCEyBjwyrvXRex20P6io@public.gmane.org> Cc: "linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org" <linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>, "jmorris-gx6/JNMH7DfYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org" <jmorris-gx6/JNMH7DfYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org>, "keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org" <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>, "linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org" <linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>, "akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org" <akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>, "hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>, "jwboyer-rxtnV0ftBwyoClj4AeEUq9i2O/JbrIOy@public.gmane.org" <jwboyer-rxtnV0ftBwyoClj4AeEUq9i2O/JbrIOy@public.gmane.org>, "linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org" <linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>, "gregkh-hQyY1W1yCW8ekmWlsbkhG0B+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org" <gregkh-hQyY1W1yCW8ekmWlsbkhG0B+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org> Subject: Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 21:30:48 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1394746248.27846.3.camel@x230> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20140313212450.67f1de8e-mUKnrFFms3BCCTY1wZZT65JpZx93mCW/@public.gmane.org> On Thu, 2014-03-13 at 21:24 +0000, One Thousand Gnomes wrote: > If I have CAP_SYS_RAWIO I can make arbitary ring 0 calls from userspace, > trivially and in a fashion well known and documented. How? > You've missed a few others too - mem= (especially with exactmap) for > example. /dev/mem access is restricted, so what would this buy you? The potential to have the kernel hand over a region belonging to hardware in response to a userspace allocation? -- Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-03-13 21:31 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 128+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2014-02-26 20:11 Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Matthew Garrett 2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 01/12] Add support for indicating that the booted kernel is externally trusted Matthew Garrett 2014-02-27 19:02 ` Kees Cook 2014-02-27 19:02 ` Kees Cook 2014-03-31 14:49 ` Pavel Machek 2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 02/12] Enforce module signatures when trusted kernel is enabled Matthew Garrett 2014-02-26 20:11 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 03/12] PCI: Lock down BAR access when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett 2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 04/12] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett 2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 05/12] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett 2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 06/12] acpi: Limit access to custom_method if " Matthew Garrett 2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 07/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when " Matthew Garrett 2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 08/12] kexec: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett 2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 09/12] uswsusp: Disable when " Matthew Garrett 2014-02-26 20:11 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-31 14:49 ` Pavel Machek 2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 10/12] x86: Restrict MSR access " Matthew Garrett 2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 11/12] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " Matthew Garrett 2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 12/12] Add option to automatically set trusted_kernel when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett 2014-02-26 20:11 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-02-26 22:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-02-26 22:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-02-26 22:47 ` H. Peter Anvin 2014-02-26 22:48 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-02-26 22:48 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-02-27 18:48 ` Kees Cook 2014-02-27 18:48 ` Kees Cook 2014-02-26 21:11 ` Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Kees Cook 2014-02-26 22:21 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-02-26 22:21 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-02-27 9:54 ` Alon Ziv 2014-03-19 17:42 ` Florian Weimer 2014-03-19 17:42 ` Florian Weimer 2014-02-27 18:04 ` Josh Boyer 2014-02-27 18:04 ` Josh Boyer 2014-02-27 19:07 ` Greg KH 2014-02-27 19:11 ` Josh Boyer 2014-02-27 19:11 ` Josh Boyer 2014-02-28 12:50 ` Josh Boyer 2014-02-28 3:03 ` James Morris 2014-02-28 4:52 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-02-28 4:52 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-13 5:01 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-13 5:01 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-13 6:22 ` Kees Cook 2014-03-13 6:22 ` Kees Cook 2014-03-13 9:33 ` James Morris 2014-03-13 9:33 ` James Morris 2014-03-13 10:12 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-13 10:12 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-13 15:54 ` H. Peter Anvin 2014-03-13 15:54 ` H. Peter Anvin 2014-03-13 15:59 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-13 15:59 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-13 21:24 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-13 21:24 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-13 21:28 ` H. Peter Anvin 2014-03-13 21:28 ` H. Peter Anvin 2014-03-13 21:32 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-13 21:32 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-13 21:30 ` Matthew Garrett [this message] 2014-03-13 21:30 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-13 23:21 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-13 23:21 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-14 1:57 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 1:57 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 12:22 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-14 12:22 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-14 12:51 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 12:51 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 15:23 ` Kees Cook 2014-03-14 15:23 ` Kees Cook 2014-03-14 15:46 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 15:46 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 15:54 ` Kees Cook 2014-03-14 15:54 ` Kees Cook 2014-03-14 15:58 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 15:58 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 16:28 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-14 16:28 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-14 17:06 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-14 17:06 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-14 18:11 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 18:11 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 19:24 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 19:24 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 20:37 ` David Lang 2014-03-14 20:37 ` David Lang 2014-03-14 20:43 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 20:43 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 21:58 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-14 21:58 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-14 22:04 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 22:04 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 21:48 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-14 21:48 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-14 21:56 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 21:56 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 22:08 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-14 22:08 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-14 22:15 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 22:15 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 22:31 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-14 22:31 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-14 22:52 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-14 22:52 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-19 19:50 ` Kees Cook 2014-03-19 19:50 ` Kees Cook 2014-03-14 23:18 ` Theodore Ts'o 2014-03-14 23:18 ` Theodore Ts'o 2014-03-15 0:15 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-15 0:15 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-19 17:49 ` Florian Weimer 2014-03-19 17:49 ` Florian Weimer 2014-03-19 20:16 ` Kees Cook 2014-03-19 20:16 ` Kees Cook 2014-03-20 14:47 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-20 14:47 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-20 14:55 ` tytso 2014-03-20 14:55 ` tytso 2014-03-20 17:12 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-20 17:12 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-20 18:13 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-20 18:13 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-13 21:26 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-13 21:26 ` One Thousand Gnomes 2014-03-13 21:31 ` Matthew Garrett 2014-03-13 21:31 ` Matthew Garrett
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=1394746248.27846.3.camel@x230 \ --to=matthew.garrett@nebula.com \ --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \ --cc=gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk \ --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \ --cc=hpa@zytor.com \ --cc=jmorris@namei.org \ --cc=jwboyer@fedoraproject.org \ --cc=keescook@chromium.org \ --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.