From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "jmorris@namei.org" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"jwboyer@fedoraproject.org" <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
"gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Subject: Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 23:22:43 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJ_8w7PscwTQG5iVRJ4k4nzvN8oqzAPgV+NExAr9v17EQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1394686919.25122.2.camel@x230>
On Wed, Mar 12, 2014 at 10:01 PM, Matthew Garrett
<matthew.garrett@nebula.com> wrote:
> On Fri, 2014-02-28 at 14:03 +1100, James Morris wrote:
>
>> Ok, which tree should take this? I'm happy to, although most of it is
>> outside security/ .
>
> Should I be looking for someone else to take them instead? :)
Andrew, is this series[1] something you'd be okay taking? It touches
many different areas, so you might be best for it.
-Kees
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/2/26/811
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>
Cc: "jmorris-gx6/JNMH7DfYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org"
<jmorris-gx6/JNMH7DfYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org>,
"jwboyer-rxtnV0ftBwyoClj4AeEUq9i2O/JbrIOy@public.gmane.org"
<jwboyer-rxtnV0ftBwyoClj4AeEUq9i2O/JbrIOy@public.gmane.org>,
"linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org"
<linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
"linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org"
<linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
"gregkh-hQyY1W1yCW8ekmWlsbkhG0B+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org"
<gregkh-hQyY1W1yCW8ekmWlsbkhG0B+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org>,
"linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org"
<linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>,
"hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org"
<hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
Matthew Garrett
<matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 23:22:43 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJ_8w7PscwTQG5iVRJ4k4nzvN8oqzAPgV+NExAr9v17EQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1394686919.25122.2.camel@x230>
On Wed, Mar 12, 2014 at 10:01 PM, Matthew Garrett
<matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> On Fri, 2014-02-28 at 14:03 +1100, James Morris wrote:
>
>> Ok, which tree should take this? I'm happy to, although most of it is
>> outside security/ .
>
> Should I be looking for someone else to take them instead? :)
Andrew, is this series[1] something you'd be okay taking? It touches
many different areas, so you might be best for it.
-Kees
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/2/26/811
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-03-13 6:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 128+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-02-26 20:11 Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 01/12] Add support for indicating that the booted kernel is externally trusted Matthew Garrett
2014-02-27 19:02 ` Kees Cook
2014-02-27 19:02 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-31 14:49 ` Pavel Machek
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 02/12] Enforce module signatures when trusted kernel is enabled Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 03/12] PCI: Lock down BAR access when trusted_kernel is true Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 04/12] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 05/12] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 06/12] acpi: Limit access to custom_method if " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 07/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 08/12] kexec: Disable at runtime if " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 09/12] uswsusp: Disable when " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-31 14:49 ` Pavel Machek
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 10/12] x86: Restrict MSR access " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 11/12] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` [PATCH 12/12] Add option to automatically set trusted_kernel when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 20:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 22:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-02-26 22:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-02-26 22:47 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-02-26 22:48 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-02-26 22:48 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-02-27 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2014-02-27 18:48 ` Kees Cook
2014-02-26 21:11 ` Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown Kees Cook
2014-02-26 22:21 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-02-26 22:21 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-02-27 9:54 ` Alon Ziv
2014-03-19 17:42 ` Florian Weimer
2014-03-19 17:42 ` Florian Weimer
2014-02-27 18:04 ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-27 18:04 ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-27 19:07 ` Greg KH
2014-02-27 19:11 ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-27 19:11 ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-28 12:50 ` Josh Boyer
2014-02-28 3:03 ` James Morris
2014-02-28 4:52 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-02-28 4:52 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 5:01 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 5:01 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 6:22 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2014-03-13 6:22 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-13 9:33 ` James Morris
2014-03-13 9:33 ` James Morris
2014-03-13 10:12 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 10:12 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 15:54 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-13 15:54 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-13 15:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 15:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 21:24 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:24 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:28 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-13 21:28 ` H. Peter Anvin
2014-03-13 21:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 21:32 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 21:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 21:30 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 23:21 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 23:21 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 1:57 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 1:57 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 12:22 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 12:22 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 12:51 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 12:51 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 15:23 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 15:23 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 15:46 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 15:46 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 15:54 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 15:54 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 15:58 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 15:58 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 16:28 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 16:28 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 17:06 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 17:06 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 18:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 18:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 19:24 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 19:24 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 20:37 ` David Lang
2014-03-14 20:37 ` David Lang
2014-03-14 20:43 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 20:43 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 21:58 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 21:58 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 21:48 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 21:48 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 21:56 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 21:56 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:08 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:08 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:31 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:31 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-14 22:52 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-14 22:52 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-19 19:50 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-19 19:50 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-14 23:18 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-03-14 23:18 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-03-15 0:15 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-15 0:15 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-19 17:49 ` Florian Weimer
2014-03-19 17:49 ` Florian Weimer
2014-03-19 20:16 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-19 20:16 ` Kees Cook
2014-03-20 14:47 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 14:47 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 14:55 ` tytso
2014-03-20 14:55 ` tytso
2014-03-20 17:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-20 17:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-20 18:13 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 18:13 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:26 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:26 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-13 21:31 ` Matthew Garrett
2014-03-13 21:31 ` Matthew Garrett
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