From: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: luto@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
bp@alien8.de, peterz@infradead.org, keescook@chromium.org,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH] Early version of thread stack randomization
Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2019 14:15:48 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1549628149-11881-1-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com> (raw)
I would really like to get an early feedback and opinions
on this stack randomization feature since there are many
ways on how this can be developed further, and I want to
hear all the opinions and objections first.
This is based on my 4.20 stable branch, compiles, boots
and can be played with.
I also have a repo for this, if it is more convenient
for anyone.
Elena Reshetova (1):
x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call
arch/Kconfig | 15 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 8 ++++++++
arch/x86/entry/common.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 4 ++++
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 15 ++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +-
include/linux/sched.h | 3 +++
include/linux/sched/task_stack.h | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
kernel/fork.c | 10 ++++++++++
mm/kmemleak.c | 2 +-
mm/usercopy.c | 2 +-
14 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--
2.7.4
next reply other threads:[~2019-02-08 12:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-08 12:15 Elena Reshetova [this message]
2019-02-08 12:15 ` [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call Elena Reshetova
2019-02-08 13:05 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-08 13:20 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-08 14:26 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-09 11:13 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-09 18:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-11 6:39 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-11 15:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-12 10:16 ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-14 7:52 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-19 14:47 ` Jann Horn
2019-02-20 22:20 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 6:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-21 13:20 ` Jann Horn
2019-02-21 15:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-20 22:15 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-20 22:53 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 23:29 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-27 11:03 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-21 9:35 ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-21 17:23 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 17:48 ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-21 19:18 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-20 21:51 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-08 15:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-09 11:38 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-09 12:09 ` Greg KH
2019-02-11 6:05 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-08 16:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-20 22:03 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-08 21:28 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-11 12:47 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-20 22:04 ` Kees Cook
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